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Corruption is increasingly recognized as a preeminent problem in the developing world. Bribery, extortion, fraud, kickbacks, and collusion have resulted in retarded economies, predator elites, and political instability. In this lively and absorbing book, Robert Klitgaard provides a framework for designing anti-corruption policies, and describes through five case studies how courageous policymakers were able to control corruption

Cover -- Controlling Corruption in Europe -- Contents -- Authors -- Executive Summarry -- 1. Methodology -- 2. European Union Member States -- 3. The South-Eastern Europe -- 4. The Former Soviet Union -- 5. Top of the Class. The Case of Estonia -- 6. Hidden Depths. The Case of Hungary -- 7. Bottom of the Heap. The Case of Romania -- 8. European Perceptions of Qualityof Government: A Survey of 24 Countries -- 9. Lessons learned. The Good, the Bad and the Ugly -- Acknowledgements

Control of corruption in a society is an equilibrium between resources and costs which either empowers or constraints elites predatory behaviour. While most research and practice focuses on legal constraints, this paper investigates normative constraints, deemed to be more important, especially civil society and the press. Fresh evidence—both historical and statistical—is found to support Tocqueville's assertions regarding the importance of collective action and the joint action of media and associations in not only creating a democratic society, but controlling corruption as well. However, little is known on how to build normative constraints.

Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies into the framework of principal‐agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.

Since the late 1990s, the detrimental effects of corruption on human wellbeing have become well established in research. This has resulted in a stark increase in anti-corruption programs launched by international and national development organizations. Despite these efforts, evaluations of the effects of these anti-corruption programs have been disappointing. This text examines this important topic.