Suchergebnisse

This strategic analysis of Swedish agriculture – production systems and agricultural landscapes in a time of change – focuses on climate change, future availability of natural resources and economic regulation in a global food market. The background to the project was that the Faculty of Natural Resources and Agriculture of the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences identified an urgent need to explore the implications and opportunities of coming changes for agricultural production systems, arable land use and farm landscape functions in Sweden. Another objective was to determine the research needed to ensure that we are equipped to adapt to the coming changes. The analysis was carried out in the form of three literature reviews (Climate Change and Agricultural Land Use in Sweden: A Literature Review, (Eckersten et al., 2008a); Changes in the Global Natural Resource Base Relevant for Future Agriculture in Sweden – A Literature Review, (Johansson, 2008); and Economic Globalisation and Swedish Agriculture – Future Changes Affecting Swedish Agriculture from an Economic Perspective with Special Emphasis on Globalisation, (Holstein, 2008). It also comprised workshops and seminars and finally production of this synthesis report, which summarises the work done and suggests six research themes. Different IPCC emission scenarios describe pathways for those factors that are regarded as important for emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), such as demography and social, economic and technological development. The projected global temperature increase varies from a little less than 2 °C up to 3.5-4.0 °C by the end of this century. Shrinking glaciers and rising sea levels are some of the consequences of the temperature increase. This climate change will have considerable consequences for agriculture, ecosystem function and human health on a global scale. The conditions for food production in Sweden are projected to become more favourable in terms of potential productivity as a result of future climate change. However, despite more favourable average cropping conditions, there could be drawbacks in the form of more frequent extreme weather events and, for example, more severe crop pathogen attacks and increased risks of nutrient leaching. The temperature increase is predicted to be greater during winter than during summer. Furthermore, precipitation will probably increase and the precipitation pattern will change. The temperature increase may lead to an extension of the growing season by several months in southern Sweden. Swedish agriculture is currently dependent on high inputs of external resources. The situation at present is that agricultural demands are increasing with regard to the natural resource base, e.g. ecosystem services and fossil fuels. The use of fossil fuels to sustain food production cannot continue indefinitely; agriculture world-wide must adopt mitigation strategies. One way is to search for self-sustaining, diversified, low-input, energy-efficient agricultural systems, using local renewable resources and ecosystem services. Another way to meet the challenges of future food supply and at the same time sustain life-support systems might be through intensive high-input agriculture on the 'best' land in order to save other areas for nature conservation. Swedish agriculture and food production are closely linked to the global food and feed market. Increased globalisation means that the profitability of Swedish farms is influenced to an increasing extent by actors on the global market. Conditions for Swedish agriculture in the past have been largely determined by political regulations, national and subsequently by CAP (Common Agricultural Policy in EU), but are gradually becoming more dependent on world market forces. Sweden has a comparative disadvantage in primary production compared with many other countries but the competitiveness of the Swedish food sector as a whole has increased during recent years due to increased exports of processed products. Another opportunity is to increase production of products with added value, e.g. organic products. However, the effects of globalisation on Swedish agriculture are hard to predict. Increased liberalisation will lead to increased competition, which will most probably lead to decreased production in Sweden. However, future changes in land productivity could potentially affect land use more than does the degree of liberalisation in trade. The conclusion that Swedish agriculture will decrease, at least in terms of land use, may very well turn out to be incorrect. This should be clear, not only from scenarios where climate change makes Swedish production more competitive but also from the latest developments on the world market where large increases in demand for agricultural products have been noted. This increase may have the consequence that land in less competitive countries will become sufficiently productive. Twelve climate scenarios for different regions in Sweden were developed within the FANAN project, from south-west Skåne in the south to Övertorneå in the north. Projections of future cropping systems under the new climatic conditions are described for three regions, south-west Skåne, Mälardalen district and the coast region of Västerbotten. There are diametrically opposed scenarios for future land use and appropriate design of agricultural production systems in the literature, which implies a need for a great variety of research. Research in adaptation as well as mitigation strategies will be important. Problems are interlinked and interdisciplinary research will probably be necessary to solve the complex problems concerning agriculture and the food supply of future populations. Six different strategic research themes are presented as a result of the FANAN project: 1.Future analyses of long-term sustainable land use, p.54. 2.Sustainable production systems — crop and animal sciences, p. 55. Cooling crops — crop-soil interactions Crop breeding — perennial cereals Domestic animal production Cultivation techniques 3.Ecosystem services in production systems of the agricultural landscape, p. 59. 4.From words to action, p. 60. 5.Monitoring of agricultural production, p. 62. 6.Multidisciplinary research network, p. 62. Large research programmes rather than small disciplinary projects will promote the solution of future complex problems. It will be necessary to combine empirical research with modelling and synthesis work in order to generate good science that is relevant to the challenges in sustainable agricultural management. FANAN concludes that SLU has a central role to play in developing these sustainable strategies.

The study was arranged to manifest its objectives through preceding it with an intro-duction. Particular attention was paid in the second part to detect the physical settings of the study area, together with an attempt to show the climatic characteristics in Libya. In the third part, observed temporal and spatial climate change in Libya was investigated through the trends of temperature, precipitation, relative humidity and cloud amount over the peri-ods (1946-2000), (1946-1975), and (1976-2000), comparing the results with the global scales. The forth part detected the natural and human causes of climate change concentrat-ing on the greenhouse effect. The potential impacts of climate change on Libya were ex-amined in the fifth chapter. As a case study, desertification of Jifara Plain was studied in the sixth part. In the seventh chapter, projections and mitigations of climate change and desertification were discussed. Ultimately, the main results and recommendations of the study were summarized. In order to carry through the objectives outlined above, the following methods and approaches were used: a simple linear regression analysis was computed to detect the trends of climatic parameters over time; a trend test based on a trend-to-noise-ratio was applied for detecting linear or non-linear trends; the non-parametric Mann-Kendall test for trend was used to reveal the behavior of the trends and their significance; PCA was applied to construct the all-Libya climatic parameters trends; aridity index after Walter-Lieth was shown for computing humid respectively arid months in Libya; correlation coefficient, (after Pearson) for detecting the teleconnection between sun spot numbers, NAOI, SOI, GHGs, and global warming, climate changes in Libya; aridity index, after De Martonne, to elaborate the trends of aridity in Jifara Plain; Geographical Information System and Re-mote Sensing techniques were applied to clarify the illustrations and to monitor desertifi-cation of Jifara Plain using the available satellite images MSS, TM, ETM+ and Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM). The results are explained by 88 tables, 96 figures and 10 photos. Temporal and spatial temperature changes in Libya indicated remarkably different an-nual and seasonal trends over the long observation period 1946-2000 and the short obser-vation periods 1946-1975 and 1976-2000. Trends of mean annual temperature were posi-tive at all study stations except at one from 1946-2000, negative trends prevailed at most stations from 1946-1975, while strongly positive trends were computed at all study stations from 1976-2000 corresponding with the global warming trend. Positive trends of mean minimum temperatures were observed at all reference stations from 1946-2000 and 1976-2000, while negative trends prevailed at most stations over the period 1946-1975. For mean maximum temperature, positive trends were shown from 1946-2000 and from 1976-2000 at most stations, while most trends were negative from 1946-1975. Minimum tem-peratures increased at nearly more than twice the rate of maximum temperatures at most stations. In respect of seasonal temperature, warming mostly occurred in summer and au-tumn in contrast to the global observations identifying warming mostly in winter and spring in both study periods. Precipitation across Libya is characterized by scanty and sporadically totals, as well as high intensities and very high spatial and temporal variabilities. From 1946-2000, large inter-annual and intra-annual variabilities were observed. Positive trends of annual precipi-tation totals have been observed from 1946-2000, negative trends from 1976-2000 at most stations. Variabilities of seasonal precipitation over Libya are more strikingly experienced from 1976-2000 than from 1951-1975 indicating a growing magnitude of climate change in more recent times. Negative trends of mean annual relative humidity were computed at eight stations, while positive trends prevailed at seven stations from 1946-2000. For the short observation period 1976-2000, positive trends were computed at most stations. Annual cloud amount totals decreased at most study stations in Libya over both long and short periods. Re-markably large spatial variations of climate changes were observed from north to south over Libya. Causes of climate change were discussed showing high correlation between tempera-ture increasing over Libya and CO2 emissions; weakly positive correlation between pre-cipitation and North Atlantic Oscillation index; negative correlation between temperature and sunspot numbers; negative correlation between precipitation over Libya and Southern Oscillation Index. The years 1992 and 1993 were shown as the coldest in the 1990s result-ing from the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, 1991. r Libya is affected by climate change in many ways, in particular, crop production and food security, water resources, human health, population settlement and biodiversity. But the effects of climate change depend on its magnitude and the rate with which it occurs. Jifara Plain, located in northwestern Libya, has been seriously exposed to desertifica-tion as a result of climate change, landforms, overgrazing, over-cultivation and population growth. Soils have been degraded, vegetation cover disappeared and the groundwater wells were getting dry in many parts. The effect of desertification on Jifara Plain appears through reducing soil fertility and crop productivity, leading to long-term declines in agri-cultural yields, livestock yields, plant standing biomass, and plant biodiversity. Desertifi-cation has also significant implications on livestock industry and the national economy. Desertification accelerates migration from rural and nomadic areas to urban areas as the land cannot support the original inhabitants. In the absence of major shifts in policy, economic growth, energy prices, and con-sumer trends, climate change in Libya and desertification of Jifara Plain are expected to continue in the future. Libya cooperated with United Nations and other international organizations. It has signed and ratified a number of international and regional agreements which effectively established a policy framework for actions to mitigate climate change and combat deserti-fication. Libya has implemented several laws and legislative acts, with a number of ancil-lary and supplementary rules to regulate. Despite the current efforts and ongoing projects being undertaken in Libya in the field of climate change and desertification, urgent actions and projects are needed to mitigate climate change and combat desertification in the near future.

Floods are one of the most important catastrophic consequences of extreme weather conditions which might lead to considerable losses of property and life. In recent years, several major floods having high social impact occurred in many parts of the world including Europe. Nearly every year during the last few decades major flooding has happened somewhere on the European continent. For the period 1980-2002, the greatest number of floods occurred in France (22 %), Italy (17 %) and the UK (12 %). The highest number of fatalities occurred in Italy (38 %), followed by Spain (20 %) and France (17 %) (Innovations Report online). Recent flooding highlights the specific need to evaluate societal vulnerability to the response of flooding to global change and climatic vulnerability. Floods becoming a part of our lives incited a new hazard culture – namely, a living with flood attitude - which is based on a more integrated approach including measures such as prevention, insurance, forecasting, warning and evacuation, and land use planning. In addition, flood risk education and awareness increased in importance. The main scope of the study is to provide a better understanding and insight of flood causing weather conditions and to explain the links between climate and floods in the mesoscale catchments with a size of a few hundreds up to a few thousand square kilometers. The present research was carried out as a part of the SPHERE Project (Systematic, Palaeoflood and Historical data for the improvEment of flood Risk Estimation) funded by the European Union. The project duration was between March 2000 and July 2003. The Institute for Hydraulic Engineering (IWS) at the University of Stuttgart was one of the project partners responsible for the investigation of the links between floods and climate. Within this task, IWS identified the flood-prone large-scale meteorological conditions in the Study Areas – Ardèche in France and Llobregat in Spain – and developed a discharge downscaling method which enables the analysis of possible past and future floods to estimate the flood risk. For the analysis of present and past floods NCEP Re-analysis Data (gridded sea level pressure), past GCM scenarios (KIHZ Project) and historical Point Sea Level Pressure and Temperature data from several stations in Europe (IMPROVE Project) were obtained. For the purposes of the current study, the identification of the short- and long-term relationships between climatic variability and flooding (on timescales of decades and centuries) is of great importance. Furthermore, the investigation of the changes in frequencies of flood-causing weather conditions and the identification of possible trends might help in the assessment of future flood frequency projections. The performance of the climatic and hydrologic models has improved considerably in the last decades. Despite the high number of sophisticated models developed, new ideas, more applications and challenging approaches are still sought. New and innovative hydrometeorological methods are required for the investigation of the flood phenomenon and for explaining the complex relationships and interactions in the nature. This work implies a first application as well. The aim of this dissertation is to present a new method to explain flood-prone weather conditions by using discharge information observed in the selected basin. Discharge includes significant information in terms of floods, since it is regarded as one of the end- products of precipitation. Hence, it can be integrated into the investigation of flood-causing weather conditions. An automated identification procedure based on fuzzy rules is developed for flood-producing weather situations based on the large-scale observations. In order to establish a daily link between circulation patterns and flood events, investigation of discharge increases instead of discharge is suggested. This approach is useful in mesoscale catchments with short concentration times. A new downscaling method, different from conventionally-used downscaling methods, was developed to generate daily discharge time series directly from large-scale atmospheric information. The common way of linking large-scale information to local-scale variables is usually downscaling of precipitation and temperature from large-scale atmospheric features and to link them to discharge with a rainfall-runoff model. In this work, a stochastic discharge simulation was developed to downscale discharge from atmospheric circulation directly. The research delivers interesting and promising results. The investigation in both Study Areas provided successful outcomes concluding that there is a strong link between the occurrence of certain circulation patterns and the occurrence of floods in the Studied Regions. ; Hochwasser entsteht als Folge extremer Wettersituationen und zählt zu den häufigsten auftretenden Katastrophen weltweit. In den letzten Jahren wurde in vielen Teilen der Welt von einer Vielzahl von Hochwasserereignissen mit großen Schäden berichtet. Im Zeitraum von 1980 bis 2002 haben sich auch in Europa viele Flutkatastrophen ereignet. Die häufigsten Hochwasserereignisse traten in Frankreich, Italien und Großbritannien auf (22 %, 17 %, bzw. 17 % der in Europa gemessenen Ereignisse, Innovation-Report). Im Hinblick auf wirtschaft-liche Folgen waren in erster Linie Deutschland und Italien betroffen, beide mit einem Schadensumfang von 11 Milliarden Euro, gefolgt von Spanien und Großbritannien mit einer Schadenshöhe von 6 Milliarden Euro. Die aktuellen Hochwasserereignisse gaben Anlass zu der Spekulation, dass der anthropogene Treibhauseffekt zu einem Anstieg der Auftrittsrate derartiger Extremereignisse im Klimasystem führe. Der gegenwärtige Wissensstand der Klimaforschung kann einen derartigen direkten Zusammenhang nicht belegen. In heutigen Klimamodellen, die das reale Klima in mathematischen Modellen abbilden, sind einige klimarelevante Prozesse noch nicht zufriedenstellend dargestellt, z.B. die Wirkung von Wolken, Aerosolen oder die veränderliche solare Strahlung. Aus diesem Grund werden verbesserte Klimamodelle benötigt, um konkrete Aussagen über die eventuellen Auswirkungen des Klimawandels zu ermöglichen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit soll im Folgenden der Zusammenhang zwischen Klima und Hochwasser untersucht werden. Dafür soll ein Link zwischen großräumigen atmosphärischen Variablen (z.B. Druckfelder) und den lokalen, hydrologisch relevanten Parameter (z.B. Niederschlag, Temperatur, Strahlung, hier: Abfluss) in mesoskaligen Einzugsgebieten hergestellt werden. Dieser Zusammenhang ist von besonderer Bedeutung etwa bei der Abschätzung der Folgen von Klimaänderungen auf das Hochwassergeschehen. Hochwasserereignisse sind meistens die Folge von ungewöhnlichen Wettergeschehnissen. Um die Entstehung von Hochwasser erklären zu können, wurden bereits zahlreiche Untersuchungen über den Zusammenhang zwischen Klima und Hochwasser durchgeführt. Bei gemäßigtem Klima führen hohe Niederschlagsmengen, die in mesoskaligen Einzugsgebieten innerhalb von kurzer Zeit fallen, in der Regel zu Hochwasser. Es ist offensichtlich, dass es einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen atmosphärischer Zirkulation und klimatischen Variablen gibt. Bislang wurde sehr wenig über die Zusammenhänge zwischen großräumigen atmosphärischen Variablen und Abflussmengen geforscht. Diese sollen in der vorliegenden Arbeit mit Hilfe verschiedener Methoden eingehend untersucht werden. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird einen direkten Zusammenhang zwischen dem großräumigen atmosphärischen Geschehen und dem Hochwasser hergestellt. Auf der Basis dieser Zusammenhänge zwischen den großräumigen atmosphärischen Variablen und den lokalen Parametern wird ein Abfluss-Downscaling Modell erarbeitet. Dieses dient zur Generierung von Abfluss-Reihen in täglicher Auflösung, welche auf beobachteten Bodenluftdruckdaten oder aus GCM stammenden Klimaszenarien basiert. Somit kann ein direkter Link zwischen groß- und kleinräumigen Variablen in mesoskaligen Einzugsgebieten erstellt werden. Basierend auf künftigen Klimaszenarien kann die Vorgehensweise ebenfalls für die Prognose der künftigen Hochwasserereignisse verwendet werden.

