Articles entitled "Latin American Trade Puzzles", "Obregón plans Huge and Deal", "Vega Inauguration to be Historic. Fete", "Mexican Progress", "The uplifting influence", "Hope for modification", "Scheme for uprising disclosed as leaders are jailed on border", "Democracy in Mexico", "Mexico after glafters", "Mexican labor found efficient", "Calles not permitted to ballot", "No decision concerning Pichilingue", "Mexico's place in the sun", "Consul scouts Flores revolt", "Pay roll of Mexico cut by Calles", "Author loses honor abroad", "Quota act cuts aliens exodus", "Dry fight on in Mexico", "Governors meet Calles in move to gain harmony", "Graft war is started by Calles", "Guard shot in battle when armed brigands invade envoy's hotel", "Doheny asked to help out Mexico by cash advance", "Many are called" and "El pueblo americano pide equidad y justicia para México". These articles analyze the religious conflict, the U.S. preeminence in the international stage, Gen. Alvaro Obregón's visit to Los Angeles in order to solve personal issues, Gen. Plutarco Elías Calles' opinions on keeping pace and goodwill. Reports on rebel Delahuertista parties. The conditions of the democracy in Mexico. Complaints about violation of mail. The Mexican labor force and its efficiency in the industry. Provisions for the municipal elections. The return of the Pichilingue island to Mexico. The Mexican presidential succession. Angel Flores's revolt to get the Presidency of the republic. Gen. Calles' project to reduce staff in the public administration. Blasco Ibañez' visit to Mexico. The immigration to the United States issue. The need to support the American Methodist Church. A Governors' meeting to support the Federal Government. Eduardo Ruiz' arrest during Gen. Alvaro Obregón's administration. The Bolshevik tendencies in Mexico. Edward L. Doheny's statements on the increase of taxes in the Oil industry. Contention in the cabinet due to the governor's election in the state of Mexico. The American people's support of the recognition of Mexico. / Artículos intitulados "Latin American Trade Puzzles", "Obregón plans Huge and Deal", "Vega Inauguration to be Historic. Fete", "Mexican Progress", "The uplifting influence", "Hope for modification", "Scheme for uprising disclosed as leaders are jailed on border", "Democracy in Mexico", "Mexico after glafters", "Mexican labor found efficient", "Calles not permitted to ballot", "No decision concerning Pichilingue", "Mexico's place in the sun", "Consul scouts Flores revolt", "Pay roll of Mexico cut by Calles", "Author loses honor abroad", "Quota act cuts aliens exodus", "Dry fight on in Mexico", "Governors meet Calles in move to gain harmony", "Graft war is started by Calles", "Guard shot in battle when armed brigands invade envoy's hotel", "Doheny asked to help out Mexico by cash advance", "Many are called" y "El pueblo americano pide equidad y justicia para México", que analizan el conflicto religioso, la preminencia de Estados Unidos en el marco internacional, la visita del Gral. Alvaro Obregón a Los Angeles para el arreglo de asuntos particulares; opiniones del Gral. PEC en el sentido de mantener la paz y la buena voluntad; reportes de partidos rebeldes delahuertistas; las condiciones de la democracia en México; demandas por violación de correspondencia; la mano de obra mexicana y su eficiencia en la industria; medidas adoptadas para las elecciones municipales; la devolución a México de la isla de Pichilingue; la sucesión a la Presidencia en México; la rebelión de Angel Flores por la Presidencia de la República; proyecto del Gral. Calles relativo a la reducción de personal de la administración pública; visita de Blasco Ibáñez a México; el problema de la migración a Estados Unidos; necesidad de apoyos a la Iglesia Metodista Americana; reunión de Gobernadores para dar su apoyo al Gobierno Federal; el arresto de Eduardo Ruiz durante la administración del Gral. Alvaro Obregón; las tendencias bolcheviques en México; declaraciones de Edward L. Doheny relativas al aumento de impuestos a la industria petrolera; disensiones en el gabinete por la elección de Gobernador del Estado de México; apoyo de los estadounidenses al reconocimiento de México.
