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THIS PAPER DISCUSSES NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL IN DETAIL. CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS ARE EXPLORED AND SUGGESTIONS GIVEN FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS. VARIOUS STRATEGIES ARE INCLUDED, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING WEAPON-FREE ZONES, SHARED SURVIVAL NEEDS AND THE PHYSICAL REALITIES OF A NUCLEAR EVENT. THE PAPER PRESENTS THE BROAD OUTLINES OF A POSSIBLE APPROACH.

Why do some states agree to suspend their weapons programs in exchange for compensation while others fail to come to terms? I argue that the changing credibility of preventive war is an important determinant of arms construction. If preventive war is never an option, states can reach mutually preferable settlements. However, if preventive war is not credible today but will be credible in the future, a commitment problem results: the state considering investment faces a "window of opportunity" and must build the arms or it will not receive concessions later on. Thus, agreements fail under these conditions. I then apply the theoretical findings to the Soviet Union's decision to build nuclear weapons in 1949. War exhaustion made preventive war not credible for the United States immediately following World War II, but lingering concerns about future preventive action induced Moscow to proliferate. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)

It is widely assumed that weak economic performance in the Soviet Union provides motivation for Soviet leaders to pursue arms negotiations in good faith. This paper argues that the reality is quite the opposite. For both political and economic considerations, the weak economy of the Soviet Union generates incentives for the Soviets to use arms control negotiations to achieve military advantages rather than to limit arms.

Theorists debate whether symmetry or asymmetry of the power balance can help bring about bargaining success. Arbitration is difficult because the 'Symmetry Theory' accepts Structuralist theoretical conventions, while the 'Asymmetry Theory' rejects such conventions. This article employs a 'Nuclear Weapons Addendum' to strengthen the Asymmetry Theory by allowing it to explain bargaining results in symmetric and asymmetric cases without dismissing Structuralist assumptions. We analyze comparative case studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty to argue that this modified Asymmetry Theory provides a more convincing narrative that should be considered in Structuralist discussions of international negotiation.