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The Essequibo[1] is a territory located in the North-East of South America, between Venezuela and Guyana, with a maritime projection towards the Atlantic. It has been part of Venezuela since 1777[2] under the rule of the Spanish Empire and then as the Republic of Venezuela since 1810.
The United Kingdom illegally occupied it in 1814,[3] while Venezuela was going through a long and bloody war of independence. The UK tried to formalise the dispossession of the territory with the Paris Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899,[4] in a flawed process in which Venezuela was represented by the United States. The British Empire exercised its power to obtain a ruling in its favour.
After the death of the lawyer Severo Mallet-Prevost in 1949, who represented Venezuela in this process, these irregularities became public knowledge.[5] In 1962, Venezuela denounced the nullity of the process before the United Nations and insisted on its historical claim.[6]
On 17 February 1966, Venezuela and the UK signed the Geneva Agreement,[7] whereby the parties recognised the nullity of the Paris Arbitral Award and agreed to search for a negotiated solution. During this process, Guyana (independent since May 1966) would administer the Essequibo but without carrying out any activity that would modify the legal situation of the territory as established in Article V of the agreement, which states that "No acts or activities taking place while this Agreement is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British Guiana or create any rights of sovereignty in those territories".
After four years, no progress was made in the negotiation, so on 18 June 1970, the two parties signed the Port of Spain Protocol,[8] to suspend the meetings for twelve years and to possibly use as an alternative one of the means of peaceful settlement provided for in the UN Charter.
In 1982, Venezuela pressured to resume the Geneva Agreement. Thus, in 1987, under the promotion of the UN Secretary-General, a Good Officer mechanism of mediation was put in place.[9]Guyana-Venezuela relations from competition to cooperation
Guyana, after its independence, was led by Forbes Burnham (1964-1985), which established a strong relationship with Cuba. Between 1981-1983, the two countries signed cooperation agreements, including on military matters, and Cuba expressed its support for Guyana in the territorial dispute with Venezuela.[10]
Since then, successive Venezuelan governments considered Guyana as a potential enemy and a close ally of Cuba, even contemplating military scenarios against it. However, the prevailing position was not to go to war with Guyana.
Beginning in 1999, the government of President Hugo Chávez put an end to the hostility towards Guyana, cancelling the military strategies. Venezuela sought a rapprochement with Guyana through diplomatic channels and cooperation mechanisms such as Petrocaribe, founded in 2005.[11]
This new stance eased tensions with Guyana and diminished the traditional distrust of the Caribbean countries of CARICOM towards Venezuela, giving the latter a strong political presence in the region.Oil matters
The enormous geological formation that generates Venezuela's hydrocarbons, known as the "mother rock" La Luna, extends from the west towards the east and south of the country until it is deposited in the Orinoco Oil Belt,[12] then towards the Essequibo and the Atlantic façade.
ExxonMobil[13] has been present in Venezuela for almost 100 years and knows the country's oil structure in detail, especially the mother rock La Luna formation and its extension into the Essequibo. Over the years, it has become itself an actor in the territorial dispute by pressuring Guyana to grant oil exploitation permits in the disputed territory.
On 14 June 1999, Guyana issued licenses in favour of ExxonMobil in the Essequibo,[14] in violation of the Geneva Agreement (Article V) and the UN's Good Officer mechanism. President Chávez immediately issued notes of protest and acted on the diplomatic front against this illegal action. On 29 September 2000, ExxonMobil suspended its activity in the area, acknowledging that an international dispute existed.[15] Subsequently, during the Chávez Presidency (1999-2012), the situation remained unchanged, with no oil activity in the waters of the Essequibo.ExxonMobil's return to Essequibo
Starting from November 2012, Guyana issued new licenses in the waters of the Essequibo[16] in favour of ExxonMobil[17] and other multinationals,[18] in a new attempt to violate the Geneva Agreement. At the time, however, the political situation in Venezuela was very different.
At the time, President Chávez was ill and died on 5 March 2013. In the aftermath, following a disputed election, Nicolás Maduro took over the presidency. A weak government was installed, and Venezuela entered a prolonged process of political instability and a deep economic and social crisis.
As soon as Guyana granted the new licenses, I (still acting as Oil Minister) informed President Maduro about their illegality, since they were not only in the waters of the Essequibo, but also in those of the Venezuelan Atlantic Façade. However, there was no official reaction by the new government, which did not even issue notes of protest to condemn Guyana's illegal actions. President Maduro had other priorities, engaged as he was in a violent campaign to crush any political dissent to consolidate his power.
ExxonMobil took advantage of Venezuela's inaction, starting intense exploration activities in 2013, drilling more than 49 offshore oil wells in the Stabroek Block and discovering successively up to 11 billion barrels of oil reserves in the Liza field.[19] This indicated that they found the mother rock La Luna formation extending from Venezuela.
The Venezuelan government's lack of response to oil drilling activity in the Essequibo was primarily due to its attempts to reach political agreements with the US. In 2015, the Maduro government began political negotiations with the White House; the US State Department adviser Tom Shannon travelled to Haiti and Caracas on several occasions to follow the discussions.[20] However, nothing was achieved with regard to the exploration activities in the Essequibo.
Subsequently, in May that year, the Venezuelan government issued Decree 1787 creating a new Integrated Maritime and Island Defence Zone that included areas of the Essequibo,[21] which generated a strong protest from Guyana and a response from the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry.[22] Then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon held a conciliatory meeting between the two Presidents at the UN Headquarters, without any constructive result.[23]
After ten years of activity in the Essequibo, by 2023, ExxonMobil and partners[24] are producing 380 thousand barrels per day (tbd); by 2024 they will reach 620 tbd; and by 2027, they project to produce 1.2 million barrels per day of oil,[25] making Guyana the second largest oil producer in Latin America.[26] This is a strategic shift in the region, a de facto situation in which Guyana has changed the status of the Essequibo and violated the Geneva Agreement, with the support of powerful multinational corporations.The diplomatic situation
Since the death of the UN's Good Officer in April 2014, this mechanism has been paralysed due to Venezuela's failure to timely respond to accept the substitutes proposed by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who were successively rejected for political reasons. The attitude of the Venezuelan government was used by Guyana to argue that Venezuela had no interest in resolving the dispute.
In February 2017, the new Secretary-General, António Guterres, agreed to extend the mechanism for one year and appointed the Norwegian Dag Nylander.[27]
From 2015, Guyana launched a diplomatic offensive at the UN General Assembly, where it presented itself as the victim of aggression and asserted its right to development, winning the support of the CARICOM[28] and the Organization of American States. For its part, the Venezuelan government, isolated internationally, did not allow any action from the UN, losing political ground in the region, especially in the Caribbean.
On 30 January 2018, after one year without results, the UN Secretary-General ceased his mediation and referred the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[29] However, the Venezuelan government does not recognise the jurisdiction of the latter and therefore refused to submit its allegations, while Guyana did so immediately.[30] In June 2022, four years later, Venezuela[31] presented its allegations against the jurisdiction of the ICJ. On 6 April 2023, the ICJ dismissed these allegations[32] and set 8 April 2024 as the deadline to receive the Counter-Memorial from Venezuela, to then rule.Venezuela's referendum and its consequences
The Venezuelan government convened a referendum about the Essequibo dispute on 3 December 2023,[33] as a manoeuvre to gain political support looking towards the 2024 presidential elections. Although the referendum has no legal effect on the ICJ process, it does have dangerous implications for the diplomatic and peaceful resolution of the dispute.
The Maduro government deployed an intense campaign for the referendum using an aggressive and militaristic narrative against Guyana, including issues such as disregarding the ICJ and the occupation of the Essequibo. Even though there was a very high abstention rate and there is no way to verify the results of the referendum, the government handled it as a political success.