Extraterritoriality at the Spanish borders leads to the applicability of the rules of security and protection of human rights being considered when the Spanish Guardia Civil monitors the border from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melila and from the countries of origin and transit of the Western Horn of Africa. As a signatory of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, the Kingdom of Spain became a lead player in the immigration policy in the Mediterranean Region by organizing, alongside third countries, an integrated method of management of the southern frontier. This management of the borders questions the consistency of the principle of non-refoulement and the scope of prohibition of collective expulsions since potential refugees, asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors or ill persons are being intercepted by Spanish civil guards at the iberian-moroccan border and immediately handed over to the authorities of third countries without being able to ask for the rights and freedoms enshrined in Spanish law. The applicability of law is called into question when Spain responds to European requirements for external borders policy by preventing asylum seekers to enter Spanish territory or to leave their country of origin or transit. This leads to map the juridicity of refugees law and fundamental rights in a context of humanitarian crisis that triggers asylum seekers to move and leave their country to reach Spain trough Ceuta, Melila or the Canary Islands. This study upon extraterritoriality enables to explore the lawfulness of the right to leave a country, including one's own, regarding the border security and protection policy of the states located at the outer borders of the EU. ; L'extraterritorialité à l'échelle des frontières espagnoles interroge le champ d'application desnormes de protection des droits fondamentaux lorsque les gardes civils espagnols surveillent lesfrontières depuis les enclaves de Ceuta ou Melilla, et depuis le territoire des pays d'origine et detransit de la corne ouest de l'Afrique. Dès son adhésion à la Convention d'application de l'accordSchengen, le Royaume d'Espagne est devenu un acteur central de la politique d'immigration enMéditerranée en structurant son mode de gestion intégrée de la frontière méridionale autour de lacoopération opérationnelle avec les pays tiers. Se pose alors la question de la compatibilité de cettegestion de la frontière avec la règle de non-refoulement et l'interdiction des expulsions collectives,à partir du moment où les réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile potentiels, les mineurs non-accompagnésou les personnes malades interceptés par la Garde civile à la frontière hispano-marocaine ou dans laMéditerranée, sont immédiatement remis aux autorités du pays tiers sans bénéficier des droits etlibertés consacrés dans le droit espagnol. Cette applicabilité des droits est mise en doute lorsquel'Espagne met en oeuvre les politiques européennes relatives aux frontières extérieures pour empêcherles exilés d'entrer sur le territoire espagnol et de partir du pays dans lequel ils se trouvent. Celarevient à mesurer la juridicité du droit des réfugiés et des droits de l'homme dans un contexte decrise humanitaire qui force les exilés à se déplacer pour quitter leur pays et rejoindre l'Espagne parCeuta, Melilla ou les îles Canaries. Cette thèse sur l'extraterritorialité permet plus largement d'appréhenderla fondamentalité du droit de quitter un pays y compris le sien par rapport aux exigencesde sécurité et de protection des frontières des États situés aux frontières extérieures de l'UE.
Extraterritoriality at the Spanish borders leads to the applicability of the rules of security and protection of human rights being considered when the Spanish Guardia Civil monitors the border from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melila and from the countries of origin and transit of the Western Horn of Africa. As a signatory of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, the Kingdom of Spain became a lead player in the immigration policy in the Mediterranean Region by organizing, alongside third countries, an integrated method of management of the southern frontier. This management of the borders questions the consistency of the principle of non-refoulement and the scope of prohibition of collective expulsions since potential refugees, asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors or ill persons are being intercepted by Spanish civil guards at the iberian-moroccan border and immediately handed over to the authorities of third countries without being able to ask for the rights and freedoms enshrined in Spanish law. The applicability of law is called into question when Spain responds to European requirements for external borders policy by preventing asylum seekers to enter Spanish territory or to leave their country of origin or transit. This leads to map the juridicity of refugees law and fundamental rights in a context of humanitarian crisis that triggers asylum seekers to move and leave their country to reach Spain trough Ceuta, Melila or the Canary Islands. This study upon extraterritoriality enables to explore the lawfulness of the right to leave a country, including one's own, regarding the border security and protection policy of the states located at the outer borders of the EU. ; L'extraterritorialité à l'échelle des frontières espagnoles interroge le champ d'application desnormes de protection des droits fondamentaux lorsque les gardes civils espagnols surveillent lesfrontières depuis les enclaves de Ceuta ou Melilla, et depuis le territoire des pays d'origine et detransit de la corne ouest de l'Afrique. Dès son adhésion à la Convention d'application de l'accordSchengen, le Royaume d'Espagne est devenu un acteur central de la politique d'immigration enMéditerranée en structurant son mode de gestion intégrée de la frontière méridionale autour de lacoopération opérationnelle avec les pays tiers. Se pose alors la question de la compatibilité de cettegestion de la frontière avec la règle de non-refoulement et l'interdiction des expulsions collectives,à partir du moment où les réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile potentiels, les mineurs non-accompagnésou les personnes malades interceptés par la Garde civile à la frontière hispano-marocaine ou dans laMéditerranée, sont immédiatement remis aux autorités du pays tiers sans bénéficier des droits etlibertés consacrés dans le droit espagnol. Cette applicabilité des droits est mise en doute lorsquel'Espagne met en oeuvre les politiques européennes relatives aux frontières extérieures pour empêcherles exilés d'entrer sur le territoire espagnol et de partir du pays dans lequel ils se trouvent. Celarevient à mesurer la juridicité du droit des réfugiés et des droits de l'homme dans un contexte decrise humanitaire qui force les exilés à se déplacer pour quitter leur pays et rejoindre l'Espagne parCeuta, Melilla ou les îles Canaries. Cette thèse sur l'extraterritorialité permet plus largement d'appréhenderla fondamentalité du droit de quitter un pays y compris le sien par rapport aux exigencesde sécurité et de protection des frontières des États situés aux frontières extérieures de l'UE.
