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Working paper
Fiscal Policymaking and the Central Bank Institutional Constraint
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences, Band 41, Heft 4, S. 647-662
ISSN: 1467-6435
Fiscal policymaking and the central bank institutional constraint
In: Kyklos: international review for social sciences
ISSN: 0023-5962
World Affairs Online
Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions - Past, present and future
In: European journal of political economy, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 722-736
ISSN: 1873-5703
This is an extensive survey of worldwide developments in the area of monetary policymaking institutions during the second half of the twentieth century and beyond. In addition the last section discusses current open issues and future challenges. Section 2 reviews the changes that have occurred in the area of central bank independence (CBI) during the last twenty years, discusses reasons for those developments and provides an overview of accumulated empirical evidence on the relation between CBI and the performance of the economy. Section 3 discusses lessons from stabilization of inflation, reviews the evidence and implications of asymmetric central bank objectives and considers the issue of CBI within the broader context of choosing a nominal anchor. Section 4 reviews the impact of independence on economic performance in the presence of labor unions. Section 5 considers future challenges facing modern central banks. The discussion presumes that CBI and price stability are here to stay and focuses on issues relating to the conduct of monetary policy by independent central banks in an era of price stability, like the risks associated with flexible inflation targeting and the impact of central bank capital and finances on its independence. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V.]
Policymaking in the European Central Bank: the Masters of Europe's money
In: Governance in Europe
World Affairs Online
Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 24, Heft 4, S. 722-736
Central bank power without central bank autonomy?
In: Finance and society, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 65-68
ISSN: 2059-5999
AbstractLeon Wansleben's new book, The Rise of Central Banks, explains how central banks have emerged as powerful monetary governors over the past half-century. Yet the book's recognition that central banks cannot extricate themselves from quantitative easing and market bailouts begs the question: what does it mean for central banks to be dominant but captive? In this commentary, I identify the book's ambiguities with the concept of infrastructural power the book draws from Michael Mann. Unless the dynamics of state-market interdependence are well specified, giving due attention to the sources of both public and private power, it is unclear what kind of agency central bankers are exercising if they lack sufficient autonomy to act in the public interest.
Central Banks
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Central Banks" published on by Oxford University Press.
The central banks
A huddle of central bankers -- The widening domain -- How it all began -- Making a name for themselves -- Reign of the rulebook -- Currency boards and their legacy -- Changing fortunes in the 1980s -- The business of central banking -- Monetary policy in practice -- The nightmare of supervision -- How central banks manage reserves -- The safety net -- The dilemma of exchange rates -- The muscle of the federal reserve -- Europe's foursome -- The bank of Japan--a rising star -- Anchors for smaller countries -- Their very own BIS -- The new central banks of the former Soviet Union -- Of markets and men -- Survival of the fittest -- Europe points the way -- A new mandate
SSRN
Working paper
Central Banks at War
In: International organization, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 63-95
ISSN: 1531-5088
War is expensive-troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured. When the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns' credibility problem more difficult, central banks enhance a government's ability to borrow. By being the sole direct purchaser of government debt, the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender. This increases lenders' confidence that the government will be punished in case of default, making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest. The sovereign, dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank, has an incentive to retain the bank. Data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign's borrowing costs, particularly during times of war. Adapted from the source document.
The Politics of Central Bank Independence
In: de Haan , J & Eijffinger , S C W 2019 , The Politics of Central Bank Independence . in R D Congleton , B N Grofman & S Voigt (eds) , The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice . vol. 2 , Oxford University Press , Oxford . https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190469771.013.23
This chapter reviews recent research on the political economy of monetary policymaking, both by economists and by political scientists. The traditional argument for central bank independence is the desire to counter inflationary biases. However, studies in political science suggest that governments may delegate monetary policy in order to detach it from political debates and power struggles. The recent financial crisis has changed the role of central banks, as evidenced by unconventional monetary and macro-prudential policy measures. Financial stability and unconventional monetary policies have stronger distributional consequences than conventional monetary policies, with implications for central bank independence. However, the authors' results do not suggest that that has happened in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis, nor has there been higher turnover of central bank governors.
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