Suchergebnisse

How do we distinguish legitimate, democratic representation from illegitimate, undemocratic elite rule? Empirical scholars of representation typically rely on the "bedrock norm" that democratic representatives must respond to the antecedent interests of their constituents, but empirical studies of public opinion suggest that constituents' interests emerge following engagement with their representatives. The result is the "constituency paradox": representatives are supposed to respond to constituent interests, interests that representatives themselves help to create. Deliberative democratic theories seek to circumvent this paradox by distinguishing between representatives who communicatively educate their constituents from those who strategically manipulate them, but it is empirically impossible to distinguish legitimate education from illegitimate manipulation. Nondeliberative criteria requiring elite competition and popular contestation also fail to ground legitimate democratic representation. In response, I develop a model of constituency deliberation that does not rely on the bedrock norm, accepts strategic as well as communicative action, acknowledges the asymmetric but reciprocal relationship between constituents and representatives, and uses a systemic approach to assess democratic representation. This deliberative model leads to institutional reforms that avoid the bedrock norm and seek to mitigate representative manipulation by creating space for constituents to respond to representatives' claims to represent their interests.

Substantial constituency influence over the lower house of Congress is commonly thought to be both a normative principle and a factual truth of American government. From their draft constitution we may assume the Founding Fathers expected it, and many political scientists feel, regretfully, that the Framers' wish has come all too true. Nevertheless, much of the evidence of constituency control rests on inference. The fact that our House of Representatives, especially by comparison with the House of Commons, has irregular party voting does not of itself indicate that Congressmen deviate from party in response to local pressure. And even more, the fact that many Congressmen feel pressure from home does not of itself establish that the local constituency is performing any of the acts that a reasonable definition of control would imply.Control by the local constituency is at one pole of both the great normative controversies about representation that have arisen in modern times. It is generally recognized that constituency control is opposite to the conception of representation associated with Edmund Burke. Burke wanted the representative to serve the constituency's interest but not its will, and the extent to which the representative should be compelled by electoral sanctions to follow the "mandate" of his constituents has been at the heart of the ensuing controversy as it has continued for a century and a half.

Abstract."Dyadic representation" has received considerable attention in the US, but much less attention in parliamentary systems where party discipline strongly limits representatives' capacity for individual action. A link between the legislative behaviour of representatives and the preferences of their geographic constituencies may nevertheless exist outside the US, however, particularly in single member plurality systems where the "electoral connection" is strong. This paper tests for evidence of this dyadic relationship in Question Period in the Canadian Parliament, across three policy domains: defense, debt and taxes, and welfare. As anticipated, there is evidence of dyadic representation in Canada. Results are discussed as they pertain to the comparative study of legislative institutions and political representation.Résumé.La «représentation dyadique» a reçu une attention considérable aux États-Unis, mais elle est beaucoup moins étudiée au sein des démocraties parlementaires où la discipline de parti limite fortement la marge de manœuvre des élus. Malgré tout, le lien entre le comportement politique des élus et les préférences de leurs commettants demeure important ailleurs qu'aux États-Unis, mais particulièrement dans les systèmes électoraux pluralitaires où la «connexion électorale» est forte. Cet article s'intéresse à cette représentation dyadique dans le cadre de la période des questions au Parlement canadien et plus particulièrement pour les trois enjeux suivants : la défense nationale, la politique fiscale et les services sociaux. Tel qu'attendu, la représentation dyadique semble se confirmer au Canada. Les résultats des analyses statistiques sont discutés et apportent un éclairage original sur l'étude comparée des institutions législatives et de la représentation politique.