[SPA] La Iglesia Catedral de Santa María de Murcia, como edificio que siempre ha estado plenamente vivo, ha sido objeto desde su origen, como modificación de la mezquita musulmana, y a lo largo de su historia, de una considerable cantidad, tanto de transformaciones de su configuración inicial para adaptarse a las necesidades de cada momento, como de actuaciones de reparación y mantenimiento. Pero de todas ellas, solo consideraremos de «restauración», aquellas realizadas en la Catedral desde el momento en que se convierte en un Bien Patrimonial con valores histórico-artísticos expresamente reconocidos, categoría que adquiere a partir del 28 de marzo de 1928, cuando se declara Monumento Nacional la capilla de San Lucas o de los Vélez. Será, pues, esta fecha la que marque el punto de inicio del periodo que abarca la investigación en que se fundamenta este trabajo, que concluirá con las actuaciones realizadas en la primera década del siglo XXI. A través del análisis sistemático de las intervenciones desarrolladas en nuestro Conjunto Catedralicio durante estos casi cien años, contextualizadas en su ámbito histórico, político, administrativo y social y estudiadas desde el punto de vista de los criterios de intervención aplicados en ellas, como proyección de una determinada teoría de protección del Patrimonio Histórico y Cultural, será posible alcanzar los objetivos de la tesis: por una parte, realizar una pequeña aportación al conocimiento de la Catedral de Murcia, con la recopilación de la numerosa documentación existente derivada de dichas actuaciones. Por otra parte, determinar las consecuencias que dichas intervenciones tuvieron en la continua transformación que la edificación ha mantenido y mantiene a través del tiempo, no sólo desde el aspecto constructivo, arquitectónico o artístico, sino como Bien Cultural dotado de una serie de valores que debemos transmitir a las generaciones futuras. Con este fin quedan recogidos diferentes aspectos analizados en el trabajo: la configuración arquitectónica del conjunto, su evolución constructiva, las circunstancias legislativas y administrativas que afectaron a su conservación, la significación del monumento tanto para los responsables de su protección, como para la sociedad murciana, la relación que mantuvieron aquellos en aras de su tutela, a veces de fructífera colaboración, a veces en franca confrontación, y la repercusión que sus acciones tuvieron en la Catedral. Se reflejan igualmente los proyectos desarrollados por los diferentes arquitectos que trabajaron en el monumento desde el ámbito institucional, y sus criterios de intervención, así como aquellos trabajos efectuados por la propiedad, muchas veces sin las debidas garantías, comprobando la evolución del carácter y los criterios aplicados en todas estas actuaciones, ligada al devenir histórico, político, económico y social del ámbito en el que se desarrollaron. Se concluye el trabajo cuestionando cual debería ser el planteamiento de la tutela futura de la Catedral, teniendo en cuenta los aspectos la condicionan: la necesidad de profundizar en el conocimiento del monumento y la concienciación de todos aquellos agentes responsables de su preservación. ; [ENG] The Cathedral Church of Saint Mary in Murcia is a building which has always been completely active. Throughout its history and since its construction as a modification of the Muslim mosque, its original configuration has undergone a considerable number of transformations through reparations and modifications in order to adapt it to the needs of the times. However, of all these changes, we shall only consider as restoration the building amendments carried out on the cathedral since it became an official place of historical interest with specifically recognized historical and cultural values, a category which was obtained on 28th March 1928 when Saint Luke s Chapel, also known as the Vélez Chapel, was declared a National Heritage Site. This event marks the starting point for the period under investigation which forms the basis of this study concluding with the building modifications carried out in the first decade of the 21st century. Through the systematic analysis of the modifications carried out on the cathedral site over this period of nearly one hundred years it will be possible to achieve the objectives of the thesis. These changes will be placed in their historical, political, administrative and social contexts, and studied from the point of view of the restoration criteria applied to them, as a projection of a specific theory of historical and cultural heritage protection. Firstly, we can provide a small contribution to the knowledge of the Cathedral of Murcia by compiling a collection of the extensive documentation that exists as a result of these developments. Secondly, we can determine the consequences that these modifications have had, and are having, on the continued transformation of the building over time, not only for constructive, architectonic or artistic purposes, but also by considering the monument as a cultural treasure endowed with a series of values that we should transmit to future generations. In order to achieve this, the different aspects analysed in the study have been gathered together: the architectonic configuration of the historical site; the evolution of its construction; the legislative and administrative circumstances that affected its conservation; the significance of the monument for those responsible for its protection and for Murcian society; the relationships among those involved in its preservation, sometimes a fruitful collaboration, other times a frank confrontation; and what repercussions their actions have had on the cathedral. A reflection will also be made on the projects developed by the architects from institutional spheres who worked on the monument, and their restoration criteria, as well as those modifications carried out by the ownership, often without the necessary guarantees, considering the evolution of its character and the criteria applied in these restoration processes, grounded in the historical, political, economic and social setting in which they were developed. To conclude the study, we question how to conduct the future maintenance and conservation of the cathedral, taking into account the two main aspects affecting this matter: the need to improve our knowledge of the building and our awareness of all the players involved in its preservation. ; Universidad Politécnica de Cartagena ; Programa de doctorado en Arquitectura y Tecnología de la Edificación

When Sweden applied for NATO membership on May 22, 2022, it ended two centuries of military non-alignment. Although it was swiftly ratified by most NATO members, Türkiye and Hungary have prolonged the accession process. With ratification from Türkiye in hand, all eyes are on Hungary next, with Sweden set to become the 32nd member of the NATO Alliance in the coming weeks. Sweden has a highly advanced military and is a net contributor to the defensive alliance; its membership represents a considerable boost to NATO capabilities. As a member of NATO, Sweden will provide the Alliance with 1) support from its strong defense industry, 2) high-technological competence, and 3) a significant air force. These contributions will be crucial in preparing the Alliance to combat modern threats, as well as providing a dramatic multiplier to NATO's capacity in two vital regions—the Baltic Sea region and the Arctic. With Sweden's modern and diverse capabilities soon to be added to NATO's toolkit, it is worth taking a look at what the country will contribute to the Alliance, now and in the future. Three Major Benefits of Sweden Joining NATOThere are three main areas where Sweden will be able to contribute tangible benefits. First is Sweden's defense industry, which will boost the Alliance's military-industrial capacity. One of the largest in Europe, Sweden's defense industry amounted to $3 billion in 2022 with exports of defense material totaling over $2 billion. The country's largest defense companies produce some of the most sophisticated equipment on the market, such as Saab's Jas 39 Gripen and BAE System AB's Combat Vehicle 90. Approximately 28,000 people are employed by Sweden's defense industry, a figure likely to rise as the government has announced a considerable increase in its annual defense budget for 2024; nearly double that of its 2020 defense budget. The high demand for defense production, which has struggled to keep up with weapons demands as countries provide armaments to Ukraine in the wake of Russian aggression, is only going to continue for the coming years. The second benefit is the high level of technological competence in Sweden's private sector. Sweden's extensive public-private partnerships, considerable R&D funding, and highly-ranked education system are some of the factors behind its success in high-tech. The government launched a national 'Cybercampus' initiative in 2020 in partnership between the Swedish Defense Forces, public universities, and private companies, and established the Centre for Cyber Defence and Information Security in Stockholm. As NATO expands its ability to counter cyber and hybrid threats, Sweden's technological know-how will help prepare the Alliance to prepare for tomorrow's threats.In addition, with Sweden in NATO, two of the three manufacturers of 5G equipment—Ericsson and Nokia—will be in the same defensive alliance. The country is home to leading high-tech firms, such as Ericsson, the world's second largest network company; Hexagon, a major software company; and Northvolt, one of Europe's largest producers of lithium batteries. Sweden's success in attracting tech startups and in producing unicorns (startups reaching a billion dollar valuation) has led the country to be informally dubbed the 'Silicon Valley of Europe'. Sweden also possesses large quantities of critical minerals—such as iron ore and rare earth metals—which are vital for the defense industry, in the green transition, and for the overall economy. After a recent discovery in the Northern Swedish city of Kiruna, the country now possesses the largest-known deposit of rare-earth metals in Europe. Sweden will provide the Alliance with a crucial opportunity to reduce its critical minerals dependency on China and other authoritarian governments. The third benefit is Sweden's air force. The country's air force is the largest in the Nordics and one of the largest in Europe, possessing at least 100 fighter jets. With many more slated to be delivered in the upcoming years, Sweden is set to dramatically bolster the Alliance's number of fighter jets in the Baltic and Arctic regions. This will reduce the need for other major allies such as the United States to provide air surveillance and air presence in the region, with NATO member states now able to take a larger role in their own region's defense. Although Sweden's air capabilities are significant, it is one of only a few European countries, and the only Nordic country, that flies the Gripen. Sweden, along with the other Nordic countries—Norway, Finland and Denmark—signed the Nordic Air Commander's Intent in March 2023, with the goal of combining air capabilities to better deter Russia. As the individual Nordic air forces seek to unite under a common purpose, Sweden remains the odd one out with its Gripen fighters, the others all use the Lockheed Martin-designed F-16 or F-35. Sweden's commitment to the Gripen has previously put it at odds with the United States, a decision which will likely be discussed more in the upcoming years as Allied cooperation intensifies. A Swedish Air Force Saab Gripen fighter.Image CreditBolstering NATO's Northern CorridorSweden's membership is also beneficial for NATO given Sweden's geostrategic location in the heart of the Nordics. This is the first time all of the Nordic countries have been in the same alliance since 1523—after Finland's accession to NATO in April 2023. With Sweden as a member, the Alliance will gain strategic depth in the Baltic Sea region. Most countries around the Baltic Sea will now be part of the same military alliance, which has led some people to dub the Baltic Sea a 'NATO lake'. Sweden's entry into the Alliance will add three new strategic locations to the Alliance: 1) the strait of Øresund, the main strait connecting the North Sea to the Baltic Sea, which will now be completely controlled by NATO members; 2) Gotland, the largest island in the Baltic Sea, often called an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' due to its central location in the Baltics; and 3) shoreline along the Åland Sea and Gulf of Bothnia will make it easier for the Alliance to defend Åland, a demilitarized region between Finland and Sweden at the entry of the Gulf of Bothnia. Sweden is increasing its military presence in these areas, most notably on Gotland. In recent years, Sweden has relocated a mechanized battalion and anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as put aside specific financing of $163 million for the defense of Gotland. NATO access to Gotland will dramatically increase its force projection capabilities into the Baltic Sea region. Sweden also possesses a world-class submarine fleet—with some of the most advanced submarines in operation—and a wealth of knowledge navigating the shallow Baltic Sea, which it has done since 1904. Sweden's fleet currently consists of three advanced Gotland-class submarines and one older model scheduled to be retired when two new designs are delivered in 2027 and 2028, giving it five submarines by the end of the decade. Critically, the entirety of US submarine capabilities and a major portion of Russia's submarine fleet are unable to operate in the shallow Baltic Sea. Sweden fills a crucial gap in capabilities for NATO in the Baltic Sea region with its long history of submarine expertise and modern capabilities.Sweden's membership will also be a game changer for NATO in the Arctic region. When Sweden joins NATO, seven of the eight Arctic states—all except for Russia—will be part of the same Alliance. With climate change poised to open new sea lanes and possibilities for resource extraction such as hydrocarbons and critical minerals, the region is becoming gradually more important both commercially and militarily. This rising geopolitical interest for the region by Arctic states—especially Russia—will require greater cooperation among NATO members to strengthen deterrence in the region. China too is increasingly interested in the region, and with intensifying Sino-Russian relations, it is potentially a new theater in the ongoing great power competition. Sweden too has noted the importance of the Arctic region and is in a process of enhancing its presence in the Arctic. This is evident from the Swedish government's recent decision to start construction on two new garrisons in northern Sweden. Russia is investing heavily in its Arctic capabilities, so too must NATO invest in its capabilities in the region. Adding Sweden as a member significantly increases NATO's access to Arctic infrastructure, training opportunities, and adds Sweden's expertise operating in the region to the Alliance's capabilities.Increased Cooperation and Bolstered CapabilitiesIn addition to the immediate benefits Sweden will bring to the Alliance, there are also future benefits to realize. Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Sweden has pursued a strategy of increased spending on the military and rearmament. This strategy has been accelerated since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The country's recent decision to increase military spending by 28% for FY2024 will bring military spending above the 2% target six years earlier than planned—showcasing Sweden's commitment to be a trustworthy partner in the Alliance. The increased funding will go towards bolstering some of Sweden's current weaknesses, such as its low number of personnel and reservists. The annual number of recruits will increase from 5,500 to 10,000 and will give Sweden one of the largest reserve forces in the Alliance. It is also planning to reactivate civilian conscription in an effort to bolster its personnel and boost its defensive capabilities. Sweden's NATO membership also opens up new possibilities of defense cooperation, both on the Alliance level and regionally. Sweden's long position of military non-alignment has led it to historically underutilize cooperation with other like-minded partners on defense and security. The upcoming years will therefore provide Sweden and the Alliance many opportunities to deepen cooperation with integration and synergies. There are also numerous opportunities for increased regional cooperation outside of NATO, most notably with bodies such as 1) the Nordic Defense Cooperation (Nordefco), a defense collaboration bringing together the five Nordic countries; 2) the Nordic Council, an inter-parliamentary body for Nordic cooperation (and which has historically not discussed defense due to Sweden and Finland's military non-alignment); 3) and bilateral defense cooperation between Sweden and Finland. A sign of increased cooperation was evident earlier this year, when the air force commanders of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Norway issued a joint declaration, with a shared goal to operate all Nordic fighter jets as one fleet. This announcement–made during the early days of the Swedish presidency of Nordefco–would result in a joint fleet of at least 250 fighter jets, and possibly as many as 400, although it is difficult to say how many are in active use. A bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed by the Swedish Minister for Defence Pål Jonson and the United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the 5th of December 2023. After the Riksdag approves and implements it, the Agreement should enter into force by late 2024.Image CreditSweden is also in the process of increasing its ties to other partners, including the United States, with whom Sweden concluded negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in December 2023. This bilateral agreement provides a framework for defense cooperation, outlines the terms for US troops in Sweden, should the need or desire ever arise, and deepens defense relations within NATO. Another important partner is the United Kingdom, with whom Sweden has cooperated more in recent years through the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—a UK-led defense initiative consisting of ten Northern European countries. Sweden in NATO marks all of the JEF countries in both frameworks, enhancing opportunities for multi-domain interoperability in the high north. Additionally, Sweden has committed to sending at least 600 troops to Latvia in 2025 as part of a NATO-led multinational battle group. These forward placed units act as a deterrent to Russia and are a visible sign of Sweden's commitment to be a net contributor to NATO.Sweden's decision to apply for NATO membership and its dramatic reinvestment in its military since the Russian annexation of Crimea represents a profound shift in the Nordic nation's military policy. With a robust defense industry, numerous high-tech companies—including one of the major producers of 5G infrastructure equipment—vital geostrategic location, and a powerful air force that increases force projection into the Baltic Sea and shores up the Northern corridor, Sweden stands to contribute significantly to the alliance from day one as a member. Together with Finland and its Nordic neighbors, Sweden is undertaking a profound integration of air capabilities and a new Nordic dimension to the alliance is emerging. As NATO's newest member, Sweden will join with a profound array of capabilities and dramatically transform the Northern corridor of the Alliance.

