Suchergebnisse

Argues that incentives for both depositors and banks are incompatible with the aim of national supervisors and the European Union, to foster a stable and efficient financial system.

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banksâ?? assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banksâ?? balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which

The current banking crisis has highlighted the fragility of the international finance system and the extent to which current system safeguards such as IMF action fall short. Envisioning a fuller banking security system leads naturally to the proposal for an international deposit insurance system based on risk‐based premiums. This proposal is outlined here as a replacement for ad hoc action by national governments and the IMF that is designed to avoid moral hazard while providing an efficient means to international banking security as part of our global financial architecture.