Suchergebnisse

Abstract
Even though the Yugoslav Communists were expelled from the Soviet bloc in 1948, the Communist regime in Yugoslavia headed by Josip Broz Tito had embraced many of the repressive policies associated with Stalinist dictatorships. Based on newly available archival materials from Bosnia and Herzegovina, this article examines policies related to the incarceration of "enemies of the state" during the first several years of Tito's regime. By focusing on policy discussions and implementation, the article shows how government, state security, and prison officials dealt with questions relating to prison conditions, penal policy, and rehabilitation. These documents permit scholars to begin moving beyond the existing focus on well-documented events of mass killing and oppression during the early years of Communist rule—such as the Goli Otok prison camp for alleged Cominformists and mass executions in late 1944—to gain a better understanding of how Yugoslav officials viewed and debated penal policies.

'Die Geographie ist für jedes Land Schicksal. Wegen seiner Randlage in Europa ist Bulgarien in seiner Entwicklung stark behindert oder sogar zurückgeworfen worden. Erst 1878 ist es der osmanischen Herrschaft, die fast ein halbes Jahrtausend gedauert hat, entkommen. 1934 war der Parteienpluralismus beseitigt worden, der zwar am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges für kurze Zeit wieder auflebte, dann aber von den Kommunisten, die nur noch eine gleichgeschaltete Bauernpartei an ihrer Seite duldeten, brutal unterdrückt worden war. Rund 4O Jahre haben die Kommunisten auf ihre rüde Art regiert und Regungen eigenständigen politischen Denkens erstickt. Sie scheuten nicht einmal davor zurück, einen Kritiker wie Georgi Markov 1978 in London zu ermorden. Der Kontakt zum Westen wurde von Sofia stark eingeschränkt. Todor Zivkov wünschte sogar den Anschluß seines Landes an die Sowjetunion. Infolge dieser Politik ist Bulgarien im Westen kaum noch wahrgenommen worden. Nach 1989 hat sich die Bulgarische Kommunistische Partei (BKP) sehr schnell dem Demokratisierungsprozeß, wie er in Ostmitteleuropa stattfand, angepaßt. Sie verzichtete auf ihre Monopolstellung, ließ Oppositionsparteien zu und benannte sich gemäß dem Trend der Zeit in 'Bulgarische Sozialistische Partei' (BSP) um. Anders als die postkommunistischen Parteien Polens, Ungarns, der Tschechoslowakei und der DDR ging die BSP aus den ersten freien Wahlen als stärkste Partei hervor. Erst 1991 siegte die 'Union der demokratischen Kräfte' (SDS) mit einem hauchdünnen Vorsprung vor der BSP und bildete, gestützt von der DPS (Bewegung für Rechte und Freiheiten), der politischen Vertretung der Türken, unter Filip Dimitrov die erste antikommunistische Regierung. Schon 1992 trat diese Regierung zurück, nachdem sie von allen Seiten unter Beschuß genommen worden war und ihr zuerst die Abgeordneten der DPS, dann eine Reihe von SDS-Abgeordneten untreu wurden. Den Abtrünnigen war der Kurs der 'blauen' Regierung zu scharf. In Wirklichkeit war er, vergleicht man ihn mit Polen, Ungarn und der Tschechoslowakei, moderat. Die neue Regierung unter Ljuben Berov, die von der BSP, der DPS und den SDS-Abtrünnigen getragen wurde, verzichtete auf eine Entsorgung der kommunistischen Altlasten und endete schließlich in einer Sackgasse. Die Wahlen von 1994 bescherten der BSP die absolute Mehrheit im Parlament. Sie wäre also bestens ausgestattet gewesen, das große Reformprogramm, wie sie es versprochen hatte, zu verwirklichen. Sie scheiterte jedoch 1995 bei der Eindämmung der Kriminalität und 1996 in der Wirtschaft. Brot wurde knapp und unverhältnismäßig teuer. Selbst das 'Neue Deutschland' ging davon aus, daß nirgendwo in Osteuropa die Krise verheerender war als in Bulgarien. Vor allem die Rentner konnten sich an die unvermeidlichen Turbulenzen und Härten der Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft nicht gewöhnen und hatten 1994 größtenteils die BSP gewählt. Erschreckend war, daß viele Intellektuelle, Journalisten oder Wissenschaftler keine so weitreichende Dekommunisierung wie etwa in Tschechien wünschten und damit gewollt oder ungewollt der BSP in die Hände arbeiteten, die so wenig reformiert war, daß sie nicht in die Sozialistische Internationale aufgenommen werden konnte. Die BSP war trotz ihres eklatanten Versagens jedoch nicht bereit, die Macht aus der Hand zu geben. Sie wich erst dem massiven Druck von der Straße und verlor die Wahlen im April 1997. Nach den Wahlen vom April 1997 machte die neue Parlamentsmehrheit der 'Vereinigten demokratischen Kräfte' (ODS) erneut Vorstöße, die kommunistische Vergangenheit aufzuarbeiten.' (Autorenreferat)