Aquest treball a fi de Màster, conté l'inventari d'emissions de diòxid de carboni, òxids de nitrogen, òxids de sofre, monòxid de carboni i hidrocarburs totals i combustible consumit, dels vols que parteixen des de l'aeroport internacional El Dorada en Bogotà Colòmbia durant els anys 2009 a 2019 d'acord a lo establer per al document EMEP/EEA air pollutant emission inventory guidebook 2019, específicament el volum 1.A.3. a Aviation, addicionalment es va realitzar una projecció del consum de combustible i emissions de diòxid de carboni fins l'any 2050 d'acord a cinc escenaris plantejats pel Comitè de Protecció Ambiental pertanyent a l'Organització Internacional d'Aviació Civil. La informació que s'ha utilitzat per a l'inventari d'emissions, va se la base de dades tràfic per equip de la Aeronàutica Civil, aquesta base de dades conté el registre d'operacions de tots els aeroports de Colòmbia, tan de vols comercials com privats a diferents nacionals i internacionals. Cada base de dades pot contenir més d'un milió d'observacions anuals dels registres aeris colombians i per poder fer l'inventari d'emissions, va ser necessari fer una desagregació de les dades i una agrupació de les variables rellevants utilitzant els software lliure RStudio. Els resultats del inventari d'emissions són reportats per a vols nacionals i internacionals de manera separada, tal com ho estableix la metodologia de la guia. La informació obtinguda del inventari d'emissions, va ser utilitzada com a línia base per a la projecció de tendències de les emissions de diòxid de carboni i consum de combustible fins l'any 2050 per cinc escenaris diferents, tenint en compte diferents pronòstics del creixement de la operació aèria colombiana i establint metes anuals d'estalvi de combustible i eficiència operacional, les quals són claus per aconseguir la reducció de les emissions de diòxid de carboni. El principal gas emès d'acord al inventari d'emissions és el diòxid de carboni, durant els anys 2009 a 2019 es van emetre 25689 kt de CO2, seguidament de 121 kt de NOX, 28 kt de CO, 16 kt de SOX i 7,3 kt de HC, els vols internacionals van emetre el 74% del total del diòxid de carboni, a pesar que el nombre de vols és inferior respecte als vols a destins nacionals. Les emissions de diòxid de carboni tenen una correlació positiva de 0,99 amb el consum de combustible i la distància recorreguda de les aeronaus. Els avions amb destins internacionals recorren majors distàncies que els avions amb destins nacionals, per lo tant, les seves emissions de CO2 son més altes. Els destins turístics a Colòmbia i les capitals de Departament, són els trajectes que més CO2 emeten, en quant destins internacionals, els trajectes a Bogotà-Miami, Bogotà-Mèxic D.F. són els que més emissions de CO2 presenten. En quant a les tendències de les emissions de CO2, es van realitzar d'acord a cinc escenaris, l'escenari 1 o escenari base, mostra les emissions de diòxid de carboni fins al 2050 quan l'operació aèria no realitza millores operacionals o de eficiència de combustible i per altra banda, l'escenari 5 o escenari optimista te metes ambicioses per aconseguir una alta eficiència en el combustible i millores operacionals. Els escenaris 2 i 3 són els que millor poden predir el comportament que tindrà les emissions de CO2, degut a que les metes proposades són les implementades actualment per una línia aèria colombiana i no suposen grans inversions econòmiques o modificacions considerables en l'operació. Aquest inventari conté les emissions generals per vols privats i comercials de transport de passatgers, carga i correspondència realitzats des del aeroport el Dorado, i inclouen destins a aeroports principals, però també aeròdroms i pistes d'aterratge privades, les emissions són calculades per al trajecte realitzat per cada aeronau, des de la porta de la sortida d'abordatge de passatgers a l'aeroport d'origen, fins al punt d'arribada on s'apaga motors a l'aeroport de destí, però no inclou les emissions generades per les operacions auxiliars com la càrrega de combustible, transport per pistes de passatgers en autobusos o manteniment de les aeronaus, així com tampoc les emissions generades per l'aviació militar o vols d'helicòpters, ja que aquestes emissions s'han de reportar per separat mitjançant un altra metodologia. ; This Master's thesis contains the inventory of emissions of carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, sulfur oxides, carbon monoxide, total hydrocarbons and fuel consumed, of the flights that departed from the El Dorado International Airport in Bogotá Colombia during years 2009 to 2019 according with the document EMEP / EEA air pollutant emission inventory guidebook 2019, specifically volume 1.A.3.a Aviation, additionally a projection of fuel consumption and carbon dioxide emissions was made until 2050 according to five scenarios established by the Environmental Protection Committee belonging to the International Civil Aviation Organization. The information that was used for the emissions inventory was the traffic database by the Aeronautica Civil, this database contains the operation records of all Colombian airports, both commercial and private flights to national destinations and international. Each database contains more than one million observations per year from the Colombian air registers and in order to make the emissions inventory, it was necessary to disaggregate the data and group the relevant variables using RStudio software. The results of the emissions inventory are reported for national and international flights separately, as stated in the guide's methodology. The information obtained from the emissions inventory was used as a baseline for the projection of trends in carbon dioxide emissions and fuel consumption until 2050 for five different scenarios, taking into account different forecasts of the growth of the Colombian air operation. and establishing annual goals for fuel savings and operational efficiency, which are key to achieving the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. The main gas emitted according to the emissions inventory is carbon dioxide, during the years 2009 to 2019 25689 ktCO2 were emitted, followed by 121 ktNOx, 28 ktCO, 16 ktSOx and 7.3 ktHC, international flights emitted 74% of total carbon dioxide, although that the number of flights is lower compared to flights to domestic destinations. Carbon dioxide emissions have a positive correlation of 0.99 with fuel consumption and distance traveled by aircraft. Airplanes with international destinations travel longer distances than airplanes with national destinations, therefore, their CO2 emissions are higher. The tourist destinations in Colombia and the capitals of the Department are the routes that emit the most CO2, in terms of international destinations, the routes to Bogotá-Miami, Bogotá-Madrid and Bogotá-México D.F. they are the ones with the most CO2 emissions. Regarding CO2 emission trends, they were carried out according to five scenarios, scenario 1 or baseline scenario, shows carbon dioxide emissions until 2050 when the air operation does not make operational or fuel efficiency improvements and Moreover, scenario 5 or optimistic scenario has ambitious goals to achieve high fuel efficiency and improved operations. Scenarios 2 and 3 are the ones that can best predict the behavior that CO2 emissions will have, since the proposed goals are those currently implemented by an airline in Colombia and do not involve large economic investments or considerable modifications in the operation. This inventory contains the emissions generated by private and commercial flights for the transport of passengers, cargo and correspondence made from El Dorado airport, and include destinations to major airports, but also private airfields and airstrips, emissions are calculated for the journey made for each aircraft, from the departure gate for passenger boarding at the origin airport, to the arrival point where the aircraft turns off the engines at the destination airport, but does not include emissions generated by auxiliary operations such as fuel loading, transportation by passenger lanes in buses or aircraft maintenance, as well as emissions generated by military aviation or helicopter flights, since these emissions must be reported separately using another methodology Keywords: Atmospheric emissions, aviation, emission trends, scenarios, emissions ; Este trabajo de fin de Máster, contiene el inventario de emisiones de dióxido de carbono, óxidos de nitrógeno, óxidos de azufre, monóxido de carbono e hidrocarburos totales y combustible consumido, de los vuelos que partieron desde el aeropuerto internacional El Dorado en Bogotá Colombia durante los años 2009 a 2019 de acuerdo a lo establecido por el documento EMEP/EEA air pollutant emission inventory guidebook 2019, específicamente el volumen 1.A.3.a Aviation, adicionalmente se realizó una proyección del consumo de combustible y emisiones de dióxido de carbono hasta el año 2050 de acuerdo a cinco escenarios planteados por el Comité de Protección Ambiental perteneciente a la Organización Internacional de la Aviación Civil. La información que se utilizó para el inventario de emisiones, fue la base de datos tráfico por equipo de la Aeronautica Civil, esta base de datos contiene los registro de operaciones de todos los aeropuertos de Colombia, tanto de vuelos comerciales como privados a destinos nacionales e internacionales. Cada base de datos puede contener más de un millón de observaciones anuales de los registros aéreos colombianos y para poder hacer el inventario de emisiones, fue necesario hacer una desagregación de los datos y una agrupación de las variables relevantes utilizando el software libre RStudio. Los resultados del inventario de emisiones son reportados para vuelos nacionales e internacionales de forma separada, tal como lo establece la metodología de la guía. La información obtenida del inventario de emisiones, fue utilizada como linea base para la proyección de tendencias de las emisiones de dióxido de carbono y consumo de combustible hasta el año 2050 para cinco escenarios diferentes, teniendo en cuenta diferentes pronósticos del crecimiento de la operación aérea colombiana y estableciendo metas anuales de ahorro de combustible y eficiencia operacional, las cuales son claves para lograr la reducción de las emisiónes de dióxido de carbono. El principal gas emitido de acuerdo al inventario de emisiones es el dióxido de carbono, durante los años 2009 a 2019 se emitieron 25689 kt de CO2, seguido de 121 kt de NOx, 28 kt de CO, 16 kt de SOx y 7,3 kt de HC, los vuelos internacionales emitieron el 74% del total del dióxido de carbono, pese a que el número de vuelos es inferior con respecto a los vuelos a destinos nacionales. Las emisiones de dióxido de carbono tienen una correlación positiva de 0,99 con el consumo de combustible y la distancia recorrida de las aeronaves. Los aviones con destinos internacionales recorren mayores distancias que los aviones con destinos nacionales, por lo tanto, sus emisiones de CO2 son más altas. Los destinos turísticos en Colombia y las capitales de Departamento, son los trayectos que más CO2 emiten, en cuanto a destinos internacionales, los trayectos a Bogotá-Miami, Bogotá-Madrid y Bogotá-México D.F. son los que más emisiones de CO2 presentan. En cuanto a las tendencias de las emisiones de CO2, se realizaron de acuerdo a cinco escenarios, el escenario 1 o escenario base, muestra las emisiones de dióxido de carbono hasta el 2050 cuando la operación aérea no realiza mejoras operacionales o de eficiencia de combustible y por otra parte, el escenario 5 o escenario optimista tiene metas ambiciosas para lograr un alta eficiencia en el combustible y mejoras operaciones. Los escenarios 2 y 3 son los que mejor pueden predecir el comportamiento que tendrán las emisiones de CO2, debido a que las metas propuestas son las implementadas actualmente por una aerolínea en Colombia y no suponen grandes inversiones económicas o modificaciones considerables en la operación. Este inventario contiene las emisiones generadas por vuelos privados y comerciales de transporte de pasajeros, carga y correspondencia realizados desde el aeropuerto el Dorado, e incluyen destinos a aeropuertos principales, pero también aeródromos y pistas de aterrizaje privadas, las emisiones son calculadadas para el trayecto realizado por cada aeronave, desde la puerta de salida de abordaje de pasajeros en el aeropuerto de origen, hasta el punto de llegada donde apaga motores la aeronave en el aeropuerto de destino, pero no incluye las emisiones generadas por las operaciones auxiliares como cargue de combustible, transporte por pistas de pasajeros en autobuses o mantenimiento de las aeronaves, así como tampoco las emisiones generadas por la aviación militar o vuelos de helicópteros, ya que estas emisiones se deben reportar por separado mediante otra metodología.

