Suchergebnisse

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was intended to reform the telecommunications industry, most especially with its inclusion of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The CDA can be viewed as the first act of Congress attempting to regulate the Internet. One of the most prominent parts of this act includes Section 230, which states that websites and Internet providers are not legally responsible for third-party content, including the content of their users and consumers (1996). Since the rapid growth of social media and advancement of technology, Section 230 of the CDA has been a subject of debate. Congress is debating whether to repeal this form of protection. On one hand, taking away this form of protection would demand platforms to be more cognizant of the content they host. In doing so, this can put an end to the spread of hate speech, white supremacy, conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation, all of which have rattled American politics (McNamee, 2020). However, removing Section 230 can also lead towards an increase in censorship (Cooke, 2020). This creates fears over the possibility that platform regulation could violate the First Amendment. This case study will analyze previous legislative attempts at either repealing or curbing the influence of Section 230 of the CDA.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act is a 1996 law wholly inadequate to address 21st Century problems. The most egregious example of this is online sex trafficking, which was allowed not only to exist, but also to thrive due, in large part, to §230. This Article examines the development of the jurisprudence regarding online advertising of sex-trafficking victims and juxtaposes the forces that created § 230 with those preventing its timely amendment. This Article argues that, although § 230 was never intended to create a regime of absolute immunity for defendant websites, a perverse interpretation of the non-sex trafficking jurisprudence for § 230 created a regime of de facto absolute immunity from civil liability or enforcement of state sex-trafficking laws. This phenomenon occurred despite the legislative intent behind § 230, and despite the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 ("TVPA") and its subsequent reauthorizations. This is the first law review article to examine the new Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act – Stop Enabling Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA – SESTA) passed in March 2018, and signed into law in April 2018. The article not only examines this new effort, but also places it within a disturbing historical context concerning the origins and abuse of § 230. The article notes the quick willingness of Congress to respond to the desires of corporate technology interests to create § 230, but its failure to quickly respond to the pleas from victims of sex trafficking, law enforcement, states attorneys general, and the courts to amend it § 230 and preclude its abuse by online entities who knowingly partner with sex traffickers to sell victims online. The article analyzes not only why FOSTA-SESTA ultimately succeeded, but also the disturbing decades long obstacles to its common sense adoption. Part I explains the impetus behind § 230, its history, and its text. Part II examines the rise in recognition of sex trafficking in both domestic and international law. It further summarizes the contours of sex trafficking in the modern world and the role online advertisement has played in its emergence. Part III analyzes the intersection of sex trafficking, the Internet, and § 230 and thoroughly assesses the development of jurisprudence culminating in the creation of a regime of de facto immunity. Part IV analyzes recent legislative efforts in both the House and Senate to amend § 230 culminating in the passage of the FOSTA – SESTA. It asserts that such an amendment was necessary to return § 230 to its original purpose of protecting some Internet companies from specific types of liability, without creating absolute immunity. It also cautions against the ability of technology corporations to thwart such important legislation.

This paper reviews the original intent and historical application of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), most notably Section 230, with special regard to cases of Internet-facilitated commercial sexual exploitation. Although the CDA was originally created to protect children online, Section 230 of the CDA has been interpreted by the courts to grant broad immunities to websites facilitating the sexual exploitation of children and adults alike. Through analyzing the genesis and evolution of the CDA, it becomes clear that court interpretations of Section 230 are starkly inconsistent with original Congressional intent, and that the primary way to avoid de facto decriminalization of Internet-facilitated commercial sexual exploitation is to amend the Communications Decency Act.

The Communications Decency Act affords Internet service providers (ISPs) immunity from liability for defamation, among other crimes, to allow self-policing of websites. However, due to this immunity, websites have no incentive to remove defamatory content, which undermines the entire purpose of the Communications Decency Act. To improve this statute and promote the removal of defamatory content, the United States should follow in the footsteps of countries with more effective Internet laws. This Note presupposes that a higher percentage of Twitter removal requests in which Twitter has withheld some content indicates a higher efficacy of the Internet laws in those countries. The data published by Twitter shows that France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and Russia are the top five countries in terms of percentage of removal requests with which Twitter has complied. Four of these five countries have laws similar to the notice and takedown provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which requires an Internet service provider to quickly remove content once made aware of its unlawful nature. Therefore, a notice and takedown provision with a critical opinion safe harbor should be added to the Communications Decency Act.

Since its inception, the Internet has disseminated the most vital commodity known to man—information. But not all information is societally desirable. In fact, much of what the Internet serves to disseminate is demonstrably criminal. Nevertheless, in the effort to unbind the "vibrant and competitive free market" of ideas on the Internet, Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which essentially grants immunity to interactive computer service providers from liability for information provided by a third party. This Comment suggests that, in certain contexts, courts applying section 230 immunity should reexamine the preemptive effect Congress intended section 230 to have on traditional state police powers. This Comment also analyzes the several judicial and legislative solutions that could alleviate the strain that section 230 immunity puts on state and local efforts to deal with criminal activity perpetrated via the Internet.