This volume provides a detailed history of the internal deportation campaign instituted by the Hungarian communist government in 1950s as a form of punishment for citizens considered enemies of the state. Their wealth, possessions, their way of life and most importantly, their influence on society at large had to be demolished. The deportation campaign targeted remnants of qualified upper middle class: educators, medical or scientific professionals, aristocratic or military officials who represented pre-war Hungary and also well-to-do kulaks (peasants). Széchenyi recounts the legal basis of the deportations, and points out the manner in which Hungarian laws were distorted to serve the purpose of sending its own citizens into forced internal exile. She has also uncovered many documents related to the deportations, their administration and implementation that are invaluable to our understanding of what amounted to a social engineering campaign by Hungary's communist leaders to rid the country of elements they deemed undesirable. In the second half of the volume, survivors recount their own personal memories of how deportations affected them and their families. 'Stigmatized' is the first book in English which lays out not only the history of the Hungarian internal deportations of the Stalinist era, but illustrates its consequences to a nation and society in the long run

The collapse of communist dictatorship and entering of Albania in the way of democratization would show a strong impact also in an important field for the society, such as the education. Albanian transition was not simply a social process, bur in first place it was connected to the reconstruction of democracy and education and in these respects it is the foundation of this reconstruction: "An education that should be rebuilt, a new generation which should be oriented towards the future, a society that must be developed." The problem of democratization and reform of education has emerged in the Albanian society with all its strength and complexity after 1990. Reforming of the educational system in Albania, tackling an issue of fundamental changes in form and content (curricula, school documentation, internal organization of school life), new developments at all levels of the education system (hidden dropouts, problems of vocational education, expansion of general secondary education), decentralization and management of pre-university and higher education, and the teacher's role in the Albanian post-communist society.

On 22 October 2003, with the initiative of Romania's president Ion Iliescu, the International Commission for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania (ICSHR) was set up. Nobel laureate for peace and American writer of Romanian origin Elie Wiesel was appointed as its president. In spring 2006, with the initiative of Romania's president Traian Băsescu, the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship in Romania (CPADCR) was formed. Vladimir Tismăneanu, the American political scientist of Romanian origin, became its president. Both commissions were established with the purpose of producing a final report on the two forms of totalitarianism in Romania: the extreme right totalitarianism between 1940 and 1944, and the extreme left totalitarianism between 1944 and 1989. Both commissions rested on legal and ethical grounds and they addressed Romanians' expectations and dilemmas linked to their recent traumatic history.

The fall of communism in Eastern Europe did not bring about a radical and immediate destruction of the material heritage of communist dictatorships in the region. In fact, the process of de-commemoration has been more contested and more protracted than had been anticipated. Thus, what warrants a closer consideration is why this is the case since on the whole public acceptance of the regime change has been very high. This paper considers the case of Poland, the country of the Solidarity movement, which played a major role in the fall of communism in the region. The two-decade-long history of the right-wing nationalists' attempts to legislate street renaming culminating in the so-called de-communization law of 2016 will serve as a lens for investigating the responses that favoured the de-communization of public space. The paper argues that the protracted nature of the remaking of public landscape in Poland has been the result of the country's transitional legacies and different approaches to transitional justice among the former dissident opposition.