Extraterritoriality at the Spanish borders leads to the applicability of the rules of security and protection of human rights being considered when the Spanish Guardia Civil monitors the border from the enclaves of Ceuta and Melila and from the countries of origin and transit of the Western Horn of Africa. As a signatory of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement, the Kingdom of Spain became a lead player in the immigration policy in the Mediterranean Region by organizing, alongside third countries, an integrated method of management of the southern frontier. This management of the borders questions the consistency of the principle of non-refoulement and the scope of prohibition of collective expulsions since potential refugees, asylum seekers, unaccompanied minors or ill persons are being intercepted by Spanish civil guards at the iberian-moroccan border and immediately handed over to the authorities of third countries without being able to ask for the rights and freedoms enshrined in Spanish law. The applicability of law is called into question when Spain responds to European requirements for external borders policy by preventing asylum seekers to enter Spanish territory or to leave their country of origin or transit. This leads to map the juridicity of refugees law and fundamental rights in a context of humanitarian crisis that triggers asylum seekers to move and leave their country to reach Spain trough Ceuta, Melila or the Canary Islands. This study upon extraterritoriality enables to explore the lawfulness of the right to leave a country, including one's own, regarding the border security and protection policy of the states located at the outer borders of the EU. ; L'extraterritorialité à l'échelle des frontières espagnoles interroge le champ d'application desnormes de protection des droits fondamentaux lorsque les gardes civils espagnols surveillent lesfrontières depuis les enclaves de Ceuta ou Melilla, et depuis le territoire des pays d'origine et detransit de la corne ouest de l'Afrique. Dès son adhésion à la Convention d'application de l'accordSchengen, le Royaume d'Espagne est devenu un acteur central de la politique d'immigration enMéditerranée en structurant son mode de gestion intégrée de la frontière méridionale autour de lacoopération opérationnelle avec les pays tiers. Se pose alors la question de la compatibilité de cettegestion de la frontière avec la règle de non-refoulement et l'interdiction des expulsions collectives,à partir du moment où les réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile potentiels, les mineurs non-accompagnésou les personnes malades interceptés par la Garde civile à la frontière hispano-marocaine ou dans laMéditerranée, sont immédiatement remis aux autorités du pays tiers sans bénéficier des droits etlibertés consacrés dans le droit espagnol. Cette applicabilité des droits est mise en doute lorsquel'Espagne met en oeuvre les politiques européennes relatives aux frontières extérieures pour empêcherles exilés d'entrer sur le territoire espagnol et de partir du pays dans lequel ils se trouvent. Celarevient à mesurer la juridicité du droit des réfugiés et des droits de l'homme dans un contexte decrise humanitaire qui force les exilés à se déplacer pour quitter leur pays et rejoindre l'Espagne parCeuta, Melilla ou les îles Canaries. Cette thèse sur l'extraterritorialité permet plus largement d'appréhenderla fondamentalité du droit de quitter un pays y compris le sien par rapport aux exigencesde sécurité et de protection des frontières des États situés aux frontières extérieures de l'UE.
Testimony issued by the Government Accountability Office with an abstract that begins "This testimony discusses our past work examining the management of research and development (R&D) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). DHS acquisition programs represent hundreds of billions of dollars in life-cycle costs and support a wide range of missions and investments including Coast Guard ships and aircraft, border surveillance and screening equipment, nuclear detection equipment, and technologies used to screen airline passengers and baggage for explosives. Since its creation in 2003, DHS has spent billions of dollars on R&D on technologies and other countermeasures to address various threats and to conduct its missions. Within DHS, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) conducts overall R&D efforts to improve homeland security. Among other things, S&T works with DHS components to provide assistance in researching and developing technologies to meet their specific missions, while the components themselves are responsible for developing, testing, and acquiring these technologies. For example, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is charged with developing, acquiring, and deploying equipment to detect nuclear and radiological materials, supporting the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for securing the nation's transportation systems and, with S&T, researching, developing, and deploying technologies to, for example, screen airline passengers and their baggage. Furthermore, the Coast Guard utilizes a variety of assets such as small boats, ships, helicopters, and other aircraft to perform its missions and regularly develops and procures new assets to replace its aging fleet. In recent years, DHS has experienced challenges in managing its multibillion dollar R&D and acquisition efforts, including instances where technologies were implemented before testing and evaluation was complete. We have also identified problems with its testing and cost-benefit analyses efforts in this area. This testimony is based on reports and testimonies we issued from May 2009 through March 2011, including a report we issued earlier this month regarding opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue. This testimony is based on the section from that report related to the management of R&D within DHS. Specifically, this testimony discusses inefficiencies in homeland security R&D and potential for cost savings in this area. This testimony is based on reports and testimonies we issued from May 2009 through March 2011, including a report we issued earlier this month regarding opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue. The testimony is based on the section from that report related to the management of R&D within DHS. Specifically, this testimony discusses inefficiencies in homeland security R&D and potential for cost savings in this area."
PREFACE -- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS AND INTRODUCTION -- Part 1 - European perspective -- Chapter 1. Sovereignty and Defence in the future of the European Union -- Chapter 2. The hegemonic rivalry between the PRC and US: EU's place -- Chapter 3. The Russia–Ukraine conflict from an international law perspective -- Chapter 4. The Russian commitment to Eurasianism: A crazy idea for European Security and Defence? -- Chapter 5. Eurasia vs. West: history, causes, and issues related to de Ukrainian war -- Chapter 6. Security of the Eastern Borders of the EU in the context of the Functions of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency. Selected elements -- Part 2 - Far East Challenges -- Chapter 7. Chinese expansionism without borders. Threat to international security -- Chapter 8. Chinese influence in the southern cone: Bolivia, Chile and Argentina -- Chapter 9. The role of the Philippines in the South China Sea -- Chapter 10. Artificial Islands in the South China Sea. Territorial Disputes in the Area. United Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea proposals -- Chapter 11. The arbitral decision regarding historic rights and the lawfulness of certain actions of China in the South China Sea under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea -- Part 3 - Global Risks -- Chapter 12. The risk of misuse of nuclear technology in the context of geopolitical conflict between the west and the east -- Chapter 13. Returned foreign terrorist fighters: different responses to a common security threat to Asia and the West? -- Chapter 14. Cyber intelligence over Cyber security in the Asia-West conflict -- Chapter 15. Jihad in Europe: Towards a predictive model for the neutralization of terrorist threats -- Chapter 16. Developments oblige the new Iranian Government to give a higher priority to its neighbouring countries -- Chapter 17. Analysis of Crisis management systems in the contexts of the Global Economic Crisis and Military-Political Changes -- EPILOGUE.
