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This article explores the implicit philosophical framework that underpins, and provides the moral and political justification for, the move towards treating data as a so-called common resource. It begins by tracing the emergence of the idea of viewing data as an open access common resource. It then outlines the regulatory, policy and legislative mechanisms that have been instituted to encourage and ensure that researchers comply with data sharing requirements, and that are institutionalising new ownership regimes away from research data being treated de facto as private property towards it becoming public property. It also spells out the case being made for treating data as a public good, including scientific, moral, economic and political arguments. The article then moves on to suggest that positioning data as a common resource is dependent on a Cartesian and representational understanding of data, their production, and their use in the making of knowledge, drawing in particular on the work of Karen Barad. Barad's critique of classical Cartesian and Newtonian metaphysical assumptions helps to reveal the positionality of the assumed universalism of treating research data as a given and a priori common resource. The final section of the article considers what treating data as a common resource and public good, and the exclusion of the labour and relations of data producers that it depends on, does ontologically, epistemologically, morally and politically. In particular, it suggests that emerging regulatory, policy, legislative and discursive practices reinforce, institutionalise and legitimise power differentials and inequalities precisely along the lines that feminist scholars have been contesting for over four decades.

We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.

Many of the challenges facing humankind, such as climate change, water scarcity, inequality, and hunger, can be resolved not only at a global level by promoting sustainable development but, first of all, at a local level. Local communities in many countries have been seeking to improve sustainability. They are the policy makers and catalysts of change that unify the global goals with their own local ones. In light of the theoretical background, this article uses the example of Ukraine to extend the analysis of the effective management of common resources proposed by Elinor Ostrom by introducing obstacles and opportunities for local communities working toward sustainable development. Considering the experience of European states, the foundation of the transformation of the conditions of sustainable development is a citizen as an individual, guided by his or her own "taste of life" in accordance with the state- and community-guaranteed right to choose one's own place in life. Under the relevant conditions, it is expedient to look for effective tools that would exert influence on central and local governments, and the possibilities of transforming the entire system of public administration by focusing on the role of the community and its opportunities for the effective use of shared resources. The duplication of the process of consolidation without development of a social state only destroys the remnants of local self-governance and, as a consequence, all other branches of power in general. The aim of paper is to use the example of Ukraine to extend the analysis of effective management of commons by introducing obstacles and opportunities that local communities face on their path toward sustainable development.

Many of the challenges facing humankind, such as climate change, water scarcity, inequality, and hunger, can be resolved not only at a global level by promoting sustainable development but, first of all, at a local level. Local communities in many countries have been seeking to improve sustainability. They are the policy makers and catalysts of change that unify the global goals with their own local ones. In light of the theoretical background, this article uses the example of Ukraine to extend the analysis of the effective management of common resources proposed by Elinor Ostrom by introducing obstacles and opportunities for local communities working toward sustainable development. Considering the experience of European states, the foundation of the transformation of the conditions of sustainable development is a citizen as an individual, guided by his or her own "taste of life" in accordance with the state- and community-guaranteed right to choose one's own place in life. Under the relevant conditions, it is expedient to look for effective tools that would exert influence on central and local governments, and the possibilities of transforming the entire system of public administration by focusing on the role of the community and its opportunities for the effective use of shared resources. The duplication of the process of consolidation without development of a social state only destroys the remnants of local self-governance and, as a consequence, all other branches of power in general. The aim of paper is to use the example of Ukraine to extend the analysis of effective management of commons by introducing obstacles and opportunities that local communities face on their path toward sustainable development.

This study examines the relationship between generalized expectations about others' behavior (interpersonal trust) and consumption of a regenerating resource in a simulated commons dilemma. Eighty subjects were assigned to one of four feedback conditions in a split-plot factorial design (trust X feedback X blocks). Resources were programmed to deteriorate at four different rates. However, subjects believed they were acting in groups of five, and that resource deterioration was a consequence of the rate of consumption of the resource. When faced with minimal deterioration of the resource pool, subjects increased their consumption over trial blocks; rapid deterioration led to decreased consumption. However, the consumption rate of low trusters was unaffected by the rate at which the resource deteriorated. High trusters consumed more than low trusters when resource deterioration was minimal, but significantly less than low trusters under conditions of rapid deterioration. The results give support to the claim that trust plays an important role in mediating resource consumption in commons dilemmas.