Human activities now represent the most important force shaping the degradation of ecosystems in all of the world´s major biomes (well established). Long-established drivers of land degradation continue to increase across much of the world, including agricultural activities {3.3.1, 3.3.2}, driven by increasing demands for food and bioenergy. More recent global change drivers, such as climate change and atmospheric nitrogen deposition, further exacerbate impacts {3.4}. We are now in a qualitatively different and novel world, compared to only a few decades ago, and the combination of drivers creates significant challenges to restore degraded land and mitigate further degradation (established but incomplete). Few, if any, areas of the world are now free of some form of human influence (well established) and some systems are experiencing unprecedented challenges. Changes in the extent and severity of both land degradation and restoration commonly result from multiple underlying social and economic factors – indirect drivers, many of which occur in places distant from where the impacts are felt (well established) {3.6.4}. Demand for food imports is increasing across much of the world. This high dependency on imported commodities means that a large share of the environmental impacts of consumption is felt in other parts of the world. The physical quantity of goods traded internationally only represents one third of the actual natural resources that were used to produce these traded goods. The sustainability of the commodity production systems that support global supply chains is thus substantially shaped by the sourcing and investment decisions of market actors who may have little direct connection to the production landscapes (established but incomplete). Moreover, the globalized nature of many commodity supply chains potentially elevates the relative importance of global-scale factors such as trade agreements, market prices and exchange rates, as well as distant linkages related to buyer and investment preferences, over national and regional governance arrangements and the agency of individual producers (inconclusive). Addressing this complexity to avoid and reverse land degradation therefore requires the building of effective multi-sector and multi-stakeholder partnerships that span national boundaries (established but incomplete) {3.6.6}. Economic growth and per capita consumption, more than poverty, is one of the biggest threats to sustainable land management globally (established but incomplete) {3.6.3, 3.6.4}. Extreme poverty, combined with resource scarcity, can contribute to land degradation and unsustainable levels of natural resource use, but is rarely the major underlying cause (well established). Many of the most marked changes in how land is used and managed come from individual and societal responses to economic opportunities, such as a shift in demand for a particular commodity or improved market access, moderated by institutional and political factors (established but incomplete). For example, clearance of native vegetation and land degradation across much of Latin America and Asia is linked to agricultural expansion and intensification at a commercial scale for export markets (well established). Reducing poverty, although a priority for sustainable development, is insufficient to mitigate land degradation if not accompanied by additional measures. Concurrently, rising per capita consumption levels can exacerbate degradation. Efforts to reverse degradation therefore require a combination of local and regional poverty-alleviation strategies, including the adoption of pro-poor food production systems, together with efforts to improve the enforcement of public regulations for sustainable land uses, and strengthening the accountability of global market actors in effectively supporting such strategies. The highly interconnected and globalized nature of indirect drivers of land degradation and restoration means that the outcome of any global, regional or local intervention can be highly unpredictable, yet contextual generalizations are possible (established but incomplete) {3.6.2.3, 3.6.3}. The ways in which land is used in one part of the world can be highly sensitive to sudden, unexpected changes in economic and institutional factors elsewhere (unresolved). For example, changes in currency exchange rates, and cascading effects on the profitability of a given commodity, can markedly accelerate or decelerate the clearance of native vegetation for agriculture within a single year {3.6.2.3}. The sudden imposition of trade restrictions (e.g., due to disease controls), can have a similarly marked impact. However, with an improved understanding of the interactive effects amongst different drivers, it is possible to make predictions that are valid under a certain range of conditions. For example, agricultural intensification and agroforestry practices can help reduce the pressure on remaining areas of native vegetation under certain conditions (such as inelastic demand for staple crops), but unless such measures are coupled with increased enforcement of land-use policies they can result in a rebound effect that increases pressure on natural resources (established but incomplete) {3.6.3}. Land degradation in any given place is rarely the consequence of a single anthropogenic driver, but is instead the result of a diverse and frequently mutually-reinforcing set of human activities and underlying drivers (well established) {3.4.5, 3.5, 3.6.2.1}. Typically, at least three types of indirect driver, such as economic, technological and institutional, underpin any direct driver of land degradation or restoration (established but incomplete). The complexity of drivers that commonly underpin land degradation highlights the fact that single factors, such as high rural population density, rarely provide an adequate underlying explanation on their own for observed impacts (established but incomplete) {3.6.3}. Land degradation is typically the result of multiple direct drivers, especially in instances of severe degradation (e.g., where land-use intensification drives increased species invasions and increases in fire frequency). This combination of drivers has resulted in large expanses of economically important grazing lands, including in North America, being transformed to fire-prone annual grass monocultures (well established) {3.3.7}. The multi-causality of land degradation requires commensurately holistic policy responses that operate across multiple scales and combine both regulatory and incentive based measures (established but incomplete). Rapid expansion and inappropriate management of agricultural lands (including both grazing lands and croplands), especially in dryland ecosystems, is the most extensive land degradation driver globally (well established) {3.3.1, 3.3.2}. The expansion of grazing lands has largely stagnated globally with evidence for an approximate 1% decline in grazing land area over the past decade. Grazing pressure has been stable or only moderately increasing across the major land areas globally, although there are regional exceptions such as Southern Asia. Over half of grazing lands occur in dryland environments that are highly susceptible to land degradation (established but incomplete) {3.3.1.3}. More recently intensification and increasing industrialization of livestock production systems, especially in developed countries, has resulted in an increasing reliance on mixed crop-livestock production systems and industrialized "landless" systems. As a result, 35% of global crop production is now allocated to livestock feed. Globally, fertilizer and pesticide use is expected to double by 2050 {3.3.2.2}. Marked drops in nitrogen-use efficiency (change in yield per unit of fertilizer input) in many parts of the world, particularly the Asia Pacific region, often accompanied by continued excessive fertilizer application, underscore the critical importance of sustainable agricultural practices, including conservation agricultural techniques, to maintain yield improvements (established but incomplete) {3.3.2.3}. Increases in consumption levels of many natural resources underpin increasing levels of degradation in many parts of the world (well established), with slow rates of adoption of sustainable production systems (established but incomplete) {3.6.2.2, 3.6.3.2, 3.6.4.2}. Projections to 2050 suggest that one billion ha of natural ecosystems could be converted to agriculture by that time. More than half of agricultural expansion in the last three decades has occurred in relatively intact tropical forests. Economic growth in the developing world is projected to double global consumption of forest and wood products by 2030, with demand likely to exceed production in many developing and emerging economies in Asia and Africa within the next decade. Traditional fuelwood and charcoal continue to represent a dominant share of total wood consumption in low income countries, up to 70%, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (well established). Under current projections efforts to intensify wood production in plantation forests, together with increases in fuel-use efficiency and electrification are only likely to partly offset the pressure on native forests (unresolved). Adoption of more sustainable production systems continues to be slow, as seen, for example, by a slowdown in the expansion of the area of certified forests. More than half of the terrestrial surface of the Earth has fire regimes outside the range of natural variability, with changes in fire frequency and intensity posing major challenges for land restoration (established but incomplete) {3.3.7}. The frequency of fires has increased in many areas – exacerbated by decreases in precipitation – including in many regions of humid and temperate forests that rarely experience large-scale fires naturally. Some changes in fire regimes, particularly in tropical forests, are sufficiently severe that recovery to pre-disturbance conditions may no longer be possible. Increases in international trade, intensification of land use and urbanization have meant that few areas of the planet are free of invasive species (established but incomplete) {3.3.8}. Nearly one fifth of the Earth´s surface is at high risk of plant and animal invasion, including many biodiversity hotspots. Climate change, including increased nitrogen deposition and changes in CO2, as well as increases in fire frequency with rising temperatures in many areas, are all likely to increase invasions {3.4}. Once established, the eradication of many invasive species is often very expensive, if not impossible, underscoring the need to develop proactive strategies to pre-empt invasions, including through inspections, research and education. Activities related to industrialization, infrastructure development, urbanization, and many extractive industries result in complete transformation of ecosystems, accompanied by near or complete loss of biodiversity and ecosystem function and the services those ecosystems provide (well established) {3.3.6}. Infrastructure, industrial development and urbanization activities, often replace natural ecosystems with impervious or contaminated surfaces such as asphalt, concrete and rooftops, leading to the one of the most severe forms of land degradation in the form of soil sealing. Built-up areas, which are dominated by sealed soils, currently occupy nearly 0.6% of the global land surface. If population densities in cities remain stable, the extent of built-up areas in developed countries is expected to increase by 30% and triple in developing countries between 2000 and 2050. Under more extreme scenarios of increasing population density and economic development, the extent of built-up areas globally may increase to over 2% of the global land area over this same time period. New urban design and green technologies that incorporate features that promote sustainability and delivery of ecosystem services can play an important role in restoring some of the ecosystem functions and services of built environments. The importance of climate change for land degradation is most prominent through its role in exacerbating the impacts of other human activities (established but incomplete) {3.4}. The exacerbating effect of climate change on the impact of degradation drivers, including land clearance and intensive farming techniques, can be felt both through chronic impacts and directional changes – like temperature changes, leading to shifts in species range sizes, as well as changes in average precipitation levels, atmospheric CO2 and nitrogen deposition – and acute impacts through extreme weather events of flooding, drought, and other natural disasters (well established). Heavy rainfall events and storms as well as heat waves and droughts are predicted to increase in frequency over several parts of the globe, with cascading effects on the frequency, intensity, extent and timing of other drivers such as fires, pest and pathogen outbreaks, species invasions, soil erosion and landslides (established but incomplete). The last decade has witnessed a rise in consumer-driven demand for sustainable land use and land management, as well as commitments to restore degraded land that is unprecedented in human history (well established) {3.6}. In the last decade hundreds of companies have made pledges to reduce their impacts on forests and on the rights of local communities, with many committing to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains entirely by 2020. In the same period, many governments and civil society groups have made ambitious commitments to restore hundreds of millions of hectares of degraded land. New players, such as the finance sector, who until recently have been completely detached from the mainstream sustainability agenda are also starting to make explicit commitments to avoiding environmental harm. The overall impact of these voluntary measures remains to be assessed but they offer a vital window of opportunity for reversing degradation trends and placing economies on a more sustainable footing – especially as large areas of marginal agricultural become increasingly abandoned with ongoing development (unresolved).

