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This article deals with a basic question: How to set the age limits for the realization of the rights and freedoms, which are guaranteed by constitutions? Usually, the rights of minors are generally regulated in the civil codes. Besides, as usual, the limited position of a minor ends, when the age of 18 years is reached. However, this rule cannot be applied directly in the sphere of constitutional rights and freedoms; otherwise, the bizarre outcome would be, that many basic rights such as life, freedom and social support would be denied to minors. As usual, constitutions do not contain general age limits; they only contain age limits for several positions in the governments or Constitutional courts and for the right to vote. Age limits must be developed exclusively on the basis of constitutional law; the legislation cannot determine these age limits in the sphere of constitutional law, as the lawmaker has to follow the constitution and not in reverse order. In this article, the German and Ukrainian constitutional doctrine concerning the age limits of minors in constitutional law is presented. The comparative analyze shows, that in both constitutional doctrines these limitations are flexible in context with the special constitutional rights or freedoms. This flexible approach is thoroughly developed in the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany: the rights and freedoms can be divided in two groups, general rights and freedoms and economic ones. The right of a minor, to realize the general ones depends on the state of the minor's ability to understand, to have the relevant intellectual capacity; basic rights as the right to live have minors from the birth, even as fetus. Economic rights and freedoms can usually be realized from the age of 18; that means, the constitutional doctrine applies the age limits of civil law. However, also in this sphere the realization of rights and freedoms requires some exceptions according to the requirements of rights and freedoms. The Ukrainian doctrine, as ...

The Handbook of Constitutional Law in Greater China surveys important issues of constitutional law in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. It synthesizes existing scholarship, debates, and views on important constitutional issues in the four jurisdictions. Written by a range of scholars, it contributes to both national and comparative scholarship on constitutional law in these jurisdictions. The book includes four parts: Part I: History. This part explores the constitutional movement of the Qing dynasty; constitutional projects in modern China; and aspects of the drafting and implementation history of the Hong Kong and Macau Basic Laws Part II: Structure. This part discusses the relationship between the party-state and the Chinese constitutional order; Chinese constitutionalism; constitutional aspects of city development under the SAR concept; constitutional review in Mainland China; a history of Taiwan's Council of Grand Justices'; and judicial review in both Hong Kong and Macau Part III: Rights, Society, and Economy. This part deals with Hong Kong's National Security Law and its impact on the one country, two systems model'; social movements and constitutionalism; LGBT rights advocacy; the integration of capitalist regions within socialist China; the constitutional relevance of labour reforms in Mainland China; healthcare rights in both the Mainland and the SARS; and foreign investment under Art. 18 of the PRC Constitution Part IV: Transnational Engagement. This part surveys comparative writings on China's constitution; the influence of international human rights treaties on China's constitutional order; the international dimension of Hong Kong's constitutional order; and the changing role of the overseas judges' in Hong Kong Exploring both historical and cutting-edge constitutional issues, this reference book is important reading for law researchers, lawyers, graduate students, undergraduates, and practitioners in the field of constitutional law and politics in Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.

Constitutional scholars do not typically employ spatial reasoning in their work. And yet, constitutional jurisprudence and much work in judicial politics implicitly rest on assumptions best cast in spatial terms. These include assuming that positions in constitutional disputes, and the views of Supreme Court justices, generally lie along a common liberal-to-conservative ideological dimension. Although the single dimension assumption is often appropriate, it suffers inherent limitations. First, Supreme Court decision-making rules, both within and across cases, expose problems of dimensionality. Second, important substantive doctrines likewise reveal dimensionality. Third, and finally, throughout the Supreme Court's history, positions deemed liberal (or conservative) in one period have emerged as conservative (or liberal) in a later period, suggesting that dimensionality is a persistent feature in our jurisprudential history. Social choice proves uniquely suited to explaining these important aspects of constitutional law. After briefly introducing the discipline of constitutional law and its relationship to social choice, this article offers three illustrations of how social choice analysis deepens our understanding of important substantive areas. The analysis exposes dimensionality within Supreme Court decision-making rules, within separation-of-powers doctrine, and over historical shifts in the liberal and conservative valence of once-prominent jurisprudential positions. Failing to appreciate dimensionality, which lies at the core of social choice theory, when studying the Supreme Court and constitutional law risks a truly one-dimensional understanding of a richer and multidimensional institution and body of doctrine. Adapted from the source document.

State administration office as state agency has broad authority in executing government affairs. This widespread authority tending to be misused so could cause loss and injustice on the part of society, therefore there must be other institutions that control it. Based on some political theory, executive as state agency are politically controlled by legislative and are juridical controlled by a judiciary, so state administrative officials carry out executive functions so juridical control judiciary are state administrative courts. In addition, public service is the social rights of society (social rights). Social rights are the rights to receive and the rights to receive from the government, therefore the government organizer is obliged to provide the best service to the community. However, the implementation of public services has not been well received by the community. Governance And Decentralization Survey (GDS) 2012 found three important issues that occurred in the field of public service delivery, first, the magnitude of service discrimination, Second, there was no certainty of cost and time of service, third, low level of public satisfaction with public service. From this situation opens the opportunity for government organizers to perform maladministration actions in public service. The number of maladministration actions in public service can be evidenced by the data reported by the Ombudsman, every year its charts always rise. Due to the construction of legal accountability for maladministration actions undertaken by government organizers in public service must be immediately re-established. Keywords: Legal Aspect, Public Service, Maladministration