Suchergebnisse

This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing parameter. This incomplete information changes many of the results which were attained in Bös (1991) in a full-information setting.

We analyze an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policy‐maker aims to improve the home firm's profit using an export subsidy. The optimal export subsidy depends on the demand conditions in the third country, which are unknown to the policy‐maker. The home firm can convey this information to the policy‐maker via costly lobbying. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: it makes the home firm's lobby effort credible and eases the policy‐maker's information problem. We identify the conditions under which lobbying is beneficial on balance and the conditions under which it is harmful.

The purpose of this research is to determine the impact of information assimilation on equity issuance in the banking sector. The data consists of 384 observations of banking and finance companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2020 to 2023. A univariate analysis was utilized to identify the differences in asymmetry between companies with seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and non-SEOs to meet capital requirements in the banking sector. The research indicates that SEO and non-SEO banks exhibit significant differences in their spreads. Despite the banking sector's access to deposits and wholesale funding to finance capital shortages or prospective projects, equity issuance by the banking sector has increased. The presence of regulations on information disclosure does not produce asymmetric information; however, the increased spread among companies with SEOs is due to the more complex information assimilation process, which in turn results in a wider spread relative to the fundamental price.

Informational lobbying -- the use by interest groups (IGs) of expert or private information to persuade policymakers to implement particular policies -- is regarded as an important means of influence. It is shown that, in a setting of partially conflicting interests, a rationale for informational lobbying exists only when messages bear a cost to the IG, & when the IG's preferences carry information in the "right" direction. In addition, it is shown that the characteristics of the IG influence the policymaker's behavior more than the content of the messages. Relationships between the occurrence & impact of lobbying & among the cost of lobbying, the stake an IG has in persuading the policymaker, the similarity between the policymaker's & the IG's preferences, & the initial beliefs of the policymaker are also explored. Results are related to empirical findings on lobbies, & to theoretical hypotheses put forth in the literature on IGs. Suggestions for further research are made. 1 Appendix, 33 References. Adapted from the source document.

Loans are illiquid assets that can be sold in a secondary market even that buyers have no certainty about their quality. I study a model in which a lender has access to new investment opportunities when all her assets are illiquid. To raise funds, the lender may either borrow using her assets as collateral, or she can sell them in a secondary market. Given asymmetric information about assets quality, the lender cannot recover the total value of her assets. There is then a role for the government to correct the information problem using fiscal tools.

Abstract
We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human capital prevailing in the labor market they will be active in. We prove existence and constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria, which are always characterized by overeducation. An increase in total expected surplus can be obtained by shrinking, at the margin, the set of workers investing in high skills. This can be implemented by imposing taxes on the cost of investing in high skills or by imposing a progressive labor earning tax.