This paper presents and critically evaluates the bank capital requirement rules proposed by the European Union - the capital requirements directive CRD IV and the capital requirements regulation CRR. First, the rules of the Basel III accord about equity capital standards of banks are briefly described. Second, the EU proposal based on Basel III is presented. The article differentiates between rules fully in line with Basel III, modified rules, and new rules not covered by Basel III. Third, the EU proposals are critically evaluated. The paper concludes that the proposals lead in the right direction, but there is still much room for improvement. In fact, some of the planned rules should be urgently revised. Above all, risk weights for member state government bonds must be introduced, liquidity requirements should not overly favour government bonds, and member states should be able to set capital requirements which are greater than 18% of risk-weighted assets.
The Basel III Accord imposes minimum liquidity standards on bank balance sheets that are already constrained by minimum capital standards. It is not clear whether or how banks' behaviors will change in this new joint-constraint regime. To gain some insight, we study the balance sheet liquidity behavior of U.S. banking companies in response to negative equity capital shocks prior to the implementation of Basel III. Our 1998-2012 data indicate that banks treated regulatory capital and balance sheet liquidity (e.g., net stable funding ratios, core deposits-to-loans, liquid assets-to-assets) as substitutes rather than complements. This main finding is limited to so-called 'community banks' with assets less than $1 billion; equity capital and liquidity were neither substitutes nor complements at larger banks. In the course of rebuilding their capital ratios, shocked community banks substituted away from loans and loan commitments and reduced their dividend payouts, actions that resulted in greater balance sheet liquidity. Thus, in the state of nature that has traditionally most concerned bank regulators (i.e., stress to bank equity capital), community banks increase their liquidity buffers. Given that these lenders do not pose systemic risk, and that they have historically exceeded the Basel III liquidity minimums by wide margins, our findings suggest that imposing minimum liquidity thresholds on small banks will likely yield little prudential benefit.
The Basel III Accord imposes minimum liquidity standards on bank balance sheets that are already constrained by minimum capital standards. It is not clear whether or how banks' behaviors will change in this new joint-constraint regime. To gain some insight, we study the balance sheet liquidity behavior of U.S. banking companies in response to negative equity capital shocks prior to the implementation of Basel III. Our 1998-2012 data indicate that banks treated regulatory capital and balance sheet liquidity (e.g., net stable funding ratios, core deposits-to-loans, liquid assets-to-assets) as substitutes rather than complements. This main finding is limited to so-called 'community banks' with assets less than $1 billion; equity capital and liquidity were neither substitutes nor complements at larger banks. In the course of rebuilding their capital ratios, shocked community banks substituted away from loans and loan commitments and reduced their dividend payouts, actions that resulted in greater balance sheet liquidity. Thus, in the state of nature that has traditionally most concerned bank regulators (i.e., stress to bank equity capital), community banks increase their liquidity buffers. Given that these lenders do not pose systemic risk, and that they have historically exceeded the Basel III liquidity minimums by wide margins, our findings suggest that imposing minimum liquidity thresholds on small banks will likely yield little prudential benefit.
Private equity/venture capital was introduced in Ghana in 1991. In conjunction with this entry of a new asset class, the Government of Ghana (GoG) created a legal/ regulatory framework for VC funds in the early 1990s, regulated by the Bank of Ghana. In late 1991, USAID sponsored a venture capital fund in Ghana, along with the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC). The initiative set up two companies, a non-bank finance company to hold the funds, the Ghana Venture Capital Fund (GVCF), and a separate management company, Venture Fund Management Company (VFMC), to make the investments. This initiative created the impetus for legal/regulatory framework for venture capital funds which was defined by the Financial Institutions (Non- Banking) Law of 1993, and "Draft Operating Guidelines for Venture Capital Funding Companies" which were published by the Bank of Ghana in 1995. Ghana is generally touted as an attractive investment destination on the continent because of its stable government and relatively strong business environment. However, there are also some market impediments specific to private equity/venture capital in Ghana. The country's strong business environment is reflected in its ranking of 70th out of 189 countries in the 2015 World Bank Doing Business Study, above both Kenya (136) and Nigeria (170). However, Treasury bill rates in Ghana have been around 25 percent (91-day and 182-day), making it harder to justify investment in riskier and more illiquid alternative assets by domestic institutional investors. There has been significant depreciation (approximately 75 percent) in the Ghana cedi since the currency was redenominated in 2007 after the significant loss of value of the Second Cedi, which was advanced in 1967. This depreciation in the Ghana cedi has made business fundamentals unsupportive for investment. The objective of this study is to assess the private equity/venture capital (PE/VC) ecosystem in Ghana and to provide recommendations aimed at fostering a robust private equity and venture capital environment that can provide risk financing for competitive small and medium enterprises (SMEs). PE/VC firms are investment managers that mobilize fixed pools of capital to invest in a variety of companies, often across many industries. These firms typically comb the market for high potential investment opportunities through their network of intermediaries, and by developing business linkages and competencies in specific sectors. Apart from providing financing, PE/VC funds tend to take a "capital plus" approach, in that they help the companies in their portfolios to enhance management capacity, improve market focus and presence, strengthen governance, and manage growth. Although PE investment styles may vary considerably, many firms seek financial returns by supporting and financing the growth of the companies in their portfolios. As such, these firms are widely linked to job creation.