Human activities now represent the most important force shaping the degradation of ecosystems in all of the world´s major biomes (well established). Long-established drivers of land degradation continue to increase across much of the world, including agricultural activities {3.3.1, 3.3.2}, driven by increasing demands for food and bioenergy. More recent global change drivers, such as climate change and atmospheric nitrogen deposition, further exacerbate impacts {3.4}. We are now in a qualitatively different and novel world, compared to only a few decades ago, and the combination of drivers creates significant challenges to restore degraded land and mitigate further degradation (established but incomplete). Few, if any, areas of the world are now free of some form of human influence (well established) and some systems are experiencing unprecedented challenges. Changes in the extent and severity of both land degradation and restoration commonly result from multiple underlying social and economic factors – indirect drivers, many of which occur in places distant from where the impacts are felt (well established) {3.6.4}. Demand for food imports is increasing across much of the world. This high dependency on imported commodities means that a large share of the environmental impacts of consumption is felt in other parts of the world. The physical quantity of goods traded internationally only represents one third of the actual natural resources that were used to produce these traded goods. The sustainability of the commodity production systems that support global supply chains is thus substantially shaped by the sourcing and investment decisions of market actors who may have little direct connection to the production landscapes (established but incomplete). Moreover, the globalized nature of many commodity supply chains potentially elevates the relative importance of global-scale factors such as trade agreements, market prices and exchange rates, as well as distant linkages related to buyer and investment preferences, over national and regional governance arrangements and the agency of individual producers (inconclusive). Addressing this complexity to avoid and reverse land degradation therefore requires the building of effective multi-sector and multi-stakeholder partnerships that span national boundaries (established but incomplete) {3.6.6}. Economic growth and per capita consumption, more than poverty, is one of the biggest threats to sustainable land management globally (established but incomplete) {3.6.3, 3.6.4}. Extreme poverty, combined with resource scarcity, can contribute to land degradation and unsustainable levels of natural resource use, but is rarely the major underlying cause (well established). Many of the most marked changes in how land is used and managed come from individual and societal responses to economic opportunities, such as a shift in demand for a particular commodity or improved market access, moderated by institutional and political factors (established but incomplete). For example, clearance of native vegetation and land degradation across much of Latin America and Asia is linked to agricultural expansion and intensification at a commercial scale for export markets (well established). Reducing poverty, although a priority for sustainable development, is insufficient to mitigate land degradation if not accompanied by additional measures. Concurrently, rising per capita consumption levels can exacerbate degradation. Efforts to reverse degradation therefore require a combination of local and regional poverty-alleviation strategies, including the adoption of pro-poor food production systems, together with efforts to improve the enforcement of public regulations for sustainable land uses, and strengthening the accountability of global market actors in effectively supporting such strategies. The highly interconnected and globalized nature of indirect drivers of land degradation and restoration means that the outcome of any global, regional or local intervention can be highly unpredictable, yet contextual generalizations are possible (established but incomplete) {3.6.2.3, 3.6.3}. The ways in which land is used in one part of the world can be highly sensitive to sudden, unexpected changes in economic and institutional factors elsewhere (unresolved). For example, changes in currency exchange rates, and cascading effects on the profitability of a given commodity, can markedly accelerate or decelerate the clearance of native vegetation for agriculture within a single year {3.6.2.3}. The sudden imposition of trade restrictions (e.g., due to disease controls), can have a similarly marked impact. However, with an improved understanding of the interactive effects amongst different drivers, it is possible to make predictions that are valid under a certain range of conditions. For example, agricultural intensification and agroforestry practices can help reduce the pressure on remaining areas of native vegetation under certain conditions (such as inelastic demand for staple crops), but unless such measures are coupled with increased enforcement of land-use policies they can result in a rebound effect that increases pressure on natural resources (established but incomplete) {3.6.3}. Land degradation in any given place is rarely the consequence of a single anthropogenic driver, but is instead the result of a diverse and frequently mutually-reinforcing set of human activities and underlying drivers (well established) {3.4.5, 3.5, 3.6.2.1}. Typically, at least three types of indirect driver, such as economic, technological and institutional, underpin any direct driver of land degradation or restoration (established but incomplete). The complexity of drivers that commonly underpin land degradation highlights the fact that single factors, such as high rural population density, rarely provide an adequate underlying explanation on their own for observed impacts (established but incomplete) {3.6.3}. Land degradation is typically the result of multiple direct drivers, especially in instances of severe degradation (e.g., where land-use intensification drives increased species invasions and increases in fire frequency). This combination of drivers has resulted in large expanses of economically important grazing lands, including in North America, being transformed to fire-prone annual grass monocultures (well established) {3.3.7}. The multi-causality of land degradation requires commensurately holistic policy responses that operate across multiple scales and combine both regulatory and incentive based measures (established but incomplete). Rapid expansion and inappropriate management of agricultural lands (including both grazing lands and croplands), especially in dryland ecosystems, is the most extensive land degradation driver globally (well established) {3.3.1, 3.3.2}. The expansion of grazing lands has largely stagnated globally with evidence for an approximate 1% decline in grazing land area over the past decade. Grazing pressure has been stable or only moderately increasing across the major land areas globally, although there are regional exceptions such as Southern Asia. Over half of grazing lands occur in dryland environments that are highly susceptible to land degradation (established but incomplete) {3.3.1.3}. More recently intensification and increasing industrialization of livestock production systems, especially in developed countries, has resulted in an increasing reliance on mixed crop-livestock production systems and industrialized "landless" systems. As a result, 35% of global crop production is now allocated to livestock feed. Globally, fertilizer and pesticide use is expected to double by 2050 {3.3.2.2}. Marked drops in nitrogen-use efficiency (change in yield per unit of fertilizer input) in many parts of the world, particularly the Asia Pacific region, often accompanied by continued excessive fertilizer application, underscore the critical importance of sustainable agricultural practices, including conservation agricultural techniques, to maintain yield improvements (established but incomplete) {3.3.2.3}. Increases in consumption levels of many natural resources underpin increasing levels of degradation in many parts of the world (well established), with slow rates of adoption of sustainable production systems (established but incomplete) {3.6.2.2, 3.6.3.2, 3.6.4.2}. Projections to 2050 suggest that one billion ha of natural ecosystems could be converted to agriculture by that time. More than half of agricultural expansion in the last three decades has occurred in relatively intact tropical forests. Economic growth in the developing world is projected to double global consumption of forest and wood products by 2030, with demand likely to exceed production in many developing and emerging economies in Asia and Africa within the next decade. Traditional fuelwood and charcoal continue to represent a dominant share of total wood consumption in low income countries, up to 70%, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (well established). Under current projections efforts to intensify wood production in plantation forests, together with increases in fuel-use efficiency and electrification are only likely to partly offset the pressure on native forests (unresolved). Adoption of more sustainable production systems continues to be slow, as seen, for example, by a slowdown in the expansion of the area of certified forests. More than half of the terrestrial surface of the Earth has fire regimes outside the range of natural variability, with changes in fire frequency and intensity posing major challenges for land restoration (established but incomplete) {3.3.7}. The frequency of fires has increased in many areas – exacerbated by decreases in precipitation – including in many regions of humid and temperate forests that rarely experience large-scale fires naturally. Some changes in fire regimes, particularly in tropical forests, are sufficiently severe that recovery to pre-disturbance conditions may no longer be possible. Increases in international trade, intensification of land use and urbanization have meant that few areas of the planet are free of invasive species (established but incomplete) {3.3.8}. Nearly one fifth of the Earth´s surface is at high risk of plant and animal invasion, including many biodiversity hotspots. Climate change, including increased nitrogen deposition and changes in CO2, as well as increases in fire frequency with rising temperatures in many areas, are all likely to increase invasions {3.4}. Once established, the eradication of many invasive species is often very expensive, if not impossible, underscoring the need to develop proactive strategies to pre-empt invasions, including through inspections, research and education. Activities related to industrialization, infrastructure development, urbanization, and many extractive industries result in complete transformation of ecosystems, accompanied by near or complete loss of biodiversity and ecosystem function and the services those ecosystems provide (well established) {3.3.6}. Infrastructure, industrial development and urbanization activities, often replace natural ecosystems with impervious or contaminated surfaces such as asphalt, concrete and rooftops, leading to the one of the most severe forms of land degradation in the form of soil sealing. Built-up areas, which are dominated by sealed soils, currently occupy nearly 0.6% of the global land surface. If population densities in cities remain stable, the extent of built-up areas in developed countries is expected to increase by 30% and triple in developing countries between 2000 and 2050. Under more extreme scenarios of increasing population density and economic development, the extent of built-up areas globally may increase to over 2% of the global land area over this same time period. New urban design and green technologies that incorporate features that promote sustainability and delivery of ecosystem services can play an important role in restoring some of the ecosystem functions and services of built environments. The importance of climate change for land degradation is most prominent through its role in exacerbating the impacts of other human activities (established but incomplete) {3.4}. The exacerbating effect of climate change on the impact of degradation drivers, including land clearance and intensive farming techniques, can be felt both through chronic impacts and directional changes – like temperature changes, leading to shifts in species range sizes, as well as changes in average precipitation levels, atmospheric CO2 and nitrogen deposition – and acute impacts through extreme weather events of flooding, drought, and other natural disasters (well established). Heavy rainfall events and storms as well as heat waves and droughts are predicted to increase in frequency over several parts of the globe, with cascading effects on the frequency, intensity, extent and timing of other drivers such as fires, pest and pathogen outbreaks, species invasions, soil erosion and landslides (established but incomplete). The last decade has witnessed a rise in consumer-driven demand for sustainable land use and land management, as well as commitments to restore degraded land that is unprecedented in human history (well established) {3.6}. In the last decade hundreds of companies have made pledges to reduce their impacts on forests and on the rights of local communities, with many committing to eliminate deforestation from their supply chains entirely by 2020. In the same period, many governments and civil society groups have made ambitious commitments to restore hundreds of millions of hectares of degraded land. New players, such as the finance sector, who until recently have been completely detached from the mainstream sustainability agenda are also starting to make explicit commitments to avoiding environmental harm. The overall impact of these voluntary measures remains to be assessed but they offer a vital window of opportunity for reversing degradation trends and placing economies on a more sustainable footing – especially as large areas of marginal agricultural become increasingly abandoned with ongoing development (unresolved).

[eng] International relations can be reviewed from different perspectives. One of them is through culture. In general, a lecture and an analysis of it from this specific point of view has been neglected, attracting much less attention comparing to other issues, like the political science, the international law, or the economics. The cultural perspective offers a mirror of the reality and can contribute to a better understanding of the external relations and on what is happening at other levels, usually considered as more relevant in the foreign policies and the traditional diplomacy, like politics, trade and commerce, or military issues. At the same time, this cultural perspective needs a transversal focus to offer a real insight and overview of the actual scope, due to the multifaceted feature of culture considered in its broad approach. The international presence and the role of culture within the bilateral relations is conditioned by the definition of the external cultural policies and the priorities and strategies in its bilateral relations with third countries. Sometimes the external cultural policies can have a close link with the internal cultural policies as well, being a projection of the internal priorities in the international context. The institutional structure and the competences of the different institutions can also influence in the role of culture in the bilateral relations of a specific country. Aside of that, there are other relevant factors that can be determinant in the bilateral relations, like the historical background or the bilateral political and commercial relations, among others. Culture in the context of the international relations and cooperation between Europe and Egypt includes from the institutional level, the bilateral and multilateral relations of the European Union, and its 28 Member States at an individual level as well. Otherwise, some of these European countries have had a long presence during the colonialist period, maintain historical ties, or have economic interests in Egypt. Within this framework, the different cultural policies are embedded in the external actions of the bilateral cultural relations and cooperation, where the cultural projection is a component of the public diplomacy as a form of soft power. The present research has as primary objective to get a deep inside of the bilateral relations, and the identification of some quantitative indicators and qualitative aspects of the European bilateral relations from the public sector, and makes a detailed analysis of which is the present situation of culture in the context of the international relations with a strategic country of the Arab world like Egypt. Getting an insight into the different facts, parameters and indicators allows to identify the different exogenous and endogenous factors which can have a determinant role, jointly with the explicit and implicit objectives, and other elements to consider, including priorities, strategies, instruments and activities. Actions taken into consideration are those from the European Union, and some of its Member States, which are reviewed and compared in a systematic way. This research takes as case study five of the European countries, the most populated of the European Union, and several specific fields. It starts checking the way how each individual country is presenting its external cultural policy in the official web, and followed by the cultural bilateral relations with Egypt. Then it is verified the role of the national cultural institutes, the archaeological cooperation, the higher education, the research and scientific cooperation, the presence of culture in the cooperation to development and the media. Finally it is revised the European Union's cultural presence through actions and initiatives in Egypt, and checked how the individual cultural bilateral relations of the selected countries fit together with them. The result offers a broad and comprehensive perspective of the presence of culture in international relations and cooperation in the particular case of Egypt. The analysis carried out allows concluding an insufficiently structured place of culture in the European external relations and cooperation with Egypt, the missed coordination among the different actors involved, the individual interests, and some incoherencies as well. ; [cat] Les relacions internacionals poden ser examinades des de diferents perspectives. Una d'elles es des de la cultura. En general, una lectura i un anàlisi d'aquest punt de vista específic ha estat oblidat, i ha atret molta menys atenció comparat amb altres temes com són els temes polítics, el dret internacional o els econòmics. La perspectiva cultural ofereix un mirall on es reflexa la realitat, que pot contribuir a un millor enteniment de les relacions exteriors i sobre el que succeeix a altres nivells, normalment considerats com a més rellevants dins de la política exterior i la diplomàcia tradicional, com són els temes polítics, comercials o militars. Al mateix temps, aquesta perspectiva cultural necessita una mirada transversal per poder oferir una mirada profunda i al mateix temps global de la actual abast del tema, ja que abraça diferents àmbits de la cultura, que en aquest cas és considerada en la seva aproximació més amplia. La presència internacional i el rol de la cultura a les relacions bilaterals està condicionada per la definició de les polítiques culturals exteriors i de les prioritats i estratègies en les seves relacions bilaterals amb països tercers. De vegades les polítiques culturals externes poden tenir un vincle estret amb les polítiques culturals internes, sent una projecció de les prioritats internes en el context internacional. L'estructura institucional i les competències de les diferents institucions poden també tenir una influència en el rol de la cultura en les relacions bilaterals d'un país concret. A part d'això, hi ha altres factors rellevants que poden ser determinants de les relacions bilaterals, com són els antecedents històrics o les relacions bilaterals polítiques i comercials, entre d'altres. La cultura en el context de les relacions internacionals i la cooperació entre Europa i Egipte inclou des del punt institucional les relacions bilaterals i multilaterals de la Unió Europea, així com les dels seus 28 estats membres a nivell individual. Per altre banda, alguns d'aquests països europeus han tingut una llarga presència durant el període colonial, mantenen vincles històrics, o tenen interessos econòmics a Egipte. En aquest marc, les diferents polítiques culturals estan encaixades en les accions exteriors de les relacions culturals bilaterals i de la cooperació, on la projecció cultural és un component de la diplomàcia pública com a forma de soft power. La recerca té com a principal objectiu aprofundir sobre les relacions bilaterals, i la identificació d'alguns dels indicadors quantitatius i aspectes qualitatius de les relacions bilaterals des del sector públic, i fer un anàlisis detallat sobre quina és la situació present de la cultura en el context de les relacions internacional amb un país estratègic del món àrab com és Egipte. Aquest aprofundiment en els diferents factors, paràmetres i indicadors permet identificar els diferents factors exògens i endògens que poden ser determinants, juntament amb els objectius explícits i implícits, i altres aspectes que s'han de considerar, com les prioritats, estratègies, instruments, i activitats. Les accions que es prenen en consideració són les de la Unió Europea, i d'alguns dels seus estats membres, que són revisades i comparades d'una manera sistemàtica. Aquest treball agafa com a estudi de cas a Egipte, i també analitza a cinc països europeus, els cinc més poblats de la Unió Europea, i alguns dels camps culturals específics. Com a marc general es comença per veure la manera com cada un d'aquests països individuals presenta la seva política cultural exterior a les pàgines webs oficials, i es continua amb les relacions culturals bilaterals amb Egipte. Després es verifica el rol dels instituts nacionals de cultura, la cooperació arqueològica, l'educació universitària, la investigació i la cooperació científica, la presencia de la cultura a la cooperació al desenvolupament, i els media. Finalment es revisa la presencia cultural de la Unió Europea mitjançant les accions i les iniciatives a Egipte, i com les relacions culturals bilaterals individuals dels països seleccionats hi encaixen. El resultat ofereix una perspectiva àmplia i comprensiva de la presencia de la cultura a les relacions internacionals i la cooperació en aquest cas particular d'Egipte. L'anàlisi que s'ha portat a terme permet concloure que la cultura té un lloc insuficientment estructurat a les relacions exteriors europees amb Egipte, l'absència de coordinació entre els diferents actors involucrats, els interessos individuals, així com algunes incoherències. ; [spa] Las relaciones internacionales pueden ser examinadas desde diferentes perspectivas, una de ellas es desde la cultura. En general una lectura y un análisis desde este específico punto de vista ha sido dejado de lado, atrayendo mucha menos atención en comparación con otros temas, como las ciencias políticas, el derecho internacional, o la economía. La perspectiva cultural ofrece un espejo donde se refleja la realidad, y que puede contribuir a una mejor compresión de las relaciones exteriores y sobre lo que sucede a otros niveles normalmente considerados como más relevantes en las relaciones exteriores y la diplomacia tradicional, como son los temas políticos, de comercio internacional o los temas militares. Al mismo tiempo esta perspectiva cultural necesita un enfoque transversal para ofrecer una visión detallada y al mismo tiempo global para conocer su alcance real, debido al carácter multidisciplinar de la cultura, considerada en su amplia aproximación. La presencia internacional y el rol de la cultura en las relaciones bilaterales están condicionados por la definición de las políticas culturales exteriores, además de las prioridades y estrategias en las relaciones bilaterales con países terceros. Por otro lado, frecuentemente las políticas culturales exteriores pueden tener vínculos estrechos con las políticas culturales a nivel nacional, siendo una proyección de las prioridades internas en el contexto internacional. La estructura institucional y las competencias de las diferentes instituciones públicas también pueden influenciar en el rol de la cultura en las relaciones bilaterales de un determinado país. Además de ello, también hay otros factores relevantes que pueden determinar las relaciones bilaterales, como los antecedentes históricos o las relaciones bilaterales políticas y comerciales, entre otras. La cultura en el contexto de las relaciones internacionales y la cooperación entre Europa y Egipto incluye, a nivel institucional, las relaciones bilaterales y multilaterales de la Unión Europea, así como sus 28 estados miembros a nivel individual. Además de ello, algunos de estos países europeos han tenido un larga presencia durante el periodo colonial, mantienen lazos históricos, o tienen intereses económicos en Egipto. Dentro de este marco las diferentes políticas culturales se encuentran incluidas en las acciones exteriores de las relaciones culturales bilaterales y la cooperación, donde la proyección cultural es uno de los componentes de la diplomacia pública como una forma de soft power. La presente investigación tiene como principal objetivo profundizar en las relaciones bilaterales y la identificación de indicadores centrados en diversos aspectos cuantitativos y cualitativos de las relaciones bilaterales europeas desde el sector público, y analiza en detalle sobre cuál es la situación presente de la cultural en el contexto de las relaciones internacionales con un país estratégico del mundo árabe como es Egipto. Esta profundización de los diferentes factores, parámetros y indicadores permite identificar los diferentes factores exógenos y endógenos que tienen un rol determinante, juntamente con los objetivos explícito se implícitos, y otros elementos que se deben considerar como son las prioridades, las estrategias, instrumentos y actividades culturales. Las acciones consideradas son las de la Unión Europea y las de algunos de sus estados miembros, la cuales son revisadas y comparadas de forma sistemática. Esta investigación se centra en el estudio de case de cinco países europeos, los cinco estados miembros de la Unión Europea más poblados, y en diferentes campos específicos. Se inicia supervisando la forma como cada país individualmente presenta su política cultural exterior en sus páginas web oficiales, seguido por una revisión de las relaciones culturales bilaterales con Egipto. Luego en diferentes capítulos se verifica el rol de los centros culturales nacionales, la cooperación arqueológica, la educación universitaria, la investigación y la cooperación científica, la presencia de la cultura en la cooperación al desarrollo, y los media. Finalmente se analiza la presencia cultural de la Unión Europea en Egipto a través de diferentes acciones e iniciativas, y como las relaciones culturales bilaterales de los países europeos seleccionados encajan con ellas. El resultado obtenido ofrece una amplia y comprensiva perspectiva sobre cuál es la presencia de la cultura en las relaciones internacionales y la cooperación en el caso particular de Egipto. El análisis llevado a cabo permite concluir un lugar insuficientemente estructurado de la cultura en las relaciones exteriores europeas con Egipto, la falta de coordinación entre los diferentes actores involucrados, los intereses individuales, así como algunas incoherencias.

