Suchergebnisse

Looks at discrimination within the US beer industry, providing examples of sexual, racial and age discrimination which violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. Provides suggestions for minimizing or eliminating these issues together with examples from industry.

This book investigates the birth and evolution of craft breweries around the world. Microbrewery, brewpub, artisanal brewery, henceforth craft brewery, are terms referred to a new kind of production in the brewing industry contraposed to the mass production of beer, which has started and diffused in almost all industrialized countries in the last decades. This project provides an explanation of the entrepreneurial dynamics behind these new firms from an economic perspective. The product standardization of large producers, the emergence of a new more sophisticated demand and set of consumers, the effect of contagion, and technology aspects are analyzed as the main determinants behind this 'revolution'. The worldwide perspective makes the project distinctive, presenting cases from many relevant countries, including the USA, Australia, Japan, China, UK, Belgium, Italy and many other EU countries.--

Cover -- Title Page -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Beer's Evolution into a Japanese Commodity -- 1 Foreign Influences: The Origins of Japan's Beer Brewing Industry, 1868-1906 -- 2 Keeping Up Appearances: Maintaining Beer's German Authenticity, 1906-36 -- 3 Brewing Self-Sufficiency: Beer, Empire, and the Wartime Command Economy, 1937-45 -- 4 "The Taste of Home": Beer as Postwar Japanese Commodity, 1945-72 -- 5 Learning from Japan: "Orion Beer" and Okinawan Consumer Identity, 1945-72 -- 6 Indigenous Brews: Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Beer's Continuing Evolution since the 1970s -- Conclusion: Biiru no Nihonka - The "Japanization" of Beer -- Appendix: Data on Japan's Beer Brands and Their Manufacturers, 1869-1949 -- Glossary -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- Editors and Contributors -- Units of Measurements -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I Overview -- 1 Economics of the Craft Beer Revolution: A Comparative International Perspective -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Defining Craft Breweries and Craft Beer -- 1.2.1 "Gypsy Brewers": Are Contract Breweries Real Craft? -- 1.3 Concentration and Homogenization in the Global Beer Industry 1900-1980 -- 1.4 When Did the Craft Beer Revolution Start? -- 1.5 A Growing Demand for "Different" Beers -- 1.5.1 Demand for Variety: A Reaction to Homogenization in Beer Markets -- 1.5.2 Increasing Income -- 1.5.3 Peer Effects in Beer Consumption and Consumer Associations -- 1.6 Pioneers and Entrepreneurs in Craft Brewing -- 1.7 The Re-emergence of Small Firms in a Concentrated Market: Generalists and Specialists -- 1.8 Legitimization, Information, and Networks -- 1.9 Developing Technology and Capital Markets for Small Brewers -- 1.10 The Geography of Craft Beer -- 1.11 Regulations -- 1.12 The Macrobrewers' Responses to Craft Brewing -- 1.12.1 Craft-Style Beer Production by Macrobrewers -- 1.12.2 Takeover of Craft Brewers -- 1.12.3 Infrastructure Investment, Free Riding, and Consumer Access -- 1.13 Conclusion -- Appendix 1 -- References -- Part II Country Studies -- 2 Craft Beer in the USA: Strategic Connections to Macro- and European Brewers -- 2.1 Evolution of US Craft Brewing -- 2.2 The Early Brewers, Promoters, and Brewmeisters -- 2.2.1 The Early Brewers -- 2.2.2 The Early Promoters -- 2.2.3 The Brewmeister -- 2.3 Marketing and Strategic Interactions Between US Craft and Macrobrewers -- 2.3.1 Marketing Differences Between Craft Brewers and Macrobrewers -- 2.3.2 Macrobrewer Responses and Other Strategic Issues -- 2.4 The European Connection and Back -- 2.5 Conclusion -- Acknowledgment -- References

Merger efficiencies provide the primary justification for why mergers of competitors may benefit consumers. Surprisingly, there is little evidence that efficiencies can offset incentives to raise prices following mergers. We estimate the effects of increased concentration and efficiencies on pricing by using panel scanner data and geographic variation in how the merger of the brewers Miller and Coors was expected to increase concentration and reduce costs. All else equal, the average predicted increase in concentration led to price increases of 2%, but at the mean this was offset by a nearly equal and opposite efficiency effect.

We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model's structure. In an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to Bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. We simulate two mergers, which relax binding incentive compatibility constraints and increase supermarkups. These coordinated effects arise even with efficiencies that offset price increases under Bertrand competition. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L14, L41, L66)