This article is an analysis of the types of prisons and labour camps, their structure and organization as well as the position of convicted persons while serving the punishment of imprisonment in Albania during the communist dictatorship period. During this time-period and up to the triumph of democracy in Albania (1944-1991) a large number of prisons and labour camps functioned and operated for the serving of punishment for a large number of convicted persons, the majority part of whom where political prisoners. The large number of prisoners during this time-period as well as of prisons and labour camps was most of all a consequence of cruel punitive policy lead by the Albanian communist state, which as such was directed solely against the opposers of the communist regime. In this line, a well deserved place will be allocated to the organization of prisons and labour camps, the purpose of punishment with imprisonment and the position of convicted persons while serving their punishment. The scope of this article is to separately shed light upon the types and purpose of establishment of prisons and labour camps, the harsh positions of convicted persons, the limitation of their rights and inhuman treatment during the monist Albanian state period.

This article is an analysis of the types of prisons and labour camps, their structure and organization as well as the position of convicted persons while serving the punishment of imprisonment in Albania during the communist dictatorship period. During this time-period and up to the triumph of democracy in Albania (1944-1991) a large number of prisons and labour camps functioned and operated for the serving of punishment for a large number of convicted persons, the majority part of whom where political prisoners. The large number of prisoners during this time-period as well as of prisons and labour camps was most of all a consequence of cruel punitive policy lead by the Albanian communist state, which as such was directed solely against the opposers of the communist regime. In this line, a well deserved place will be allocated to the organization of prisons and labour camps, the purpose of punishment with imprisonment and the position of convicted persons while serving their punishment. The scope of this article is to separately shed light upon the types and purpose of establishment of prisons and labour camps, the harsh positions of convicted persons, the limitation of their rights and inhuman treatment during the monist Albanian state period.

This paper presents various important aspects in the cultural relations between Albania and Hungary, both during the communist regime that lasted almost 50 years in Albania (1944-1992), and in the last thirty years (1993-2022), which are considered "the democracy years" in Albania, although they have rather been years of protracted transition. The paper presents important information about: a) Albanian students who were educated in Hungary; b) linguistic and literary publications created in the two countries, both in Albanian and Hungarian, and c) relations between the two countries, especially in education over the last 30 years.

Abstract More than 40 years ago, János Kornai introduced his famous supermarket metaphor. Socioeconomic systems cannot be constructed from purposely selected features, similar to customers in a supermarket, who can freely put into their shopping trolley whatever they like. Systems constitute an organic whole. They contain good and bad features in fixed proportions. After 1990, Kornai and most Western commentators expected that as market integration and private property expand, China would eventually turn into a liberal democracy. Prior to the worldwide fall of communism, Kornai had three primary criteria to determine whether a country was socialist or capitalist; later he amended this with six secondary ones. The present paper introduces into this list an additional 11 criteria—i.e. 20 quantifiable metrics altogether. Kornai was among the very first to recognize that with President Xi Jinping taking charge, China made a U-turn. While capitalist elements remain strong, in the final analysis, the country is on its way back to where it was before 1978.

AbstractMore than 40 years ago, János Kornai introduced his famous supermarket metaphor. Socioeconomic systems cannot be constructed from purposely selected features, similar to customers in a supermarket, who can freely put into their shopping trolley whatever they like. Systems constitute an organic whole. They contain good and bad features in fixed proportions. After 1990, Kornai and most Western commentators expected that as market integration and private property expand, China would eventually turn into a liberal democracy. Prior to the worldwide fall of communism, Kornai had three primary criteria to determine whether a country was socialist or capitalist; later he amended this with six secondary ones. The present paper introduces into this list an additional 11 criteria—i.e. 20 quantifiable metrics altogether. Kornai was among the very first to recognize that with President Xi Jinping taking charge, China made a U-turn. While capitalist elements remain strong, in the final analysis, the country is on its way back to where it was before 1978.

More than 40 years ago, János Kornai introduced his famous supermarket metaphor. Socioeconomic systems cannot be constructed from purposely selected features, similar to customers in a supermarket, who can freely put into their shopping trolley whatever they like. Systems constitute an organic whole. They contain good and bad features in fixed proportions. After 1990, Kornai and most Western commentators expected that as market integration and private property expand, China would eventually turn into a liberal democracy. Prior to the worldwide fall of communism, Kornai had three primary criteria to determine whether a country was socialist or capitalist; later he amended this with six secondary ones. The present paper introduces into this list an additional 11 criteria—i.e. 20 quantifiable metrics altogether. Kornai was among the very first to recognize that with President Xi Jinping taking charge, China made a U-turn. While capitalist elements remain strong, in the final analysis, the country is on its way back to where it was before 1978.