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AbstractLeon Wansleben's new book, The Rise of Central Banks, explains how central banks have emerged as powerful monetary governors over the past half-century. Yet the book's recognition that central banks cannot extricate themselves from quantitative easing and market bailouts begs the question: what does it mean for central banks to be dominant but captive? In this commentary, I identify the book's ambiguities with the concept of infrastructural power the book draws from Michael Mann. Unless the dynamics of state-market interdependence are well specified, giving due attention to the sources of both public and private power, it is unclear what kind of agency central bankers are exercising if they lack sufficient autonomy to act in the public interest.

Since the first acute episode of financial crisis in autumn 2008, the world has manifestly changed in dramatic ways that reinforce skepticism and challenge the old assumptions of political economy. Hence this Article about central banks, whose pivotal role in post-crisis capitalism has not been adequately politically or theoretically addressed in any existing literature and can now be opened up by a conjunctural analysis that recognises uncertainty and mutability. There are several reasons why this is an intellectually and politically interesting task. Central banks have become an object of controversy and public attention after being pivotally involved in crisis management, which has since 2010 increasingly involved nonstandard monetary-policy crisis measures applied on a heroic scale. For example, in December 2011 and February 2012, Mario Draghi offered one trillion euros of cheap credit to European banks. This is a kind of role reversal for the bankers and a bouleversement of an institution that had been recently reinvented in a technocratic paradigm. After the 1980s, central bankers became respected econocrats whose technical practice was inflation targeting via shortterm interest-rate variation with freedom from political interference (or democratic accountability) justified by claims of technical mastery and neutrality. This Article that explores these issues is organized in a relatively straightforward way. Part II provides a brief overview of the scientization of central banking and the recent return to improvization. Then, Part III focuses on the peculiarity of a new conjuncture where the central banks have gone long on no growth capitalism. Part IV provides an overview of mainstream verdicts for and against quantitative easing, while Part V presents our analysis of the distributive issues.

"Central Banks" published on by Oxford University Press.

Monetary policy measures in reaction to the Global Financial Crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic have resulted in unprecedented (re)distributional effects. In addition, Central Bank (CB) interventions have been conceptualized as targeted measures favouring certain market participants compared to others. Against this background, discussions about CBs and inequality have sparked in the economic and legal literature. The article takes up this discourse and sheds light on the different aspects of equality within monetary policy: equality as an objective of monetary policy, equality and inequality considerations with regard to the design of monetary policy measures, and equality and inequality as side effects of monetary policy and the interaction between inequality and the monetary policy transmission. The aim is to provide a structural analysis of how the notion of equality is embedded in the mandate of the ECB and how it translates into legal requirements with regard to the implementation of monetary policy measures.
Central Banks, inequality, ECB, monetary policy, global financial crisis, COVID-19

Sarajevo -- Dayton -- Background -- IMF role -- Currency board arrangements -- Final agreement -- Developing the central bank law -- Our first meeting -- The second meeting -- November meetings -- The payment bureau system -- Bank payment systems -- The post-war system in Bosnia -- Cash settlement -- Adopting the central bank law -- Steve Hanke -- February 1997 mission -- The outcome -- Preparations for the central bank's start up -- The June 1997 mission -- John Dalton's visit -- The opening -- My arrival in Sarajevo -- The bank briefing -- The final Friday for NBBH as a monetary institution -- The last weekend -- Monday, August 11 -- Tuesday, August 12 -- Wednesday, August 13 -- Thursday, August 14 -- Friday, my last day -- The more complete "opening" -- Immediate issues -- Croat complaints -- The NBBH problem solved again -- Opening the main units -- New bank notes -- Promoting the KM -- Payment bureau reform -- The transformation strategy -- Mostar and Dubrovnik -- David Whitehead -- Kim Rhee -- Farewell Sarajevo -- Lessons learned -- Planning and donor coordination is required -- Short-term needs and long-run development -- There are no blank slates -- Policies must reflect capabilities -- Political support for reforms is needed -- Postscript -- Appendix I: The main monetary policy regimes -- Appendix II: The quantity theory of money -- Appendix III: designs for KM bank notes -- Appendix IV: the nature of money

Sovereign immunity — Foreign States, State-owned corporations and their property — Central Bank of Nigeria — Claim under documentary credit — Whether entitled to jurisdictional immunity — Whether immunity available to organisations legally independent of foreign State — Acts iure gestionis and iure imperii — Whether act to be classified according to nature or purpose — Whether classification to be made according to municipal or international law — Whether application of restrictive theory of sovereign immunity requires special connection between facts of the case and the forum — Whether public interest relevant — Attachment of bank deposits — Immunity from attachment — Whether funds allocated to State public service immune from attachment — Whether possible future use of assets for State activities relevant — The law of the Federal Republic of Germany