On 5 December 2023, in an aggressive address to the country,[34] Maduro ordered the creation of a new state in the Essequibo (so-called "Guayana Esequiba"), a Military Defence Zone with a political-military authority; he also announced the granting of licenses there, giving a three-month deadline to the oil multinationals operating there to "abandon" the area.
The escalation of tensions is of concern to countries in the region, mainly Brazil,[35] which has increased its military presence on the borders.[36] For its part, the United States announced joint military exercises in support of Guyana,[37] while the UK sent a warship to the Essequibo.[38] In response, the Venezuelan government conducted a naval military exercise in the area including overflight of Sukhoi fighter jets.[39]
This escalation occurred despite the fact that a meeting was held in St. Vincent and the Grenadines – the pro tempore President of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) – between the presidents of Guyana and Venezuela on 14 December. They issued a declaration to agree to reduce tensions, avoid any military action and respect the Geneva Agreement.[40] However, Guyana's President Irfaan Ali made it clear that his country will follow the ICJ process, without direct negotiations with Venezuela.[41]A regional flashpoint
There are two opposing positions on the Essequibo territorial dispute that could escalate into a conflict in the short or medium term: Maduro's government does not recognise the ICJ's jurisdiction or any of its decisions, while Guyana occupies and produces oil in the Essequibo, awaiting a decision from the ICJ that legitimise its actions. These positions could turn into an open conflict, especially as oil exploitation in the area will reach significant levels and the licenses granted by Guyana will block the Venezuelan Atlantic façade.
Despite Maduro's aggressive rhetoric, it seems unlikely – although the risk remains– that his government will enter into an open conflict with Guyana, both because of the lack of internal and external support for such an action and owing to the country's serious crisis and extreme weakness, so that any military action in the Essequibo could cause the collapse of his regime.
But this may change, given the country's unstable political situation. And, in any foreseeable scenario, Venezuela will not give up its historical claim to the Essequibo or its access to the Atlantic. Any government in Venezuela that initiates the recovery of the country and the re-establishment of its international alliances would have sufficient elements and strength to demand a fair solution to the Essequibo dispute.
Guyana has acted aggressively, violating the Geneva Agreement, especially due to its support for large oil multinational companies against Venezuela's strategic interests. The situation in the Essequibo, with no prospect of a diplomatic agreement, constitutes a potential conflict – a regional flashpoint – that could have complex and unpredictable implications soon, especially when it affects strategic issues for Venezuela such as oil and access to the Atlantic.Rafael Ramírez is former Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Minister (2014) and UN Ambassador (2014-2017); Venezuelan Oil Minister and CEO of PDVSA (2002-2014).[1] An Amazonian territory of 160,000 square kilometres, practically uninhabited and full of natural resources.[2] Rajihv Morillo Dáger, "La Capitanía General de Venezuela de 1777, base de la integración y la territorialidad nacional", in Analítica.com, 18 September 2019, https://www.analitica.com/?p=828410.[3] Fundación Empresas Polar, "Schomburgk, Robert Hermann", in Diccionario de Historia de Venezuela, https://bibliofep.fundacionempresaspolar.org/dhv/entradas/s/schomburgk-robert-hermann.[4] Tribunal of arbitration constituted under article I of the treaty of arbitration signed at Washington. See: "Award regarding the Boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela, 3 October 1989", in Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. 28 (2007), p. 331-340, https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVIII/331-340.pdf.[5] Otto Schoenrich, "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary Dispute", in The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, No. 3 (July 1949), p. 522-530, DOI 10.1017/S0002930000092691.[6] Venezuela, Question of Boundaries between Venezuela and the Territory of British Guiana : Statement of His Excellency, Dr. Marcos Falcon Briceno, Minister for External Relations of Venezuela, at the 348th Meeting of the Special Political Committee on 12 November 1962 (A/SPC/71), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/862319.[7] UK and Venezuela, Agreement to Resolve the Controversy over the Frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana, signed at Geneva on 17 February 1966, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028012b96f.[8] Guyana, UK and Venezuela, Protocol to the Agreement to Resolve the Controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland over the Frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana, signed at Port of Spain on 18 June 1970, https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=080000028011a754.[9] UN Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) website: Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela, https://dppa.un.org/en/node/185706.[10] Guyana Minister of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Relations between Cuba and Guyana, 3 January 2013, https://www.parliament.gov.gy/media-centre/speeches/diplomatic-relations-between-cuba-and-guyana.[11] Petrocaribe was a cooperative oil procurement agreement signed between Venezuela and 18 Caribbean countries, including Guyana, whereby Venezuela guaranteed the supply of 46 per cent of fuel needs through financing facilities and possibilities of payment through direct deliveries of products.[12] Christopher J. Schenk et al., "An Estimate of Recoverable Heavy Oil Resources of the Orinoco Oil Belt, Venezuela", in USGS Fact Sheets, No. 2009-3028 (October 2009), https://doi.org/10.3133/fs20093028.[13] Formerly Standard Oil.[14] Permanent Court of Arbitration, Guyana v. Suriname: Pleadings - Guyana Memorial, Vol. 3, Annex 160: "Exxon Signs PSC for Deepwater Acreage off Guyana; Adds to Global Deepwater Portfolio, 14 June 1999", https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/983.[15] Ibid., Annex 166; Rafael D. Ramírez, "Carta Esso Guyana al Ministerio de Petróleo Guyanés", in RafaelRamirez.net, 8 January 2024, https://www.rafaelramirez.net/?p=10536.[16] In the Stabroek Block and in the Pomeroon Block.[17] "Oil Companies for More Seismic Surveys This Year – Singh", in Stabroek News, 1 April 2013, https://www.stabroeknews.com/?p=234162.[18] Guyana Government, Petroleum Agreement between the Minister Responsible for Petroleum Representing the Government of the Republic of Guyana and CGX Resources Inc., 12 February 2013, https://oilnow.gy/contracts/cgxenergy-psa.pdf.[19] "Guyana Says Another 'Significant Discovery' Made at Stabroek Offshore Block", in Reuters, 26 October 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/guyana-says-another-significant-discovery-made-stabroek-offshore-block-2023-10-26.[20] Girish Gupta, "U.S., Venezuelan Officials Meet in Haiti, Continue Quiet Diplomacy", in Reuters, 14 June 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-venezuela-usa-idUKKBN0OU0VL20150614.[21] Wilfredo Robayo Galvis, "Las ZODIMAIN de Venezuela: ¿una nueva amenaza contra la integridad territorial de Colombia?", in ExternaDIP Blog, 17 July 2015, https://dip.uexternado.edu.co/?p=570.[22] "Venezuela in Spat with Guyana over Oil Exploration", in BBC News, 10 June 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-33078948.[23] "Granger and Maduro Shake Hands; Meeting Ongoing", in iNews, 27 September 2015, https://wp.me/p3INEd-bS7.[24] Chevron and CNOOC.[25] ExxonMobil, ExxonMobil Starts Production at Third Offshore Guyana Project, 14 November 2023, https://investor.exxonmobil.com/news-events/press-releases/detail/1153.[26] Ahead of the current production of Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia and Ecuador.[27] UN Secretary General, Mr. Dag Halvor Nylander of Norway - Personal Representative on the Border Controversy between Guyana and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 27 February 2017, https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/220583.[28] Commonwealth Secretariat, Foreign Ministers Offer Support to Guyana on Border Dispute, 28 September 2015, https://thecommonwealth.org/node/1341.[29] UN Secretary General, Statement Attributable to the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on the Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela, 30 January 2018, https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/231290.[30] ICJ, Guyana Files an Application against Venezuela, 4 April 2018, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/105581.[31] Headed by current Vice President Delcy Rodríguez (former Foreign Affairs Minister).[32] 14 to 1 vote. See ICJ, Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela) - The Court Delivers its Judgment on the Preliminary Objection Raised by Venezuela, 6 April 2023, https://www.icj-cij.org/node/202655.[33] Sébastian Seibt, "Essequibo Referendum: Is Venezuela about to Seize Part of Guyana?", in France 24, 3 December 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/americas/20231203-essequibo-referendum-is-venezuela-about-to-seize-part-of-guyana.[34] Venezuela's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anuncios para la protección y defensa de la Guayana Esequiba, 5 December 2023, https://mppre.gob.ve/?p=197473.[35] President Lula Da Silva warned that "humanity should be afraid of war. War only takes place when common sense is lacking".[36] Katy Watson, "Brazil Deploys Troops to Venezuela Border", in BBC News, 7 December 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-67645018.[37] US Embassy in Guyana, SOUTHCOM to Conduct Flight over Guyana, 7 December 2023, https://gy.usembassy.gov/southcom-to-conduct-flight-over-guyana.[38] "British Warship Arrives Near Guyana Fueling Essequibo Land Dispute with Venezuela", in France 24, 29 December 2023, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231229-british-warship-in-guyana-waters-fanning-tensions-with-venezuela.[39] Andreina Itriago Acosta, "Venezuela Deploys Troops to East Caribbean Coast, Citing Guyana Threat", in Bloomberg, 28 December 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-28/venezuela-deploys-soldiers-amid-guyana-threat-maduro-says.[40] "Breaking: Guyana and Venezuela Agree on 11-Point Peace Declaration in SVG", in One News SVG, 14 December 2023, https://wp.me/pbPotL-3El.[41] Melissa Wong, "President Ali Says Guyana Is Not Seeking War in Talks with Venezuela", in Loop News, 14 December 2023, https://caribbean.loopnews.com/node/686901.

