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Transaction cost economics (TCE) is at the heart of the new theory of the firm. While it is an established research tradition with a well developed theoretical framework and good empirical results, critics consider TCE too limited to understand the essential characteristics of complex organizations like the firm. The criticism is that we need to go beyond the original TCE framework and develop a more pluralistic approach towards issues of economic organization. This book provides a lively debate on these issues in an open-minded, academic manner. Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond contributes to our further understanding of the theory of the firm and provides a better knowledge of the complexities of economic organization

Theories commonly progress through four stages, from informal to pre‐formal to semi‐formal and fully formal. This paper reports on the earliest stage of transaction cost economics that extended from the 1920s to the 1970s. That the gestation stage lasted so long is partly because transaction cost economics departed significantly from the then‐prevailing economic orthodoxy. Also, and related, it is an interdisciplinary undertaking. As reported herein, transaction cost economics selectively combines economics, organisation theory and law and is the product of the contributions of some of the finest minds in those three fields.

WITHIN ECONOMICS THERE HAS DEVELOPED A FAIRLY COHESIVE BODY OF THEORY THAT IS FREQUENTLY REFERRED TO AS "TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS." THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE LITERATURE ON THE SUBJECT AND SUGGESTS THAT MUCH OF THIS BODY OF THOUGHT IS BASED ON INCOMPLETE REASONING. UNDERLYING THIS SUGGESTION IS THE OBSERVATION THAT ANY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, BE IT PRODUCTION OR CONSUMPTION, IS MADE UP OF TWO PARTS: A CONTROL ASPECT AND A USE ASPECT. IT ARGUES THAT A SHORTCOMING OF TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS IS THE SOLE ATTENTION IT GIVES TO THE CONTROL ASPECT OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION.

Since its emergence in the 1970s, transaction cost economics (TCE) has become a leading approach in the research on contracts, firm organization and strategy, antitrust, marketing, inter-firm collaboration and entrepreneurship. With contributions by leading scholars in economics, law and business administration - including Oliver E. Williamson, recipient of the 2009 Nobel Prize in economics for his development of the transaction cost approach - this volume reviews the latest developments in TCE and applies them to contemporary theoretical and empirical problems. Beginning with an introductory

The deconstruction method was used to analyze a seminal text in transaction cost economics, viz., Oliver Williamson's Economic Institutions of Capitalism. This deconstructive reading revealed that the assumption of opportunism that gives rise to the problem of economic organization as formulated by William son also tends to undermine the proposed solution to this problem. The plausi bility of unified governance as a solution to the problem of opportunism in transaction relations with asset specificity is shown to hinge on the temporary deferment of the assumption of opportunism. Thus, transaction cost economics finds itself in an impasse of thought: actors have to be assumed to be both opportunistic and not-opportunistic if the logic of the theory is to be main tained.

Proceedings Paper (for Acquisition Research Program) ; Many goods and services required for government operations can be provided through commercial markets. Public officials, therefore, face a number of ''make-or-buy'' decisions. Transactions Cost Economics (TCE) offers a useful foundation for characterizing ''make-or-buy'' decisions, which this paper explores. Our dual objective is to synthesize key principles of TCE and to apply TCE to federal outsourcing. One especially useful insight is that transaction costs vary widely, and depend in known ways upon the attributes of the outsourcing action. This means, among other things, that one size should not fit all in outsourcing decision processes. ; Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research Program ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Using a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach, this paper explores which organizational forms Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) may take. A critical question about form is the amount of vertical integration that an ACO may have, a topic central to TCE. We posit that contextual factors outside and inside an ACO will produce variable transaction costs (the non-production costs of care) such that the decision to integrate vertically will derive from a comparison of these external versus internal costs, assuming reasonably rational management abilities. External costs include those arising from environmental uncertainty and complexity, small numbers bargaining, asset specificity, frequency of exchanges, and information "impactedness." Internal costs include those arising from human resource activities including hiring and staffing, training, evaluating (i.e., disciplining, appraising, or promoting), and otherwise administering programs. At the extreme, these different costs may produce either total vertical integration or little to no vertical integration with most ACOs falling in between. This essay demonstrates how TCE can be applied to the ACO organization form issue, explains TCE, considers ACO activity from the TCE perspective, and reflects on research directions that may inform TCE and facilitate ACO development.