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AbstractLeon Wansleben's new book, The Rise of Central Banks, explains how central banks have emerged as powerful monetary governors over the past half-century. Yet the book's recognition that central banks cannot extricate themselves from quantitative easing and market bailouts begs the question: what does it mean for central banks to be dominant but captive? In this commentary, I identify the book's ambiguities with the concept of infrastructural power the book draws from Michael Mann. Unless the dynamics of state-market interdependence are well specified, giving due attention to the sources of both public and private power, it is unclear what kind of agency central bankers are exercising if they lack sufficient autonomy to act in the public interest.

"Central Banks" published on by Oxford University Press.

A huddle of central bankers -- The widening domain -- How it all began -- Making a name for themselves -- Reign of the rulebook -- Currency boards and their legacy -- Changing fortunes in the 1980s -- The business of central banking -- Monetary policy in practice -- The nightmare of supervision -- How central banks manage reserves -- The safety net -- The dilemma of exchange rates -- The muscle of the federal reserve -- Europe's foursome -- The bank of Japan--a rising star -- Anchors for smaller countries -- Their very own BIS -- The new central banks of the former Soviet Union -- Of markets and men -- Survival of the fittest -- Europe points the way -- A new mandate

CHARLES GOODHART'S THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS REPRESENTS AN ATTEMPT TO SELL OUT THOSE SHORTCOMINGS OF "FREE BANKING" THAT SUPPLY A RATIONALE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL BANKS. HOWEVER, ONE OF GOODHART'S PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS--THAT CENTRAL BANKS ARE PRACTICALLY INEVITABLE OUTGROWTHS OF THE "NATURAL" TENDENCY FOR BANK RESERVES TO BECOME CONCENTRATED IN A DOMINANT "BANKERS' BANK"--UNDERSTATES THE ROLE LEGAL RESTRICTIONS HAVE PLAYED IN SPONSORING THE EMERGENCE OF BANKERS' BANKS, INCLUDING THE BANK OF ENGLAND. SOME OF GOODHART'S OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST FREE BANKING REST ON AN EXAGGERATED VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF BUSINESS CYCLES AND FINANCIAL CRISES UNDER FREE BANKING AS COMPARED WITH CENTRAL BANKING.

War is expensive-troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured. When the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns' credibility problem more difficult, central banks enhance a government's ability to borrow. By being the sole direct purchaser of government debt, the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender. This increases lenders' confidence that the government will be punished in case of default, making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest. The sovereign, dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank, has an incentive to retain the bank. Data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign's borrowing costs, particularly during times of war. Adapted from the source document.

We present a model of central bank collateralized lending to study the optimal choice of the haircut policy. We show that a lending facility provides a bundle of two types of insurance: insurance against liquidity risk as well as insurance against downside risk of the collateral. Setting a haircut therefore involves balancing the trade-off between relaxing the liquidity constraints of agents on one hand, and increasing potential inflation risk and distorting the portfolio choices of agents on the other. We argue that the optimal haircut is higher when the central bank is unable to lend exclusively to agents who actually need liquidity. Finally, for an unexpected drop in the haircut, the central bank can be more aggressive than when setting a permanent level of the haircut.

All the first central banks were established in the form of private joint-stock companies. After World War II the majority of them were nationalized. However the small group of central banks continues to remain in private property. Though their financial activities do not differ from other central banks, private property has an essential influence on corporate governance.

AbstractWar is expensive—troops must be equipped and weapons must be procured. When the enormous borrowing requirements of war make the sovereigns' credibility problem more difficult, central banks enhance a government's ability to borrow. By being the sole direct purchaser of government debt, the central bank increases the effective punishment that can be imposed on the government for defaulting on the marginal lender. This increases lenders' confidence that the government will be punished in case of default, making lenders willing to purchase the debt at a lower rate of interest. The sovereign, dependent on the low borrowing costs offered by the central bank, has an incentive to retain the bank. Data covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reveal that possessing a central bank lowers the sovereign's borrowing costs, particularly during times of war.