Chapter 1: Lianqi Development Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai Baoye Group Corp., Ltd., Sakai SIO International(Guangzhou)Co., Ltd. et al. (Appeal against Jurisdictional Objection in Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Invention): The Principle of "Two Conveniences" and the Mechanism of Leapfrog Appeal shall be Fully Considered when Confirming the Jurisdiction of Non-infringement and Infringement of Patent -- Chapter 2: Shanxi Coal International Energy Group Jincheng Co., Ltd. v. China CITIC Bank Co., Ltd. Xi'an Branch, Shaanxi Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Contract): In a Confirming Warehouse Transaction Without Real Trade Background, the Real Legal Relationship Among the Buyer, Seller, and the Bank Shall be Found to be the Relationship of Loan and Guaranty Contract -- Chapter 3: Xinjiang Longmei Energy Co. Ltd. v. Zheng X (Dispute over Equity Transfer Contract): Changed Circumstances Shall not Be Claimed to Rescind the Contract Concluded When a Party Clearly Knowing the Risk -- Chapter 4: Ping An Bank Co., Ltd. Beijing Branch, and Beijing Gold Exchange Co., Ltd. et al v. Hainan Jinfenghuang Hotspring Resort Co., Ltd., Beijing Xinyupeng Mechanical & Electrical Engineering Co., Ltd. et al (Dispute over Loan Contract): The Effect of Issuing a Blank Guaranty Contract Stamped with the Official Seal, and the Issue That a Guaranty Provider May Be Exempted Within the Scope of the Pledge Waived by Its Pledgee -- Chapter 5: China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Construction Co., Ltd. v. Hengfeng Bank Co., Ltd. Ningbo Branch and defendants in the first instance, Ningbo Zhong Ren Hong Electronics Co., Ltd. and Ningbo Gang Di Trade Co., Ltd. et al. (Disputes over the Issuing of Letter of Credit and the Right of Recourse) : Instruments Debtors Shall not Protest Against the Pledgee on the Ground of Protesting Against the Pledgor -- Chapter 6: Xinjiang Hua Cheng An Ju Real Estate Development Co., Ltd. v. China Railway Construction Bridge Engineering Bureau Group Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Contract for the Undertaking of Construction Projects): on Application of Good Faith Principle in Finding the Validity of Contract -- Chapter 7: LC Securities Co., Ltd. and Eastern Gold Jade Co., Ltd. v. Yunnan Xinglong Industry Co., Ltd. and Zhao X et al. (Dispute over a Suretyship Contract): The Scope of Security Liability Assumed by the Security Provider Shall be Limited to the Scope of the Principal Obligation -- Chapter 8: Bank of DaLian Co., Ltd. v. Dalian Branch of China Railway Modern Logistics Technology Co., Ltd. and Jinzhou Zuoyuan Sugar Foods Co., Ltd. et al. (Dispute over a Loan Contract): Pledge in Movable Property May not be Created by Possession Reformulation -- Chapter 9: Sichuan Zhongding Construction Engineering Co., Ltd. v. Zhu X and Natural Resources Bureau of Wulan County (Dispute over Contract for the Undertaking of Construction Projects): In a De Facto Juristic Relation, the Actual Builder May Claim Project Payments Directly with the Party Offering the Contract -- Chapter 10: Fujian Tinghu Real Estate Group Co., Ltd. v. Natural Resources Bureau of Xianyou County (Dispute over a Contract for Transfer of State-owned Construction Land Use Right): In Case of Breach of Contract due to Objective Reasons, the Liquidated Damages Clause Shall be Applied Primarily to Cover the Loss -- Chapter 11: Wang X V. Bazhou Sairui Machinery & Equipment Installation Co., Cao X(A) (Dispute over Change of Registration): The Claim of the Resigned Legal Representative for the Registration of the Change of the Legal Representative of Company Shall, Absent Other Remedies, Be Accepted by the Court -- Chapter 12: Peng X V. Chengdu Rural Commercial Bank Co., Ltd. Cuqiao Subbranch, Chen X, et al. (Dispute over Suretyship agreement): Impact on the Liability of Other Guarantors Involved of Creditor's Waiver in Mixed Security of Security in Rem as Provided by Debtor -- Chapter 13: Hubei YAS Commercial Chain Co., Ltd. V. Danyang Yongsheng Motor Transport Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Tort Liability): Criteria for the Determination of Erroneous Application for Property Preservation -- Chapter 14: Jiang X, Chen X, el al. V. Lin X, Weng X(A)., et al. (Dispute over Objection to the Enforcement of Judgment): Determination on the Time When the Seizure Ruling and the Notice of Assistance in Execution Take Effect -- Chapter 15: Huang X V. Xiamen Shuangrun Investment Management Co., Fenghe (China) Co. (the third party in the first instance), Hui'an County Rural Credit Cooperative (Dispute over the Objection by an Outsider to the Enforcement): The Requirements for the Valid Objection to the Execution by the Transferee of Equity -- Chapter 16: Guilin Zhangtai Industry Group Co., Ltd., Guangxi Lichengdong Investment Co., Ltd. et al (Enforcement Reconsideration of Dispute over Recovery of Financial Distressed Debt): Identification of Interest in Cases of Enforcement against Dispute over Recovery of Financial Distressed Debt -- Chapter 17: Zhou X v. Xiamen Baixiang Shouli E-Business Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Online Shopping Contract): Determination of the Basis for the Adjustment of Agreed Punitive Liquidated Damages. - Chapter 18: Yunnan Copper Co., Ltd. v. Kunming Wanbao Jiyuan Biotechnology Co., Ltd., Yunnan Zhongheng Innovation Investment Co., Ltd. etc (Dispute over Sale Contract): Identification of the Nature and Validity of Closed-loop Sale Contracts -- Chapter 19: Zhongkong Guorong New Energy Development Co., Ltd. v. Fuzhou Dade Industry Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Sale Contract): Determination and Application of Deposit-related Penalty Rules for Partial Performance of Contracts -- Chapter 20: Zhongrong Hengsheng Wood Industry Co., Ltd.(Beijing)v. Crosplus (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. and Nanjing Mengyang Furniture Sales Center (Dispute over Copyright Infringement): Elements for Copyright Protection of Works of Applied Art -- Chapter 21: JDB (China) Co., Ltd. v. Guangzhou Wanglaoji Health Industry Co., Ltd. (Dispute over False Advertising): Identification of False Advertising -- Chapter 22: Shandong Bittel Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd (Bittel) v. Jiangsu Zhongxun Digital Electronics Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Tortious Liability for Damages Arising from Malicious Prosecution in Intellectual Property Litigation): Standard for Assessing the Subjective Fault in Disputes over Damages Arising from Malicious Prosecution in Intellectual Property Litigation -- Chapter 23: Lacoste Company Limited v. Cartelo Pty Ltd. and Trademark Review and Adjudication Board of State Administration for Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic of China (Administrative Dispute over Trademark Disputes): Impact of Offshore Co-existence Agreements on Determining the Trademark Similarity -- Chapter 24: Xiamen Meetyou Co., Ltd. v. Beijing Kangzhilesi Network Technology Co., Ltd. and China National Intellectual Property Administration (Administrative Dispute over Request for Declaration of Trademark Invalidity): Whether the Trademark at Issue is the Sign "Not to be Used as Trademark" Falls within the Jurisdiction of People's Court to Review the Administrative Act or Conduct in Affirming and Authorizing the Trademark -- Chapter 25: Xiao X v. Seno LED Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Invention): The Role of Interpretations of the Recorded Technical Effect upon the Patent Claims and Impact on the Principle of Equivalence -- Chapter 26: Medacor (Tianjin) Technology Co., Ltd. v. Sunshine (Tianjin) Group Co., Ltd., and Defendants in the First Instance, Wang A, Zhang A, et al. (Dispute over Infringement of Trade Secrets): How to Determine whether the Customer List Constitutes the Trade Secrets -- Chapter 27: Ningbo Beworth Textile Machinery Co., Ltd. v. Ningbo Cixing Company Limited (Dispute over License Contract for Technological Secrets): Handling of Cases involved both Criminal and Civil Proceedings related to Trade Secrets -- Chapter 28: VMI Holland B.V. and Cooper (Kunshan) Tire Co., Ltd. v. Safe-run Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Confirmation of Patent Non-infringement): Prerequisites for Confirming Patent Non-infringement -- Chapter 29: Alfa Laval Corporate A B v. China National Intellectual Property Administration and SWEP International A B (the Third Party in the First Instance) (Administrative Dispute over Invalid Patent for Invention): Determination of Modification of Patent Claims beyond Scope in Invalidity Declaration Proceedings -- Chapter 