Suchergebnisse

В статье рассматриваются варианты федеративного устройства, предлагаемые различными политическими силами в проектах конституции России начала 1990-х годов. Анализируются проекты Конституционной Комиссии РФ, Президента РФ, Конституционного Совещания, а также альтернативные проекты российских политических объединений. Показаны отличительные черты федеративного устройства в конституционных проектах, подготовленных организациями демократического толка, коммунистическими объединениями, а также в проектах, представленных небольшими политическими организациями или отдельными авторами. Рассматривается развитие федеративных отношений РФ в начале 1990-х годов, политика субъектов Федерации во взаимоотношениях с центром. Исследуется характер Федеративного договора РФ, включенного в большинство конституционных проектов 1992-1993 гг. Выявляются ключевые проблемы становления федеративного устройства современной России: причины и процесс формирования асимметричной федерации, проблема суверенитета республик в составе РФ. Особое внимание уделено проблеме федеративного устройства в проекте Конституции России, вынесенном на всенародное голосование 12 декабря 1993 г. ; In the article the author considers variants of the Russian federal structure offered by various political forces in drafts of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in the beginning of the 1990th. These Constitutional drafts are offered by Constitutional Commission, President of Russia, Constitutional Meeting and alternative drafts which were offered by Russian political associations. Distinctive features of the federal structure in the constitutional projects prepared by the organizations of democratic sense, by communistic associations, and also in the projects presented by the small political organizations or certain authors are shown. The author analyzes development of the federal relations of the Russian Federation in the beginning of the 1990th, policy of subjects of Federation in relationship with the center is considered. Character of the Federal contract Russian Federation included in the majority of the constitutional projects of 1992-1993 is investigated. Key problems of formation of the federal structure of modern Russia come to light: the reasons and process of formation of asymmetric federation, a problem of the sovereignty of the republics as a part of the Russian Federation. The special attention is paid to a problem of the federal device in the draft of the Constitution of Russia, submitted for national vote on December 12, 1993.

This book rethinks the idea and practice of federalism, and considers the specific constitutional purposes that federalism serves. Using the methodology of constitutional theory, the book re-evaluates our understanding of federalism in its historical development and present incarnations.

This title rethinks the idea and practice of federalism, and considers the specific constitutional purposes that federalism serves. Using the methodology of constitutional theory, the book re-evaluates our understanding of federalism in its historical development and present incarnations.

THE AUTHORS CONTEND THAT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT IT PROCUDED HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY AND UNNECESSARILY CLOUDED BY AN ANCIENT DISPUTE BETWEEN THE ADHERENTS OF TWO VERY BROAD TRADITIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS. A "RATIONALIST" LINE OF INTERPRETATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED FOR THE CENTRELITY OF IDEAS AND POLITICAL PRINCIPLES TO THE OUTCOME OF THE CONVENTION'S DEBATES, WHILE A "MATERIALIST" TRADITION HAS CONSISTENTLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF PRATICAL POLITICS AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. THE AUTHOR INTEGRATE THESE ALTERNATIVE TRADITIONS OF ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION BY DEMONSTRATING THAT A DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE EXISTS BETWEEN PHILOSPHICAL AND MATERIAL INFLUENCES IN THE CONVENTION. THE AUTHORS DEMONSTRATE, THROUGH BOTH EMPIRICAL AND INTERPRETIVE MEANS, THAT, ALTHOUGH QUESTIONS OF BOTH PHILOSOPHICAL AND MATERIAL CONTENT AND IMPORT WERE BEFORE THE CONVENTION THROUGHOUT, QUESTIONS OF EACH GENERAL TYPE DOMINATED THE CONVENTION'S ATTENTION DURING PARTICULAR PHASES OF ITS WORK. THEREFORE, THE FOCUS OF DEBATE AND DECISION, AS WELL AS THE VOTING COALITIONS THAT CONFRONTED ONE ANOTHER OVER THE ISSUES DISCUSSION, WERE ORGANIZED AROUND SHARED PRINCIPLES AT SOME STATES, WHILE AT OTHER TIMES THEY WERE ORGANIZED AROUND CONFLICTING MATERIAL INTERESTS.

The subject of the article is justification of the main elements of the constitutional responsibility of the Russian Constitutional Court in the context of constitutional reform.The purpose of the article is confirmation or refutation of the hypothesis that the Constitutional Court must be subject to constitutional responsibility.The methodology. The author uses methods of complex analysis of legislation, synthesis, as well as formal-logical and formal-legal methods.The main results, scope of application. Russia as a democratic state excludes the existence of legally irresponsible subjects of state power. It concerns the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. Legal irresponsibility characterizes only the absolute monarchy. The article comprehensively examines the problem of responsibility of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the reasons for the poor development of this institution in legislation and academic literature are also considered. The reasons for the Constitutional Court's dependence on the President of the Russian Federation as a "guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation" have been systemized. The author considers duumvirate of guarantors of constitutional legitimacy as a nonsense. The reasons for the Constitutional Court's peculiar use of the law of the legislative initiative are considered. This initiative was used only in the direction of increasing the term of the powers of judges of the Constitutional Court from 65 up to 70 years. The life-long status of the President of the Court is seen as a violation of the principle of equality of judges, which is the most important guarantee of the independence of the Constitutional Court. Constitutional reform-2020 completed the process of dependence of the Constitutional Court on the President of the Russian Federation and the "second government" - the Administration of the Russian President. Some constitutional and legal torts of the Constitutional Court of the Russia are considered also. The author comes to the conclusion that judges of the constitutional court have a special responsibility - political, moral and historical. The main questions are need to be resolved: who has the right to state the torts of the constitutional court and what are the consequences of this statement? ; Комплексно исследуется проблема ответственности Конституционного Суда РФ, рассматриваются причины слабой разработанности этого института в теории конституционного права и практике государственного строительства. Изучается возможность причинения Конституционным Судом вреда конституционной законности. Делается вывод о том, что конституционная реформа 2020 г. завершила процесс зависимости Конституционного Суда от Президента РФ и фактически «второго Правительства» -Администрации Президента РФ.

The model of federal relations enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation is constantly evolving as a result of the development of legislative regulation and the practice of its application. The article analyzes its development in the period 2000 - 2003 on the basis of the Federal Law "On the general principles of the organization of legislative (representative) and executive bodies of state power of the subjects of the Russian Federation", in particular, such changes as the introduction of the institute of federal influence (coercion); clarification of the role of contracts and agreements concluded between the executive authorities of the Russian Federation and the subjects of the Federation in regulating federal relations; improvement of the division of powers between the federal center and the subjects of the Federation, including budgetary federalism. Russian federalism is regarded as cooperative, the legal space of which cannot be formed without the participation of the subjects of the Federation. The author substantiates that in the sphere of joint management, federal public authorities should be guided by the principle of "reasonable restraint" and not intrude into those relations that a subject of the Russian Federation can regulate without prejudice to the qualitative fulfillment of the tasks of public authority. At the same time, the subjects of the Federation should not emphasize their specifics, it is necessary to proceed from the principle of consolidation of legislation, the creation of uniform rules operating in a single economic space. The author comes to the conclusion that the incompleteness of the constitutional regulation of federal relations allows them to evolve in different directions, to look for an optimal model of the federal structure for Russia.