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This paper extends the analysis of deterrence to examine terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and rogue nations. Such situations are characterized by differential pre‐emptive and response capacity, in contrast to the traditional deterrence literature on nuclear superpowers, where such factors are absent. We focus on the credibility of deterrence responses to pre‐emption and show that credible (subgame‐perfect) responses are rarely proportional. The analysis is also extended to asymmetric deterrence scenarios whereby credibility and proportionality depend on the potential aggressor's access to conflict technology and the responder's preferences for indirect conflict vs. the status quo.

A primary motivation for forming military alliances is to deter adversaries. However, some alliances are more effective at deterrence than others. Deterrence theory suggests that an alliance may fail to deter if the commitment is not considered credible by adversaries. Building on alliance reliability research, we contend that alliances whose members have experienced significant changes in power since formation are vulnerable to violation. Moreover, we argue that these changes are observable to adversaries, making them more likely to target the alliance. We test this argument using a sample of countries with membership in defensive alliances between 1816 and 2000. Our results indicate that states whose allies have experienced significant changes in power are more likely to be the target of militarized disputes than states whose allies have not experienced significant changes in power. These findings connect alliance reliability research to deterrence theory, illustrating the need to take into account changes over time in understanding the deterrence potential of military alliances. Our findings also suggest that future research should take these processes into account in studying dispute escalation and intra-alliance relations.

Since 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched eight military operations with an executive mandate in the framework of its European (now Common) Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP), all of which have utilized deterrence to fulfil their missions. Some have done so implicitly by having a mission that requires them to keep certain actors from doing something unwanted, whilst others have done so explicitly by having deterrence clearly mentioned as one of their core tasks in their mandates. Despite this, deterrence in the context of CSDP has been an almost totally neglected subject in the academic literature. Furthermore, the EU itself has tended to take the deterrence effect of CSDP operations for granted, which is dangerous because it may blind it to potential problems that may in fact be undermining their credibility. This article seeks to launch a more focused discussion on deterrence in the context of EU security policy by analysing the credibility of CSDP operations' deterrence postures. Based on findings from case studies on operations Althea and Atalanta, it argues that CSDP operations' deterrence postures lack credibility because they have insufficient resources for taking care of their deterrence tasks. Furthermore, they do not communicate threats effectively.

For deterrence to work, a potential attacker needs to perceive the deterrer's threats as capable and credible for retaliation. The issue of relative capabilities has been extensively analyzed, yet the core problem concerns credible intentions. The strategic literature is largely influenced by commitment theory prescribing various "manipulation of risk" strategies intended to enhance threat credibility. A few analysts, however, challenge this view and recognize the importance of "intrinsic interests" in the issues at stake (i.e., inherent credibility), which can limit the effectiveness of costly signals. These two alternative views are quantitatively tested in the cases of major-powers deterrence from 1895 to 1985. A new measure of the observable category of inherent credibility is also introduced, consisting of the regional interests of major powers in the area of dispute. The results indicate strong and significant effects of regional interests on both the onset and outcomes of extended-immediate deterrence, thus suggesting relevant theoretical and policy implications.

Deterrence theory suggests that extended general deterrent threats are likely to be more effective when a potential challenger views them as capable and credible. When states sign formal defense pacts, they are making explicit extended general deterrent threats. Thus, the population of defense pacts allows us an opportunity to judge the efficacy of extended deterrent threats with different characteristics. We find that defense pacts with more capability and more credibility reduce the probability that a member state will be a target of a militarized dispute. We also find that states can affect the capability and credibility of their extended deterrent threats through alliance design. Members of defense pacts that include higher levels of peacetime military coordination are less likely to be attacked. This analysis provides support for deterrence theory in the context of extended general deterrence. It also provides evidence that should aid policymakers in designing security structures to meet their goals. (International Interactions (London)/FUB)

A primary motivation for forming military alliances is to deter adversaries. However, some alliances are more effective at deterrence than others. Deterrence theory suggests that an alliance may fail to deter if the commitment is not considered credible by adversaries. Building on alliance reliability research, we contend that alliances whose members have experienced significant changes in power since formation are vulnerable to violation. Moreover, we argue that these changes are observable to adversaries, making them more likely to target the alliance. We test this argument using a sample of countries with membership in defensive alliances between 1816 and 2000. Our results indicate that states whose allies have experienced significant changes in power are more likely to be the target of militarized disputes than states whose allies have not experienced significant changes in power. These findings connect alliance reliability research to deterrence theory, illustrating the need to take into account changes over time in understanding the deterrence potential of military alliances. Our findings also suggest that future research should take these processes into account in studying dispute escalation and intra-alliance relations.

Due to Russian nuclear signaling during its war against Ukraine, there is renewed interest in strengthening
nuclear deterrence in a Euro-Atlantic context. The changes in the agreed language in the new North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Strategic Concept, adopted on 29 June 2022 at the summit in Madrid, and the Vilnius Summit Communiqué from 11 June 2023, are examples of this interest. Subsequently, this policy brief focuses on one aspect of strengthening NATO's extended nuclear deterrence (END), namely how can NATO adapt its nuclear policy and posture to mitigate the uncertainties related to the political credibility challenge of extended nuclear deterrence? Questions regarding the political will to use nuclear weapons by the guarantor to protect and reassure allies in an END relationship is a well-known evergreen that reappears from time to time. Therefore, the author argues that NATO should address this political credibility challenge by strengthening the role of European allies in the nuclear strategy of the Alliance.