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Abstract In this paper, we consider climate scepticism in the Russian context. We are interested in whether this has been discussed within the social scientific literature and ask first whether there is a discernible climate sceptical discourse in Russia. We find that there is very little literature directly on this topic in either English or Russian and we seek to synthesise related literature to fill the gap. Secondly, we consider whether Russian climate scepticism has been shaped by the same factors as in the USA, exploring how scientists, the media, public opinion, the government and business shaped climate scepticism in Russia. Climate scepticism in the USA is understood as a 'conservative countermovement' that seeks to react against the perceived gains of the progressive environmental movement, but we argue that this is not an appropriate framework for understanding Russian climate scepticism. Articulated within a less agonistic environment and situated within an authoritarian regime, Russian expressions of climate scepticism balance the environmental, political and economic needs of the regime under the constraints of a strong 'carbon culture' and closed public debate.

The analysis examines the sociopsychological findings of climate sceptical discourse. The author distinguishes two elements in the debate on climate change: a diagnostic part including observation of global warming, its causes (greenhouse gas emissions) and its possible consequences (trend scenario of major climate change); and a "prescription" part which, taking into account the diagnosis, proposes policy measures and is no longer a matter of scientific observations but a moral assessment. After a reminder of what is fuelling the debate (the part of uncertainty which can only concern the prospective vision arising from the observation of the facts, and not the characterisation of the facts observed), Antonin Pottier clearly shows that climato-sceptical arguments are confusing between diagnosis and prescription: it is because they refuse to accept the need for or content of climate policies that they deny the scientific reality of climate change, shifting the debate and embracing themselves in error. This is all the more damaging as it finds a significant media resonance which tends to stifle the information available to public opinion somewhat more: "Citizens' perception of contemporary challenges is hampered, to the benefit of the interests that would be undermined by combating greenhouse gas emissions. ' ; International audience The analysis examines the socio-psychological mechanisms underlying the dimate-sceptical position. Pottier distinguishes between two elements in the debate on climate change: a "diagnostic" component, induding the observation of the warming of the planet, its causes (the emission of greenhouse gases) and its possible consequences (a scenario tending towards large-scale dimatic upheavals), and a "prescriptive" part which, taking account of the diagnosis, proposes political measures and relates not to scientific observations but to a moral evaluation of the situation. After reminding us of what "fuels" the debate (the element of uncertainty which, Pottier argues, can relate only to the ...

In order to meet the challenges of sustainable development, it is of utmost importance to involve all relevant decision makers in this process. These decision makers are diverse, including governments, corporations and private citizens. Since the latter group is the largest and the majority of decisions relevant to the future of the environment is made by that group, great effort has been put into communicating relevant research results to them. The hope is that well-informed citizens make well-informed choices and thus act in a sustainable way. However, this common but drastic simplification that more information about climate change automatically leads to pro-environmental behaviour is fundamentally flawed. It completely neglects the complex social-psychological processes that occur if people are confronted with threatening information. In reality, the defence mechanisms that are activated in such situations can also work against the goal of sustainable development, as experimental studies showed. Based on these findings, we propose an agent-based model to understand the relation between threatening climate change information, anxiety, climate change scepticism, environmental self-identity and pro-environmental behaviour. We find that the exposure to information about climate change, in general, does not increase the pro-environmental intent unless several conditions regarding the individual&rsquo ; s values and information density are met.

Why do populist citizens oppose climate change? Thus far, data constraints limited the ability to test different theoretical mechanisms against each other. We argue that populist attitudes affect climate attitudes through two distinct channels, namely institutional trust and attitudes towards science. The former argument focuses on political institutions as the central actors in implementing climate policy. Individuals who distrust these institutions are more sceptical about climate change. The latter argument claims that populists deny climate change because they distrust the underlying climate science. According to this view, populists would view climate scientists as part of the self-serving elite that betrays the people. Utilising data from the Austrian National Election Study and structural equation modelling, we find strong support for the relationship of populism and climate attitudes via attitudes towards science and institutional trust. Populists systematically hold more negative attitudes towards science and political institutions, and consequently deny climate change.

Many recent planning decisions, such as planned retreat of coastal settlements from the sea, are premised upon the scientific consensus that climate change is real. Not all local residents accept forced relocation, and some hold a radical form of rights-based belief that is hostile to government intervention into private arenas. This 'deontological libertarian' belief is related to a sceptical view of climate science. Data from an Australian survey are employed to demonstrate that climate scepticism is associated with the tendency to see private-property rights as a fundamental entitlement irredeemable in the prospect of forced retreat, regardless of compensation. The sceptical view has defensible normative elements constructed upon the framework of inviolable rights also underpinning recognised environmental and development imperatives. Appealing to absolute rights generally may be an effective way to approach the sceptical public. Rights offer a generalisable framework in which sceptics which they can see how their non-sceptical counterparts are similarly situated despite expressing a different policy preference. Although consensus is not guaranteed, communication can proceed more easily by making a common ontological terrain explicit. © 2014 Taylor & Francis. ; postprint

"Climate change scepticism" is a familiar concept in popular and scholarly discourse and generally refers to a family of arguments and individuals that reject, dispute, or question the orthodox view of the climate issue. At close range though, it is evident that the concept is often used casually, without consideration of the complexity of the category it represents. Scholars have varied interpretations of the concept and sometimes actively dispute its meaning and reach. The article proposes that the sceptic phenomenon can be variegated according to the types of sceptic critiques and, additionally, according to sceptics' attitudinal characteristics. Taxonomies are proposed for each. The types of sceptic arguments are organised in a conceptual hierarchy consisting of two classes of critiques ("core" and "concomitant"), three centers of scepticism ("evidence," "process," and "response"), and seven specific objects of scepticism. For the attitudinal characteristics of sceptics, the article takes stock of the different motives, modes, and certainties of belief among sceptics. It proposes some relabeling of the category and subcategories to more accurately describe nuances in sceptic positions, as well as to dispose of unproductive labels. The article suggests how the refined conceptualisation might help observers and policy practitioners to manage the sceptic challenge in a more discerning and constructive fashion.

Recent years have been marked by two conspicuous developments in the political landscape. The first one is the rising wave of nationalism in Europe reflected in increased parliamentary representation of far-right parties, both nationally and on EU level, which has probably reached its zenith with the successful Brexit campaign. The second one is the growing concern for and increasing engagement in addressing the burning issue of climate change and environmentalism. This paper embarks on deciphering the interconnection between the two developments. The objective of this thesis is to perform mapping of the current positions of Europe's far right on the environmental and climate agenda. For this purpose, I have performed a qualitative content analysis of the 2019 EP election programmes/manifestos of seven European far-right parties. The analysis is framed within four related concepts: 1) climate scepticism; 2) climate change visà-vis globalisation; 3) the role of international organisations/instruments in addressing climate change; and 4) energy transition. The results of the analysis show that, despite the parties sharing the same ideology and system of values, they do not have a uniform stance on climatechange and environmentalism and their attitude towards these issues varies considerably