Suchergebnisse

The government of Sri Lanka has been disproportionately borrowing from the domestic banking and non-banking sectors to finance its budget deficit. These sectors also serve as funding sources for the country's private investors. The government's expansionary fiscal policy has increased its total income, but it may also raise interest rates and reduce private investment. This study estimates the crowding-out effect of public borrowing from domestic sources on private investment in Sri Lanka. Using time-series data from 1960-2014 sourced from the Central Bank of Sri Lanka and World Development Indicators, we develop an investment function with three independent variables, public borrowing, interest rate, and gross domestic product. Unit root tests and the autoregressive distributed lag and vector error correction models are also utilized. To test the long-run relationships among the variables, we conduct a bound test of co-integration, and the results show that there is long-run co-integration between the variables. Vector autoregressive models, variance decomposition analysis, the Granger causality test, and impulse response functions are used to analyse the results. The study provides evidence for the absence of a crowding-out effect in Sri Lanka as a result of public borrowing from domestic sources. This evidence has important implications of fiscal management in Sri Lanka. To avoid external indebtedness and unnecessary inflation due to debt financing, the government can rely on domestic sources without hurting private investment in the country.

JEL Classification: H21, H32, H41 ; We address in this paper the issue of the existence or not of a crowding-out effect of Corporate Social Responsability by government intervention through a lump sum tax. For this purpose, we build a model of impur altruism for firms. We show that in general it will happen to be that public policy crowds out corporate (private) contribution but the crowding-out will not be complete. Two interesting findings are that i) the intensity of the crowding-out depends upon the relative performance of the government in producing the public good and ii) that public policy has an impact on wages in the economy since it is the opportunity cost for firms that spend time on Corporate Social Responsibility.

JEL Classification: H21, H32, H41 ; We address in this paper the issue of the existence or not of a crowding-out effect of Corporate Social Responsability by government intervention through a lump sum tax. For this purpose, we build a model of impur altruism for firms. We show that in general it will happen to be that public policy crowds out corporate (private) contribution but the crowding-out will not be complete. Two interesting findings are that i) the intensity of the crowding-out depends upon the relative performance of the government in producing the public good and ii) that public policy has an impact on wages in the economy since it is the opportunity cost for firms that spend time on Corporate Social Responsibility.

JEL Classification: H21, H32, H41 ; We address in this paper the issue of the existence or not of a crowding-out effect of Corporate Social Responsability by government intervention through a lump sum tax. For this purpose, we build a model of impur altruism for firms. We show that in general it will happen to be that public policy crowds out corporate (private) contribution but the crowding-out will not be complete. Two interesting findings are that i) the intensity of the crowding-out depends upon the relative performance of the government in producing the public good and ii) that public policy has an impact on wages in the economy since it is the opportunity cost for firms that spend time on Corporate Social Responsibility.

JEL Classification: H21, H32, H41 We address in this paper the issue of the existence or not of a crowding-out effect of Corporate Social Responsability by government intervention through a lump sum tax. For this purpose, we build a model of impur altruism for firms. We show that in general it will happen to be that public policy crowds out corporate (private) contribution but the crowding-out will not be complete. Two interesting findings are that i) the intensity of the crowding-out depends upon the relative performance of the government in producing the public good and ii) that public policy has an impact on wages in the economy since it is the opportunity cost for firms that spend time on Corporate Social Responsibility.

The search model contains two matching technologies, the public employment service (PES) with its type-specific registers for workers and vacancies, and the search market where firms advertise vacancies and unemployed who have not been placed by the PES search for jobs. The placement activity of the PES increases the bargained wages, reduces active job search, decreases the number of advertised vacancies, but - compared with the laissez- faire regime - increases employment and per capita consumption. Of all the instruments of ALMP, the probabilities of a match, the portion of unskilled not interested in a job, and the hiring subsidies generate crowding-out effects. The productivity of the unskilled, (re-employment)bonuses, penalties for violations of the search rule, and the stringency of the search rule cause crowdingin effects. Assistance for problem groups is less effective than promoting active job search. ; Das Suchmodel umfasst zwei Matching-Technologien, die des PES mit typspezifischen Registern für Arbeitslose und Vakanzen und die des Suchmarkts, wo Firmen Vakanzen annoncieren und nicht Vermittelte nach Stellen suchen. Die Vermittlungstätigkeit des PES erhöht die Lohnkosten, reduziert die aktive Suche und die annoncierten Vakanzen, senkt im Vergleich zum Laissez-faire Regime die Arbeitslosenquote und steigert den Pro-Kopf-Konsum. Von den Instrumentvariablen der ALMP verdrängen die Matchwahrscheinlichkeiten, der Anteil der "Arbeitsunwilligen" und die Lohnkostenzuschüsse Arbeitsplätze. Die Produktivität der Geringqualifizierten, (Wiederbeschäftigungs-) Prämien, Sanktionen für Suchregel-Verstöße sowie die Intensität der Regeldurchsetzung senken die Arbeitslosigkeit. Die Förderung von "Problemgruppen" ist weniger wirkungsvoll als die Förderung der aktiven Jobsuche.