Suchergebnisse

The exposure of rural communities to illegal waste dumping practices associated with the lack of or poor waste collection schemes prior to the closure of rural dumpsites under EU regulations and the role of collection efficiency afterward in reducing this critical environmental threat constitutes a key issue in rural Romania. The present study reveals huge amounts of household uncollected waste released into the natural environment outside the official statistics of rural dumpsites. Despite the expansion of waste collection coverage towards rural areas since 2010, the problem of illegal dumping practice is difficult to solve. The improvement of collection efficiency, better law enforcement, and surveillance of environmental authorities coupled with educational and environmental awareness are necessary steps to combat this bad practice. A circular economy paradigm must be enacted in rural regions through separate collection schemes and to improve cost-efficient alternatives, such as home composting, and traditional and creative reuse practices, particularly in less developed regions.

The purpose of this article is to propose a reinterpretation of the traditional flypaper effect according to which central government transfers to local governments increase public spending by more than do increases in private income. Here, higher transfers from the federal government might induce less efficiency in local tax collection opposed to the income effect. Initially, we build a model in order to point out the possible existence of that flypaper effect in a context of standard maximization on the part of local governments. Next, we construct efficiency scores for Brazilian municipalities using Free Disposable Hull (FDH), taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -tax revenue- and the size of local informal economy - tax base. Last, using two stages least squares and Tobit regressions, which the instruments is built upon the rules established in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and where we find that unconditional transfer funds to municipalities, we estimate that transfers have the opposite effect (negative) of consumer's income on efficiency of taxation, which leads us to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect. ; O objetivo do artigo é propor uma reinterpretação do tradicional efeito flypaper, fenômeno que ocorre quando as transferências do governo central para os governos locais aumentam o gasto público mais do que aumentos na renda privada. Aqui as transferências mais altas podem induzir menor eficiência na coleta de impostos do que os aumentos na renda. Inicialmente construímos um modelo que aponta a possibilidade de existência de efeito flypaper no contexto de um modelo de maximização padrão por parte dos governos locais. Depois construímos scores de eficiência para os municípios brasileiros usando Free Disposable Hull (FDH), levando em consideração dois produtos: a quantidade de impostos per capita coletados localmente - receita tributária - e o tamanho da economia informal - base tributária. Finalmente, usando mínimos quadrados dois estágios e regressões Tobit, em que o instrumento é construído a partir das regras de cálculo das transferências não condicionais estabelecidas na Constituição de 1988, e onde encontramos evidência de que as transferências têm o efeito oposto (negativo) ao da renda sobre a eficiência na taxação, chegou-se à reinterpretação do efeito flypaper.

The purpose of this article is to propose a reinterpretation of the traditional flypaper effect according to which central government transfers to local governments increase public spending by more than do increases in private income. Here, higher transfers from the federal government might induce less efficiency in local tax collection opposed to the income effect. Initially, we build a model in order to point out the possible existence of that flypaper effect in a context of standard maximization on the part of local governments. Next, we construct efficiency scores for Brazilian municipalities using Free Disposable Hull (FDH), taking into consideration two outputs: amount of per capita local tax collected -tax revenue- and the size of local informal economy - tax base. Last, using two stages least squares and Tobit regressions, which the instruments is built upon the rules established in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and where we find that unconditional transfer funds to municipalities, we estimate that transfers have the opposite effect (negative) of consumer's income on efficiency of taxation, which leads us to a reinterpretation of the flypaper effect.

This paper evaluates the political economy and structural factors explaining the collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax [VAT]. We consider the case where the collection efficiency is determined by the probability of audit and by the penalty on underpaying. Implementation lags imply that the present policy maker determines the efficiency of the tax system next period. Theory suggests that the collection efficiency is impacted by political economy considerations – greater polarization and political instability would reduce the efficiency of the tax collection. In addition, collection is impacted by structural factors affecting the ease of tax evasion, like the urbanization level, the share of agriculture, and trade openness. Defining the collection efficiency of the VAT as the ratio of the VAT revenue to aggregate consumption divided by the standard VAT rate, we evaluate the evidence on VAT collection efficiency in a panel of 44 countries over 1970-99. The results are consistent with the theory - a one standard deviation increase in durability of political regime, and in the ease and fluidity of political participation, increase the VAT collection efficiency by 3.1% and 3.6%, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in urbanization, trade openness, and the share of agriculture changes the VAT collection efficiency by 12.7%, 3.9%, and - 4.8%, respectively. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in GDP/Capita increases the tax efficiency by 8.1%. Qualitatively identical results apply for an alternative measure of VAT collection efficiency, defined by the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP divided by the standard VAT.

This paper evaluates the political economy and structural factors explaining the collection efficiency of the Value Added Tax [VAT]. We consider the case where the collection efficiency is determined by the probability of audit and by the penalty on underpaying. Implementation lags imply that the present policy maker determines the efficiency of the tax system next period. Theory suggests that the collection efficiency is impacted by political economy considerations - greater polarization and political instability would reduce the efficiency of the tax collection. In addition, collection is impacted by structural factors affecting the ease of tax evasion, like the urbanization level, the share of agriculture, and trade openness. Defining the collection efficiency of the VAT as the ratio of the VAT revenue to aggregate consumption divided by the standard VAT rate, we evaluate the evidence on VAT collection efficiency in a panel of 44 countries over 1970-99. The results are consistent with the theory - a one standard deviation increase in durability of political regime, and in the ease and fluidity of political participation, increase the VAT collection efficiency by 3.1% and 3.6%, respectively. A one standard deviation increase in urbanization, trade openness, and the share of agriculture changes the VAT collection efficiency by 12.7%, 3.9%, and - 4.8%, respectively. In addition, a one standard deviation increase in GDP/Capita increases the tax efficiency by 8.1%. Qualitatively identical results apply for an alternative measure of VAT collection efficiency, defined by the ratio of VAT revenue to GDP divided by the standard VAT.

Abstract
The policy led by a large number of developing countries, with the aim of increasing indirect taxes, has opened the issue of Value Added Tax (VAT) performance. Reforms of tax systems of transition countries generally involve an increase in standard rates in order to increase VAT, which is the main source of public revenues. In such a way, developing countries determine the VAT performance and the amount of revenue that could be collected by indirect taxation. Theoretical analyses of standard rates and other factors that have reflections on the VAT collection efficiency explicitly prove that there are different ways to improve the efficiency of VAT collection, and exclude an increase in the standard rate. An increase in the standard rate provides a balance of negative effects, which can be blurred by recorded tax revenues. The subject of this paper is an analysis of the factors that influence the efficiency of VAT collection in Serbia. The main objective of the paper is to examine the impact of the change in the standard rate, which is the result of the reforms carried out in 2012, on the performance of VAT. Regression analysis was applied to the data series for the period 2005-2016.The results show that the change in the standard rate had a statistically significant negative impact on VAT performance. Our analysis also indicates that the economic growth rate has reflections on VAT collection. A strong positive correlation between the economic growth rate and VAT performance was calculated.