Suchergebnisse

Defence date: 03 October 2018 ; Examining Board: Prof. David K. Levine, EUI (Supervisor); Prof. Giacomo Calzolari, EUI; Prof. Juan-José Ganuza, UPF and Barcelona GSE; Prof. Gerard Llobet, CEMFI ; The aim of this thesis is to investigate cartels and the impact of competition policy from various angles. Chapter 1, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, José Manuel Ordóñez-de-Haro and Juan Luis Jiménez, analyzes the relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles. We analyze the relationship between cartel startups/breakups and economic cycles using a dataset of cartels sanctioned by the European Commission. Results show that cartels are more likely to be formed when the business has evolved positively in the previous months and managers expect prices to decline, but that cartels also tend to breakup when the business has evolved positively. Upturns in firm-specific business cycles appear to cause cartel turnovers: existing cartels die while new ones are set up. Chapter 2 aims at obtaining a precise measure of how much firms benefit from collusion. I evaluate the causal effect of being a cartel member on the revenues and profits of cartelized firms, using comparable non-collusive firms as control group. A dataset of discovered cartel cases in Spain from 1990 to 2014 and an alternative dataset of firms' balance sheets are used. Results show that firms increase their revenues, on average, between 19% and 26% due to the collusive agreement, while no significant effect is found on profits. Estimations by cartel duration demonstrate that the members of long-lasting cartels not only increase their revenues (29%−50%), but also their profits more than two times. Further analysis shows that cartels that are profitable from the beginning tend to last longer and do not apply for Leniency Programs. Chapter 3, joint with Joan-Ramon Borrell, Juan Luis Jiménez and José Manuel Ordóñezde-Haro, investigates how Leniency Programs destabilize cartels. We study the effect of the Leniency Program on cartel duration, cartel fines and on the years of investigation using a difference-in-differences program evaluation approach. Cartel cases discovered by the European Commission and the Spanish Competition Authority are analyzed. Results show a short-run effect of the Leniency Program: the detected cartels have longer duration than the ones in the control group. In the long-run, the program decreases cartel duration. On the other hand, no significant effect is found on fines, while the duration of the investigation decreases significantly around 0.8-1.3 years.

For over a hundred years, competition policy has been a central part of a market economy's legal framework. Over the past third of a century, however, the scope and effectiveness of competition policy has been narrowed under the influence of certain ideas about the functioning of the market economy, sometimes referred to as the Chicago School of Law and Economics—ideas which have subsequently been widely discredited within the economics profession, but whose influence within antitrust law remains significant. This paper argues that, to the contrary, changes in our economy and our understandings of the interplay between economics and politics necessitates a broader reach for competition policy even than envisaged by the original advocates of antitrust law. This takes on particular significance with recent reports, such of that of the Council of Economic Advisers of President Obama, highlighting the increase in market power across many important sectors of the US economy and persistent higher rates of return to capital than seem consistent with competition. These monopoly rents may, in turn, play an important role in the country's growing inequality.

This paper presents a model of local government policy competition in an New Economic Geography-setting. To maximize welfare, local governments can subsidize a mobile factor or provide public goods. In the local perspective, firms' vertical linkages promote colocation and policy (subsidy) setting is simultaneous, giving rise to mixed profiles. Agglomeration benefits lead larger regions to set higher subsidies, preventing a race to the top. We show the results numerically as well as in an analytical case. In contrast to related literature, policy harmonization can be welfare-improving, mainly due simultaneous policy-setting with a (local) utilitarian objective.

Two aspects of National Competition Policy (NCP) are likely to be the catalyst of change in Australian local government (LG): competitive neutrality and the reform of public monopolies. Competitive neutrality will be achieved in LG through the imposition of tax equivalents, removal of debt guarantees and cross‐subsidisation deemed not to be in the public interest. The reform of public monopolies will open more functions to competition.But other items of the NCP are also of significance to LG. The imposition of prices oversight of LG services will make these more cost reflective. Legislative reviews at LG level will produce deregulation in some cases and greater uniformity in others while the issue of allowing private access to LG assets has competitive potential in relation to the services and provision of roads, parks and sewerage treatment.We emphasise the importance of recognising the present benefits of current LG operations and cite the current proposal to privatise Tasmania's water and sewerage services as an example. NCP has the potential to produce further LG boundary amalgamations, or to accelerate regional cooperation as an alternative. The role of cross‐border and competitive tendering in this respect are highlighted. Finally, we analyse the implications of the NCP for the Local Government Grants Commission process.

Defense date: 08/02/2008 ; Examining Board: Prof. Massimo Motta, European University Institute (Supervisor) Prof. Bruce Lyons, University of East Anglia Prof. Paul Seabright, University of Toulouse Prof. Karl Schlag, Universitat Pompeu Fabra ; This thesis aims at shading light on three issues which are at the forefront of the European Commission's agenda. The first two chapters deal with the issue of state subsidies and their impact on market competition and development. Both papers design a theoretical setting where such impact can be assessed and provide for the tools needed for welfare analysis. The third chapter, instead, is mainly empirical and aims at measuring the effect on competition due to an increase in advertising in the context of public procurement auctions. Throughout this introduction, I will briefly describe the motivation and the main insights underlying each chapter.