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This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposalfor the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining thevalues of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process –selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. Weargue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specificlegitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism vis-a-vis other, more traditionallyemployed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal andconclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.

This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposalfor the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining thevalues of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process –selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. Weargue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specificlegitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism vis-a-vis other, more traditionallyemployed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal andconclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.

This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposalfor the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining thevalues of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process –selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. Weargue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specificlegitimacy of courts, and we champion this two-stage mechanism vis-a-vis other, more traditionallyemployed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal andconclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.

AbstractThis article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposal for the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining the values of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process – selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. We argue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specific legitimacy of courts, and we champion this two‐stage mechanism vis‐à‐vis other, more traditionally employed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal and conclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations.

This article discusses from the perspective of democratic theory an innovative proposal for the selection of constitutional, supreme court, or federal judges that aims at combining the values of expertise and political independence. It consists in combining a certification process – selecting a pool of properly qualified candidates – with a random selection among this pool. We argue that such selection procedure would better respect the separation of powers and the specific legitimacy of courts, and we champion this two‐stage mechanism vis‐à‐vis other, more traditionally employed, selection procedures. We then deal with a diversity of objections to our proposal and conclude by taking stock of both its virtues and limitations. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

The World's second oldest system of judicial review of national legislation emerged through court practice from the very first years after the adoption of the Constitution of Norway in 1814. The review is exercised by the ordinary courts at all levels with the single Supreme Court as the last instance. No specialized constitutional court has been established. The independence of the judiciary is generally recognized as high. But what degree of legitimacy should judges appointed in order to ensure ordinary judicial business enjoy when exercising a basically political function like reviewing and possibly setting aside acts of Parliament?

This Article explores how constitutional judges can become agents for development and how they may wish to go about performing this role. Due to the high politico-economic stakes involved and the inevitability of trade-offs between competing interests, judicial review of developmental questions is liable to expose judges to negative fall-outs. At the same time, it is fairly common for Asian constitutions to expressly set out the parameters or objectives for economic development that the State is expected to realize, while simultaneously recognizing a suite of (socio-)economic rights, thereby providing textual ammunition to query the validity of a government's chosen implementation in court. Against this reality, the Article suggest a range of coping mechanisms that can mitigate risks to judicial legitimacy. In terms of institutional design, the decentralized model of review facilitates access to constitutional justice for affected individuals and communities in remote and rural areas, making this the preferred option in large developing countries. When deciding on the merits of developmental claims, courts should combine a strong presumption of constitutionality as far as the substance of the law is concerned with robust scrutiny of compliance with procedural guarantees. Additionally, courts should be better equipped with knowledge about the methodologies used by and insights from other social sciences to enable them to better evaluate extra-legal evidence submitted and anticipate the likely economic consequences of particular judicial findings, possibly with a view to tailoring their remedies accordingly.

Introduction :the methodology of the research : how to assess the reality of transjudicial communication? /Tania Groppi and Marie-Claire Ponthoreau --Pt. 1:Reference to foreign precedents by the Australian High Court: a matter of method /Cheryl Saunders and Adrienne Stone.--Canada: protecting rights in a "worldwide rights culture", an empirical study of the use of foreign precedents by the Supreme Court of Canada (1982-2010) /Gianluca Gentili --India: a "critical" use of foreign precedents in constitutional adjudication /Valentina Rita Scotti --The Supreme Court of Ireland and the use of foreign precedents: the value of constitutional history /Cristina Fasone --Israel: creating a constitution: the use of foreign precedents by the Supreme Court (1994-2010) /Suzie Navot --Namibia: the Supreme Court as a foreign law importer /Irene Spigno --South Africa: teaching an "old dog" new tricks? an empirical study of the use of foreign precedents by the South African Constitutional Court (1995-2010) /Christa Rautenbach --Pt. 2:Austria: non-cosmopolitan, but Europe-friendly: the Constitutional Court's comparative approach /Anna Gamper --Lifting the constitutional curtain? the use of foreign precedent by the German Federal Constitutional Court /Stefan Martini --Hungary: unsystematic and incoherent borrowing of law: the use of foreign judicial precedents in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, 1999-2010 /Zoltan Szente --A gap between the apparent and hidden attitudes of the Supreme Court of Japan towards foreign precedents /Akiko Ejima --Mexico: struggling for an open view in constitutional adjudication /Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor and Ruben Sanchez Gil --Romania: analogical reasoning as a dialectical instrument /Elena Simina Tanasescu and Stefan Deaconu --Russia: foreign transplants in the Russian Constitution and invisible foreign precedents in decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court /Sergey Belov --Judges as discursive agent: the use of foreign precedents by the Constitutional Court of Taiwan /Wen-Chen Chang and Jiunn-Rong Yeh --United States of America: first cautious attempts of judicial use of foreign precedents in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence /Angioletta Sperti --Conclusion:The use of foreign precedents by constitutional judges: a limited practice, an uncertain future /Tania Groppi and Marie-Clair Ponthoreau