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This policy brief analyses the politics and priorities of actors in and around Afghanistan. First, it examines the breakdown in the Doha talks, initial progress made in the so-called intra-Afghan talks, and the near future paths of action of both the Afghan government and the Taliban movement. The second half revolves around the strategic considerations and political redlines of Afghanistan's most important neighbours, Pakistan and Iran. Understanding vital security interests – the so-called redlines – of Iran and Pakistan is necessary in order to recognise both the developments in Afghanistan and the limitations of a future peace deal in Afghanistan. This brief attempts to contribute to this understanding. It is based on current reporting from sources and media in Afghanistan and insights gathered from numerous meetings in Kabul between 8 and 10 July 2019. The brief is written for officials, scholars and journalists working on Afghanistan, and it concludes that a breakthrough has not and will likely not occur for the time being – understanding the reasons why provides valuable lessons for future peace initiatives.

This report is based on the seminar: "Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond" organized by the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen, October 2016. The report includes perspectives by the speakers of the seminar and their attribution to understand the external and internal factors affecting the security situation, thereby attempting to explain the current low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All these perspectives present an intriguing puzzle that seeks to identify present challenges and opportunities on the table for both states. By identifying areas of common ground or perceived common obstacles, the report addresses initiatives and processes that could be applied in igniting paths of reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. ; This report is based on the seminar: "Mutual Trust Building and Reconciliation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Beyond" organized by the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen, October 2016. The report includes perspectives by the speakers of the seminar and their attribution to understand the external and internal factors affecting the security situation, thereby attempting to explain the current low level of trust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. All these perspectives present an intriguing puzzle that seeks to identify present challenges and opportunities on the table for both states. By identifying areas of common ground or perceived common obstacles, the report addresses initiatives and processes that could be applied in igniting paths of reconciliation between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Observers have classified the European Union as reluctant in its implementation of the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P). This contribution revisits that argument by employing a more nuanced interpretation of norm implementation than the binary conceptualisation typically applied. By appraising EU reactions to the 2011 Libyan crisis, we investigate whether a "European practice of mass atrocity prevention" is emerging and if so how this relates—or not—to R2P. We do this by investigating EU practices seeking to protect people from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity – paying particular attention to the three pillars and four policy areas included in the R2P framework. Our review of EU responses to Libya seeks to unveil whether and if so how EU practice related to mass atrocity prevention in that country rejected, adopted or indeed adapted R2P. The enquiry appraises both how R2P mattered to the EU response and how the Libya crisis affected the Union's approach to mass atrocity prevention and within it R2P. In this way, the study asks how norms can change practice, but also how practice can change norms. As such, our focus is on the inter-relationship between principles and practices of protection.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many Governments are instituting mobile tracking technologies to perform rapid contact tracing. However, these technologies are only effective if the public is willing to use them, implying that their perceived public health benefits must outweigh personal concerns over privacy and security. The Australian federal government recently launched the "COVIDSafe" app, designed to anonymously register nearby contacts. If a contact later identifies as infected with COVID-19, health department officials can rapidly followup with their registered contacts to stop the virus' spread. The current study assessed attitudes towards three tracking technologies (telecommunication network tracking, a government app, and Apple and Google's Bluetooth exposure notification system) in two representative samples of the Australian public prior to the launch of COVIDSafe. We compared these attitudes to usage of the COVIDSafe app after its launch in a further two representative samples of the Australian public. Using Bayesian methods, we find widespread acceptance for all tracking technologies, however, observe a large intention-behaviour gap between people's stated attitudes and actual uptake of the COVIDSafe app. We consider the policy implications of these results for Australia and the world at large.

Is it possible for authoritarian states such as China, Russia, and Iran to combine the soft power narratives directed primarily towards an international audience with the narratives directed primarily towards a domestic audience that are aimed at maintaining regime security? To investigate this question, this article analyses the 2015 military parade in Beijing, using this case to highlight and discuss the constraints on Chinese leaders' efforts to project soft power. The key finding is that soft power will continue to be the weak link in China's pursuit of a great power position and status as long as what continues to count as "Chinese" is defined in opposition to hostile "others" and the humiliation narrative continues to function as the central identity marker in the party-led construction of national identity (the "us").