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The European Union (EU), though a treaty between states, is different from previous international organisations in the depth and breadth of its aims. Termed a supranational organisation, it seeks not only to work in the common interest of its 27 member states, but in the general interest of the Union. Scholars of EU studies have long debated the construction of this emergent political community, asking whether it would come to exist the manner needed to legitimise these newfound powers. A subset of these researchers has been particularly interested in European socialisation, a field that studies how time spent working in European institutions leads to effective cooperation and the creation of a common, imagined collective. Reviewing literature dating back to the 1970s, this dissertation finds consistent results showing that inductees' ages and countries of origin seem to matter consistently for their likelihood of undergoing European socialisation; however, few other results appear consistently and across studies. The theoretical contribution of this work is to argue that beliefs, rather than demographics should be studied. By looking at how novel organisational roles and norms cohere to those learned over time in national communities, the socialisation process can be better understood. Setting the study at the Lesvos migration hotspot, this study uses ethnographic research methods to understand the microprocesses of the socialisation process among Seconded National Experts (SNEs) deployed by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Border and Coast Guard (Frontex) in support of Greek authorities. On the basis of intensive fieldwork, including formal interviews with 24 SNEs and participant observations, this research finds that beliefs regarding legitimate authority and what constitutes high-quality work, formed during their tenures in national professional communities, help explain the efficaciousness of the socialisation process on Lesvos. Moreover, the work finds that the European ...
ABSTRACT. In 2010, Fisheries and Oceans Canada led a multidisciplinary oceanographic research mission onboard the Canadian Coast Guard Ship Hudson to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Regulatory Area to collect benthic imagery and geological data in support of the identification of vulnerable marine ecosystems. Using the remotely operated vehicle ROPOS, six benthic video transects were collected on Orphan Knoll, a submerged circular continental fragment located 550 km northeast of St. John's, Newfoundland. High-resolution video footage, digital still images, and specimen samples were collected between 1655 and 3004 m depth across the flanks and plateau of the knoll and Orphan Seamount. In 2007, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization implemented a ~15,800 km2 closure over Orphan Knoll to restrict the use of bottom- tending fishing gear in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/105. However, at the time, its benthic communities and the presence of vulnerable marine ecosystems had not been fully assessed. Here we present a pictorial guide to the epibenthic megafauna enumerated and taxonomically identified from five ROPOS transects collected on Orphan Knoll and Orphan Seamount. The purpose of this report is to provide a visual representation and taxonomic nomenclature scheme of the epibenthic megafauna of Orphan Knoll for use in future monitoring of the benthic communities of this unique topographic feature. RÉSUMÉ. En 2010, Pêches et Océans Canada a mené une mission de recherche océanographique multidisciplinaire à bord du navire de la Garde côtière canadienne Hudson dans la zone de réglementation de l'Organisation des pêches de l'Atlantique Nord-Ouest, afin de recueillir des données géologiques et d'imagerie benthique pour appuyer l'identification des écosystèmes marins vulnérables. À l'aide d'un véhicule télécommandé ROPOS, des images vidéo de six transects benthiques ont été recueillies sur le dôme Orphan, un fragment continental circulaire submergé situé à 550 km au ...
International audience ; Facing new security challenges, and more particularly the migrant crisis, the European Union is emphasizing a comprehensive approach to security marked by interdependence between internal and external security. Enhancing its operational approach, the European Union has deployed tools from both the CSDP and the AFSJ to struggle the various forms of organized crime developed in the context of the migration crisis. While legally, the CSDP and the AFSJ are clearly distinct, an operational coordination has naturally developed in practice between, on the one hand, the operations and missions CSDP and, on the other hand, the agencies Europol and Frontex, under the responsibility of the ESLJ. If the legal framework of this coordination was initially limited, it tends to be structured and to develop with the new regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard. ; Face aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires, et plus particulièrement la crise des migrants, l'Union européenne met l'accent sur une approche globale de la sécurité marquée par l'interdépendance entre sécurité intérieure et sécurité extérieure. Renforçant son approche opérationnelle, l'Union européenne a déployé des outils relevant tant de la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) que de l'Espace de liberté de sécurité et de justice (ELSJ) afin de lutter contre les différentes formes de criminalité organisée développées dans le cadre de la crise migratoire. Alors que juridiquement, la PSDC et l'ELSJ sont bien distincts, une coordination opérationnelle s'est naturellement développée dans la pratique entre, d'une part, les opérations de gestion de crise relevant de la PSDC et, d'autre part, les agences Europol et Frontex relevant de l'ESLJ. Si le cadre juridique de cette coordination était initialement peu établi, il tend à se structurer et à se développer avec le nouveau règlement relatif corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes.
