Suchergebnisse

State territory — Territorial waters — Jurisdiction over — Inter-oceanic waterway — Navigable channel — Beagle Channel between Argentina and Chile — Islands at mouth of channel.Jurisdiction — Territorial — Over national waters — Maritime jurisdiction — Uti possidetis juris doctrineTreaties — In general — Title — Significance of — Preamble — Relevance ofTreaties — Interpretation — Principles and rules of interpretation — Interpretation by principles of Vienna Convention of 1969 on the law of treaties — Bases of negotiationTreaties — Interpretation of — Bilingual treaties — Varying versions — Maps and charts as evidence of contents — Confirmatory or corroborative incidents and material — Relevance of speech by Minister of Foreign AffairsTreaties — Special kinds of — Arbitration treaties — Denunciation of general treaty not affecting pending arbitration proceedingsDisputes — Arbitration — Law applied by arbitral tribunals — Decision in accordance with international law — Other matters to be taken into accountDisputes — Arbitration — Acceptance of arbitrationDisputes — Arbitration — Arbitration treaty — Denunciation of general treaty not affecting pending arbitration proceedingsDisputes — Arbitration — Appointment 'of members of Court of Arbitration — Death of a memberDisputes — Arbitration — Procedure — Visit to locus — Expenses — LanguageDisputes — Arbitration — Evidence — Boundary dispute — Relevance of cartography — The "time frame" — Maps and Admiralty charts — Memorandum by Admiralty hydrographer — Acts of jurisdiction as confirming or corroborative evidenceDisputes — Arbitration — The award — Declaration that decision constitutes the award — dispositif.State territory — Parts of — Water boundaries — Definition of boundary by arbitration — Tracing of boundary — Straight base lines — The Beagle Channel between Argentina and Chile — Islands at mouth of channel

This Christmas we commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the Beagle Channel crisis. This contributíon reconstructs this piece of history, from its beginning in 1977 to the menace of war, the Vatican mediation and finally the ratification of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship by Argentina in 1984. Dismissing simplistic analogies with the Falklands war, the reduction of the crisis to a populist manoeuvre of the Argentine Military Junta is refuted and the hypothesis of a bluff called by Chile with the support of the Vatican is proposed. The treaty is approached intertwining the mediation's dynamics with the broader context of the Argentine transition and the economic conjuncture. This reconstruction is based on puhlished material as well as on hitherto unpublished interviews. ; En esta Navidad, se cumplen treinta años de la crisis del Canal de Beagle. La presente contribución reconstruye esta historia, desde sus comienzos en 1977 a la amenaza de guerra, la mediación vaticana y fundamentalmente la ratificación por Argentina del Tratado de Paz y Amistad, en 1984. Rechazando fáciles analogías con la guerra de las Malvinas, se refuta la reducción de la crisis a una maniobra populista de la Junta Militar argentina, proponiendo la hipótesis de un bluff llamado por Chile con el concurso del Vaticano. Llegamos al tratado enlazando las dinámicas propias de la mediación con el contexto más amplio de la transición argentina y de la coyuntura económica. Esta reconstrucción se funda tanto en material publicado como en entrevistas inéditas.

It has been demonstrated that although the Argentine Declaration of Nullity does not contain valid legal arguments for rejection, it does indicate weaknesses in the Court's opinion that make it vulnerable to rejection for political reasons. Specifically, the Court's remarks about Chilean possession of disputed islands outside the hammer were especially ill-advised. In addition, the Court failed to clearly articulate the reason for dividing the small Channel islands by appurtenance while refusing to do so for PNL. Finally, the Court's refusal to apply an Oceanic principle, even in a narrow sense, was questionable in a case in which the legal arguments based upon the Treaty text were closely balanced. The Court's lack of power to decide "ex aequo et bono" did not prevent a broad interpretation of the Treaty to include some version of the Oceanic principle. Although the Court's refusal to apply the Oceanic principle was logically defensible, its broadside discrediting of the principle was not. The Court's adverse findings were made even more unacceptable to Argentina by virtue of such flaws in style. If the members of the International Court of Justice are to play a more important role in resolving future heated international disputes, they will have to speed up the procedure of the bodies on which they serve, improve their judicial style, and pay more attention to the symbolism of international politics.

At the Vatican, on 2 May 1985, representatives of Chile and Argentina signed a treaty to end the Beagle Channel dispute, the last major territorial conflict between the two nations. The treaty was a tribute to the professionalism of the negotiators of both countries as well as of the Vatican mediators, and it represented a major foreign policy triumph for President Raúl Alfonsín, head of Argentina's democratically-elected civilian government. Alfonsin's position on key issues, such as sovereignty over the islands within the channel, contrasted sharply with those of his military predecessors. According to Vatican officials, it was Alfonsin's flexibility that laid the groundwork for resolution of the issue (New York Times, 1984a). Chilean willingness to accede to fundamental Argentine demands was also crucial to resolution.

This book provides a unique view on the Beagle Channel crisis (1977-1984) between Argentina and Chile by examining it in a global political context. The author explores the factors which led from imminent conflict to signing the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in just six years. Regional and international dimensions of the Beagle crisis are given particular attention, including international arbitration, the participation of the Vatican as a third actor, the role of the US, the complicating effects of the Falkland war, and the relations between each party and the UK. The author highlights unequal effects on Argentine and Chilean foreign policies of domestic structures and international conditions. The book seeks to determine the extent to which foreign policy provides opportunities for states to exercise political autonomy, given the powerful constraints imposed by the multiple structures of the international system, and how negotiation behaviour generated the path from conflict to cooperation between Argentina and Chile. The author's focus on foreign policy aids the understanding of processes and decisions within Argentina and Chile during the Beagle crisis while utilising new theoretical approaches in the field of negotiation behaviour in Latin America. Andrés Villar Gertner holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Cambridge, UK, where he is Research Associate at the Centre for Rising Powers. Prior to his doctoral studies, he was a political analyst in the Department of Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile from 2007-09

Dedication -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Acronyms -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- Setting the Stage -- Research Design and Road Map -- Variables: Explanandum and Explanans -- Overview -- Notes -- Chapter 2: FPDM: Agents, Structures, and Status -- Introduction -- The Agency and Structure Debate -- The Theoretical Debate: Neorealism, Constructivism, and FPA -- Can the Agency-Structure Puzzle Be Resolved? -- Perception and Status -- The Domestic-International Scope: A Theoretical Challenge -- FPDM: The Individual and Situational Context -- Notes