30: Shimano v. Sensah Smart Sports Equipment Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Invention): Determination of Protection Scope of Functional Features -- Chapter 31: Shenzhen Jiedian Technology Co., Ltd. v. Shenzhen Laidian Technology Co., Ltd. and Anker Innovations Technology Co., Ltd. (Dispute over Infringement of Patent for Utility Models): Classification and Identification Standards of Technical Features in Patent Claims -- Chapter 32: Wartsila Finland Oy and Spliethoff's Bevrachtingskantoor B.V. v. Rongcheng Xixiakou Shipbuilding Co., Ltd. and Yingqin Engine (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (Tort dispute over the sale and purchase of marine equipment): Mere interest in the performance of a contract does not in principle fall within the scope of application of the law of tort liability -- Chapter 33: Shanghai Salvage Company under the Ministry of Transport v. Provence Shipowner 2008-1 Ltd, CMA CGM SA, et. al (Dispute over salvage at sea and ship pollution damage liabilities): How to distinguish the costs of preventive measures and the costs of salvage measures, determine the subject avoiding liability in ship collision and oil spill pollution incidents, and identify restricted and unrestricted maritime compensation claims -- Chapter 34: Bank of China Limited, Henan Branch v. UBAF (Hong Kong) Ltd. (Dispute over independent guarantee): How to determine independent guarantee fraud by a prima facie complying demand due to abuse of claim for payment -- Chapter 35: Evergreen Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. .

UPDATE 9/30 6a.m. ET: According to the Associated Press, preliminary official results showed the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) finishing first with 29.2% of the vote and Chancellor Karl Nehammer's Austrian People's Party was second with 26.5%. The center-left Social Democrats were in third place with 21%. The outgoing government — a coalition of Nehammer's party and the Greens — lost its majority in the lower house of parliament.VIENNA/MUNICH - "Wars belong in museums" reads an inscription in front of the Museum of Military History in Vienna, Austria. As the crow flies, there are less than 400 miles between Lviv in western Ukraine and Vienna. In the Austrian capital, however, the distance feels much greater. Unlike many German cities, no Ukrainian flags are seen in Vienna's institutional buildings. In Vienna, one of the few reminders of the ongoing war in Ukraine is to be found behind the Soviet War Memorial, where a wall is painted in the colors of the Ukrainian flag.Recent regional elections in Germany have been shaped by growing discontent with the country's Ukraine war policy. Meanwhile, to Germany's south, slight attention is paid to the ongoing war in Ukraine ahead of the Austrian parliamentary elections on September 29. The public debate in Austria is instead dominated by topics such as migration and asylum politics, and future coalition options. The limited weight of foreign policy in the conversation can partly be explained by Austria's specific circumstances as a neutral country. Austria has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 1995 but is not a member of NATO. After Sweden and Finland joined NATO in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, only three other European countries (Cyprus, Ireland, and Malta) share Austria's category.But foreign policy could play a significant role in negotiations to form a government coalition after the elections. The far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which is polling first at 27%, could put European Ukraine aid under the microscope. In its election program, the FPÖ opposes sanctions against Russia and demands a halt to Austria's contributions to the European Peace Facility (EPF), the mechanism through which the EU has provided $6.8 billion in military support to Ukraine. Hungary, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has long used its veto power within the EU to block military aid packages for Ukraine or allow them to be approved in exchange for concessions. Orbán, who has an alliance with the FPÖ in the European Parliament, is seen as a role model by Herbert Kickl, the FPÖ's candidate for chancellor. The FPÖ has never won a national election but it finished first in the elections to the European Parliament in Austria last June. A win for the FPÖ would not guarantee its participation in government, let alone the privilege of appointing the new Austrian chancellor. Still, forming a government coalition while bypassing the far-right party would be complicated. The FPÖ is followed closely in the polls by the center-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), led by Chancellor Karl Nehammer. He currently leads a coalition government with the Green Party. Third in the polls comes the center-left Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ). The two traditional center-right and center-left political forces would probably need a third party to reach a parliamentary majority. The ÖVP and the FPÖ, on the contrary, are likely to gain over 50% of the seats in parliament.The conservatives appear ready to reach out to the FPÖ after the elections, although they have announced their opposition to Kickl, the FPÖ leader, serving in a future cabinet. The two parties already shared the government in the early 2000s and again later on, from 2017 to 2019. On both occasions, the ÖVP filled the chancellor position. It could be different this time, especially if the FPÖ wins by a significant margin over the ÖVP.Christoph Schwarz, a Research Fellow at the Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, said if the FPÖ enters the government, "one can assume that Austrian support for EU initiatives in support of Ukraine will be harder to attain." Even so, he adds, much would depend on "political bargaining and the composition of such a government." The FPÖ and United Russia, Vladimir Putin's party, signed a Friendship treaty in 2016. The FPÖ's Russian connections have led to bizarre moments. Karin Kneissl, appointed Austria's foreign minister on the FPÖ's recommendation in 2017, danced with Putin at her wedding in 2018. Kneissl now lives in Russia, where she was recently appointed goodwill ambassador for Siberian tiger conservation. The FPÖ has since distanced itself from the Friendship treaty, but ties between the far-right party and Moscow have survived. Austria's neutral status is key to understanding its foreign policy. Following its annexation into Nazi Germany in 1938, Austria did not fully recover its sovereignty until 1955 after reaching an agreement with the former Allied powers. An independent Austria was something both the U.S. and the USSR could accept as long as the country renounced union with Germany and remained neutral. On October 26, 1955, the Austrian parliament approved a declaration of neutrality. The date is Austria's national holiday, underscoring the importance of neutrality for Austrian national identity. During the Cold War, Austria's neutrality contributed to the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, establishing their headquarters in Vienna. Vienna also hosts the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (or OSCE) and is one of the four major U.N. headquarter sites. Recent polls indicate that neutrality remains popular with some three-quarters of the Austrian population in favor of it. The Ukraine war has not had a major impact on the numbers. Schwarz argues that, in Austria, "foreign policy thinking has been largely outsourced to Brussels and any topic that could lead to a potentially uncomfortable discussion on neutrality is avoided at all costs." The meaning of Austria's neutrality, however, is certainly far more diffuse nowadays than it was during the Cold War. As an EU member, Austria is part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. The country has also participated in NATO's Partnership for Peace since 1995. Some recent developments have brought Austria closer to NATO. In July 2023, Austria joined the German-led Sky Shield initiative, which seeks to strengthen Europe's air defenses in light of the Ukraine War. The FPÖ opposes this step, whereas the ÖVP promoted it in the government.Broad support for neutrality does not necessarily mean Austrians want to keep their army small. A slim majority supports increasing military expenditures and the government has taken steps in that direction. As of 2022, only three EU countries were spending less than Austria on their armies in proportional terms. Back then, Vienna spent 0.8% of its GDP on defense. This year, it will be close to 1%. Schwarz believes that, regardless