Suchergebnisse

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE CONSITITUTIONAL THEORY OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN BY CONTRASTING IT WITH THE RECENT WORK OF JOHN HART ELY. THIS CONTRAST ILLUSTRATES THE GREAT DISTANCE WE HAVE TRAVELED IN A CENTURY OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, AND IT ALSO TO CLARIFY LINCOLN'S CONTROVERSIAL AND FREQUENTLY MISUNDERSTOOD REACTION TO THE DRED SCOTT OPINION. LINCOLN'S POSITION ON THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY IS PREDICATED UPON A COMMITMENT TO NATURAL RIGHTS PRINCIPLES THAT MANIFESTS ITSELF IN AN INSISTANCE UPON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FOR CONSITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. IT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE TWO DOCUMENTS IN LINCOLN'S THOUGH THAT IS THE BASIS FOR CHARACTERIZING HIS PUBLIC LAW PHILOSOPHY THE THEORY OF CONSITUTIONAL ASPIRATION.

The paper highlights the publication of the first comprehensive edition on the history of domestic consitutional justice. An attempt to reconstruct the prehistory of domestic constitutional normative control supported by a profound source base is one of the values of the retrospection section (until 2001). The paper marks two opposite interpretations of constitutional control — constitutional (value-based) and functional (pragmatic). The ambivalent understanding of the nature of constitutional jurisdiction results in groundless, both conceptually and empirically, reproaches of constitutional justice for politicization. The chapters on the current stage provide both less properly justified and contradictory theses than those expressed in retrospection section chapters. Lack of strength of the expressed arguments adversely affect the methodological integrity and conceptual unity of the entire text.