Suchergebnisse

THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT IF THE ABM TREATY IS TO BE RESPECTED, SO FAR AS IT PROVIDES FOR SYSTEMS OTHER THAN FIXED, LAND-BASED ONES, MUST NOT ENTER THE STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING. BUT RESEARCH ALONE INTO ANY KIND OF SPACEBASED DEFENSE SYSTEM IS NOT UNLAWFUL PER SE. ONLY A COMPLETE RENUNCIATION OF BALLISTIC DEFENSE COULD BE SIGNIFICANT FOR ARMS CONTROL: TREATIES SO FAR, SUCH AS THE SATL II, HAVE SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS, ALLOWING TOO MANY MISSILES, AND SHORT THROUGH WITH LOOPHOLES

Benutzerkommentar

Since wartime force ratios among adversaries do not merely reflect population ratios, a high degree of manpower mobilization can make up for the quantitative demographic inferiority of a small nation. In this context, a sizable, well-trained, combat-ready, militia-type reserve force is integral to the wartime order of battle. This reserve force can bridge the gap in manpower requirements of the armed forces, minimizing redundancy in the military's peacetime strength without reducing the size of its effective wartime strength. Strategic analysts and political sociologists tend to agree that the role of the reserves within this three-tier system has enabled Israel to become an effective regional military power despite her quantitative inferiority in regular forces. The proposition that a sizable combat-ready reserve force can be a central component of an effective defense posture is upheld by Israel's experiences in the 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982 wars. However, these wars have also exposed the built-in sociopolitical constraints and military-operational limitations of a reserve-based defense posture that reduce the range of strategic options available to "a nation in arms." Some ambitious strategic objectives may be unattainable for a small nation in arms because the use of force needed to achieve them tends to overburden the civilian component of the nation's defense posture.