of the composition of the next government coalition, the current commitment to a military expenditure of 1.5% of the GDP by 2028 will be maintained. In comparison to other EU countries, Austria retains significant ties with Russia even after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Austria's Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI) is the largest Western bank still operating in Russia. The Austrian government successfully lobbied in December 2023 for RBI to be excluded from the EU's 12th package of Russia sanctions. Since then, the European Central Bank and U.S. authorities have continued to exert pressure on RBI and the government in Vienna. Nevertheless, in 2024, over half of RBl's profits came from its operations in Russia and Belarus. Although the bank's stated objective is to "heavily scale back" from these markets, there is no clear path to repatriate the profits. The situation was further complicated in early September when a Russian court blocked any potential sale of RBI's Russian subsidiary. Aside from banking ties, Austria is heavily dependent on Russian gas. This year, Austria has imported at least 80% of its natural gas from Russia every month. That percentage is higher than in the previous two years. In this sense, Austria represents the reverse image of Germany, which has progressively diversified its energy supply away from Russia since 2022. Although there was no time for parliamentary approval before the elections, the Austrian government recently agreed to review the current national security strategy, which dates back to 2013. Back then, Russia was described as a "partner." The new national strategy, however, would define Moscow as a "threat" and emphasize the need to decrease Austria's energy dependency on it. Schwarz argues that "there is a good chance of this strategy being adopted in more or less its current form" if the next government does not involve the FPÖ. There will be far more uncertainty about the next national security strategy, and Austria's foreign policy overall, if the FPÖ enters the government, especially if it fills the position of chancellor. The elections on September 29 will determine the negotiating strength of the different parties, but talks to create a government are expected to take time. The EU will pay particular attention to the negotiations in hopes of avoiding a new Austrian government that complicates EU sanctions against Russia and military aid for Ukraine.

James Freeman's always excellent "best of the web" WSJ column today covers a Manhattan Institute report by Mark Mills itself referencing material deep in side an International Energy Agency report on battery powered electric cars. Like corn ethanol, this enthusiasm may also pass. The economic and environmental costs of batteries are slowly seeping out. One of my pet peeves in all of our command-and-control climate policy is that any comprehensive quantification of costs and benefits seems so rare, or at least so hidden. How many dollars for how many tons of carbon -- and especially the latter: how many tons of carbon, really, all in, including making the cars? (California only counts tailpipe emissions!) I have seen guesstimates that electric cars only breakeven in their carbon emissions at 50,000-70,000 miles. And, the point of the article, those estimates are likely undercounts especially if there is a huge expansion.  Parts I found interesting and novel: For all of history, the costs of a metal in both dollar and environmental terms are dictated primarily by ore grades, i.e., the share of the rock dug up that contains the metal sought... Ore grade is what accounts for the differences in the cost per pound of gold, $15,000, and iron, $0.05. The former ore grades are typically below 0.001% and the latter over 50%.... Average nickel ore grade is under 2% and for copper below 1%, ... Such geological realities determine the amount of energy used by big machines to do the digging, moving, grinding, refining, etc.The global mining industry today already accounts for about 40% of all industrial energy use, and that's before an epic expansion that will be needed to meet green plans. Petroleum itself typically accounts for half of mining-sector energy use.Thus, estimating future EV energy emissions requires including the trajectory for ore grades. There is no evidence that any study is doing so. [My emphasis] Every metal exhibits a long-run and significant decline in ore grades. [The International Energy Agency] acknowledges this, even if it tendentiously understates the reality: "Future [minerals] production is likely to gravitate towards more energy-intensive pathways." The word "likely" dodges the fact that the data and the trends are clear. Copper is typical and is one metal for which there are no substitutes for building EVs or wind and solar hardware. As a National Renewable Energy Laboratory paper pointed out, "a decrease in copper ore grade between 0.2% and 0.4%, will require seven times more energy than present-day operations." And copper ore grades are forecast to continue the long-run decline...Mr. Mills cites an IEA report showing a trend of increasingly energy-intensive mining to collect a number of other minerals needed for EVs and adds:All the trends for declining ore grades are visible, even if they are ignored. [my emphasis]Now any economist of a certain era like me remembers the resource limits arguments of the 1970s, and the fact that raw materials prices keep going down over time. How does this square with the above? Simple: over time energy prices go down, and a bit the cost of machinery goes down, so we can mine lower and lower quality ore at the same or lower price.  This is how we overcome the laws of thermodynamics. As the thing you want is more and more needle in a haystack of rubble, it takes more and more energy to pull it out. We could make copper from sea water with enough free energy. We could make copper from other elements in particle accelerators with enough free energy. Energy abundance drives declining resource prices. And, of course, current policy is driving us to more and more expensive energy.  So perhaps the resource limited crowd might be right after all, though only because of our self-imposed energy policies. (I don't see how one can use nuclear or solar power to run a mine. Maybe, which would at least help the carbon issue if not all the other externalities of mining.)Some of the environmental question around carbon is nicely stated as, what kind of earth do we want to leave our great grandchildren? A hotter earth is not a pleasant choice. But an earth with all of its high grade minerals removed, and only a tenth of a degree cooler, is not a great choice either. I recall from somewhere a speculation about whether industrial civilization could revive after a social collapse. The answer is no. We can't even have a new Bronze Age. All the easily accessible deposits are gone.  Second, an interesting forecast that our regulators will give up -- i.e. give up on the idea that replacing ICE vehicles with batteries and continuing as we do now will work: . . . Consumers are also to be persuaded, or forced, to drive less in general and travel more by bus, bicycle, rail, ride-share, or on foot, and to own fewer cars in the first place. As stated in the IEA net zero goal: the number of global households without a car needs to rise from 45% today to 70% by 2050, reversing a century-long trend of rising ownership. One researcher simply stated: "There is therefore a need for a wide range of policies that include measures to reduce vehicle ownership and usage." As usual, California regulators are ahead of the proverbial curve in admitting that the state's emissions goals will require citizens of that state—on top of being forced into EVs—to drive 25% fewer miles than they did 30 years ago . . . Reversing Americans' entire residential locations to something like a Manhattan where non-car transport can work is hard enough.  