Denne Ph.D. afhandling omfatter fundamentale betragtninger omkring topologier, algoritmer, implementeringer, metoder etc., der kan indg˚a i næste generation af aktive kontrol systemer. Specifikt foresl˚as der en variant af feedforward kontrol refereret til som indesluttet feedforward aktiv kontrol forkortet IFFAK. I denne topologi indg˚ar et sæt reference sensorer, der er positioneret p˚a en overflade, der fuldt ud indeslutter de ønskede stille-zoner, hvori et sæt performance sensorer monitorerer den opn˚aede støjreduktion. Denne indesluttet-feedforward aktiv kontrol (IFFAK) topologi er indlejret i et mange-input-mange-output (MIMO) system, der omfatter b˚ade feedforward og feedback kontrol. Det totale system er refereret til som et hybrid MIMO indesluttetfeedforward FBS (HMIMOIFFFBS). Undersøgelsen af et komplekst multi-kanals aktiv støjreduktion (ASR) system med hybrid feedforward og feedback topologier er motiveret ud fra krav om høj aktiv støjdæmpning i ekstreme støjmiljøer, som f.eks. opleves ombord p˚a luftb˚arne militære platforme. Støjoptagelser erhvervet ombord p˚a s˚adanne fartøjer afslører lydtryk, der ofte overstiger 140 dB re. 20 μPa. Endvidere udviser disse støjsignaler store tidslige s˚avel som spatiale variationer. Naturlige begrænsninger i feedback baserede aktiv kontrol (AK) systemer som typisk anvendes i moderne ASR støjværn, hvor modstøjssignalet notorisk er forsinket i forhold til den primære forstyrrelse, sætter en øvre grænse for, hvor stor en aktiv dæmpning, der kan opn˚aes. S˚aledes, hersker der i krævende militære applikationer et krav om nye mere avancerede og effektive ASR løsninger. Den opn˚aelige ASR i et FFS er i stor udstrækning bestemt af kohærensen mellem sættet af reference sensorer og sættet af fejl- eller performance sensorer. S˚aledes omfatter denne afhandling en del kohærensundersøgelser baseret p˚a diffustfeltsm˚alinger i et støjkammer samt m˚alinger, der er foretaget i en CH-47D Chinook helikopter. Fra disse kohærensanalyser kan det konkluderes, at IFFAK systemet anvendt p˚a pilothjælme giver mulighed for ca. 25 dB støjreduktion ved 100 Hz faldende til ca. 10 dB dæmpning ved 900 Hz. Endvidere, er der ikke nogen umiddelbare tegn p˚a en mætning med stigende antal reference sensorer. S˚aledes vil et større antal reference sensor forventeligt kunne øge den øvre ASR frekvensgrænse for systemet, der bestemmes af den rumlige samplingstæthed. I hybridsystemet indg˚ar der b˚ade et kontinuerlig-tids FBS og et diskret-tids FBS. Disse vil bidrage med yderligere støjreduktion primært overfor bredb˚andet støj henholdsvis overfor periodiske signaler. Tidsforsinkelser udgør en anden bestemmende faktor for den opn˚aelige effekt i et FFS design, men specielt i et FBS design, eftersom fysiske systemer altid opererer kausalt. For at vurdere størrelsesordenen af det tidsforspring som hver reference sensor giver i forhold til hver fejlsensor i det foresl˚aede IFFAK system indføres en størrelse, der betegnes som den spatialt-vægtet middeltidsgevinst. Der eksisterer imidlertid et problem, n˚ar man forsøger at modellere et fysisk system med en endelig rummelig udstrækning og hvor der s˚aledes ikke er nogen indlysende input-output definition med et endeligt-element multi-kanals system. Som regel eksisterer der ikke nogen unik overføringsfunktion eftersom systemet ikke bliver punktvist stimuleret, men derimod stimuleret xii over et areal som for eksempel under diffustfelts belysning. En ny akustisk signalbehandlingsmetode, der betegnes som samlet kanal residual spektral analyse (SKRSA) er udviklet. Denne metode benyttes til ekstraktion af fælles signal information fra forskellige observationspunkter i rummet. Ideen er at separere hvert spektrum i et kohærent spektrum og et residual spektrum. Indholdet i det kohærente spektrum kan opn˚aes som en linear kombination af spektrene fra de andre kanaler, hvorimod indholdet af det residuale spektrum er unikt for den p˚agældende kanal. I et specifikt eksempel, belyses et system best˚aende af et sæt reference sensorer monteret p˚a en Gentex HGU-55/P hjælm, der igen er p˚amonteret en hoved og torso simulator med et diffust lydfelt. Under anvendelse af SKRSA metoden estimeres den spatialt-vægtet middeltidsgevinst til at være i størrelsesorden 800-900μs. Afhandlingen omfatter ogs˚a en detaljeret beskrivelse af en ny id´e til en beregningsmæssig effektiv implementering af et multi-kanals system, hvor b˚ade de adaptive filtre, der indg˚ar i den aktive kontrol s˚avel som de adaptive filtre, der indg˚ar til modellering af systemoverføringsfunktionerne kan antage individuelle længder. En ny og mere generel variant af APA algoritmen er udviklet. Denne adaptive filter algoritme inkluderer parametre for b˚ade wægt-styret og kontrol-effekt-styret lækage, adaptiv tap-vægte regulering s˚avel som numerisk regulering og betegnes MC-αγΠ-APA. En simplificering af denne algoritme, fører til MC-αγΠ-NLMS algoritmen, der er en udbygget variant af NLMS algoritmen. Systemets evne til off-line simultant at kunne identificere et complex system best˚aende af ialt 28 enkelt systemgrene bliver demonstreret. Forskellig adaptive filtre samt parametering heraf bliver udforsket. Et nyt og generelt multi-hastigheds systemkoncept for aktiv kontrol er udviklet. Specifikt implementeres og testes et system, hvor der i alt samples med tre forskellige hastigheder. P˚a multi-hastighedsniveau 0 benyttes en meget høj samplingsfrekvens med henblik p˚a at reducere forsinkelser i konverteringstrinene, der indg˚ar i de sekundære grene. Den ikke adaptive kontrol udføres p˚a det lavere multi-hastigheds niveau 1. Herved tilsikres et kompromis imellem forsinkelser til afgivelse af modstøjssignaler og krav til en endelig system b˚andbredde. Sluttelig foreg˚ar den adaptive kontrol ved det lavere multi-hastigheds niveau 2. Herved begrænses den ofte beregningsmæssige tunge adaptive filter opdatering til en s˚a lav samplingsfrekvens som muligt. I et specifikt eksempel demonstreres, at en beregningsmæssig besparelse p˚a ca. 40% kan opn˚as under opretholdelse af samme ASR ved nedsampling fra multi-hastighedsniveau 1 p˚a 24 kHz til multi-hastighedsniveau 2 p˚a 3 kHz. Det er en almindelig ingeniørpraksis at foretage en antagelse om Gaussisk fordelte signaler. Imidlertid, er mange fænomener i dagligdagen bedst modelleret med s˚akaldte alfa-stabile fordelings funktioner. Dette gælder ogs˚a for støjsignaler, der ønskes undertrykt ved hjælp af et aktivt støjdæmpningssystem. Afhandlingen indholder en kort teknisk beskrivelse af de stabile fordelingsfunktioner samt adaptive filter algoritmer for disse type signaler. Store dele af HMIMOIFFFB systemet samt de udviklede metoder og algoritmer er implementeret i et realtids miljø, der inkluderer en signal processor. I første omgang vil disse blive aftestet p˚a en til form˚alet designet aktive kontrol testenhed. ; This Ph.D. thesis includes fundamental considerations about topologies, algorithms, implementations, methods etc., that can enter in the next generation of active control (AC) systems. Specifically, a new variant of feedforward control referred to as confined feedforward active control (CFFAC) is proposed. This topology is constituted from a set of reference sensors that are positioned on a surface that completely confines the desired zones of quite. A set of performance sensors monitors the achieved noise reduction. This CFFAC topology in turn is embedded in a multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) system that facilitates both feedforward and feedback control. The general system is then referred to as hybrid MIMO confined-feedforward feedback (HMIMOCFFFB) active noise reduction (ANR) system. The investigation of a multi-channel ANR system with hybrid feedforward and feedback topologies is motivated by requirements of high ANR attenuation in extreme noise environments as typically experienced onboard airborne military platforms. Noise recordings acquired on such platforms reveal very high sound pressure levels often exceeding 140 dB re. 20 μPa. Moreover, these noise signals exhibit large temporal as well as spatial variations. Inherent limitations are related to the use of stand-alone feedback AC implementation commonly applied in modern ANR headset. In such systems the anti-noise signal is notoriously behind the primary disturbance in time. Accordingly, in demanding military applications requirements on more advanced and effective ANR system designs prevail. The achievable ANR performance in a feedforward system (FFS) is to a large extent determined by the degree of coherence between the set of reference sensors and the set of error sensors (or performance sensors). Accordingly, this thesis includes a number of coherence analysis that are based on diffuse sound field measurements in a reverberant chamber and measurements conducted onboard a CH-47D Chinook helicopter. From these coherence analysis it can be concluded that the CFFAC system with 10 reference sensors applied to pilot helmets potentially provides approximately 25 dB noise reduction at 100 Hz decreasing to approximately 10 dB attenuation at 900 Hz. Moreover, there is no apparent sign of saturation of the noise reduction with an increasing number of reference sensors. Accordingly, by using more reference sensors the spatial sampling rate is increased which in turn most likely also will lead to an increased ANR bandwidth. The hybrid system is also constituted from a continuous-time feedback system (FBS) and a discrete-time FBS. The continuous-time FBS is primarily responsible for additional broadband noise reduction, whereas the discrete-time FBS primarily is responsible for the attenuation of periodic signals. Owing to the requirement on causal operation of a physical AC system time delays will also to a large extent determine the achievable performance in FFS design and in particular in FBS design. A quantity referred to as the spatially-weighted-averaged acquisition lead time is introduced to represent the averaged time-advance obtained by each reference sensor relative to each performance sensor involved in the proposed CFFAC system. A problem exist when one attempts to model a physical spatially distributed system with no obvious input and output channel definition by a finite lumped-elements multi-channel system. Usually, no unique transfer function x exist as the system is not point-wise excited, but excited over an area as in the case of diffuse sound field illumination. A new method for acoustical signal processing that is referred to as joint-channel residual spectral analysis (JCRSA) is developed. The JCRSA method is used for the extraction of joint signal information from different observation positions in space. The idea is to separate each spectrum in a coherent spectrum and a residual spectrum. The contents of the coherent spectrum can be obtained from a linear superposition of the other signals, whereas the residual spectrum bears information that is unique to each specific channel. In a specific example a system consisting of 10 reference sensors flush-mounted on a Gentex HGU-55/P helmet that in turn is mounted on a head and torso simulator (HATS), is exposed to diffuse sound field illumination. By applying the JCRSA method the spatially-weighted-averaged acquisition lead times provided by the reference sensors relative to the performance sensors are estimated to be as much as 800-900μs. The thesis also includes a detailed description of a new idea for a computational efficient implementation of a multi-channel system in which the adaptive filters for adaptive control as well as the adaptive filters used for plant modeling are allowing to take different lengths. A new and more general variant of the affine projection algorithm has been developed. This adaptive filter algorithm that is denoted by multiple-channel-αγΠ-affine projection algorithm includes parameters for both weight-driven and control-effort-driven leakage, adaptive tap-weight regularization as well as numerical regularization. A simplification of this algorithm leads to the MC-αγΠ-NLMS algorithm that is an extended variant of the NLMS algorithm. Off-line simultaneous system identification capabilities of a complex system involving a total 4 secondary paths, 20 feedback paths and 4 control-performance paths is demonstrated. Different adaptive filters and parameterizations hereof are examined. A novel and general multi-rate adaptive filter for adaptive AC has been developed. Specifically, a system involving 3 different sampling rates has been implemented and the results hereof are presented. In this multi-rate system conversion take place at highly oversampled rates in order to reduce the delays in the secondary paths. The non-adaptive control is performed at a somewhat lower rate. Hereby, a compromise between delays related to the generation of the anti-noise signal and the computational load involved is ensured. Finally, the adaptive control that might be computational intensive takes place at an even slower sampling rate hereby relaxing the requirements on a high bandwidth. It is demonstrated that computational savings as high as 40% can be achieved in a 192, 24, 3 kHz triple-rate system as compared with a 24 kHz single-rate system without sacrificing the ANR performance. It is common engineering practice to apply an assumption of Gaussian distributed signals. However, many phenomena encountered in daily life fall into a generalization of the normal distribution that is referred to as α-stable distributions. Noise sources encountered in the domain of AC are sometimes best fitted to the family of α-stable distributions. This thesis includes a brief technical introduction to the stable distributions and description of the adaptive filter that can be used for AC. Large parts of the HMIMOCFFFB system including the developed methods and algorithms have been implemented in a real-time environment (RTE) that includes a signal processor. Test on the helmet system will continue and a dedicated reference test unit (RTU) for AC is currently being designed.

