Cabora Bassa: Ein Damm gegen die Afrikaner
In: Pogrom, 10
Kritische Darstellung des Staudammprojekts Cabora Bassa, seiner Zielsetzung und der Auswirkungen auf die Bevölkerung
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In: Pogrom, 10
Kritische Darstellung des Staudammprojekts Cabora Bassa, seiner Zielsetzung und der Auswirkungen auf die Bevölkerung
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: Issue: a journal of opinion, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 47-54
The impact of African opposition to the Portuguese Zambezi Development Scheme and in particular to the construction of the Cabora Bassa hydro-electric dam in Mozambique was first felt in Europe in 1968 and reached its climax in 1971. It has influenced the thinking and the decisions of a great many individuals, groups, and organizations in the United States as well. In view of the wide publicity accorded various attempts in the United States and elsewhere to prevent any further support of Portugal's efforts to retain control over its colonies and develop them economically, one can assume that the controversy over Cabora Bassa is familiar to most people interested in African affairs. Nevertheless, more information is needed with respect to the facts and viewpoints surrounding the Cabora Bassa Dam project itself.According to Portuguese sources, planning for the development of the Zambezi valley began with the First Development Plan in 1953. In March 1957, the Overseas Ministry created the Missao de Fomento e Povoamento do Zambezi (M.F.P.Z.)—or the Zambezi Development Office, an organization to develop and to populate the Zambezi valley. The general plan for this development was presented to the government in 1966, and in November 1967 invitations for tenders to construct the Cabora Bassa Dam were issued. Offers were due in January 1968.The Third Development Plan for the Portuguese African territories covering the period from 1968 to 1973 provides for investments in Mozambique of about US $730.7 million. The costs for constructing the dam and the complete power scheme at Cabora Bassa are estimated at US $517.5 million. Portugal will absorb US $421 million of this amount and South Africa US $96.5 million. The ultimate production of energy is estimated to be twice that of the Aswan Dam. It will be surpassed in capacity only by the Churchill Falls Dam in Canada and by dams in the USSR at Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk. The Aswan Dam was built at a cost of more than US $1,000 million—a figure considerably higher than the estimate for the Cabora Bassa Dam.
In: Issue: a journal of opinion, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 56-57
The issue raised by the Cabora Bassa Dam has figured in the agendas of the principal international conferences, in the world press; it is discussed in public meetings, it provokes popular demonstrations. Big financial interests and reactionary political forces follow anxiously the developments of events doing everything possible to make the project a reality, while the progressive forces try to prevent its realization.In this context, it is important to analyze the meaning and the implications of this project—in particular to find out which are the reasons determining the different positions on Cabora Bassa.This ambitious project would provide Mozambique with all the electric power she needs for her development, as well as enabling her to export power to the neighboring countries. It would seem then in the interests of the people of Mozambique that the dam be built. And this is the argument that the forces interested in the project are using to justify their involvement.They argue that the building of the dam will give work to thousands of Mozambicans both in the building and in the resulting industrial complex. That it will irrigate thousands of hectares of land, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of people to benefit from this arable land. That it would attract foreign investments, thus facilitating the development of the country. That it will make the Zambezi navigable up to the Indian Ocean. And that, since independence will come sooner or later, it is advisable to let the dam be built: because an independent Mozambique will be in a much better economic situation with the dam than without it.
In: Issue: a journal of opinion, Band 4, Heft 2, S. 56-57
The issue raised by the Cabora Bassa Dam has figured in the agendas of the principal international conferences, in the world press; it is discussed in public meetings, it provokes popular demonstrations. Big financial interests and reactionary political forces follow anxiously the developments of events doing everything possible to make the project a reality, while the progressive forces try to prevent its realization.In this context, it is important to analyze the meaning and the implications of this project—in particular to find out which are the reasons determining the different positions on Cabora Bassa.This ambitious project would provide Mozambique with all the electric power she needs for her development, as well as enabling her to export power to the neighboring countries. It would seem then in the interests of the people of Mozambique that the dam be built. And this is the argument that the forces interested in the project are using to justify their involvement.They argue that the building of the dam will give work to thousands of Mozambicans both in the building and in the resulting industrial complex. That it will irrigate thousands of hectares of land, thus allowing hundreds of thousands of people to benefit from this arable land. That it would attract foreign investments, thus facilitating the development of the country. That it will make the Zambezi navigable up to the Indian Ocean. And that, since independence will come sooner or later, it is advisable to let the dam be built: because an independent Mozambique will be in a much better economic situation with the dam than without it.
In: Diskurs-Bücher 1
In: International affairs, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 131-131
ISSN: 1468-2346
In: Entwicklungspolitische Korrespondenz: EPK ; Zeitschr. zu Theorie u. Praxis d. Entwicklungspolitik, Heft 1, S. 14-15
Kurzer Abriß der Geschichte und der politischen Auseinandersetzungen um den Staudamm, seiner ökonomischen und ökologischen Folgen sowie Bestandsaufnahme der Interessenlage von Mosambik und der Südafrikanischen Republik hinsichtlich der weiteren Nutzung. (DÜI-Jan)
World Affairs Online
World Affairs Online
In: Scientia Militaria: South African journal of military studies, Band 7, Heft 1
ISSN: 1022-8136
In: Southern Africa record, Heft 37, S. 4-15
ISSN: 0377-5445
World Affairs Online
In: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities: UJAH, Band 13, Heft 1
ISSN: 1595-1413