Carbon emissions in the next century means China, India and Africa. Do they join the modern world? Reducing "global" car ownership means, no. You walk. Not in the article, my own pet peeve about electric car mandates, current policy, and the coming total ban on ICE vehicles: Economics teaches you the wonder of tremendous variety in our economy. Lots of people use cars and trucks for lots of different things. If electrification saves carbon at all -- a big if, and the central point of this report -- but is expensive or range limited, then it makes sense to do it first where it's least costly and most beneficial, and leave the most high value and hard to substitute uses of gas power alone. For example, the natural first use for electric cars is a second or shared small car with small battery for around town. Most families have two cars. Or, you could own a small limited range car for daily driving and rent a Chevy Tahoe for a long road trip. Privately owned cars sit idle most of the time, and are not a great first use for expensive and environmentally costly batteries anyway. A fire truck that operates one month of the year in the middle of nowhere off the grid should probably stay gas powered forever. The earth does not require 100% elimination of ICE, 90% will do! Yet our policy makers see only one vision: each family has one car, Chevy Chase's family truckster, and must take that car on a long road trip. So the car needs to be huge, have a huge battery, and have a network of charging stations. All at once. Moonshot, not bit by bit. The pressure on materials will not just come from cars either. The current policy plan is to move home heating, AC, stoves, and industry to electricity, and to move electric production to solar panels and windmills. But those only work during the day. The current plan -- dream -- is battery powered grid scale electric storage. To obviate the need for backup fossil plants -- i.e. doubling the fixed cost -- we then need something like a week's worth of battery backup for the whole current electrical output, all the cars, houses, and industry that are going to be forced to move to electricity, and new economic growth. A total ban on gas power, a forced move to huge cars with huge batteries, and no clear quantitative understanding that this actually saves any carbon at all, let alone the other environmental consequences of massively increasing resource extraction, will obviously end badly. Freeman says "they're coming for your cars." They may, but we are still a democracy. More likely, this will join corn ethanol, switchgrass, high speed trains, urban mass transit, and a hundred other enthusiasms in a pile of eternal subsidies while the chattering classes move on to the next great enthusiasm. I can bet what will happen in California. The ban will take effect, but there will be a mechanism to plead for exemptions. Once again large well connected people and companies will get exemptions, smaller businesses will shut down, and everything gets more expensive.  The sad effect of all of this is that slow diffusion of sensible electric cars may be stalled, along with development of the technology--whatever it is--that will eventually win out 20 or 30 years from now.  

Public interest litigation is a mechanism of intervention in a matter that concerns the public. It could be about human rights, government policy, or some other issue that could present a challenge to public life. Public interest litigation is important because it presents hope to the powerless and offers justice where there might not previously have been the opportunity. The aim of public interest litigation is to recognise injustice and give a voice to the concerns of members of society who might not have the means to articulate them. In Nigeria there is a high tendency for people of low socioeconomic status to experience police brutality, or even become victims of extra-judicial killing. In this article, it was argued that although public interest litigation is a good strategy to engage the injustice of extra-judicial killings, the recurrence shows that the solution lies more in addressing a systemic problem. ; Dorcas A. Odunaike: odunaiked@babcock.edu.ng ; Dorcas Odunaike is a PhD and Head of the Department of Private and Commercial Law at the Babcock University School of Law & Security Studies, Nigeria. ; Olalekan Moyosore Lalude is a PhD Candidate at the Babcock University School of Law & Security Studies, Nigeria. ; Temitope Omotola Odusanya is a PhD and member of Gender Parity Initiative, Nigeria. ; Dorcas A. 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Study Soc." 2008, vol. 11, issue 1. ; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter), Article 4, https://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf. ; African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, General Comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: The Right To Life (Article 4), Pretoria University Law Press November (2015), https://www.achpr.org/legalinstruments/detail?id=10. ; Agbiboa D.E., The Precariousness of Protection: Civilian Defense Groups Countering Boko Haram in Northeastern Nigeria, "ASR" 2020, vol. 64, no. 1. ; Ajibo C.C, Itanyi N., Okiche E., Chime I., Mosanya S., Nwodo F., Sustainable Development Enforcement Conundrum in Nigeria: Challenges and Way Forward, "Commonwealth Law Bulletin" 2020, vol. 47 issue 2. ; Akinsanmi G., Nigeria Records 122 Extra-Judicial Killings in Nine Months, This Day, https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2020/10/11/nigeria-records-122-extra-judicial-killings-in-nine-months. ; Amnesty International, Killing at Will Extrajudicial Executions and Other Unlawful Killings by the Police in Nigeria, Amnesty International Publications, 2009. ; Amnesty International, Nigeria: Time to End Impunity: Torture and Other Violations by Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), Amnesty International Nigeria 2020, AFR 44/9505/2020. ; Animasawun G., The Military and Internal Security Operations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Rethinking Security for Positive Peace in Maiduguri Nigeria, "J. Peace Res." 2012, vol. 45, issue 2. ; Animasawun G.L., Causal Analysis of Radical Islamism in Northern Nigeria's Fourth Republic, "Afr. Secur. Rev." 2013, vol. 22, issue 4. ; Ayoyo D.D., Police Officers' Assessment of NPF Reforms: Evidence from an Area Command in Ondo State, "Police Practice and Research" 2019, vol. 20, issue 1. ; Channels Television, IG Unveils New Police Order 237 On Use of Force, https://www.channelstv.com/2019/10/03/ig-unveils-new-police-order-237-on-use-of-force. ; Chukwu S., Emerinwe G., Police Brutality and Human Rights in Nigeria's Democracy: Focus on Restoration of Man's Dignity, "Revista Brasileira de Gestão Ambiental e Sustentabilidade" 2020, vol. 15 issue 7. ; Dada J., Impediments to Human Rights Protection in Nigeria, "Ann. Surv. Am. L." 2012, vol. 18, issue 1. ; Dandurand Y., Jahn J., The Fragility of a Culture of Lawfulness, "Bialostockie Studia Prawnicze" 2018, vol. 23, no. 3. ; Danjuma Dami C., Impact of Terrorism, Banditry and Kidnapping on Human Security in Nigeria, "Saudi J. Humanities Soc. Sci." 2021, vol. 6, no. 8. ; Doma H., Enhancing Justice Administration in Nigeria through Information and Communications Technology, "The John Marshall Journal of Information Technology & Privacy Law" 2016, vol. 32 no. 2. ; Dzienkowski J.S., The Contributions of Louis Brandeis to the Law of Lawyering, "Touro Law Review" 2016, vol. 33. ; Elechi O.O., Extra-Judicial Killings in Nigeria: The Case of Afikpo Town, National Criminal Justice, Case Number 202800 (2003), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/extra-judicial-killings-nigeria-case-afikpo-town. ; Emelonye U., Non-Governmental Appraisal of the Frameworks for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in Nigeria, "GJPLR" 2021, vol. 9, no. 5. ; Fernquest J., State Killing, Denial, and Cycles of Violence in the Philippines, "PSR" 2018, vol. 66. ; Hobbes T., Leviathan, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2011. ; HRMI Rights Tracker, United States: How Well is the United States Respecting People's Human Rights? Human Rights Measurement Initative (2019), https://rightstracker.org/en/country/USA. ; Human Rights Watch, "Everyone's in on the Game" Corruption and Human Rights Abuses by the Nigerian Police Force, Human Rights Watch, August 2010. ; Ibezim-Ohaeri V., Spaces for Change: Galvanizing Collective, Action to Protect the Civic Space in Nigeria, https://yaraduafoundation.org/files/Galvanizing%20Collective%20Action.pdf. ; Ifejika S.I., The Nigerian State and International Human Rights Laws in the Fourth Republic, "Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. 