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AbstractWe consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters' preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.

What do we expect when we say something to someone, and what do they expect when they hear it? When is a conversation successful? The book considers a wide set of two-person conversations, and a bit of game theory, to show how conversational statements and their interpretations are governed by beliefs. Thinking about beliefs is suitable for communication analysis because beliefs are well-defined and measurable, allowing to differentiate between successful understandings and their less successful counterparts: misunderstandings.

The book describes the theoretical framework and empirical measurements of misunderstandings – written by an economist, but in simple words and using interdisciplinary concepts. The material will benefit students and researchers of behavioural economics and its neighbouring fields, and anyone interested in human language.

PurposeThe purpose of the paper is to report on an in‐depth study of "pay‐rolling" agencies. Pay‐rolling agencies are a particular form of employment intermediaries through which employers attempt to bypass statutory obligations concerning workers' benefit entitlements and trade union rights, simply by paying workers through an agency. The paper was prompted by the growing amount of anecdotal evidence suggesting proliferation of pay‐rolling agency systems in Pakistan.Design/methodology/approachThe paper involved a total of 97 interviews were undertaken in six case studies across three industrial sectors with employees, employers, agency and union officials and industry specialists.FindingsFindings revealed sufficient evidence on the use of pay‐rolling agencies. The results confirmed the anecdotal evidence that some employment agencies are not truly genuine. The evidence suggested that there is a growing trend for agencies to be simply a sham arrangement, refuting the notion that temporary agency work has only been a natural and inevitable response to changes in the economy.Originality/valueThe paper furthers the understanding of the motives and characteristics of agency employment beyond the conventional model of genuine agency work.

Abusive uses of Structured Intervention Units and the Correctional Service's conduct mean Parliament must get rid of SIUs or adopt Senate amendments.

Abusive uses of Structured Intervention Units and the Correctional Service's conduct mean Parliament must get rid of SIUs or adopt Senate amendments.