ABSTRACT . John Searle believes that collective intentions are crucial to his philosophy, but he is yet to present a coherent account of these entities. No account whatsoever of collective intentions is presented in the book where Searle needs them the most (The Construction of Social Reality), or, for that matter, in any other of Searle's major books. The only account, and a defective one at that (so I argue), is found in a short, somewhat obscure article entitled "Collective Intentions and Actions," but in fact what Searle presents there is, at best, an account of collective actions, not of collective intentions. In light of Searle own ground‐breaking work in the philosophy of mind, and in particular in light of his far‐reaching analyses showing how intentions differ from related mental states, I argue that collective intentions are not consistent with Searle's philosophy of mind.
A theory of collective violence must explain both why it is collective and why it is violent. Whereas my earlier work addresses the question of why collective violence is violent, here I apply and extend Donald Black's theory of partisanship to the question of why violence collectivizes. I propose in general that the collectivization of violence is a direct function of strong partisanship. Strong partisanship arises when third parties (1) support one side against the other and (2) are solidary among themselves. Such support occurs when third parties are socially close to one side and remote from the other and when one side has more social status than the other. Third parties are solidary when they are intimate, culturally homogeneous, and interdependent. I focus in particular on lynching: Lynching is a joint function of strong partisanship toward the alleged victim and weak partisanship toward the alleged offender. Unequal strong partisanship appears in both classic lynchings (of outsiders) and communal lynchings (of insiders) across societies and history. Where partisanship is weak or strong on both sides, lynching is unlikely to occur. Evidence includes patterns of lynching in various tribal societies, the American South, imperial China, and medieval Europe.
Diese Arbeit möchte verstehen, was es bedeutet gleichzeitig eine Gemeinschaft und ein Unternehmen zu sein, und welche Herausforderungen dadurch für die intraorganisationale Koordination entstehen. Wie vereinbaren alternative Betriebe unterschiedliche Menschen und Rationalitäten miteinander, ohne auf formale Hierarchien zurückzugreifen? In einer vergleichende Fallstudie von drei kleinen, direkt-demokratisch organisierten Kollektivbetrieben wird der Beziehung zwischen Koordination, Bewertung und Moralvorstellungen nachgegangen. Die Arbeit nutzt hierfür Laurent Thévenots pragmatischer Soziologie des Engagements. Die Ergebnisse der Arbeit liefern einen Beitrag zu drei Forschungsbereichen: Die Arbeit liefert einen Beitrag zum Feld der "valuation studies". Es wird gezeigt, dass die mit Bewertung verbundene Unsicherheit zu Prozessen führen kann, die mehr einer kollektiven Entdeckung, als einem Konflikt entsprechen. Darüber hinaus wird die zentrale Rolle von legitimen Differenzierungs- und Äquivalenzprinzipien für Kommensuration aufgezeigt. Die Arbeit liefert einen Beitrag zur Forschung zum Verhältnis von Koordination, Bewertung und Moralvorstellungen in Organisationen. Sie zeigt, dass ein theoretischer Rahmen, der unterschiedliche Grade der Generalisierung von Koordination beachtet, wichtige Erkenntnisse für das Verständnis intraorganisationaler Koordination liefert. Die Arbeit liefert einen Beitrag zur Forschung über Kollektivbetriebe und Genossenschaften. Indem die eingenommene Perspektive über die Analyse von Governance-Strukturen hinausgeht, wird die Dualität von Kollektivbetrieben als ein Problem der Balance zwischen unterschiedlichen Koordinationsmodi gerahmt. Aus dieser Perspektive ist die zentrale Spannung, die Kollektivbetriebe ausbalancieren müssen, eine zwischen auf Vertrautheit basierender Koordination und Koordination, die auf Generalisierung von Beziehungen beruht. ; This thesis wants to understand how alternative firms deal with the complexity of balancing different rationalities in their intraorganizational coordination, in the absence of formal hierarchies. In a comparative case study of three small, democratically governed collective firms, the relationship between coordination and morality is analyzed. The majority of research on collective firms focuses on democratic governance structures, which risks to underestimate the importance of coordination that is based on intimate knowledge and personal relations. This is especially important to understand collective firms, which are dependent on lateral accountability and cooperation between their members. Consequently, this work is informed by the work of Laurent Thévenot which allows to understand coordination based on different levels of generalization. The results of this thesis contribute to three different areas of research: First, contributions are made to the field of valuation studies, by further developing insights on the notion of the test. The thesis also points out the central role of legitimate principles of difference and equivalence for successful commensuration, and the tension between particularity and generalization in standardizing evaluation devices. Second, the study contributes insights for scholarship on coordination and morality in organizations. It demonstrates that considering coordination based on different degrees of generality yields important insights on intraorganizational coordination. Finally, this study contributes to scholarship on cooperatives and collectivist organizations. The often noted duality of collective firms is reframed as the need to balance and mediate different modes of coordination. The study develops a heuristic concept, the composite relation, which explains how collectives are held together despite their central tension between particular and collective goods.
AbstractGroups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one's own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one's own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based on evidence that a group can generate by performing internal promptings. Whereas these promptings are done mentally in individual self-knowledge, these promptings are done by interactions of group members in the collective case. The group can then acquire inferential self-knowledge of their vices based on the evidence generated by the interactions within the group. Groups thereby bring themselves into a position from which they can combat and change those vices intentionally.
Can an entire nation be collectively guilty for crimes committed in its name? Focusing on the case of Serbia, this article argues that collective guilt is a morally flawed and untenable concept that should be rejected. It presents various moral and practical objections to both the generic notion of collective guilt and the more specific idea of Serbian collective guilt and contends that the latter is a fundamental impediment to peace-building and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. On what basis might it be argued that the Serbs are collectively guilty? To claim that they are collectively guilty for having supported Milošević both exaggerates levels of support for the former Serbian leader and does a major injustice to those individuals who bravely fought against the Milošević regime. Drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, the article concludes by suggesting that perhaps we can speak of Serbian collective responsibility.
New South Wales' (NSW) strata regime has had considerable global influence, inspiring many jurisdictions across and beyond the commonwealth. Both Singapore and British Columbia, Canada have adopted NSW's strata model. That being said, these jurisdictions have permitted a collective sale by a supermajority of owners for some two decades while NSW only recently enacted legislation allowing for a strata scheme to be redeveloped or collectively sold via a 75% majority. This marks a significant milestone as it departs from the orthodox position requiring unanimity. Given the newness of the legislative amendments, there is no jurisprudential guidance regarding the content of a strata renewal committee's duty in NSW. Through a comparative analysis of British Columbia and Singapore, this paper suggests how NSW could articulate the duty of care imposed on the strata renewal committee when effecting a collective sale. Being only the second State in Australia to permit strata renewal by a supermajority, the issues raised by the paper may be of some interest in coming years.
In: "Collective Intentionality," with Marija Jankovic, in The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Social Science, ed., Lee McIntyre and Alex Rosenberg, New York: Routledge, 2016.