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In the last decade, the energy industry has been taken a big impact socially, ambiently, and economically due to the exponential increment in the use of fossil energetics, energy resources that have several problems due to low energetic efficiency, high-level pollution in storage and use. With the oscillations of the current price of petroleum and other fossil energetics, glo bal governments have determined the necessity to develop the research of renewable energy technologies, for global exploitation. The energetic potential of the Sun has shown as an alternative with a higher level of adaptation for domestic and industrial use; said potential due to their variable nature de pending on the time of the day, the season of the year, and the atmospheric situation shows an energetic constant of 1360 W/m2 . In this section is important to clarify the importance of quantification of the solar radiation that reaches the terrain surface, the main issue in the exploitation of renewable energetic, since the beginning of the XX century has approached widely. Several mathematic models of direct solar radiation have made using different strategies in solar tracking; the main importance of these solar tracking methods consists of the necessity to optimize the amount of solar radiation in any solar collector system. This research work proposes the mathematical analysis of the incident solar radiation on a flat surface through MATLAB programming language of several solar tracking schemes on clear sky conditions to geographical coordinates and climate conditions of Zacatecas (Latitude 22.7725 N, length 102.6436 E and altitude of 2,240 m). In this paper, programming routines have been written for the next tracking schemes: Continous tracking in the form of heliotrope, tilted with latitude and with azimuthal angular rotation. Tilted tracking with latitude. Continous tracking that rotates in the horizontal axis West-East according to the solar altitude. Fixed tracking. The main purpose is to find an efficient solar tracking method for the study location. This manner follows with step tracking analysis to 1, 30, 60, 120, and 240 minutes respectively. Clear sky model developed by the European Solar Radiation Atlas, Linke turbidity factor, total diffuse radiation by the change of a solid angle, Albedo parameter and, relative optical mass are concepts that have been worked to develop the analyzed modeling method on this thesis. Obtained data of the average monthly diary solar irradiation calculations are shown in form of tables and graphs to perform the corresponding analysis. Data comparison is ma de for each of the months of the 2019 year, to the different solar tracking schemes. Data analysis has been work and is shown as monthly percentual values, control case is defined as the continuous solar tracking heliotrope type with 100 %, due to the natural behavior of the scheme which provides the maximum value of solar energy possible. Shown for validation different comparations with the calculated data, regarding the mea sured data by the solar station Zacatecas 04 located at the UAZ Siglo XXI Campus in Zacatecas in the sixth building of the Universidad Aut´onoma de Zacatecas. In the same way, were analyzed and compared data obtained with a similar model develop in Mexico City presented by Ram´ırez in the 2017 year in her bachelors' degree thesis, at the Facultad de Ciencias de la UNAM. Making a comparison of the different cases of solar tracking, the following is observed: (a) More solar radiation reaches each month, to the surfaces that comply with some scheme of sun-tracking, with respect to those surfaces that do not move.(b) The surface to which the least collection of solar radiation affects monthly is the horizontal surface. The solar irradiation per month estimated for this case is approximately 25 % below the maximum calculated value corresponding to the monitoring of heliotrope-type solar collection. Regarding the comparative analysis of the data obtained, it can be seen that: (a) The clear sky model prepared by ESRA has a behavior very close to reality for the geographical location Latitude 22.7725 N, longitude 102.6436 E and altitude 2,240 m related to the UAZ Siglo XXI Campus in Zacatecas, having a difference with the data obtained by the station Solarimetric Zacatecas 04 with a maximum value of 0.13 % for the month of January of the same year. ; En la última década la industria de los energéticos ha tomado un gran impacto social, ambiental y económico debido al aumento exponencial del uso de los energéticos fósiles, fuentes energéticas que poseen variados problemas en su uso los cuales van desde baja eficiencia energética, alto nivel de contaminación en su uso y reserva. Con las actuales oscilaciones del precio del petróleo y el de otros combustibles fósiles, los gobiernos mundiales han llegado a la conclusión de que es necesario fomentar la investigación y desarrollo de tecnologías de energías renovables, para su explotación global. El potencial energético del Sol, se muestra como una de la alternativas con mayor adaptabilidad para los usos domésticos e industriales; dicho potencial aun en su naturaleza variable de acuerdo a la hora del día, época del año y situación atmosférica, presenta como constante energética 1360 W/m2. En este apartado es de suma importancia el cuantificar la radiación solar que alcanza la superficie terrestre, principal problema en el aprovechamiento del energético renovable, que desde principios del siglo XX se ha abordado ampliamente. Varios modelos matemáticos de la radiación solar directa se han realizado utilizando diversas estrategias de seguimiento solar; la importancia de estos sistemas radica en la necesidad de optimizar la cantidad de radiación solar en cualquier tipo de colector. En este trabajo de investigación se plantea el análisis matemático de la radiación solar incidente en una superficie plana mediante el lenguaje MATLAB de diversos esquemas de seguimiento solar en condiciones de cielo claro para las coordenadas geográficas y condiciones 12climatológicas de Zacatecas (Latitud 22.7725 N, longitud 102.6436 E y altitud 2,240 m). Se escribieron rutinas de cáculo para los esquemas de seguimiento: Seguimiento continuo de tipo heliotropo, inclinada con latitud y rotación según el ángulo acimutal.Seguimiento inclinado con la latitud. Seguimiento inclinado con la latitud. Seguimiento continuo que rota sobre el eje horizontal Este-Oeste según la altura solar. Seguimiento fijo. La finalidad principal es encontrar el método de seguimiento solar mas eficiente para el lugar de estudio, de esta manera continuar con el análisis del seguimiento escalonado a 1, 30, 60, 120 y 240 minutos respectivamente. El modelo de cielo claro desarrollado por el Atlas Europeo de la Radiación Solar (ESRA por sus siglas en inglés), el factor de turbidez de Linke, la irradiación total difusa por el cambio de angulo sólido, el parámetro de Albedo y la masa óptica relativa son conceptos que se trabajaron para desarrollar el modelo analizado en esta tesis. Los datos obtenidos de los cálculos de irradiación solar promedio diaria mensual, se presentan en forma de tablas y gráficas con la finalidad de realizar el análisis correspondiente. Se hace una comparación de los datos obtenidos para cada uno de los meses del año 2019, para los diferentes esquemas de seguimiento solar. Se analizaron los datos y también se presentan en los valores en forma de porcentaje mensual, a manera de control, se considera el esquema de seguimiento continuo al sol de tipo heliotropo con el 100 %, esto se hace debido a la naturaleza del mismo esquema, el cual proporciona la máxima energía solar posible. Se muestra a manera de validación, diferentes comparaciones con los datos calculados con las rutinas elaboradas, con respecto a los datos obtenidos de mediciones de la estaciónsolarimétrica Zacatecas 04 ubicada en el Campus UAZ Siglo XXI, edificio 6 de la Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas. De la misma manera se analizaron y compararon los datos obtenidos mediante un modelo similar en al Ciudad de México presentados por Ramírez en el año 2017 en su tesis de licenciatura, en la Facultad de Ciencias de la UNAM. Al hacer la comparación de los diferentes casos de seguimiento solar se observa lo siguien te: (a) Llega más cantidad de radiación solar por mes, a las superficies que cumplen con algún esquema de seguimiento del sol, con respecto a aquellas superficies que no se mueven. (b) La superficie a la que menos captación de radiación solar incide mensualmente es la superficie horizontal. La irradiación solar, por mes estimada para este caso se encuentra aproximadamente en un 25 % por debajo del máximo valor calculado correspondiente al seguimiento de captación solar de tipo heliotropo. Respecto al an´alisis comparativo de los datos obtenidos se puede apreciar que: (a) El modelo de cielo claro elaborado por ESRA tiene un comportamiento muy cercano a la realidad para la ubicación geográfica Latitud 22.7725 N, longitud 102.6436 E y altitud 2,240 m relacionado con el Campus UAZ Siglo XXI en Zacatecas teniendo una diferencia con los datos obtenidos por la estación solarimétrica Zacatecas 04 con un valor máximo de 0.13 % para el mes de Enero del mismo año.

