Suchergebnisse

Народные училища образовательные учреждения дореволюционной России. Согласно Уставу о народных училищах для всех городов Российской империи от 5 августа 1786 г. были организованы Главные и Малые народные училища. Во время школьной реформы 1804 г. Главные народные училища преобразованы в гимназии, а Малые в Уездные училища. Начальные народные училища были созданы в 1864 г. и давали только начальное образование. К ним относились земские школы, различные ведомственные и частные школы, а также церковно-приходские и воскресные школы. Их деятельность регулировалась Положением о начальных народных училищах, принятом в 1874 г. В условиях колонизации Северного Кавказа постоянно ощущалась необходимость кадрового обеспечения во всех сферах общественной жизни и государственного управления, включая просвещение, а также стремление обеспечить поддержку политики власти со стороны местных жителей. Одной из попыток решения этой проблемы было развитие народных училищ, ориентированных не только на подготовку мальчиков к писарским должностям, но и просвещение населения. Эта задача приобретала особую важность в контексте потребностей образования и воспитания населения региона в традициях православной культуры через познание Закона Божия. С привлечением широкого круга источников проведен анализ положения священнослужителей в начальных школах Северного Кавказа, определен их статус в решении вопросов образовательного процесса и участие в управлении. ; Public schools are educational establishments of pre-revolution Russia. According to Charter about public schools for all cities of the Russian empire from 5th August, 1786 Main and Small public schools were organized. During school reform in 1804 Main public schools were regenerated in gymnasiums and Small in district schools. Initial public schools were created in 1864 and could give primary education only. State schools, different department and private schools, and also church-parish and Sunday schools, referred to them. Their activity was regulated by Statute about initial public schools, accepted in 1874. In the conditions of colonization of North Caucasus the necessity of the skilled providing was constantly felt for all spheres of public life and state administration, including enlightenment and also aspiration to provide support of politics of power from the side of locals. One of attempts of this problem's decision was development of the public schools oriented not only on preparation of boys to copyist positions but also on enlightenment of the population. This task acquired the special importance in the context of necessities of education and population's education of region in traditions of the Orthodox culture through cognition of Law of the Lord. With bringing in the wide circle of sources an analysis is conducted from the position of clergymen in initial schools of North Caucasus, their status in the decision of questions of educational process and participation in management.

The article analyzes the strategy of the Russian Orthodox Church for the revival of national, state and church identity in Russia. The peculiarities of the church interpretation of the concept of identity and the risks of loss of national identity are revealed from the standpoint of the Church. The author concludes that in the socio-political discourse of the Orthodox Church the concept of identity is presented as a cultural and social marker and is comprehended in the paradigm of conformity with established standards and behavioral responses. Spiritual identity is seen in Orthodoxy through an appeal to the religious tradition and is correlated with the moral imperative formed in the past and with the social and legal code. The Church considers the Orthodox self-identification of citizens and its participation in sociocultural transformations of Russia to be important factors of state identity. In declarations on the topic of Christian identity, the leaders of the Church rely on the idea of Russian religious philosophy about the genetic connection of Orthodoxy with national consciousness. The tendency of Orthodox participation in the public examination of secular cultural events, in teaching schoolchildren ("General Professional Competences' in the course of 'The Basics of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics") and in the scientific activity of higher educational institutions (the inclusion of "theology" in the list of scientific disciplines of the Higher Certifying Commission) is developing. Public support for the interaction of the Church with state institutions of culture and education is regarded by the author as a factor of acquiring institutional features of identity by Orthodoxy. The active participation of the Church in the public discussion on the relationship between Russia and European countries is motivated by the desire to develop international cooperation, which is hampered by the value contradictions that the "secularized" West is offered to overcome by returning to a Christian identity. The scientific intelligentsia reacts inconsistently to the church formulation of the national identity as Russian identity. The implantation of Russian identity to the detriment of Russia causes ideological conflict. ; В статье анализируется стратегия Русской Православной церкви по возрождению национальной, государственной и церковной идентичности в России. Выявляются особенности церковной трактовки понятия идентичности, риски утраты национальной идентичности, с точки зрения Церкви. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что в социально-политическом дискурсе Православной церкви концепт идентичности представлен в качестве культурного и социального маркера и осмысливается в парадигме соответствия устоявшимся нормам и поведенческим реакциям. Духовная идентичность рассматривается в православии через апелляцию к религиозной традиции, соотносится со сформировавшимся в прошлом нравственным императивом и социально-правовым кодексом. К важным факторам государственной идентичности Церковь относит православную самоидентификацию граждан и свое участие в социокультурных преобразованиях России. В декларациях на тему христианской идентичности руководители Церкви опираются на идею русской религиозной философии о генетической связи православия с национальным сознанием. Получает развитие тенденция православного участия в общественной экспертизе светских культурных мероприятий, в обучении школьников (ОПК в составе курса ОРКСЭ) и научной деятельности высших учебных заведений (включение "теологии" в список научных дисциплин ВАК). Общественная поддержка взаимодействия Церкви с государственными учреждениями культуры и образования расценивается автором как фактор обретения православием институциональных признаков идентичности. Активное участие Церкви в общественной дискуссии на тему взаимоотношений России с европейскими странами мотивируется стремлением развивать международное сотрудничество, чему препятствуют ценностные противоречия, преодолеть которые "секуляризованному" Западу предлагается через возвращение к христианской идентичности. Научная интеллигенция противоречиво реагирует на церковную формулировку национальной идентичности как русской идентичности. Насаждение русской идентичности в ущерб российской вызывает конфликт идеологем.

