In this brief overview, I argue that Africanist contributions to the study of politics have not been insignificant. While Africanists, like many other comparativists, have felt uncomfortable about the imperialist aspirations of rational choice, they increasingly see the future as a time when theoretical and methodological pluralism will prevail.
Ronald Moe's lucid article, "Political Science and the Savings and Loan Crisis" (1991), considered what the political scientist's role might have been in regard to that crisis (had not our profession given up its expertise in that area). His comments led me to reflect on the role of the political scientist in relation to another national crisis—the Gulf War of 1991. During the war, and in the months preceding it, it seemed that political science—or at least my specialty, international relations (IR)—had no role to play. This strange fact results from certain paradoxes that actually encourage us to foster a separation between academic expertise in international relations, and public knowledge of how foreign policy decisions are made.Within hours of the war's beginning, I called several IR colleagues to get their opinions as to why the United States had taken the plunge. I got appropriate, you might say textbook, answers. One colleague went right for the military rationale: "to save us from the Peace Dividend," "to give us the chance to test new weapons," and—one that I wouldn't have thought of myself—"to deplete inventory." Another mentioned the more abstract balance-of-power principle, expressed in this case as "to keep our little brothers (i.e., the Third World) in their place," while others thought of domestic factors, such as "to divert attention from the S&L crisis," or economic advantages, such as "Saudi is footing the bill."
This book deals with representation in science, politics and art both in its historical dimensions and in its contemporary expression. It aims to reveal the current trends of culture and guide these towards the goal of a future culture for the coming global technological civilization.
This paper, initially prompted by the puzzles raised from the atypical emergence of charismatic politics in the otherwise ordinary political system that our contemporary democracy is supposed to be, seeks to bring political charisma back into the study of comparative politics by reconstructing the concept and rendering it applicable to empirical research. Unlike previous approaches, which have suffered from either individual or structural reductionism, the present study examines charisma as a pure power term by focusing on what makes it appear in ordinary democratic politics as an extraordinary phenomenon, namely, its personal (as opposed to impersonal) character of leadership and the pursuit of a politically radical (as opposed to moderate) program. Accordingly, political charisma is defined as a distinct type of legitimate leadership that is personal and aims at the radical transformation of an established institutional order. Such an understanding of political charisma enables us to further analyze the core features of charismatic leadership and construct an "index of charismaticness" ready to be put under comparative empirical investigation. Sampling from postwar and contemporary European politics, a number of charismatic leaders are examined and then contrasted to non-charismatic ones. It is argued that, once reclaimed for political science, charisma may prove a useful concept with surprising analytical potential. Renewed interest in political charisma is expected to offer valuable clues in such important research areas as political leadership, populism, and contentious politics.
