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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Tables -- Foreword -- A Political Map of the Contemporary Arab World -- Introduction -- 1 The Origins of the Arab State System -- 2 'Strong' and 'Weak' States: A Qualified Return to the Muqaddimah -- 3 Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework -- 4 The Rentier State in the Arab World -- 5 Policies for Development: Attitudes toward Industry and Services -- 6 Arab Bureaucracies: Expanding Size, Changing Roles -- 7 Social Structure and Political Stability: Comparative Evidence from the Algerian, Syrian and Iraqi Cases -- 8 Arab Military in Politics: from Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian Regime -- 9 Opposition as Support of the State -- 10 Notions of the State in Contemporary Arab-Islamic Writings -- 11 Arab Regimes: Legitimacy and Foreign Policy -- 12 The Impact of Palestine on Arab Politics -- 13 Economic Interdependence and National Sovereignty -- 14 Immigrants in the Arab Gulf Countries: 'Sojourners' or 'Settlers'? -- 15 Migration and Political Integration in the Arab World -- 16 The Politics of Arab Integration -- References -- Index.

The Arab world has experienced a large number of military presidencies since General Bakr Sidki's brief rule in Iraq in 1936. The phenomenon became of great significance beginning with Colonel Jamal ʿAbd al-Nasir's presidency in Egypt in the early 1950s, which established a model for similar regimes in Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and, at least initially, Libya under the self-promoted Colonel Muʿammar al-Qadhafi. The president who exchanged his uniform for a suit; an authoritarian style of political management in the name of a revolution against an old, foreign-dominated order; and the legitimacy obtained from laudable achievements in the international and economic sphere: these were all part of al-Nasir's influence and legacy.

The situation in the Middle East is complicated, (a) by a series of superimposed linguistic, national & religious allegiances, among a group of peoples at various econ, cultural & constitutional levels & in various pol'al alignments, (b) by the various foreign influences exerted in the area, & (c) by the almost pathological hatred & fear of Israel by the Arab-speaking countries. This hatred & fear is due largely to the following: (1) Pan-Arabism & Pan-Islamism that regard Jews as alien colonizers; (2) embitterment caused by the Arab refugees; (3) recognition of Israel's higher standards of educ, its greater powers of org, its internal cohesion, patriotism & energy; (4) jealousy of Israel's comparatively greater wealth & its financial backing by Jews abroad; & (5) conviction that Israel's immigration policy must inevitably lead to an expansionist urge. The hatred & fear is expressed by the blockade of Israel, by frontier clashes & by the refusal to recognize the existence of Israel or to sign peace treaties with her. Apart from the general Arab hatred of Israel, Egypt has additional reasons of her own, which stem from the fact that Israel forms a barrier to the movement of Egyptian forces to other Arab-speaking countries; these have been strengthened by the Israeli invasion of Sinai. IPSA.