In this article, the author tries to reflect the emergence of the intellectual concept of "Church History" through a number of theoretical frameworks, setting this discursive turn on the map of the epoch using several narratives. The first is the problem of the cultural gap arising during the 18th century between the intellectual elites of the nobility and clergy. Second, we examine the bureaucratization of the empire leading both to the convergence of parallel "ecclesiastical" and "civil" administrative structures and to the emergence of the bureaucratic layer between episcopate and the monarch, who was considered as the formal "head" of the earthly ecclesiastical structure. Third, we consider the establishment of the administrative bonds between governmental authorities and individuals, which were understood as being in competition for the "pastoral" power of the church hierarchy. We next examine the change in the mode of knowledge distribution, which took place within the emergence of the "public sphere" in the early 19th-century Russian Empire. Finally, we look at the problem of the national identity emerging in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which was centered around the concept of the ethnic community and political body (and its history) rather than on the community of believers actualized in the discourse of the epoch as the concept of Church (and its history). All those narratives on social change strive to explain the global change in Orthodox theology, which became centered on ecclesiology. This change might be effectively problematized as a transition between first and second "orders of theology" within the framework proposed by G. Kaufman. This method of explanation may be especially productive when it comes to drawing an analogy between Russian and Western theology in the modern period. ; В данной статье предпринимается попытка с точки зрения ряда теоретических программ осмыслить возникновение в Российской империи начала XIX в. интеллектуального феномена "церковной истории". Выделяется несколько нарративов, в рамках которых может проясниться место этого дискурсивного поворота "на карте" высказываний эпохи: 1) проблема культурного разрыва, который в течение XVIII в. образуется между дворянской и "духовной" интеллектуальными элитами; 2) бюрократизация империи, приведшая, с одной стороны, к созданию параллельных "церковных" и "гражданских" административных инстанций, а с другой — к возникновению бюрократической "прослойки" между епископатом и императором как формальным главой церковной организации; 3) установление административной связи между властью и индивидом, которая различается как "конкурентоспособная" по отношению к пастырской власти церковной иерархии; 4) изменения в характере "дистрибуции знания", происходящие в процессе становления в Российской империи конца XVIII – начала XIX в. "публичного пространства"; 5) проблема возникновения национальной идентичности, от которой отстраивается отличная от нее конфессиональная идентичность, центральным элементом которой является понятие о "Церкви". Эти нарративы о социальном изменении могут объяснить глобальное изменение в характере православного богословия, в центре которого начиная с XIX в. оказывается понятие о Церкви и ее бытии во времени — экклесиологическая проблематика. Наряду с прочими вариантами осмысления, этот терминологический сдвиг может быть продуктивно проблематизирован в качестве перехода от первого ко второму "порядкам теологии" в рамках системы, предложенной Г. Кауфманом, что позволяет провести аналогии в истории европейской и российской богословской мысли Нового времени.

