Suchergebnisse

How are resources typically allocated across budget categories in evaluation studies? To address this question, data from two studies of evaluation budgeting practices are presented. In the first study, estimated budget figures were provided for formative and summative evaluations by evaluators in 29 state department of education evaluation units. In the second study, initial budget figures, final costs, and study characteristics were abstracted from the records of 85 evaluations conducted by an evaluation contracting firm. A common pattern of budget allocations was identified in which approximately 61% of the total evaluation budget was allocated to personnel, overhead added an additional 13% to 14% to the cost of the evaluation, and all other budget categories consisted of about 15% or less of the total budget. These allocation patterns were found to vary according to certam study characteristics, however, such as size of total budget, purpose of the evaluation (formative or summative), study design, and other client-related factors.

Scarce resources can be allocated to budget categories by
processing a set of goals to be achieved, alternative budget categories
and relations between each budget category and each goal expressed in
whatever terms with which the user is comfortable. A concrete example is
given involving the allocating of a $500,000 budget to the police
and the courts in the light of the goals of crime reduction and fair
procedure in separating the innocent from the guilty. The police do
better than the courts on crime reduction, but the courts do better than
the police on fair procedure. Fair procedure, it is suggested, is
considered more important than crime reduction. With that tentative
assumption one can determine what proportion of the budget should be
allocated to the police and what proportion to the courts. Initial
allocations may be changed in the light of whatever constraints exist
concerning minimum amounts that need to be allocated to the police or
the courts. The initial allocations can also be subjected to a
sensitivity analysis, to see how responsive they are to changes in the
inputs concerning the relative importance of the goals and the nature of
the relationships between each budget category and each goal.

EU declares to provide support for the rural and poor regions of its member states. However, recent research shows that past EU budget allocations (in EU-15) can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers deciding on the bulk of EU spending. A standard power measure alone can explain about 85% of the variance of the past EU budget shares, while, if stable coalition patterns among member countries are taken into account, power can explain at least 95% of the budget allocation. In this paper we use such estimates to predict EU budget shares after the eastern enlargement. According to our estimates eastern enlargement has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Moreover, whether the voting rules are based on the Nice Treaty (NT) or the Constitutional Treaty (CT) makes a difference for most member states. Many member states would be worse off under CT than under NT.

This study presents an analytical model of budget allocation into military and civilian expenditures within an arms race between two rival countries and compares the consequences of shortsighted (period-by-period) planning versus forward-looking (long-term) planning. The authors show that although shortsighted planning is favorable for both countries, they are likely to be locked in a prisoner's dilemma in which both overinvest in arms procurement. The likelihood of overinvestment in arms procurement is higher when the perceived benefit from security is higher and when future benefits from existing arms stocks are ''high''; that is, when the rate of technology improvement over time is lower, the depreciation rate of existing arms is lower and the discount factor is higher. A dynamic version of Kagan et al., employing real-world data, finds evidence for the existence of a prisoner's dilemma in the Israeli—Syrian arms race.

This paper discusses about the election of regional heads to the regional government budget allocation. This study discusses the regional budget in the period before local election and during the local election. Comparison is done by comparing the average expenditure comparison before and during the local election period by using paired sample t-test. The sample in this study in Indonesia carried out the post-conflict local election in 2017. The results of this study showed that basically before the post-conflict local election and at the post-conflict local election. There was a decrease in the allocation of grant spending during the post-conflict local election compared to the previous year. Besides that, there was no difference in the allocation of social assistance expenditure. This can improve the renewal and regulatory system in Indonesia, thus indicating that budget politicization is not proven.

In this paper, we argue that the bulk of EU budget spending can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers. Using such estimates, we compare the incumbent member states' predicted budget receipts before and after eastern enlargement and examine the impact of different voting rules in EU-27. According to our estimates eastern enlargement has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Moreover, whether the voting rules are based on the Nice Treaty or the Constitutional Treaty makes a difference for most member states. [Copyright 2007 Elsevier B.V.]