On ascending the throne in 1881, Tsar Alexander III of Russia proclaimed that "From henceforth, all matters of state will be discussed quietly between Ourselves and God." Both parts of this statement contain excellent advice for contemporary leaders. If you have a direct line to God (and several obviously think that they do), you should use it. And whether talking to the Divinity or anyone else, international affairs should be discussed quietly.
This is probably pointless advice when offered to products of democratic political systems; and in the case of President Trump he would need to experience something like a lightning bolt on the road to Damascus to follow it. Nonetheless, recent days have, or should have, offered a lesson in the folly and dangers of megaphone "diplomacy."
The initial U.S. proposal (or demand) to Ukraine for control of its mineral reserves was indeed completely illegitimate and utterly unacceptable to Kyiv or any independent and self-respecting government on the face of the planet. However, given the weakness of Ukraine's position and the already fragile state of his relations with the Trump administration, it was very foolish of President Zelensky to allow his officials to say things like this in public.
All Zelensky had to say was something along the lines of "very interesting proposal with positive aspects which we will consider carefully," etc., and then leave it to Ukrainian negotiators to take a firm line with their U.S. opposite numbers in private. He's an actor! He must know how to murmur "rhubarb rhubarb rhubarb" before a public audience without actually saying anything.
Much more foolish, boorish, undignified, ill-considered, dangerous and plain wrong however was Trump's response, calling Zelensky a "dictator" and a "modestly successful comedian," giving an utterly false figure of his popularity ratings and demanding that Ukraine hold presidential elections. He then made this even worse by refusing to call Putin a dictator and instructing the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to vote against a resolution including language blaming Russian aggression for the Ukraine War.
Incredibly enough, this put the U.S. in the same camp as Russia, voting against a huge majority of the U.N. General Assembly. Even China — China, for Heaven's sake — abstained on the resolution. This kind of thing is bad for the Trump administration and dangerous for the peace process, because it allows opponents of Trump and enemies of the peace process to denounce it as "surrender" to Russia motivated by personal and ideological amity between Trump and Putin, rather than a necessary step to end a destructive war, eliminate grave dangers to the world and costs to the U.S., and respect the will of a large majority of the international community.
It is indeed crucial to moderate U.S. official rhetoric against Russia and create the necessary atmosphere for successful negotiations; but what Trump could have said calmly and reasonably is that the Biden administration's habit of trying to negotiate with Russia and China while hurling public abuse at them was profoundly counter-productive; and that at a very delicate moment in the peace negotiations the U.S., while not necessarily disagreeing with the language of the U.N. resolution, therefore thought it better to abstain rather than risk undermining the talks. Much of the time, all leaders really need to say in public is something along the lines of, "We believe firmly in a world of universal peace and harmony and goodwill and suchlike." Chinese diplomats used to be very good at that until they started imitating the public language of their American colleagues.
The one thing to be said for Trump is that his locker-room language seems to reflect a locker-room spirit. In other words, he hurls insults and mockery at people, but really does not seem to bear a long-term grudge if they reply in kind. However crude his language and ruthless his approach to negotiations, he is in the end interested in the actual deal — sometimes quite a reasonable one, as may turn out to be the case with the U.S.-Ukrainian agreement on minerals. And this seems to work quite well at home.
In international affairs however it can be disastrous. Not many world leaders are as pachydermous as Trump, who could give your average rhinoceros a run for its money in this regard; and above all, insults to them are very often seen as insults to their countries, which will not be so readily forgiven. Sometimes indeed Trump's remarks are open — and utterly gratuitous — insults to countries, including some old and close allies. Trump may extract some reasonable concessions from Mexico and Canada through a mixture of negotiations and pressure. He will not do so by renaming the Gulf of Mexico and calling the Canadian prime minister the governor of the 51st U.S. state.
As to the European leaders! They remind me of Robert Burns' mouse, when its plans for a secure and peaceful slumber were disturbed by the plough:
"Wee, sleekit, cowrin, tim'rous beasties,O, what a panic's in yer breasties!Ye need na run tae Trump sae hasty,Wi' bickerin brattle!"
From the way they talk, anyone would think that the U.S. had already withdrawn from NATO, Russian troops were at the gates of Warsaw, and BlackRock (the former U.S. employer of the next German Chancellor Friedrich Merz) had taken away Merz's pension.
None of this hysteria is warranted. The Trump administration will not allow further NATO expansion, but it has shown no sign whatsoever of withdrawing from NATO, which is far too important as a base for the projection of U.S. power in the Middle East and support for Israel, which the Trump administration has no intention of giving up. Article 5 remains in place. Europeans are talking about a return to Yalta and the Cold War; but during the Cold War, Soviet tanks were in the middle of Germany. Today Russian ones are in eastern Ukraine. Russia has neither the ability nor the desire to attack NATO within its existing borders, unless NATO intervenes in Ukraine. Trump's threatened tariffs notwithstanding, the U.S. and European economies are very closely linked, and — as BlackRock itself demonstrates — their financial industries are virtually joined at the hip. Merz's pension is entirely safe. There is plenty of time for European establishments to think carefully, soberly and privately about the future of European security; and while they are thinking, not to talk so much.

Elbridge Colby, who worked guiding Pentagon policy in first Trump administration and is an advocate of building up military assets and deterrence as a way to avoid future U.S. wars — particularly with China — has just been named the incoming Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.It is an important role, and one that realists and many restrainers are all too happy to go to Colby, who is the most representative of the realist approach to foreign policy that Trump has nominated or selected since winning the White House in November. Colby has openly said he opposed the Iraq war and every U.S. conflict/overseas intervention since, and has been a vocal critic of U.S. proxy war against Russia in Ukraine. He has supported Ukraine's campaign to defend itself, but says the war is not a first priority interest of the United States and warns that continuing Washington aid and weapons at the current pace won't make a difference there, while sapping U.S. resources for its own defenses.His pick has realists, particularly on the Right, cheering, comparing him to an older tradition of U.S. foreign policy practitioners."Bridge Colby is arguably the leading conservative realist in U.S. defense and foreign policy today," notes Reid Smith, vice president of foreign policy at Stand Together, tells RS. "He hails from an intellectual tradition defined by statesmen like James Baker and Brent Scowcroft, who prioritized power and pragmatism over gauzy moralizing or rigid ideology. At the same time, his approach signals a generational shift toward a foreign policy grounded in reason, mindful of constraints, and informed by the lessons of past mistakes."What Colby believes is the chief security interest of the U.S. is China and that is where some restrainers peel off. Colby has said Washington must preserve its weapons, and shift its energy and focus for accelerated defense industrial production, on China. While he wants to avoid, war, he believes, "(Chinese) are actively preparing for conflict. My view is to prevent them from dominating Asia without a war. But the only prudent way is to be prepared to fight to show Beijing that there is nothing to gain by initiating conflict."In that vein he sees Taiwan as the flashpoint. As he wrote in the Wall Street Journal in September: "For about the past decade, I have been arguing in every available format that we should prepare ourselves to defend Taiwan. But my argument has always been that Taiwan isn't itself of existential importance to America. Rather, our core interest is in denying China regional hegemony over Asia. Taiwan is very important for that goal, but not essential.The key is to make Taiwan defensible at a reasonable level of cost and risk for Americans. This is a theme I developed at great length in my 2021 book. The sharpness and insistence of my arguments have been motivated by this precise fact: To make Taiwan defensible, America must focus on preparing for Taiwan's defense and Taiwan must do more."Some restrainers, even realists, believe that China's "desire to dominate Asia" is in itself a realist position for China and one that does not threaten the U.S. and therefore would not require the power projection that in fact might provoke the very war that Colby claims to want to avoid.Interestingly, Colby's only serious detractors have been pro-Israel types who say he is "too dovish" on Iran, citing a column in 2012 taking a realist point of view on the debate over whether the U.S. should attack the Islamic Republic, or not:But perhaps the most important argument against attacking Iran has received less attention. That is that none of the attack proponents can give a sensible answer to the question General David Petraeus posed at the beginning of the Iraq war: "How does this end?" (Matthew) Kroenig and other advocates for war note, correctly, that a strike against Iran could do substantial damage to Iran's program. But they fail to explain how the United States will prevent Iran from simply restarting its program, this time in deadly earnest. These critics, who cite Colby's 2021 co-written essay on reducing the U.S. military footprint in the Middle East as another datapoint in his "dovishness," fail to note that he has firmly stated his support of Israel's security, protecting Americans from the threat of transnational terrorism, and preventing "the domination of the oil-rich Gulf states by a potentially hostile power" as the three main U.S. interests in the region. In the same stated essay he says:These (U.S.) interests can be served through a far more scoped and modest approach than the United States has pursued over the last generation—most notably through the "freedom agenda" but also through its efforts to broadly stabilize the Middle East. The United States should therefore reduce its military engagement and presence in the region, shifting burdens as much as possible to other, primarily 76 regional, actors. This last goal can best be pursued by supporting and bolstering the capabilities of Israel and regional states like the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt, whose interests on key issues broadly align with the United States.Colby, during the Trump administration, also advised Trump to be cautious in sliding into war with Iran, which, despite the administration's assassination of IRGC commander Qassem Soleimani in early 2020, did just that. This was seen as a win for realists/restrainers in the Trump orbit like Tucker Carlson and Colby, who at the time wrote in the Wall Street Journal, "As the U.S. protects its interests in the Middle East, it must not allow its military focus to be wrested away from Asia." So again, his real sites are laser pointed eastward.Colby is a major proponent of rebuilding the American defense industrial base. Trump's other pick announced last night, billionaire Stephen Feinberg as Deputy Secretary of Defense in charge of budgets, runs a major private equity firm overseeing a vast web of defense companies, so the two will compliment each other, no doubt in that regard, but the closeness of profit-making industrialists to strategy & policy is already giving some restrainers heartburn. But Colby has had years of experience in government and in developing the intellectual firmament behind a "peace through strength" approach and many have breathed a sigh of relief that his position on China, which is decidedly more hawkish than the those who want a much less militarized posture, is not as ideologically driven and keen for a Cold War redux as others in the Republican orbit around Trump today.

