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[An economist's take on differential accumulation and inflation in Pakistan] Our analysis seeks to look at inflation as a political economic phenomenon, based on a framework devised by Jonathan Nitzan and christened differential accumulation. The theory of differential accumulation rejects the conventional definitions of capital and draws upon Veblenian economics to integrate the definitions of power and capital by describing the ownership of capital as differential power claims over social processes. In order to maximize capital accumulation, businessmen allocate resources, in response to the socio-political environment, to beat a certain benchmark rate of return in their pursuit of maximizing capital accumulation. We find evidence for the existence of this phenomenon in Pakistan by assuming that a certain group of businessmen seeks to maximize power by maximizing relative profit, which in turn affects overall inflation. However, we have not established proof through a scientifically rigorous process due to incomplete datasets. We believe that these findings merit further investigation and propose that the maximization of relative profit as opposed to absolute profit, may, in fact, be a behavioral phenomenon. Such a finding will merely be the doppelganger of the maximization of relative utility, as opposed to absolute utility, in consumer decision-making models.

From the 1980s to the present, Hollywood's major distributors have been able to redistribute U.S. theatrical attendance to the advantage of their biggest blockbusters and franchises. At the global scale and during the same period, Hollywood has been leveraging U.S. foreign power to break ground in countries that have historically protected and supported their domestic film culture. For example, Hollywood's major distributors have increased their power in such countries as Mexico, Canada, Australia and South Korea. This paper will analyze a pertinent test case' for Hollywood's global power: China and its film market. Not only does China have a film-quota policy that restricts the number of theatrical releases that have a foreign distributor (∼ 20 to 34 films per year), the Communist Party has helped the Chinese film business grow to have steady film releases and its own movie star system. Theoretically, China would be a prime example of a film market that would need to be opened with the assistance of the U.S. government. Empirically, however, the case of Chinese cinema might be a curious exception; we can investigate how a political economic strategy rooted in explicit power is reaching a limit. Hollywood is, potentially without any other option, taking a more friendly, collaborative approach with China's censorship rules and its quota and film-production laws.

From the 1980s to the present, Hollywood's major distributors have been able to redistribute U.S. theatrical attendance to the advantage of their biggest blockbusters and franchises. At the global scale and during the same period, Hollywood has been leveraging U.S. foreign power to break ground in countries that have historically protected and supported their domestic film culture. For example, Hollywood's major distributors have increased their power in such countries as Mexico, Canada, Australia and South Korea (Jin, 2011). This paper will analyze a pertinent "test case" for Hollywood's global power: China and its film market. Not only does China have a film-quota policy that restricts the number of theatrical releases that have a foreign distributor (~ 20 to 34 films per year), the Communist Party has also nurtured a Chinese film business that has steady film releases and its own movie star system. Theoretically, China would be a prime example of a film market that would need to be opened with the assistance of the U.S. government. Empirically, however, the case of Chinese cinema might be a curious exception; we can investigate how a political economic strategy rooted in explicit power is reaching a limit. Hollywood is, potentially without any other option, taking a more friendly, collaborative approach with China's censorship rules and its quota and film-production laws.

The Asian miracle faces two external threats, both related to re-armament. One is that the regional arms race will trigger open hostilities. The other is that renewed conflict in the Persian Gulf will trigger an oil crisis, choking Asia's energy-hungry economies. The immediate danger on both fronts is limited. In the Asia, tangible 'peace dividends' from growth still far outweigh potential 'redistributional gains' from war, whereas in the Middle East the Arab-Israeli peace process remains on course. The long-run risks, however, are significantly greater. Asian growth will eventually decelerate, which implies a far thinner cushion to soften political disputes.

The interaction of oil exports from the Middle East in the 1970s with arms imports to this region has drawn attention from several researchers. The existing literature, however, is seriously flawed for it ignores the large corporate players whose actions synchronize the two flows of income and, thus fails to identify the significance of these corporations for the political economy of armaments. This present paper is the first of a series of four essays that attempt to relate the dynamics of market structures to the escalation of military sales. Here we briefly asses some neo-Marxist and institutional writings that offer insight into the subject of relevant issues. We find them deficient and perhaps outdated in some respects.

In his new book, "Chaebol: The Transnational Capital That Rules Korea," Hyung-Joon Park argues that the state has not receded, but has become more of an agent for capital – an interview with Seon-hee Ahn.

Much more than a simple examination of EU-Asia relations, this book examines the idea that the EU may constitute a 'model' for East Asian regionalism. It challenges specialists on the EU to understand the EU's impact on Asia and Asia's impact on the EU whilst illustrating that there is a commonality of interests in both Europe and Asia.

This is the third paper in a series of four essays that deal with recent developments affecting the political economy of armaments. It begins by identifying the 'military bias paradox' of divergent behaviour, whereby the large armament corporations experienced an almost uninterrupted growth since the peak of the Vietnam War while domestic military spending exhibited a decade-long decline. The resolution of this apparent paradox could be found in the merging institution of arms exports, which supplemented domestic military budgets. The expansion of world markets for weapons coincided with the oil crisis of the 1970s. The Middle East became the focus of these developments. The interaction during the 1970s of rising military exports to this area and growing oil exports from the region provided a bsais for cooperation between major armament and energy corporations in an 'Armadollar-Petrodollar Coalition'. The consolidation of this coalition removed a major conflict between 'civilian' and 'military' producers in the United States and affected the course of U.S. domestic and foreign military policies.