Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 166-180
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 166-180
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 131-158
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: American economic review, Band 98, Heft 4, S. 1629-1635
ISSN: 1944-7981
Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern outcomes that survive iterated strict dominance. If commitment attempts never fail, there are three such outcomes. In two of them, all the surplus goes to one player. In the third, there is a high probability of conflict. If commitment attempts succeed with probability q < 1, the unique outcome that survives iterated strict dominance entails conflict with probability q2. When c = 0, analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance. (JEL C78, D84)
In: IMT Lucca EIC Working Paper Series 02, January 2017
SSRN
Working paper
In: Militaire spectator: MS ; maanblad ; waarin opgen. de officie͏̈le mededelingen van de Koninkl. Landmacht en de Koninkl. Luchtmacht, Band 179, Heft 10
ISSN: 0026-3869
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
World Affairs Online
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 81-102
ISSN: 0020-8833, 1079-1760
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 45, Heft 1, S. 131-158
ISSN: 1468-2478
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 81-101
ISSN: 1468-2478
In light of growing water scarcity, virtual water, or the water embedded in key water-intensive commodities, has been an active area of debate among practitioners and academics alike. As of yet, however, there is no consensus on whether water scarcity affects conflict behavior and we still lack empirical research intending to account for the role of virtual water in affecting the odds of militarized disputes between states. Using quantitative methods and data on virtual water trade, we find that bilateral and multilateral trade openness reduce the probability of war between any given pair of country, which is consistent with the strategic role of this important commodity and the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains. We also find that the substantive effect of virtual water trade is comparable to that of oil and gas, the archetypal natural resources, in determining interstate conflicts' probability.
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In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 110-111
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: Peace research abstracts journal, Band 38, Heft 6, S. 857
ISSN: 0031-3599
In: Armed forces & society: official journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society : an interdisciplinary journal, Band 42, Heft 2, S. 301-323
ISSN: 0095-327X
World Affairs Online
"This book probes key issues pertaining to Africa's relations with global actors. It provides a comprehensive trajectory of Africa's relations with key bilateral and major multilateral actors, assessing how the Cold War affected the African state systems' political policies, its economies, and its security. Taken together, the essays in this volume provide a collective understanding of Africa's drive to improve the capacity of its state of global affairs, and assess whether it is in fact able to do so."--Back cover
World Affairs Online