Suchergebnisse

Despite the globalization of accounting standards occurring through convergence to International Financial Reporting Standards, local accounting systems are deeply intertwined with each country's unique institutions such as its corporate system, disclosure practices, and enforcement mechanisms. First, this book empirically analyzes the effects of globalization and localization of accounting rules on corporate behavior such as earnings management, signaling, investment behavior, and dividend payout policy. Second, the book unravels the economic consequences of disclosure based on the concept of self-disciplining enforcement such as management forecasts, environmental disclosures, and risk disclosures by Japanese firms. This volume is a step forward in understanding the link between accounting and corporate behavior based on a new institutional accounting approach.

Corporate misconduct is of increasing concern to society ‐ and researchers. Despite this increased research focus, little is known about the factors that lead to such wrongdoing, the consequences of such behavior, and consequently of meaningful remedies and deterrence measures. A large factor in this information problem is the ambiguity surrounding the definition and use of the terms "corporate crime" and "illegal corporate behavior." Researchers use them interchangeably despite the fact they are two different phenomena. This article reviews some of the definitions and uses of these terms, and points out the confusion which results. It then discusses major differences between illegal corporate behavior and corporate crime, and the positive implications of treating them separately.

Laboratory experiments provide the most rigorous method of testing scientific theories. However, their current use is primarily limited to testing theories of individual behavior. I suggest the conditions under which one can test theories of corporate behavior in laboratory experiments, using human subjects in the role of purposive corporate actors (such as groups or the state). Using the Condorcet Jury Theorem, I demonstrate that, when four conditions are met, laboratory experiments with human subjects represent statistically conservative tests of such theories. I address the issue of `external validity' and argue that it is not a concern for laboratory experiments as a means of testing theories with clearly stated scope conditions. Finally, I point out that, contrary to popular belief, supermajority decision rules, used by juries and legislatures alike presumably for more important decisions, actually lead to inferior collective decisions.

AbstractAlthough numerous benefits are associated with interfirm ties, these external relationships can also have negative consequences. Theoretically based in the relational component of social capital, we identify one potentially serious consequence of interfirm ties, propensity of firms engaging in illegal behavior. Results of our study of S&P 500 firms suggest that companies benefit from a lower likelihood of illegal behavior when they have numerous weak ties to other firms. Conversely, when they become overly embedded in a network of strong ties, they are more likely to engage in illegal behavior. We also found evidence that reciprocity and status similarity influence firms' propensity to engage in illegal behavior.

This book carefully examines the effects of changes in the corporate governance structure on corporate behavior or company performance, using micro-data from listed companies in Japan. The author found that in Japan the introduction of stock options had neither a positive impact on profitability nor the negative side effects of promoting risk-taking behaviors. Furthermore, he found that corporate diversification and division of corporations showed negative impacts on profitability. The corporate governance structure of Japan has exhibited a large change from the second half of the 1990s to the present. There have been institutional reforms involving enterprise law, such as the introduction of stock options and the removal of the ban on holding companies. With respect to the ownership structure of a company, discernible trends are that the equity holdings of financial institutions and business corporations have fallen while the presence of foreign stockholders has risen. These trends are often pointed out as signs that the Japanese corporate governance structure has been approaching the American model and that this will energize Japanese firms. The author contradicts common academic theories, however, and concludes that the formation of the corporate governance which emphasizes the agency problem between shareholders and corporate managers is inadequate. He suggests that an institutional arrangement for a corporate governance system that values a variety of stakeholders' interests is greatly needed and concludes that perspectives on maximizing surplus values for various stakeholders and distributing the surpluses appropriately among the stakeholders will become increasingly important for the purpose of managing corporations.