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Abstract
Collective privacy loss becomes a colossal problem, an emergency for personal freedoms and democracy. But, are we prepared to handle personal data as scarce resource and collectively share data under the doctrine: as little as possible, as much as necessary? We hypothesize a significant privacy recovery if a population of individuals, the data collective, coordinates to share minimum data for running online services with the required quality. Here, we show how to automate and scale-up complex collective arrangements for privacy recovery using decentralized artificial intelligence. For this, we compare for the first time attitudinal, intrinsic, rewarded, and coordinated data sharing in a rigorous living-lab experiment of high realism involving >27,000 real data disclosures. Using causal inference and cluster analysis, we differentiate criteria predicting privacy and five key data-sharing behaviors. Strikingly, data-sharing coordination proves to be a win–win for all: remarkable privacy recovery for people with evident costs reduction for service providers.

In order to build and maintain social capital in their Online Social Networks, users need to disclose personal information, a behavior that at the same time leads to a lower level of privacy. In this conceptual paper, we offer a new theoretical perspective on the question of why people might regulate their privacy boundaries inadequately when communicating in Online Social Networks. We argue that people have developed a subjective theory about online privacy putting them into a processing mode of default trust. In this trusting mode people would (a) discount the risk of a self-disclosure directly; and (b) infer the risk from invalid cues which would then reinforce their trusting mode. As a consequence people might be more willing to self-disclose information than their actual privacy preferences would otherwise indicate. We exemplify the biasing potential of a trusting mode for memory and metacognitive accuracy and discuss the role of a default trust mode for the development of social capital.

People's perception of privacy can primarily be directed to themselves or to the value of privacy for society. Likewise, privacy protection can repel both individual and collective privacy threats. Focusing on this distinction, the present article examines Internet users' privacy protection behaviors in relation to individual privacy concerns and their perceived collective value of privacy over time. We conducted a longitudinal panel study with three measurement points ( N = 1790) to investigate relations between and within persons. The results of a random-intercept cross-lagged panel model revealed positive relations between the perceived value of privacy, privacy concerns, and privacy protection between persons. At the within-person level, only a temporal increase in the perceived value of privacy was related to increased protection behaviors. This suggests that individual privacy concerns are not as important for temporal protection as assumed, but that a recognition of collective privacy may temporarily change people's privacy behavior.

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy. Without being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled. Thus, Rawls assumes that people are entitled to form families, as well as personal associations which reflect their tastes as well as their beliefs and interests. He seems also to have assumed that people are entitled to seclude themselves, as well as to associate with others, and to keep some of their beliefs, knowledge, feelings and ideas to themselves, rather than being obliged to share them with others. So, thinking of privacy as an amalgam of claims to seclusion, solitude, anonymity and intimate association, we can say that Rawls appears to include at least some forms of privacy in his account of the liberties protected by the first principle of justice. [First paragraph]

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy. Without being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled. Thus, Rawls assumes that people are entitled to form families, as well as personal associations which reflect their tastes as well as their beliefs and interests. He seems also to have assumed that people are entitled to seclude themselves, as well as to associate with others, and to keep some of their beliefs, knowledge, feelings and ideas to themselves, rather than being obliged to share them with others. So, thinking of privacy as an amalgam of claims to seclusion, solitude, anonymity and intimate association, we can say that Rawls appears to include at least some forms of privacy in his account of the liberties protected by the first principle of justice. [First paragraph]

Part 5: Project Workshops and Tutorial Papers ; International audience ; In this paper, we introduce a privacy-enhanced Peer Manager, which is a fundamental building block for the implementation of a privacy-preserving collective adaptive systems computing platform. The Peer Manager is a user-centered identity management platform that keeps information owned by a user private and is built upon an attribute-based privacy policy. Furthermore, this paper explores the ethical, privacy and social values aspects of collective adaptive systems and their extensive capacity to transform lives. We discuss the privacy, social and ethical issues around profiles and present their legal privacy requirements from the European legislation perspective.

Body-worn cameras are quickly becoming ubiquitous in public spaces around the world. Whether worn by officers of the law or personnel of a local car parking authority, they present a unique form of surveillance which challenges privacy in public. Governments and other organizations are adopting laws, internal rules, and operational guidelines in a scramble to catch up with the rapid spread of the technology. This fragmented approach to policymaking has so far not provided a panacea to the surrounding privacy issues. In this contribution, we will apply the relatively underexplored theoretical angle of republican political theory and its focus on non-domination to this problem. We argue that taking a republican approach to the value of privacy might be a first step towards addressing some of the concerns raised by the chapters. We focus on two aspects of republican theory: the arbitrariness of interferences, and the closely related notion of freedom as non-domination rather than non-interference. The potential usefulness of the concept of collective privacy in this regard will also be discussed. First, however, we will summarize the preceding chapters which inform this analysis.

La defensa de la privacidad se ha basado, históricamente, en la protección de la autonomía y dignidad de los individuos. Sin embargo, el reciente desarrollo de la economía de la vigilancia ha hecho que se multipliquen los tipos de tecnologías de seguimiento y los objetivos de observación disponibles. Esta situación está revelando los límites de los mecanismos políticos, jurídicos y sociales con los que las sociedades de raigambre liberal protegían la privacidad; y nos obliga a repensar las amenazas que se vierten sobre la privacidad desde una nueva perspectiva. A tal fin se defenderá que es necesario desarrollar una dimensión colectiva sobre la privacidad, que no esté centrada únicamente en los individuos, como mecanismo para comprender e interrelacionar el conjunto de cambios sociotécnicos que amenazan la dignidad, autonomía política y soberanía digital de los grupos humanos ; The defense of privacy has historically been based on the protection of the autonomy and dignity of individuals. However, the recent development of the surveillance economy has multiplied the types of monitoring technologies and observation targets available. This situation shows the limits of the political, legal and social mechanisms of the liberal societies to protect the privacy, and forces us to rethink these threats from a new perspective. To this end, the aim of this paper is to defend the necessity to develop a collective dimension of privacy, not only focused on individuals, as a mechanism to understand and interrelate the set of socio-technical changes that threaten the dignity, political autonomy and digital sovereignty of human groups