International audience ; Facing new security challenges, and more particularly the migrant crisis, the European Union is emphasizing a comprehensive approach to security marked by interdependence between internal and external security. Enhancing its operational approach, the European Union has deployed tools from both the CSDP and the AFSJ to struggle the various forms of organized crime developed in the context of the migration crisis. While legally, the CSDP and the AFSJ are clearly distinct, an operational coordination has naturally developed in practice between, on the one hand, the operations and missions CSDP and, on the other hand, the agencies Europol and Frontex, under the responsibility of the ESLJ. If the legal framework of this coordination was initially limited, it tends to be structured and to develop with the new regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard. ; Face aux nouveaux défis sécuritaires, et plus particulièrement la crise des migrants, l'Union européenne met l'accent sur une approche globale de la sécurité marquée par l'interdépendance entre sécurité intérieure et sécurité extérieure. Renforçant son approche opérationnelle, l'Union européenne a déployé des outils relevant tant de la Politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) que de l'Espace de liberté de sécurité et de justice (ELSJ) afin de lutter contre les différentes formes de criminalité organisée développées dans le cadre de la crise migratoire. Alors que juridiquement, la PSDC et l'ELSJ sont bien distincts, une coordination opérationnelle s'est naturellement développée dans la pratique entre, d'une part, les opérations de gestion de crise relevant de la PSDC et, d'autre part, les agences Europol et Frontex relevant de l'ESLJ. Si le cadre juridique de cette coordination était initialement peu établi, il tend à se structurer et à se développer avec le nouveau règlement relatif corps européen de garde-frontières et de garde-côtes.
In many European migrant films, the bodily inscription of postcolonial subjects, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers is marked as other, and therefore socially ordered elsewhere. This is achieved through physical displacement to the outskirts of society, into liminal spaces that function as waiting rooms or holding areas preventing entry into Europe. These zones of marginalisation and exclusion, heterotopias or non-places, can nevertheless become places of semi-belonging and transformation. This chapter focuses on Mare Chiuso (Closed Sea, Italy, 60 min.) by filmmaker Andrea Segre, a documentary comprising interviews, archival footage and original film captured with mobile cameras by migrants at the moment of interception by Italian patrol guards. Here the issue of legality and citizenship is addressed from subaltern positions, giving voice and space to African migrants trying to reach the shores of Southern Italy, only to be deported by Italian patrols to Libyan detention camps, in violation of the principles of Human Rights. The aim of the documentary is to relate what actually happened to African refugees on the Italian ships during these 'push-back operations', and in Libyan prisons after deportation. The filmmakers met their witnesses at the Shousha refugee camp, at the border between Libya and Tunisia, and in two reception camps for asylum seekers (C.A.R.A.) in southern Italy. The interviews they conducted with the refugees and footage from the refugees' own films taken with a smartphone constitute the main part of the documentary, along with a session of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, where one of the witnesses sued Italy. Hence it was through their own filming on a smartphone that these citizen media activists and refugees managed to challenge the illegality of Italy's 'push-back operations'. This chapter argues that recounting one's own history by recording it, is a way of taking charge of one's own representation and reversing the gaze, making the inhospitable 'mare chiuso' a site ...
The COVID-19 pandemic has created profound changes in all areas of migration and asylum. EU Member States and OECD countries have made many efforts to keep the pandemic under control, entailing impacts such as border closures, travel restrictions, and the need to introduce sanitary measures. Beginning with the pandemic's impact on permits and entry conditions, the Inform reports on contingency measures to keep systems operational and to mitigate the impacts on migrants and citizens to the extent possible. For instance, the reduction of in-person immigration related services was largely replaced by electronic or postal communication to ensure continuity in processes. In EU Member States and Norway, the automatic extension of residence permits or the removal of the obligation to leave in some cases, were some of the measures taken to reduce the impact of COVID-19. Most EU Member States provided financial support for migrant workers affected by the pandemic, either due to unemployment or loss of income, and made COVID-19 related healthcare services available to all migrants. Although restrictions were imposed on the admission of migrants, continued admission was granted for jobs deemed essential to meet labour market needs, notably in areas of health, agriculture, and transport. New digital tools have been critical in providing asylum and migration services, although the Inform notes that it has also raised new challenges. In the area of asylum, for instance, providing effective and fair application and appeals processes has become more complicated by having remote interviews, and depends largely on the applicants' ability to use and access electronic means. Both the requests for asylum and the number of returns carried out have reduced in 2020 as a result of the pandemic. The landscape also changed for international students, where in-person attendance was discouraged if not suspended altogether. Many students returned home, and in some cases, were able to continue their studies remotely, while processes to renew residence permits were moved online. The joint research shows that public authorities have acted swiftly to introduce new measures or adapt their systems to confront the migration challenges caused by the pandemic, or in some cases, to simply continue to use pre-existing on-line systems. While the long-term impacts are hard to predict, the last chapter of the inform looks towards future migration policies and how these might be shaped in the context of the digitalisation of migration management, the need for bio-secure borders, and the expansion of teleworking digital nomads. The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) provided inputs to the publication.