Для приведения религиозного пространства России в соответствие с Конституцией необходима замена терпимости в вопросах веры как принципа устройства религиозной сферы на религиозную толерантность. Среди религиозных сообществ страны важную роль в данном процессе должна сыграть Русская православная церковь (РПЦ). Изучению роли РПЦ в конституционализации религиозного пространства России внимания наукой не уделялось, чем обусловлена новизна исследования. Особая культурно-историческая и духовная роль православия для России создает предпосылки для того, чтобы РПЦ заняла ведущее место в этом процессе. Между тем ряд препятствий не позволяет РПЦ это сделать. Цель данного исследования – выявление таких препятствий и предложение подходов к их преодолению. Основой методологии исследования является диалектика, дополненная элементами ряда других подходов. Методы исследования – исторический, сравнительно-правовой и логический анализ, обобщение, опросы. В ходе исследования авторами опрошено более девятисот респондентов в шести странах, в том числе около 700 лиц, назвавшихся верующими. Исследованием установлен пониженный уровень уважительного отношения иноверующих к РПЦ в сравнении с уровнем такового к православной вере. Для изменения ситуации РПЦ следует начать с признания исторических ошибок православия в отношении иноверующих, отказа от терпимости в вопросах веры в пользу религиозной толерантности, установления реального количества православных россиян. Актуальность исследования обусловлена накоплением в обществе предпосылок неуважительного отношения к РПЦ. Кроме того, с принятием поддержанной Россией Резолюции ГА ООН о религиозной толерантности роль РПЦ в приведении религиозного пространства страны в соответствие с Конституцией РФ должна возрастать. Авторы приходят к следующему выводу: обладая потенциальными признаками религиозного лидера в приведении религиозного пространства России в соответствие с Конституцией, РПЦ фактически к такой роли готова не в полной мере. Необходимо принять ряд мер для изменения ситуации. ; Bringing the religious space of Russia into conformity with the Constitution requires replacing the patience in the matters of faith as a principle of the organization of the religious sphere by religioustolerance.Among the religious communities of the country, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) should play an important role in this process. The study of the role of the ROC in the constitutionalization of the religious space of Russia was not of great interest to science. The special cultural, historical, and spiritual role of Orthodoxy for Russia creates the prerequisites for the leading place of the ROC in this process. Meanwhile, a number of obstacles prevents the ROC from taking this place. The purpose of the study is to identify such obstacles and propose approaches to overcome them. The basis of the research methodology is the dialectic, supplemented by elements of a number of other approaches. Research methods are historical, relatively legal and logical analysis, synthesis, surveys. During the study, the authors interviewed more than nine hundred respondents in six countries, including about 700 individuals who identified themselves as persons of faith. The study showed a reduced level of respectfulness from persons of a different faith for the ROC in comparison with their respectfulnessto the Orthodox faith. To change the situation, the ROC should begin by recognizing the historical mistakes of Orthodoxy towards people of a different faith, refusing patience in matters of faith in favor of religious tolerance, and establishing the real number of observers of Orthodox faith in Russia. The relevance ofthe study is due to the accumulation of prerequisitesin a society of disrespect for theROC.In addition, with the adoption of the UN GAResolution onReligiousTolerance, supported by Russia, the role of the ROC in bringing the religiousspace into accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation should increase. In conclusion, possessing the potential signs of a religious leader in bringing the religious space of Russia in accordance with the Constitution, the ROC is in fact not fully prepared for such a role. It is necessary to take a number of measures to change the situation.

Author explores the place and role of orthodoxy as civilizational phenomenon in co-working and translation of mental, spiritual identity of belarusian societies' stem component. Main positions and trends of formed religious situation were identified and defined as examples of ongoing modernization processes in modern society. Also, there was an analysis of the church's socio-political doctrine: « basic social concept of Russian orthodox church», in which political views of Russian Orthodox Church were reflected. The key Government and Orthodox Church dialog's strategies were considered. Special attention was pointed to the question of correlation of traditions and innovations in modern Orthodox Church's doctrine. The activity of Orthodox Church was disclosed as moderator of social integration of Belarusian society and moderator of preservation of national identity and traditional values in line with suggested by Orthodox Church concept of church-state relations - the concept of "co-working". = В статье исследуется вопрос роли и места православия как цивилизационного феномена в сопроизводстве и трансляции ментальной, духовной идентичности, стержневого компонента белорусского общества. Определены и сформулированы основные позиции и тенденции сложившейся религиозной ситуации в контексте происходящих модернизационных процессов в современном обществе. Проведен анализ социально-политической доктрины церкви «Основы социальной концепции Русской православной церкви», в которой отражены общественно-политические взгляды РПЦ. Рассмотрены ключевые стратегии диалога государства и православной церкви. Особое внимание уделено вопросу корреляции традиций и инноваций в современной доктрине православной церкви. Раскрывается деятельность православной церкви в качестве модератора социальной интеграции белорусского общества и сохранения национальной идентичности и традиционных ценностей в русле предложенной ею концепции церковно-государственных отношений — концепции «соработничества».