People rely on data-driven AI technologies nearly every time they go online, whether they are shopping, scrolling through news feeds, or looking for entertainment. Yet despite their ubiquity, personalization algorithms and the associated large-scale collection of personal data have largely escaped public scrutiny. Policy makers who wish to introduce regulations that respect people's attitudes towards privacy and algorithmic personalization on the Internet would greatly benefit from knowing how people perceive personalization and personal data collection. To contribute to an empirical foundation for this knowledge, we surveyed public attitudes towards key aspects of algorithmic personalization and people's data privacy concerns and behaviour using representative online samples in Germany (N = 1,065), Great Britain (N = 1,092), and the United States (N = 1,059). Our findings show that people object to the collection and use of sensitive personal information and to the personalization of political campaigning and, in Germany and Great Britain, to the personalization of news sources. Encouragingly, attitudes are independent of political preferences: People across the political spectrum share the same concerns about their data privacy and show similar levels of acceptance regarding personalized digital services and the use of private data for personalization. We also found an acceptability gap: People are more accepting of personalized services than of the collection of personal data and information required for these services. A large majority of respondents rated, on average, personalized services as more acceptable than the collection of personal information or data. The acceptability gap can be observed at both the aggregate and the individual level. Across countries, between 64% and 75% of respondents showed an acceptability gap. Our findings suggest a need for transparent algorithmic personalization that minimizes use of personal data, respects people's preferences on personalization, is easy to adjust, and does not extend to political advertising.

Any strategy to mitigate climate change will have economic and political implications that are incompatible with libertarian ideals of free markets. These political implications have created an environment of rhetorical adversity in which disinformation is systematically disseminated by a variety of politically and economically motivated actors who seek to delay or defang climate policies. I review the strategies of climate denial and how they fit within an historical arc ranging from denial of the adverse health effects of tobacco to the denial of facts and policies involving the COVID-19 pandemic. I review communicative countermeasures and conclude by pointing to the necessity to examine whether science denial is a necessary implication of libertarianism or whether it can be reframed to become an ally in climate mitigation and public-health policies.

As demonstrated by China's first and long-awaited Arctic Policy White Paper released in January 2018, the Arctic is assigned increasing strategic importance in Beijing. The central priority behind China's intensified diplomatic and economic activities in the region is to establish strong and comprehensive relationships with all the Arctic states and stakeholders and gradually increase China's presence and influence in Arctic multilateral institutions. This is the context in which to analyze recent developments in the Chinese approach to the Kingdom of Denmark constellation and, more specifically, in the Chinese engagement in Greenland. The article contextualizes and examines the increasingly confident, proactive and sophisticated Chinese diplomacy in the Arctic with a focus on exploring how Greenland fits into this. The main argument is that there is more to China's growing interests and activities in Greenland than ensuring Chinese access to potential Greenlandic resources. Rather, the main driving force is Beijing's long-term aim to ensure great power influence in the Arctic. The article further explores the complex triangular relations between Beijing, Nuuk, and Copenhagen with Washington on the side underlining how further developments in relations between Nuuk and Copenhagen, one the one hand, will be influenced by "the China factor" but also, on the other hand, will set the parameters for how China's role in Greenland further develops. ; As demonstrated by China's first and long-awaited Arctic Policy White Paper released in January 2018, the Arctic is assigned increasing strategic importance in Beijing. The central priority behind China's intensified diplomatic and economic activities in the region is to establish strong and comprehensive relationships with all the Arctic states and stakeholders and gradually increase China's presence and influence in Arctic multilateral institutions. This is the context in which to analyze recent developments in the Chinese approach to the Kingdom of Denmark constellation and, more specifically, in the Chinese engagement in Greenland. The article contextualizes and examines the increasingly confident, proactive and sophisticated Chinese diplomacy in the Arctic with a focus on exploring how Greenland fits into this. The main argument is that there is more to China's growing interests and activities in Greenland than ensuring Chinese access to potential Greenlandic resources. Rather, the main driving force is Beijing's long-term aim to ensure great power influence in the Arctic. The article further explores the complex triangular relations between Beijing, Nuuk, and Copenhagen with Washington on the side underlining how further developments in relations between Nuuk and Copenhagen, one the one hand, will be influenced by "the China factor" but also, on the other hand, will set the parameters for how China's role in Greenland further develops

There is broad consensus among economists that unmitigated climate change will ultimately have adverse global economic consequences, that the costs of inaction will likely outweigh the cost of taking action, and that social planners should therefore put a price on carbon. However, there is considerable debate and uncertainty about the appropriate value of the social discount rate, that is the extent to which future damages should be discounted relative to mitigation costs incurred now. We briefly review the ethical issues surrounding the social discount rate and then report a simulation experiment that constrains the value of the discount rate by considering 4 sources of uncertainty and ambiguity: Scientific uncertainty about the extent of future warming, social uncertainty about future population and future economic development, political uncertainty about future mitigation trajectories, and ethical ambiguity about how much the welfare of future generations should be valued today. We compute a certainty-equivalent declining discount rate that accommodates all those sources of uncertainty and ambiguity. The forward (instantaneous) discount rate converges to a value near 0% by century's end and the spot (horizon) discount rate drops below 2% by 2100 and drops below previous estimates by 2070.

