Suchergebnisse

Front matter -- Preface -- Contents -- Tables, Figures, and Boxes -- Executive Summary -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Firearms and Ammunition: Physics, Manufacturing, and Sources of Variability -- 3 Firearms Identification and the Use of Ballistic Evidence -- 4 Current Ballistic Imaging Technology -- 5 Current Ballistic Image Databases: NIBIN and the State Reference Databases -- 6 Operational and Technical Enhancements to NIBIN -- 7 Three-Dimensional Measurement and Ballistic Imaging -- 8 Experimental Evidence on Sources of Variability and Imaging Standards -- 9 Feasibility of a National Reference Ballistic Image Database -- 10 Microstamping: Alternative Technology for Tracing to Point of Sale -- 11 Best Standards for Future Developments in Computer-Assisted Firearms Identification -- References -- Appendix A Gun Enforcement and Ballistic Imaging Technology in Boston -- Appendix B Biographical Sketches of Committee Members and Staff.

The armour technologist conducts ballistic impact testing either for evaluating armour materials and systems or for studying material's defeating mechanism. Most standards make use of the ballistic limit velocity for ballistic assessment. This is the bullet impact velocity that leads to the protection perforation in 50 per cent of the cases. Various models have been emerged to estimate this key metric. The present article summarises the popular models developed for ballistic limit estimation. An attempt is made to point out models' strength and weakness. First, the experimental set-up used for that goal is displayed. Next, a concise overview of ballistic limit estimation methods is presented. Lastly, a discussion is dedicated to model's comparison and analysis. This literature survey reveals that the main drawback of already existing methods is that they are purely statistical. Moreover, existing methods are based on the normality assumption of perforation velocities which tends from -infinity to infinity. The main conclusion of this survey is that the presented methods offer a comparable accuracy in estimating the ballistic limit velocity. However, a given variability is remarked when extreme values estimation is of interest, impact velocities leading to low and high perforation probability. Finally, existing models' performances decay with the reduction of the experimental sample size which represent a constraining requirement in ballistic resistance assessment.

Strategic, technical, and political case for eliminating all ballistic missiles; US perspective.

Defense against nuclear attack--so natural and seemingly so compelling a goal--has provoked debate for at least twenty years. Ballistic missle defense systems, formerly called antiballistic missile systems, offer the prospect of remedying both superpowers' alarming vulnerability to nuclear weapons by technological rather than political means. But whether ballistic missile defenses can be made to work and whether it is wise to build them remain controversial. The U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 restricts testing and deployment of ballistic missile defenses but has not prohibited more than a decade of research and development on both sides. As exotic new proposals are put forward for space-based directed-energy systems, questions about the effectiveness and wisdom of missile defense have again become central to the national debate on defense policy. This study, jointly sponsored by the Brookings Institution and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, examines the strategic, technological, and political issues raised by ballistic missile defense. Eight contributors take an analytical approach to their areas of expertise, which include the relationship of missile defense to nuclear strategy, the nature and potential applications of current and future technologies, the views on missile defense in the Soviet Union and among the smaller nuclear powers, the meaning of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for today's technology, and the present role and historical legacy of ballistic missile defense in the context of East-West relations. The volume editors give a comprehensive introduction to this wide range of subjects and an assessment of future prospects. In the final chapter, nine knowledgeable observers offer their varied personal views on the ballistic missile defense question.

While discussions of Iran's growing strategic threat focus almost exclusively on its nuclear capabilities and objectives, Tehran's massive ballistic missile arsenal poses a clear and present danger to both the oil installations of the Persian Gulf monarchies and to the Western military presence in the region. This in turn has prompted members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to acquire air defense and ballistic missile defense systems at various levels and in various configurations. At the same time, endemic inter-gulf rivalries have left these nations highly vulnerable to Iranian missile threats. Tehran is currently improving the missile accuracy and destructive power of its arsenal in addition to shortening exposure time to hostile attack through increased reliance on solid-fuel engines, which cut launch preparation time and make for easier maintenance. This evergrowing and more sophisticated arsenal has increased fears among the GCC states in recent years, especially as Iran's ballistic missile program has not received the same level of international scrutiny as its nuclear program. Adapted from the source document.

Strategic and technical issues involved in the Strategic Defense Initiative, a program to develop a defense against intercontinental missiles. Partial contents: Star wars and strategic defense, by Jeffrey Boutwell; The Strategic Defense Initiative, by Caspar W. Weinberger; Defense as a deterrent of war, by Edward Teller; Soviet perspectives on BMD, by Raymond Garthoff.