The modern problems of obtaining autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are analyzed. The centennial struggle for autocephaly of the UOC proves that the problem of obtaining independence from the Russian Orthodox Church îf the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) is very complicated, both according to the legislation of Ukraine and the canons of the church law. The Kyiv metropolis was an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from 988 to 1686, when it was, from the point of view of many Orthodox churches, illegally and not canonically annexed to the Moscow Patriarchate. In this movement the Orthodox Church was divided into three separate churches – the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which now calls itself simply «the UOC»; UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate (KP), established in 1992 and not recognized by the Ecumenical Orthodoxy as canonical and God-inspired, and The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which arose in 1919-1921. It should be noted that in the period of the Ukrainian Revolutions of 2004 and 2014 and at the beginning of the war in the Eastern Ukraine, the hierarchs of the UOC-MP organized an open antiUkrainian and anti-constitutional campaign, both behind the walls of temples, and at mass events. During the presidential election, this church illegally campaigned for one a pro-Russian Candidate only. In these conditions, the question of the separation of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate became more pressing and urgent.Proponents of autocephaly point out that the grounds for granting UOC Tomos for autocephaly are identical to that of the Polish version of 1924. However, we consider the obvious difficulties that distinguish the situation with Orthodoxy in Ukraine, compared with the UOC of Poland. In order to make the Russian Orthodox Church not to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine, not to agitate against the state of Ukraine, include in the name of the UOC the phrase that it is an Orthodox Church in Ukraine with a center abroad – in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine two bills – No. 4511 and No. 5309, which since 2016 it was never accepted, because they duplicate the existing Law and contradict Art. 35 of the Constitution. However, as we see, de facto the ROC (MP), directly and indirectly, is campaigning for so-called – «Russian World». For example, just recently the Russian edition of «Orthodoxy and World» published an interview with a member of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a supporter of Ukrainian autocephaly by the Metropolitan of Prussia Elpidophor, from which the publication dropped unwanted phrases.On April 22, 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate adopted a petition from the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to give Tomos on autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution in support of this appeal, and the appeal of the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches – KP and UAOC and some of the ÌPs. Similar Tomos is now awaiting northern Macedonia. History shows that the procedure for the delivery of Tomos for autocephaly is not easy, long-term.The analysis shows that, despite the difficulties of securing the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate by legislative means, there are grounds to expect that the UOC of Tomos would be still received. This decision is not obvious, since some autocephalous Orthodox churches against it and support arguments of the Russian Orthodox Church. The petition of the state authorities concerning the autocephaly of the church is a long-standing claim by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus, Ukraine has to wait for the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to hold the Unifying Synod. ; Проанализированы современные проблемы получения автокефалии Украинской православной церкви. ; Проаналізовано сучасні проблеми отримання автокефалії Української православної церкви.

The modern problems of obtaining autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church are analyzed. The centennial struggle for autocephaly of the UOC proves that the problem of obtaining independence from the Russian Orthodox Church îf the Moscow Patriarchate (ROC MP) is very complicated, both according to the legislation of Ukraine and the canons of the church law. The Kyiv metropolis was an integral part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from 988 to 1686, when it was, from the point of view of many Orthodox churches, illegally and not canonically annexed to the Moscow Patriarchate. In this movement the Orthodox Church was divided into three separate churches – the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which now calls itself simply «the UOC»; UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate (KP), established in 1992 and not recognized by the Ecumenical Orthodoxy as canonical and God-inspired, and The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), which arose in 1919-1921. It should be noted that in the period of the Ukrainian Revolutions of 2004 and 2014 and at the beginning of the war in the Eastern Ukraine, the hierarchs of the UOC-MP organized an open antiUkrainian and anti-constitutional campaign, both behind the walls of temples, and at mass events. During the presidential election, this church illegally campaigned for one a pro-Russian Candidate only. In these conditions, the question of the separation of the UOC from the Moscow Patriarchate became more pressing and urgent.Proponents of autocephaly point out that the grounds for granting UOC Tomos for autocephaly are identical to that of the Polish version of 1924. However, we consider the obvious difficulties that distinguish the situation with Orthodoxy in Ukraine, compared with the UOC of Poland. In order to make the Russian Orthodox Church not to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine, not to agitate against the state of Ukraine, include in the name of the UOC the phrase that it is an Orthodox Church in Ukraine with a center abroad – in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine two bills – No. 4511 and No. 5309, which since 2016 it was never accepted, because they duplicate the existing Law and contradict Art. 35 of the Constitution. However, as we see, de facto the ROC (MP), directly and indirectly, is campaigning for so-called – «Russian World». For example, just recently the Russian edition of «Orthodoxy and World» published an interview with a member of the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a supporter of Ukrainian autocephaly by the Metropolitan of Prussia Elpidophor, from which the publication dropped unwanted phrases.On April 22, 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate adopted a petition from the President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew to give Tomos on autocephaly to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution in support of this appeal, and the appeal of the hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox churches – KP and UAOC and some of the ÌPs. Similar Tomos is now awaiting northern Macedonia. History shows that the procedure for the delivery of Tomos for autocephaly is not easy, long-term.The analysis shows that, despite the difficulties of securing the separation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the Moscow Patriarchate by legislative means, there are grounds to expect that the UOC of Tomos would be still received. This decision is not obvious, since some autocephalous Orthodox churches against it and support arguments of the Russian Orthodox Church. The petition of the state authorities concerning the autocephaly of the church is a long-standing claim by the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Thus, Ukraine has to wait for the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I to hold the Unifying Synod. ; Проанализированы современные проблемы получения автокефалии Украинской православной церкви. ; Проаналізовано сучасні проблеми отримання автокефалії Української православної церкви.