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On April 9th, the Karen National Liberation Army—the armed wing of the ethnic armed organization, the Karen National Union (KNU)—units from a formerly military-aligned Border Guards Force that has pulled back from the junta, and elements of the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) seized the Myanmar side of a border crossing in the city of Myawaddy along the Thai border. Although fighting continues in the city of 200,000 and the junta can be expected to retaliate via the air, the apparently impending fall of Myawaddy caps off a five-month string of resistance successes on the battlefield in Myanmar. With the Myanmar junta continuing to lose ground to the loose (but growing) coalition of pro-democracy forces, led by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), and ethnic armed groups, the balance of power in Myanmar is shifting against the military. From a strategic perspective, it is increasingly evident that the military's hold on power is slipping, but the resistance likely needs more leverage to achieve its Spring Revolution. The international community should therefore refrain from pushing the pro-democracy resistance to negotiate before it is ready. Falling Dominoes Along Myanmar's PeripheryAfter slowly building momentum leading into 2023, resistance forces fighting the Myanmar military that seized power in a coup in February 2021 have seized significant territory and towns throughout Myanmar in a stunning series of offensives over the past five months.On October 27th, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) suddenly attacked junta targets throughout northern Shan State along the border with China. Previously, the groups had quietly backed anti-junta forces but declined to the enter the war directly. But, in October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance took advantage of Chinese consternation about international crime to seize major towns and cut key highways. This marked the first instance of significant losses of towns and revenue by the junta. Signaling the junta's crumbling morale, entire battalions now regularly surrender in the months since October.Taking advantage of the junta's weakness, the Arakan Army soon launched its own highly successful offensive in Rakhine State on Myanmar's western edge. The Arakan Army has taken six out of 17 townships in the state and has now neared the port of Kyaukphyu, a vital terminus for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor with a strategic oil and gas pipeline. The AA shows few signs of halting its offensive as it approaches Sittwe, the state capital. It clearly harbors ambitions of taking the whole western seaboard.Resistance gains are far from limited to the Three Brotherhood Alliance. To the north of Rakhine, Chin resistance forces—along with AA—have steadily wrapped up junta forces along the Myanmar-India border, while PDFs and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are also particularly active in Sagaing Region's international borderlands. Despite losing the initially captured district capital of Kawlin in early 2024, anti-junta forces continue to make gains against the Myanmar military deeper in Sagaing and Magway Regions. Further to the north, the KIA launched its own large-scale assaults on junta positions in Kachin State in March 2024, having since seized numerous bases and the important China-Myanmar border town of Lweje. Meanwhile, on Myanmar's eastern side, the junta's position is similarly shaky. The Pa-O National Liberation Organization decided to enter the war against the junta in January 2024, targeting Hsihseng town in southern Shan State. In Kayah State, anti-junta troops took most of the state capital Loikaw and the majority of the state's territory. KNU forces in Kayin State have surrounded Kawkareik, which they had previously failed to seize in 2022. Resistance units have now also driven off junta forces from much of the Asia Highway linking Myanmar and Thailand. With the town of Myawaddy close to complete resistance control, the junta's position in the east—and leading to Myanmar's capital—is in real jeopardy.Despite the junta cracking down on urban guerillas earlier in the war, the NUG and its PDFs have launched daring strikes in recent days in Myanmar's central plains and largest urban areas. Drone operators recently gained a symbolic victory by hitting the military's headquarters and junta head Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's residence in the capital, Naypyidaw. After these recent gains along the country's periphery, the expectation is that fighting will soon spread more directly into the country's Bamar-majority regions. Resistance Gains and a Desperate JuntaFollowing five months of military gains, the resistance enters 2024 in a far better strategic position than in any of the years since 2021. Zooming out, the coalition has steadily cut the junta off from its borders with Bangladesh, India, China, and now Thailand, thus forcing it to hold on under what amounts to a nationwide siege of the country's center. The junta is on the backfoot, an assessment supported by the lack of strategic counteroffensives and its desperate search for manpower. There are three key takeaways for international policymakers from these developments.For one, the war is far from over, and the junta still maintains the air power and artillery to inflict unimaginable damage upon Myanmar's people. Indeed, it has only ramped up its terror tactics, opting to destroy Kawlin in Sagaing Region rather than see the NUG effectively govern a town. The junta sees targeting the pro-democracy NUG and PDFs and attempting (unsuccessfully so far) to split the ethnic armed groups from the rest of the anti-junta coalition as its main strategic objectives. Inflicting punishment on the population is one of the few tools left to it, and Myanmar's humanitarian crisis can only be expected to worsen significantly due to the junta's destructiveness.Two, while the resistance is cooperating strategically at an unprecedented level, a political framework that satisfies Myanmar's many diverse actors and ensures the Spring Revolution comes to fruition is still far away. Signs of concern include intra-coalition disputes over control in Chin State, the AA's worrying statements regarding the Rohingya, and lingering frustrations with the NUG's leadership among many youth leaders, PDFs, and ethnic minority groups. However, despite these challenges, it is important to reiterate that Myanmar has long been "fragmented," and the current revolution constitutes the best chance for a stable, democratic, and inclusive Myanmar. Signs of improvement include the recent hosting of a second People's Assembly and the January 2024 joint statement by the NUG, Chin National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, and the KNU. Moreover, battlefield cooperation can