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Following renewed academic and policy interest in the destination-based principle for taxing profits—particularly through a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT)—this paper studies other forms of efficient destination-based taxes. Specifically, it analyzes the Destination-Based Allowance for Corporate Equity (DBACE) and Allowance for Corporate Capital (DBACC). It describes adjustments that are required to turn an origin into a destination-based versions of these taxes. These include adjustments to capital and equity, which are additional to the border adjustments needed under a DBCFT. The paper finds that the DBACC and DBACE reduce profit shifting and tax competition, but cannot fully eliminate them, with the DBACE more sensitive than the DBACC. Overall, given the potential major political cost of switching from an origin to a destination-based tax system, we conclude that advantages of the DBCFT are likely to outweigh the transitional advantages of the DBACE/DBACC.

Cover -- Content -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Background: Theory of Neutral Taxes without Border Adjustment -- A. The Theory of the ACE -- III. Defining Destination-Based Allowances -- A. The DBCFT -- B. The DBACE -- C. The DBACC -- IV. Properties and Implications of Destination-Based Allowances -- A. Domestic Neutrality -- B. Profit Shifting -- C. Strategic Interactions -- D. Revenue -- E. Exchange Rate and Trade -- F. Incidence -- G. Sector-Specific Issues -- V. Conclusions -- References -- Tables -- 1. Acronyms and Tax Systems -- A1. Empirical Evidence on the ACE -- A2. Experiences with ACE Systems -- Figures -- 1. The Marginal Return to Capital Before and After Tax -- Appendixes -- 1. Country Experiences with Rent Taxes.

This paper proposes the introduction of a consumption-based corporate income tax in the European Union. Our proposal would guarantee neutrality regarding investment decisions and at the same time increase cost-efficiency. The proposal is based on the S-base cash flow tax, where transactions within the corporate sector are not at all taxable and only transactions be-tween shareholders and corporations are subject to tax. In contrast to existing S-base cash flow tax systems, tax deductibility of investments is deferred. Rather, the acquisition costs and capital endowments are compounded at the capital market rate and are set off against fu-ture capital gains. Dividends and withdrawals are fully taxable at the shareholder level. Be-cause of the similarities to the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) tax our proposal is called Allowance for Shareholder Equity (ASE tax). The ASE tax exhibits the same neutrality properties as the traditional cash flow tax. More-over, the compounded inter-temporal credit method ensures that it is neutral with respect to the decision between domestic and foreign investment. To increase acceptance of the ASE tax, current taxpayers' documentation requirements will be reduced rather than extended. Our proposal is shaped in a way that it could be realized in a single EU country or in all member states of the EU.