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What kind of knowledge could be obtainable just by thinking? Debating the A Priori presents a series of exchanges between two leading philosophers on how to answer this question. In this extended debate, Boghossian and Williamson contribute alternating chapters which develop radically contrasting views and present detailed replies to each other's arguments. A central case is the nature of basic logical knowledge and the justification for basic deductive inferences, but the arguments range widely across epistemology, the philosophy of language, and metaphilosophy. The debate takes in the status of the distinctions between analytic and synthetic and between a priori and a posteriori, as well as problems concerning the conditions for linguistic understanding and competence, and the question of what it might be to grasp a concept or to have an intuition. Both authors explore implications for how philosophy itself works, or should work. The result vividly exposes some of the main fault lines in contemporary philosophy, concerning the relation between reason and experience, the status of basic beliefs, the nature of concepts and intuitions, the role of language in our understanding of the world, how to study knowledge, and what it is to do philosophy. Both authors provide conclusions which sum up their positions and place the arguments in context. Their lively and engaging exchanges allow the reader to follow up-close how a philosophical debatte evolves.

This paper discusses the modern idea of imagination and its various transformations in the phenomenological conceptual frameworks of Edward Casey, Mikel Dufrenne (1910-1995), Max Scheler (1874-1928) and Vasily Sesemann (1884-1963). I would like to raise and critically assess questions regarding the role of imagination in our consciousness: whether imagination is a productive or reproductive activity; and how, if at all, aesthetic expression limits the imagination. Casey criticizes Dufrenne for his attempt to unite imagination with aesthetic expression. He argues for the autonomy of the imagination but leaves the question of the relationship between the imagination and perception unanswered. Dufrenne partially shares his theory of imagination with Sesemann. Both philosophers claim that imagination is a reproductive activity rather than a productive one in the sense that it is limited by the forms of the material a priori. In other words, aesthetic expression has to obey the principle of correlation between percipiens and perceptum. Creativity becomes possible when the creator is able to reproduce in his expression another subject's possible perceptivity. Max Scheler emphasized the correlative connection of spiritual activity with the world. He linked the concept of imagination to the practical being in the world. In Sesemann's aesthetics the role of embodied imagination in artistic creation and the perception of aesthetic objects were also considered. Both authors argued that the connection between imagination and the essential modes of the world's givenness is guaranteed by the mode of embodied imagination. Both acknowledged that imagination is related to unconscious desires and drive. Both authors stated that the schematisms of imagination express the style of the perception of the world. The fact that imagination is an embodied phenomenon is illustrated by the way it exists in the world, since imagination is essentially a free activity restricted only by "the style of the world's horizon."

Este artigo examina o impacto do problema de causalidade na filosofia moral de Kant, mais especificamente a influência de Hume na visão de Kant sobre o livre arbítrio. Em uma investigação sobre o entendimento humano, Hume argumenta que não podemos saber apenas por meio de nossas capacidades intelectuais que efeito um determinado evento trará sem uma base empírica. A causalidade, portanto, equivale apenas a um hábito, que não tem fundamento lógico. Este é o primeiro problema levantado por Hume, ao qual Kant dedica grande parte de sua Crítica da razão pura. Um segundo problema tem a ver com a questão da liberdade, particularmente o dilema colocado pelo determinismo, que consiste na aparente impossibilidade de saber se nossas ações são ou não uma conseqüência das escolhas livres. Kant procura responder a este segundo problema em sua filosofia moral, notadamente nos Fundamentos da metafísica da moral e na Crítica da razão prática. Afirmo que em Kant o conceito de "transcendental" é a chave não apenas para responder ao problema teórico da causalidade, mas também para enfrentar o problema prático da liberdade. O que distingue o exame moral de Kant é precisamente uma análise crítica da razão. Seu projeto moral faz parte de um projeto crítico abrangente, em que o conhecimento teórico e prático está entrelaçado.