Suchergebnisse

PurposeThe New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) was published in June 2004. This modification of the regulatory framework for banking institutions raises the question to what extent real estate financing will be impacted and how market participants can be adequately prepared. Aims to examine the impact of Basel II on the future pricing and availability of debt capital and on the cost of capital in real estate financing and to present possible reactions for real estate developers.Design/methodology/approachThis research paper follows a deductive approach. First, the New Basel Capital Accord and the main features of commercial real estate financing are presented. On a normative level, the implications for developers are explained. Since no information regarding the behaviour of market participants in commercial real estate financing was available, the authors have ascertained the relevant questions within the framework of an empirical analysis. A total of 205 banking institutions were asked to fill out a survey pertaining to commercial real estate financing. The results of this survey are partly presented and interpreted.FindingsThe availability and the pricing of debt capital will be risk‐adjusted and will depend on the amount of regulatory equity banks will have to hold in reserve for a credit engagement. The cost of debt capital in real estate financing will rise due to systemic reasons of the New Basel Capital Accord. Banks are/will be very restrictive with regard to credit allowances. The use of the positive leverage effect will become more difficult. Structured financing, particularly the use of private equity, is the best way to fill a potential financing gap.Originality/valueThe paper is a timely investigation of a significant regulatory framework that is of world‐wide significance. The New Basel Capital Accord is introduced in its fundamental structure and the two relevant rating approaches are described and put into context. The paper reduces the complexity of the comprehensive and sophisticated Basel Capital Accord. Based on the facts that have been analysed, recommendations of how real estate developers can react to the changes in financing that lie ahead are given.

AbstractFollowing a few general considerations on the recently proposed revision of the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, this paper focuses on the first pillar of the Basel Committee proposals, the handling of capital requirements for credit risk in the banking book. The Basel Committee envisages an approach alternatively based on external ratings or on internal rating systems for the determination of the minimum capital requirement related to bank loan portfolios. This approach supports a system of capital requirements that is more sensitive to credit risk. On the basis of specific assumptions, these requirements provide a measure of the value at risk (VaR) produced by models used by major international banks. We first address the impact of the standardised and (internal ratings‐based) IRB foundation approach using general data on Italian banks loans' portfolios default rates. We then simulate the impact of the proposed new rules on the corporate loan portfolios of Italian banks, using the unique data set of mortality rates recently published by the Bank of Italy. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis: (i) the standardised approach implicitly penalizes Italian banks in their interbank funding as their rating is generally below AA/Aa, (ii) the average default rate experienced by Italian banks is higher than the one implied in the benchmark risk weight (BRW) proposed by the Basel Committee for the IRB foundation approach, thereby potentially leading to an increase in the regulatory risk weights, and (iii) the risk‐weight is based on an average asset correlation that is significantly higher than the one historically recorded within the Italian banks' corporate borrowers. These findings support the need for a significant revision of the basic inputs and assumptions of the Basel proposals. Finally, in relation to the conditions that allow the capital market to effectively discipline banks, we comment on the proposals advanced in relation to the third pillar of the new capital adequacy scheme.

After the Asian crisis of 1997-98, policy-makers invested much energy in designing a new international financial architecture. However, many of the policy proposals that have emerged from think tanks and the multilateral agencies have proven unworkable or politically unpalatable. The debate focuses on state-led initiatives. But the assumption that public policy is by definition an output of public institutions is difficult to sustain in an era of global change. This article considers specialized forms of intelligence gathering and judgment determination which seem increasingly important as sources of governance in this era of financial market volatility: Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's, the major bond rating agencies. More specifically, we examine a proposal of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to reform the existing capital adequacy framework by incorporating banks' own internal ratings and external bond ratings from the rating agencies, in order to calculate bank risk-weighted capital requirements. The article identifies a series of negative implications from the use of private rating agencies as a substitute for state-based regulation, premised on the organizational incentives that shape the ratings industry. Cementing these organizational incentives into the emerging financial architecture will, we argue, lead to negative social and economic consequences.