create the trust necessary to build towards a political framework. Military coordination between the NUG and the ethnic armed organizations has improved over time. Indeed, although command and control is a perennial issue among Myanmar's anti-junta resistance, the recent offensives across the country point towards unprecedented strategic cooperation. While motivations vary for joining the resistance offensives against the junta, many ethnic armed groups see the military's weakened position as an opportunity and the best chance in Myanmar's modern history for creating an inclusive, federal democracy. Importantly, Myanmar's people remain committed and supportive of the struggle.Third, despite the military's desperation and a shifting balance of power, it is not the time for international actors to push the resistance to enter peace negotiations. The military remains fundamentally intransigent and the core cause of instability in Myanmar. Because the military still holds onto the large towns and cities in the Bamar heartland, its forces maintain an airpower and artillery advantage, and the resistance has not yet developed a mutually agreed-upon postwar political framework, a premature ceasefire and negotiated settlement risks "freezing" the conflict in place.China and many of Myanmar's other neighbors are above all concerned with stability, and Beijing in particular would be fine with an internally divided but quiescent Myanmar so long as its Belt and Road investments can continue unhindered. China out of concern for its own interests has already compelled Three Brotherhood Alliance to enter into a tenuous ceasefire with the junta in northern Shan State and is reportedly attempting another one in Rakhine State with the AA. In response to the impending fall of Myawaddy, Thailand's prime minister recently stated that "maybe it's time to reach out and make a deal" with the military. But, until the battlefield situation develops to the point where the military has no choice but to accept civilian control, negotiations undertaken now—especially under China's auspices—would not result in the Spring Revolution's goals of an inclusive, federal democracy. Indeed, Myanmar would remain internally divided and perpetually unstable, likely with a politically active military either still in power or waiting on the wings to again leave the barracks. With their forces continuing to make gains on the battlefield and in need of more time to advance a political framework acceptable across the coalition, the pro-democracy resistance's demands that it will not accept a political role for the military after the war should be respected. The military will not negotiate in good faith unless it no longer believes it can survive as an institution at war with the whole country.For policymakers in Washington, this means that the United States should expand its support for the pro-democracy resistance in Myanmar to buy them more time. Importantly, it should expand its material support, including by providing funding for the resistance's governance and political cooperation efforts. Additionally, it should rapidly increase its humanitarian aid to reduce civilian suffering. But, above all, US policy should aim to ensure that the Spring Revolution continues to make gains against the military. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.
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On April 9th, the Karen National Liberation Army—the armed wing of the ethnic armed organization, the Karen National Union (KNU)—units from a formerly military-aligned Border Guards Force that has pulled back from the junta, and elements of the People's Defense Forces (PDFs) seized the Myanmar side of a border crossing in the city of Myawaddy along the Thai border. Although fighting continues in the city of 200,000 and the junta can be expected to retaliate via the air, the apparently impending fall of Myawaddy caps off a five-month string of resistance successes on the battlefield in Myanmar. With the Myanmar junta continuing to lose ground to the loose (but growing) coalition of pro-democracy forces, led by the civilian National Unity Government (NUG), and ethnic armed groups, the balance of power in Myanmar is shifting against the military. From a strategic perspective, it is increasingly evident that the military's hold on power is slipping, but the resistance likely needs more leverage to achieve its Spring Revolution. The international community should therefore refrain from pushing the pro-democracy resistance to negotiate before it is ready. Falling Dominoes Along Myanmar's PeripheryAfter slowly building momentum leading into 2023, resistance forces fighting the Myanmar military that seized power in a coup in February 2021 have seized significant territory and towns throughout Myanmar in a stunning series of offensives over the past five months.On October 27th, 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) suddenly attacked junta targets throughout northern Shan State along the border with China. Previously, the groups had quietly backed anti-junta forces but declined to the enter the war directly. But, in October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance took advantage of Chinese consternation about international crime to seize major towns and cut key highways. This marked the first instance of significant losses of towns and revenue by the junta. Signaling the junta's crumbling morale, entire battalions now regularly surrender in the months since October.Taking advantage of the junta's weakness, the Arakan Army soon launched its own highly successful offensive in Rakhine State on Myanmar's western edge. The Arakan Army has taken six out of 17 townships in the state and has now neared the port of Kyaukphyu, a vital terminus for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor with a strategic oil and gas pipeline. The AA shows few signs of halting its offensive as it approaches Sittwe, the state capital. It clearly harbors ambitions of taking the whole western seaboard.Resistance gains are far from limited to the Three Brotherhood Alliance. To the north of Rakhine, Chin resistance forces—along with AA—have steadily wrapped up junta forces along the Myanmar-India border, while PDFs and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) are also particularly active in Sagaing Region's international borderlands. Despite losing the initially captured district capital of Kawlin in early 2024, anti-junta forces continue to make gains against the Myanmar military deeper in Sagaing and Magway Regions. Further to the north, the KIA launched its own large-scale assaults on junta positions in Kachin State in March 2024, having since seized numerous bases and the important China-Myanmar border town of Lweje. Meanwhile, on Myanmar's eastern side, the junta's position is similarly shaky. The Pa-O National Liberation Organization decided to enter the