On October 26, 2001, Jim Roche, the then Secretary of the Air Force, stood behind the podium in the Pentagon briefing room to announce that Lockheed Martin had won the competition to build the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Joining him on the stage, were Edward Aldridge, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and Gordon England, the Secretary of the Navy.All three took turns at the microphone to tout the Joint Strike Fighter's anticipated virtues. "The Joint Strike Fighter is a family of highly common, lethal, survivable, supportable, and affordable next generation multirole strike fighter aircraft," said Aldridge. All these claims have proven to be spurious to a greater or lesser extent in subsequent years as the F-35 program limped through a seemingly endless development process, but none so much as the "affordable" claim. At the time of the announcement, the F-35 was supposed to enter active service in 2008 and the program was expected to cost $200 billion.Nearly 23 years later, the F-35 is officially the most expensive weapon program in history clocking with an anticipated total program cost of $2 trillion and engineers continue to struggle to make the jet work properly with development and procurement costs having more than doubled.The three men who made that announcement were nearing the end of their long careers. Aldridge retired from the government in 2003 and went on to serve on the board of Lockheed Martin. Jim Roche left the Pentagon in 2005 and became the director of Orbital ATK. Gordon England eventually became deputy secretary of defense before retiring in 2009. Through their Joint Strike Fighter decision, these three men committed the United States to spend hundreds of billions of dollars for a program that has proven to be an unmitigated disaster. They created a massive financial obligation that future generations of taxpayers must bear, without the much-touted program having produced any of the actual security benefits it was supposed to bring to the U.S. armed forces. By the time the program's conceptual flaws became obvious, all three individuals had long since left government service and it was left to an entire generation of their successors to salvage something from the mess they left behind.It is that last point the individuals who temporarily occupy offices vested with such authorities need to keep front of mind. They have the power to commit future generations to truly massive amounts of spending. All three of the prime F-35 decision-makers were born in the 1930s making them part of the Silent Generation. Generation X, the Millennials, and Gens Z and Alpha must bear the burden of their decisions.The power to spend such generational wealth should not be wielded in a perfunctory manner. Those with the power of the pen should be far less credulous when people pitch them on pie-in-the-sky programs based on unproven technological promises and assumptions.Amid growing concerns over the perceived threat of great power conflict and nuclear confrontation, the national security establishment and policymakers have relied upon misguided lessons about how the U.S. maintained the peace and won the Cold War to resurrect the hubristic reliance on expensive technology to provide, at least on paper, a military superiority that we hope will preserve the preeminence of our military.Prominent figures in Congress have called for a "generational" investment in U.S. defense spending that would see defense spending rise to 5% of GDP by 2030 with little regard for those who will ultimately have to foot the bill. While it is hypothetically possible to reach this goal it does not mean we should. Take for example the decision to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad simultaneously, a monumental (and likely self-defeating) undertaking estimated to cost a staggering $1.7 trillion over the coming decades, a figure that mirrors the totality of student debt!The issue is that the individual components of this effort have proven to be unanticipatedly more complicated and expensive than originally projected. For instance, the Air Force's Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program has overrun its budget projection by more than 81%. Regardless of policymakers' justification for this irresponsible use of taxpayer dollars, there has been a complete lack of accountability within the defense procurement apparatus. The forebears of tomorrow are failing to use this moment as an opportunity to avoid repeating the mistakes of the F-35, Littoral Combat Ship, Ford-class Aircraft Carrier, and Zumwalt-class Destroyer programs all while undermining the ability of the average American to achieve the quintessential goals of the American Dream. Pouring funds into the abyss, or simply the pockets of defense executives who then initiate stock buy-backs while enjoying record profits for the defense industry quarter after quarter, ensure that future generations will be forced to make sacrifices on other national security priorities like infrastructure, the power grid, national debt, student debt, the economy, education, supply chain resiliency, healthcare and more to comply with the commitments made by our political leaders who are consigning future generations to insurmountable debt in the name of an illusory concept of "national security."Since the year 2000, the U.S. increased its defense spending by at least 48% when adjusting for inflation. So, how can it be that after ending the longest wars in our nation's history, and already spending more on our national security than at peak times during the Vietnam and Korean Wars, we still need to spend more money on defense?The security and economic well-being of future generations will not be manifested through the myopic decisions to increase defense spending in the name of more security. Continuing to print money for the development of new weapons programs that will likely be outmoded by the time they are ready for a hypothetical war will keep weapons contractors and shareholders happy, but it will do little to actually make Americans or our allies safer amidst a rapidly changing world.It is time for policymakers in Washington to realize that there is more that goes into our national security than just spending more money on the military, and devote real time and energy to a realistic and sustainable strategy that builds confidence, readiness and stability into our national security.

By Morgan Bazilian and Thijs Van de GraafThe International Energy Agency (IEA) is marking its 50-year anniversary. From its origins as a relatively unknown analytical body primarily focused on oil security for a select group of OECD members, it has evolved significantly. Today, the IEA also confronts pressing global issues such as climate change and mineral security. Its expanding collaboration with countries like India underscores its increasing global influence.However, the IEA's transformation is not devoid of challenges or criticism. It faces intensified scrutiny within the increasingly politicized arena of energy policy, a massive global energy crisis that has refocused attention on energy security, and the urgent imperative of achieving net-zero emissions.Redefining Energy SecurityEnergy security has long been a central goal of both domestic and foreign policy. In the US, it harkens back to the Eisenhower and Carter doctrines committing US forces to minding the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Sea. In the UK, the tales of Churchill and Fisher moving the Royal Navy from domestic coal to imported oil have achieved nearly legendary status. But doing so traded huge gains in efficiency and vessel range for lasting dependence on strategic resources sourced from abroad. Today there are new technologies, new priorities for society, a new focus for capital, and thus new ways to think about energy security. Geopolitical shocks and the race to net zero emissions have brought into focus supply chain security for key energy technologies—from solar panels, to heat pumps, electrolyzers and batteries—as well as the demand side of the energy security equation.Yet, the IEA's definition of energy security is still largely focused on supply – that is the supply of fuels like oil. The ongoing security crisis in the Red Sea, the ongoing Ukraine War, attacks on Gulf refineries, and other conflict underscores the persistent importance of fuel supply security. Oil Market Dynamics and the OPEC RivalryThe IEA was established as a response to the global oil crisis of 1973 as a way for oil importers to have a way to discuss the big issues of oil security.It also established a mechanism for countries to agree to a minimum amount of oil to have on hand in the case of another shock. Until recently, that emergency tool had only been activated three times: during the first Gulf War, after hurricane Katrina, and in 2011 during the Libyan Crisis. In 2022, in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the IEA decided in two steps to release no less than 182.7 million barrels, the largest collective drawdown of emergency stocks ever. As the move was not preceded by an immediate supply shock, it prompted criticism that the Biden administration was using it for political gains – to combat inflation and rising energy prices ahead of the 2022 midterm elections. Perhaps not surprisingly, the move also drew criticism from OPEC. At the time of its founding, the IEA's relations with OPEC were antagonistic, but a thaw in the relations had set in since the end of the Cold War. A producer-consumer dialogue ensued and was formalized in the form of the International Energy Forum, based in Riyadh.Today, the relationship has soured again. OPEC countries are upset by the oil price cap that the West has imposed on Russia, fearing the mechanism could one day be directed against them. The oil producer club is also upset by the IEA's projection that demand for fossil will peak before the end of the decade, describing such a narrative as "extremely risky," "impractical" and "ideologically driven."Navigating Political CrosscurrentsOver the last decade especially, the IEA has come under increasing pressure. First from left leaning organizations and climate activists around its under-estimation of renewable energy and its alleged bias against those forms of energy.Such criticism even led some founding IEA member countries to strike out on their own, and set up the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in 2009. That agency also celebrated its anniversary this year, turning 15. It already boasts an impressive 169 members, far more than the IEA's 31 members.Still, criticism of the IEA did not dissipate. In April 2019, a group business leaders, scientists and campaigners criticized the IEA's World Energy Outlook for not considering the tougher temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. The IEA also faced a campaign to make its data publicly available, rather than locked after paywalls.Most recently, criticism, largely from the political right have come in the form that the organization has become too climate focused, and that is clouding its analytical rigor.Both critiques are not terribly helpful or illuminating. Rather, any international organization must be understood to be political to some degree. Further, the IEA has a relatively modest budget for an international organization. That budget come from countries – namely the small group of wealthy OECD nations. Those countries have shifting politics, and that comes across in funding requests—strings attached funding. The United States is the largest funder of the Agency—its politics, therefore, have a larger impact than others. That said, the EU and Japan also have considerable weight. It is no small feat to juggle this dynamic backdrop—fundamentally political—for an organization that aspires to do rigorous and balanced analysis. Forging Ahead: Dr. Birol's VisionIts current leadership, Dr. Fatih Birol is a former Chief Economist of OPEC and then of the IEA itself. He has made some rather significant changes to the scope of the Agency and its focus. Perhaps the most important, is his focus on expanding the breadth of membership and scope to countries outside the OECD who are critical to global energy markets—think China and India. But, others, too like South Africa, etc. He has also prioritized areas of late that are not on the top-tier political list of most members, such as clean cooking. An area that causes millions of deaths each year and is imminently addressable from a technological perspective. Until recently, the IEA was not well known outside of energy circles. Yet, the worst energy crisis in 50 years, combined with the pressing need to address climate change, have changed that. As the IEA moved into the limelight, it has also faced more scrutiny. Amidst this politically charged landscape, the IEA must both stick to its core strengths - being a source of high-quality energy data and analysis - while also continuing to evolve its mandate and outreach for the challenges of the 21st century.

Incoming governor Republican Atty. Gen. Jeff Landry, for now, is showing he's
seeking
a home run when it comes to smaller, more efficient yet as effective government
when, as part of his introduction of new
(and solid) appointees to his administration, he noted willingness to establish
co-payments and work requirements for Medicaid recipients in Louisiana.

Medicaid blows away any other single spending item
in the state's budget. The latest
projections have it spending $3.75 billion this year in state taxpayer dollars,
which in terms of those dollars only elementary and secondary education rivals,
but throwing in $13.5 billion in federal dollars means about three-eighths of total
state spending goes out the door for this program.

Both cost sharing by and community engagement
requirements of some program recipients not only could return a little
offsetting revenue but also could results in wiser utilization that reduces
costs, as clients behave more responsibly in their consumption of health care
on the dole. Research
profusely demonstrates over a variety of welfare programs that asking for
exchanges of resources with clients, whether that be cash, labor, or action or
desire to participate in the paid or unpaid workforce reduces dependency on
welfare without a decline in well-being of the clients.

However, the legal environment and the nature of
health care as a relative demand-inflexible good make creation of incentive
programs like these trickier. Cost sharing for Medicaid is allowed under federal
law, but exempts
a significant minority of clients, and at low permissible rates unchanged
for a decade. Further, as expected when people are asked to pay more for a
good, cost sharing leads to lower utilization of Medicaid, which potentially
could lead to those with the least resources less able to access health care.

While that cudgel often is used by leftist special
interests to argue against any form of cost sharing, which fewer
than half the states employ, in fact the latest
research reveals that of those who drop out of Medicaid with the introduction
of cost sharing typically are the healthiest who don't need it (and if they
find they do, they typically re-enroll). In other words, cost sharing (at ridiculously
low maximum levels such as $75 for hospitalization, $4 for a doctor visit
and $8 for nonemergency emergency room use, with a cap of five percent of
income) doesn't really discourage clients who need Medicaid.

Louisiana charges only low copayments on prescription
medicine, $0.50 to $3.  It doesn't charge
what it could for anything else or on managed care premiums, but if it did older
data suggest it could save
$175 million annually. And that doesn't include savings from more efficient
use of resources caused by cost sharing, which exist but no study has been able
to quantify for any jurisdiction.

Community engagement is more complicated. For one
thing, the legal environment as shaped by present jurisprudence makes it
difficult for states like Louisiana who unwisely expanded Medicaid to impose
this, as lower federal courts through 2020 ruled that imposing such a
requirement, even upon as was the case just able-bodied adults without dependents
years prior to retirement age (ABAWDs), in a strict legal sense didn't comport
to the law
establishing Medicaid that mandates any waiver to its requirements not
reduce the prospects of the client population.

That could change with the current U.S. Supreme
Court lineup that might, much to the chagrin of the political left that usually
shies away from following the law and Constitution literally in favor of
expansive interpretations that can read in their political agendas, take a more
holistic approach to this question and rule in favor of introducing
community engagement. That may come, as after several states tried this and
were found wanting in the courts plus their dealing with a Democrat Pres. Joe Biden
Administration hostile to these efforts caused them to abandon such efforts, since
a few states are gearing up to try again and take the Biden Administration all
the way to the Court if necessary, if not wait for a more flexible future
administration to aid them.

Absent that, the only such program now in
existence is Georgia's,
because its work/volunteer/student requirement program for ABAWDs is for anyone
in the expanded zone, which Georgia wisely has yet to accept. And it had to
fight the Biden Administration in court to get it underway, which finally happened
earlier this year, in showing raw numbers of Medicaid-insured would go up.

However, because it hasn't expanded Medicaid, it
has decided to pay entirely for some insurance benefits for qualifying clients,
which is less than it would pay under expansion but with potentially many fewer
recipients. But, the point of the program isn't so much as to insure the
uninsured but to let them use the program as a bridge to obtaining insurance
through the private sector through employment that offers that as a benefit.

Another issue with requirements for the Medicaid population
is, because of federal law that makes it so easy to receive care without paying
by citing indigency, strictures
often can be dodged easily while still receiving care. This is why such requirements
have but a negligible effect on promoting work when applying those to other
welfare programs can produce dramatic changes. That's why a community engagement
requirement that the Republican-led U.S. House of Representatives had on the table
earlier this year would have knocked out Louisiana only an estimated
52,700 (expansion) clients at a total of $34.5 million in state costs.

So, what Louisiana could do is abandon expansion
and use the Georgia model. That would provide an instant
$451 million in savings, some of which then would be plowed back into the
25 to 100 percent federal poverty limit clientele for stripped-down insurance,
with about a third to a half in the past already able to pay for their insurance
likely through the workplace, so the uninsured portion won't rise much and the
state will pay less for insuring those who really need it and give back to the
community in some form.

Excitingly, with these reforms Landry is swinging for
the fences that could result in a huge payoff by trimming state government to
the tune of several hundred million dollars while the deserving poor obtain
health insurance and care when they feel they need it. It's been years since
health care policy in the state could find itself on such a healthy trajectory.