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In this article it is argued that the economic crisis has made national collective bargaining systems increasingly multi-layered, perforated and dynamically unstable, i.e. hybrid. The authors explain these transformations in terms of the concomitance of two different sources of change which do not necessarily follow the same logics. The first source stems from national systems' endogenous logic of path dependency and the second from pressure to reform in accordance with exogenously applied strategies and logics. It is argued that these sources act like a whipsaw, pushing and pulling national collective bargaining systems between the two logics, leading to hybrid collective bargaining systems.

Abstract
This paper addresses the design of the machinery of collective bargaining from the perspective of microeconomic and macroeconomic flexibility. In the former context, somewhat greater attention is given over to enterprise flexibility than external adjustment. In the latter context, close attention is also paid to changes in collective bargaining along the dimensions of bargaining coverage, structure, and coordination. Support is adduced for the German, contemporary Scandinavian, and British models. The role of trust in securing micro and macro flexibility also receives attention, suggesting that the polder or Dutch model might also be expected to populate the firmament of fit-for-purpose collective bargaining arrangements.

JEL Classification: Microeconomics/Institutions (D02), Institutions and the Macroeconomy (E02), Employment/Unemployment/Wages (E24), Income Distribution (E25), Macroeconomic Policy Objectives (E61), Labor Economics Policies (JO8) Trades Unions (J51), Collective Bargaining (J52), Labor-Management Relations (J53), Public Policy (J58), Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems (P51)

In recent years, individual and company bargaining have increasingly supplanted sector and country collective bargaining leading to increasingly heterogeneous and perforated, i.e. hybrid, national collective bargaining systems. Little is known about the relative effects of these different systems. In this paper the authors derive and test a comprehensive categorization of collective bargaining systems and argue that different systems are associated with different production functions and therefore have different effects on labour productivity. The hypotheses are tested using representative workplace level data for all member states of the European Union. It is found that the performance of coordinated sector collective bargaining systems is higher than for all other forms of collective and individual bargaining. Policy implications of the results are discussed as these results challenge attempts to reform collective bargaining in Europe.

The transition to a market driven development strategy in Latin America for more than a decade has redefined business strategies and reshaped the state`s traditional role as guarantor of employment, stability, and protection. These changes, plus the move to create more flexible labor markets in some countries, have lead to the elimination or reduction of legislated employment protections and benefits, creating space for unions to enlarge their role in collective bargaining.

One aim of the project entitled "European collective bargaining in the building industry" (a joint initiative by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the German trade union IG Bau and the European Federation of Building and Woodworkers- EFBWW) is to investigate what steps are necessary to achieve better coordination of collective bargaining policy in this sector. The building workers' trade unions in Europe continue to differ concerning the extent to which they believe such coordination should lead to common positions, common claims or collective agreements in Europe. The project will examine the collective bargaining systems currently in operation in the building sector in Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. This article describes, on the basis of the project findings to date, the difficulties and obstacles which beset the coordination of collective bargaining policy in Europe.

This thesis investigates the link between the structure of collective bargaining and the macroeconomic performance. Chapters 1 and 2 study collective bargaining systems by considering their interactions with their institutional environment. Chapter 1 analyzes the role of collective bargaining systems on the link between wage growth and the unemployment rate, i.e. the wage Phillips curve, which may have implications for the feasibility of monetary policy objectives. Chapter 2 examines theoretically how the collective bargaining system influences the outcomes of reforms modifying the employment protection legislation. Chapters 3 and 4 study the macroeconomic effect of reforms to collective bargaining systems. Chapter 3 provides evidence on the link between the decentralization of collective bargaining and economic growth. Finally, chapter 4 questions the timing of reforms aimed at changing the institution of collective bargaining, analyzing their effects on employment according to the position on the economic cycle when they are implemented. ; Cette thèse étudie le lien entre la structure des négociations collectives et la performance macroéconomique. Les chapitres 1 et 2 étudient les systèmes de négociation collective en considérant leurs interactions avec leur environnement institutionnel. Le chapitre 1 analyse le rôle des systèmes de négociation collective sur le lien entre la croissance des salaires et le taux de chômage, c'est-à-dire la courbe de Phillips des salaires, qui peut avoir des implications sur la faisabilité des objectifs de politique monétaire. Le chapitre 2 étudie théoriquement comment le système de négociation collective influence les résultats des réformes de la législation sur la protection de l'emploi. Les chapitres 3 et 4 étudient l'effet macroéconomique des réformes des systèmes de négociation collective. Le chapitre 3 renseigne sur le lien entre la décentralisation des négociations collectives et la croissance économique. Enfin, le chapitre 4 questionne le timing des réformes qui visent à modifier l'institution des négociations collectives, en analysant leurs effets sur l'emploi selon la position sur le cycle économique lors de leur mise en œuvre.