Suchergebnisse

Ein Kritikpunkt am Kyoto-Protokoll lautet, dass Emissionen durch Spezialisierung und internationalen Handel ins Nicht-Kyoto-Ausland verlagert werden könnten (»Carbon Leakage«). Die Analyse sektoraler Importströme und die damit einhergehenden CO2-Importe zeigen, dass Kyoto-Länder ihr Importvolumen aus Nicht-Kyoto-Ländern erhöhen und die CO2-Importe im Schnitt um 8% ansteigen, wobei energieintensive Sektoren, wie Metallerzeugung und Papierwaren, besonders stark betroffen sind. Folglich sollte sich die internationale Politikgemeinschaft verstärkt mit Möglichkeiten auseinandersetzen, wie CO2-Grenzausgleichssteuern WTO-konform implementiert werden können.

Policy makers in the EU and elsewhere are concerned that unilateral carbon pricing induces carbon leakage through relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries to other regions. A common measure to mitigate such leakage is to combine an emission trading system (ETS) with output-based allocation (OBA) of allowances to exposed industries. We first show analytically that in a situation with an ETS combined with OBA, it is optimal to impose a consumption tax on the goods that are entitled to OBA, where the tax is equivalent in value to the OBA-rate. Then, using a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to empirical data, we quantify the welfare gains for the EU to impose such a consumption tax on top of its existing ETS with OBA. We run Monte Carlo simulations to account for uncertain leakage exposure of goods entitled to OBA. The consumption tax increases welfare whether the goods are highly exposed to leakage or not. Thus, policy makers in regions with OBA can only gain by introducing the consumption tax. It can hence be regarded as smart hedging against carbon leakage.

Policy makers in the EU and elsewhere are concerned that unilateral carbon pricing induces carbon leakage through relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries to other regions. A common measure to mitigate such leakage is to combine an emission trading system (ETS) with output-based allocation (OBA) of allowances to exposed industries. We first show analytically that in a situation with an ETS combined with OBA, it is optimal to impose a consumption tax on the goods that are entitled to OBA, where the tax is equivalent in value to the OBA-rate. Then, using a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to empirical data, we quantify the welfare gains for the EU to impose such a consumption tax on top of its existing ETS with OBA. We run Monte Carlo simulations to account for uncertain leakage exposure of goods entitled to OBA. The consumption tax increases welfare whether the goods are highly exposed to leakage or not, and can hence be regarded as smart hedging against carbon leakage.

Policy makers in the EU and elsewhere are concerned that unilateral carbon pricing induces carbon leakage through relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries to other regions. A common measure to mitigate such leakage is to combine an emission trading system (ETS) with output-based allocation (OBA) of allowances to exposed industries. We first show analytically that in a situation with an ETS combined with OBA, it is optimal to impose a consumption tax on the goods that are entitled to OBA, where the tax is equivalent in value to the OBA-rate. Then, using a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to empirical data, we quantify the welfare gains for the EU to impose such a consumption tax on top of its existing ETS with OBA. We run Monte Carlo simulations to account for uncertain leakage exposure of goods entitled to OBA. The consumption tax increases welfare whether the goods are highly exposed to leakage or not, and can hence be regarded as smart hedging against carbon leakage.

Mit dem Klimaabkommen von Paris hat sich eine Situation der national differenzierten Klimapolitik entwickelt, die zu ungleichen CO2-Preisen in den einzelnen Ländern geführt hat. Internationaler Handel zwischen Ländern mit unterschiedlich strikter Klimaschutzpolitik kann zu Carbon Leakage führen. Dies reduziert die Effizienz einer Klimaschutzpolitik. Ein Grenzausgleich, im Sinne einer Harmonisierung unterschiedlicher CO2-Preise mit Hilfe von CO2-Zöllen, bietet sich als eine Maßnahme an, um Wettbewerbsverzerrung aufgrund von unilateraler Klimaschutzpolitik zu reduzieren und Carbon Leakage zu verhindern. Nicht nur in der Fachliteratur, sondern auch auf politischer Ebene findet die Idee eines Grenzausgleiches Zustimmung. Der jüngste Vorschlag einer solchen Maßnahme wurde im Zuge des von der Europäischen Kommission unter Ursula von der Leyen beschlossenen 'Green Deals' benannt und soll helfen die Europäische Union bis zum Jahr 2050 zur Klima-Neutralität zu führen. Obwohl die Grundidee von Grenzausgleichsmaßnahmen im Sinne einer Verlagerung zu einer konsumbasierten CO2-Bepreisung reizvoll und klar ist, ist dessen Ausgestaltung und Implementierung in der Praxis komplex. Dies führt zu einem hohen bürokratischen Mehraufwand und damit einhergehenden hohen administrativen Kosten. Darüber hinaus kann ein Grenzausgleich als Handelsbarriere gesehen werden, welche zu Vergeltungsmaßnahmen der vom Grenzausgleich betroffenen Länder im Ausland führen kann. Aus diesem Grund empfiehlt sich ein enger Fokus auf energieintensive und international exponierte Sektoren.

SUMMARY
Policy makers in the EU and elsewhere are concerned that unilateral pricing of the carbon externality induces carbon leakage through relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed production to other regions. A common measure to mitigate such leakage is to combine an emission trading system with output-based allocation (OBA) of allowances where the latter works as an implicit production subsidy to regulated industries. We show analytically that it is optimal to impose in addition a consumption tax on the OBA goods (i.e., goods that are entitled to OBA) at a rate which is equivalent in value to the OBA subsidy rate. The explanation is that the consumption tax alleviates excessive consumption of the OBA goods, which is a distortionary effect of introducing OBA. Using a multi-region multi-sector computable general equilibrium model calibrated to empirical data, we quantify the welfare gains for the EU of imposing such a consumption tax on top of its existing emission trading system with OBA. We run Monte Carlo simulations to account for uncertain leakage exposure of goods entitled to OBA. The consumption tax increases welfare whether the goods are highly exposed to leakage or not, and hence can be regarded as smart hedging against carbon leakage.

The future international climate policy architecture will most likely consist of partial climate policy initiatives like the EU's Emission Trading System. Trade integration threatens to undermine these systems' environmental effectiveness by shifting emissions to other countries. We estimate a gravity model based on 103 countries and use it to simulate several such climate policy experiments. The model's parameters are structurally linked to empirical estimates, i.e. bilateral trade costs and the elasticity of substitution are consistent with the data. Unlike previous empirical work, the approach allows to quantify emission relocation in general equilibrium. With trade liberalization experiments, the model also allows to deliver a perspective on environmental aspects of hypothetical FTA formation. We find that an EU emission allowance price of 15 US-$ suffi ces to bring the EU on track for its Kyoto target but also leads to emission relocations of about 10% of the EU's emission savings.