war against the junta in January 2024, targeting Hsihseng town in southern Shan State. In Kayah State, anti-junta troops took most of the state capital Loikaw and the majority of the state's territory. KNU forces in Kayin State have surrounded Kawkareik, which they had previously failed to seize in 2022. Resistance units have now also driven off junta forces from much of the Asia Highway linking Myanmar and Thailand. With the town of Myawaddy close to complete resistance control, the junta's position in the east—and leading to Myanmar's capital—is in real jeopardy.Despite the junta cracking down on urban guerillas earlier in the war, the NUG and its PDFs have launched daring strikes in recent days in Myanmar's central plains and largest urban areas. Drone operators recently gained a symbolic victory by hitting the military's headquarters and junta head Senior General Min Aung Hlaing's residence in the capital, Naypyidaw. After these recent gains along the country's periphery, the expectation is that fighting will soon spread more directly into the country's Bamar-majority regions. Resistance Gains and a Desperate JuntaFollowing five months of military gains, the resistance enters 2024 in a far better strategic position than in any of the years since 2021. Zooming out, the coalition has steadily cut the junta off from its borders with Bangladesh, India, China, and now Thailand, thus forcing it to hold on under what amounts to a nationwide siege of the country's center. The junta is on the backfoot, an assessment supported by the lack of strategic counteroffensives and its desperate search for manpower. There are three key takeaways for international policymakers from these developments.For one, the war is far from over, and the junta still maintains the air power and artillery to inflict unimaginable damage upon Myanmar's people. Indeed, it has only ramped up its terror tactics, opting to destroy Kawlin in Sagaing Region rather than see the NUG effectively govern a town. The junta sees targeting the pro-democracy NUG and PDFs and attempting (unsuccessfully so far) to split the ethnic armed groups from the rest of the anti-junta coalition as its main strategic objectives. Inflicting punishment on the population is one of the few tools left to it, and Myanmar's humanitarian crisis can only be expected to worsen significantly due to the junta's destructiveness.Two, while the resistance is cooperating strategically at an unprecedented level, a political framework that satisfies Myanmar's many diverse actors and ensures the Spring Revolution comes to fruition is still far away. Signs of concern include intra-coalition disputes over control in Chin State, the AA's worrying statements regarding the Rohingya, and lingering frustrations with the NUG's leadership among many youth leaders, PDFs, and ethnic minority groups. However, despite these challenges, it is important to reiterate that Myanmar has long been "fragmented," and the current revolution constitutes the best chance for a stable, democratic, and inclusive Myanmar. Signs of improvement include the recent hosting of a second People's Assembly and the January 2024 joint statement by the NUG, Chin National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, and the KNU. Moreover, battlefield cooperation can create the trust necessary to build towards a political framework. Military coordination between the NUG and the ethnic armed organizations has improved over time. Indeed, although command and control is a perennial issue among Myanmar's anti-junta resistance, the recent offensives across the country point towards unprecedented strategic cooperation. While motivations vary for joining the resistance offensives against the junta, many ethnic armed groups see the military's weakened position as an opportunity and the best chance in Myanmar's modern history for creating an inclusive, federal democracy. Importantly, Myanmar's people remain committed and supportive of the struggle.Third, despite the military's desperation and a shifting balance of power, it is not the time for international actors to push the resistance to enter peace negotiations. The military remains fundamentally intransigent and the core cause of instability in Myanmar. Because the military still holds onto the large towns and cities in the Bamar heartland, its forces maintain an airpower and artillery advantage, and the resistance has not yet developed a mutually agreed-upon postwar political framework, a premature ceasefire and negotiated settlement risks "freezing" the conflict in place.China and many of Myanmar's other neighbors are above all concerned with stability, and Beijing in particular would be fine with an internally divided but quiescent Myanmar so long as its Belt and Road investments can continue unhindered. China out of concern for its own interests has already compelled Three Brotherhood Alliance to enter into a tenuous ceasefire with the junta in northern Shan State and is reportedly attempting another one in Rakhine State with the AA. In response to the impending fall of Myawaddy, Thailand's prime minister recently stated that "maybe it's time to reach out and make a deal" with the military. But, until the battlefield situation develops to the point where the military has no choice but to accept civilian control, negotiations undertaken now—especially under China's auspices—would not result in the Spring Revolution's goals of an inclusive, federal democracy. Indeed, Myanmar would remain internally divided and perpetually unstable, likely with a politically active military either still in power or waiting on the wings to again leave the barracks. With their forces continuing to make gains on the battlefield and in need of more time to advance a political framework acceptable across the coalition, the pro-democracy resistance's demands that it will not accept a political role for the military after the war should be respected. The military will not negotiate in good faith unless it no longer believes it can survive as an institution at war with the whole country.For policymakers in Washington, this means that the United States should expand its support for the pro-democracy resistance in Myanmar to buy them more time. Importantly, it should expand its material support, including by providing funding for the resistance's governance and political cooperation efforts. Additionally, it should rapidly increase its humanitarian aid to reduce civilian suffering. But, above all, US policy should aim to ensure that the Spring Revolution continues to make gains against the military. The views expressed are the author's alone, and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center. Copyright 2024, Indo-Pacific Program. All rights reserved.
In: Integration: Vierteljahreszeitschrift des Instituts für Europäische Politik in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Band 26, Heft 4, S. 536-549