Misinformation can undermine a well-functioning democracy. For example, public misconceptions about climate change can lead to lowered acceptance of the reality of climate change and lowered support for mitigation policies. This study experimentally explored the impact of misinformation about climate change and tested several pre-emptive interventions designed to reduce the influence of misinformation. We found that false-balance media coverage (giving contrarian views equal voice with climate scientists) lowered perceived consensus overall, although the effect was greater among free-market supporters. Likewise, misinformation that confuses people about the level of scientific agreement regarding anthropogenic global warming (AGW) had a polarizing effect, with free-market supporters reducing their acceptance of AGW and those with low free-market support increasing their acceptance of AGW. However, we found that inoculating messages that (1) explain the flawed argumentation technique used in the misinformation or that (2) highlight the scientific consensus on climate change were effective in neutralizing those adverse effects of misinformation. We recommend that climate communication messages should take into account ways in which scientific content can be distorted, and include preemptive inoculation messages.

Governments around the world have implemented measures to manage the transmission of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). While the majority of these measures are proving effective, they have a high social and economic cost, and response strategies are being adjusted. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that communities should have a voice, be informed and engaged and participate in this transition phase. We propose ten considerations to support this principle: (1) implement a phased approach to a 'new normal'; (2) balance individual rights with the social good; (3) prioritise people at highest risk of negative consequences; (4) provide special support for healthcare workers and caring staff; (5) build, strengthen and maintain trust; (6) enlist existing social norms and foster healthy new norms; (7) increase resilience and self-efficacy; (8) use clear and positive language; (9) anticipate and manage misinformation and (10) engage with media outlets. The transition phase should also be informed by real time data according to which governmental responses should be updated.

Artiklen præsenterer et bud på et revideret Center of Gravity (COG) koncept, som både fokuserer på det strategiske og det operative niveau, og ikke mindst forbindelsen mellem de to niveauer. ; This article presents a solution to a revised Center of Gravity (COG) concept, that can focus both on the strategic and the operational level and not least the connection between the two levels.

The report (EU-CIVCAP Deliverable 5.1) appraises the EU's capabilities to execute conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. The Deliverable focuses on capabilities developed under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and whether their application matches up with EU strategies to address security needs on the ground. The purpose of this endeavour is to examine whether the EU's capabilities are appropriate and sufficient to reach its expectations – and those of others – in preventing conflict and building peace in both regions. ; Deliverable 5.1 is a report on EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa and the Western Balkans. It appraises the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy missions individually within and comparatively across both regions.

Static high contrast ('dazzle') patterns, such as zigzags, have been shown to reduce the perceived speed of an object. It has not escaped our notice that this effect has possible military applications and here we report a series of experiments on humans, designed to establish whether dynamic dazzle patterns can cause distortions of perceived speed sufficient to provide effective defence in the field, and the extent to which these effects are robust to a battery of manipulations. Dynamic stripe patterns moving in the same direction as the target are found to increase the perceived speed of that target, whilst dynamic stripes moving in the opposite direction to the target reduce the perceived speed. We establish the optimum position for such dazzle patches; confirm that reduced contrast and the addition of colour do not affect the performance of the dynamic dazzle, and finally, using the CO 2 challenge, show that the effect is robust to stressful conditions.

Representations of trafficking and forced labour are pervasive within media, policymaking, and humanitarian debates, discourses and interventions. The terms exploitation and trafficking are increasingly used to characterise the work that migrants do in the sex industry and other irregular employment sectors. Of late, the notion of 'modern slavery' is on show in campaigns aiming to raise awareness about trafficking and funds for anti-trafficking initiatives among corporations and local enterprises as well as the general public. Celebrity interventions, militant documentaries, artistic works and fiction films have all become powerful vectors of the global distribution of the trafficking and 'modern slavery' rhetoric. These offer simplistic solutions to complex issues without challenging the structural and causal factors of inequality. Through fictional and narrow representations of ideal victims they tend to entrench racialised narratives and conflate all sex work with trafficking, which legitimates criminalising policies and interventions exacerbating the social vulnerability of sex workers. It is because of the under-researched role of representation in the development of anti-trafficking policies and initiatives that the Anti-Trafficking Review decided to devote a thematic issue on trafficking representations.