Ali E. Abbas (" The Multiattribute Utility Tree ") received his M.S. in electrical engineering, M.S. in engineering economic systems and operations research, Ph.D. in management science and engineering, and Ph.D. (minor) in electrical engineering, all from Stanford University. He is an associate professor in the Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. His research interests include utility theory, decision making with incomplete information and preferences, dynamic programming, and information theory. He previously worked with Schlumberger Oilfield Services, where he held several international positions in wireline logging, operations management, and international training. He was also a lecturer in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford, and he was involved with several consulting projects for mergers and acquisitions in California. Dr. Abbas is a member of INFORMS, a senior member of the IEEE, and an associate editor for Decision Analysis and Operations Research. Address: Department of Industrial and Enterprise Systems Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 117 Transportation Building, MC-238, 104 South Mathews Avenue, Urbana, IL 61801; e-mail: aliabbas@uiuc.edu . James S. Dyer (" A Discrete Time Approach for Modeling Two-Factor Mean-Reverting Stochastic Processes ") occupies the Fondren Centennial Chair in Business in the Red McCombs School of Business Administration at the University of Texas at Austin. His research and teaching interests are focused on applications of decision analysis and real options to problems of risk management and capital budgeting, and he has published extensively on these subjects in various journals, including Management Science and Operations Research. He is the former Chair of the Decision Analysis Society of INFORMS, and the former area editor for decision analysis for Operations Research. He was awarded the Ramsey Medal by the Decision Analysis Society and the Edgeworth-Pareto Award by the International Society on Multiple Criteria Decision Making. Address: Information, Risk, and Operations Management Department, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712; e-mail: jim.dyer@mccombs.utexas.edu . Jeffery L. Guyse (" Consistency Among Elicitation Techniques for Intertemporal Choice: A Within-Subjects Investigation of the Anomalies ") is currently an associate professor in the Technology and Operations Management Department at the Cal Poly Pomona. He holds a Ph.D. from University of California, Irvine in management and an undergraduate degree in economics from California State University, San Marcos. His research interests are focused on the methodological issues involved with eliciting preferences for decisions that occur over time for both monetary and nonmonetary outcomes. Address: Technology and Operations Management Department, College of Business Administration, California State Polytechnic University, Pomona, 3801 West Temple Avenue, Pomona, CA 91768; e-mail: jlguyse@csupomona.edu . Warren J. Hahn (" A Discrete Time Approach for Modeling Two-Factor Mean-Reverting Stochastic Processes ") is an assistant professor of decision sciences in the Graziadio School of Business and Management at Pepperdine University. He received his Ph.D. in management science from the University of Texas at Austin in 2005, and he also holds an M.B.A., an M.S. in civil engineering, and a B.S. in petroleum engineering, all from the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include discrete-time modeling of stochastic processes and numerical techniques for solving decision analysis problems, with applications to commodity price modeling and valuation of real options. From 1991 through 2001, he held several engineering and financial management roles with firms in the energy industry, including ARCO, Vastar Resources, and BP. Address: Graziadio School of Business and Management, Pepperdine University, 24255 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, CA 90263; e-mail: joe.hahn@pepperdine.edu . Thomas W. Keelin (" Quantile-Parameterized Distributions ") is a cofounder and managing partner of Keelin Reeds Partners (KR), a management consulting firm that provides portfolio management, strategy, asset valuation, decision analysis, and business-development services. Over the last decade with KR, he has supervised such engagements for more than 80 venture-funded and emerging life sciences companies. Previously, Tom was the worldwide managing director of the Strategic Decisions Group (SDG), where he also served on the board of directors and executive committee. Over two decades at SDG, Tom founded the firm's electric utilities and life sciences practice areas and headed its strategy and strategy implementation consulting practices. He is a coauthor of the Harvard Business Review article "How SmithKline Beecham Makes Better Resource-Allocation Decisions" (March–April 1998), and he has testified before regulatory bodies in multiple U.S. states and internationally on issues of decision quality, investment risk analysis, and customer markets. He is also managing partner of Turning Point Asset Management, an investment management firm specializing in the acquisition and resolution of residential mortgages across the United States using an unusual combination of advance analytics and working with borrowers. Tom is a cofounder and is on the Board of Directors of the Decision Education Foundation, a not-for-profit organization that helps teens develop good decision making as a life skill. He holds three degrees from Stanford University: B.A. in economics and M.S. and Ph.D. in engineering-economic systems. Address: Keelin Reeds Partners, Menlo Park, CA 94025; e-mail: tomk@keelinreeds.com . L. Robin Keller (" From the Editor: Multiattribute and Intertemporal Preferences, Probability, and Stochastic Processes: Models and Assessment ") is a professor of operations and decision technologies in the Merage School of Business at the University of California, Irvine. She received her Ph.D. and M.B.A. in management science and her B.A. in mathematics from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served as a program director for the Decision, Risk, and Management Science Program of the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF). Her research is on decision analysis and risk analysis for business and policy decisions and has been funded by NSF and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Her research interests cover multiple attribute decision making, riskiness, fairness, probability judgments, ambiguity of probabilities or outcomes, risk analysis (for terrorism, environmental, health, and safety risks), time preferences, problem structuring, cross-cultural decisions, and medical decision making. She is currently Editor-in-Chief of Decision Analysis, published by the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). She is a Fellow of INFORMS and has held numerous roles in INFORMS, including board member and chair of the INFORMS Decision Analysis Society. She is a recipient of the George F. Kimball Medal from INFORMS. She has served as the decision analyst on three National Academy of Sciences committees. Address: Merage School of Business, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-3125; e-mail: lrkeller@uci.edu . Francois Melese (" A Multiattribute Sealed-Bid Procurement Auction with Multiple Budgets for Government Vendor Selection ") is a professor of economics and the executive director of the Defense Resources Management Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School. He earned his B.A. in economics at the University of California, Berkeley; his M.A. at the University of British Columbia, Canada; and his Ph.D. at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. His research interests include public budgeting, public procurement, game theory, and defense economics. He is widely published in these areas and on other topics in economics and management. He has taught public executive management courses around the world, and he has been an advisor and consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD Director of Administration and Management), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Comptroller), NATO's Political and Economics Directorate, and the Defense Business Board (Advisors to the Secretary of Defense). A frequent participant at NATO meetings, Dr. Melese has represented the United States as a speaker and moderator in countries throughout Europe. Dr. Melese is a member of the American Economic Association, Southern Economic Association, and Western Economic Association, and he is an elected member of the Research Society of American Scientists—Sigma Xi. Address: Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943; e-mail: fmelese@nps.edu . Bradford W. Powley (" Quantile-Parameterized Distributions ") is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University. Brad holds an M.S. degree in management science and engineering from Stanford and a B.S. degree in mechanical engineering and materials science from the University of California, Davis. Brad consults on various portfolio management, strategy, asset valuation, and decision analysis engagements within the life sciences industry, and he has held various positions in manufacturing, design, and systems engineering in HP's Imaging and Printing and Medical Products Groups. His research interests include probability encoding and the application of decision analysis to asset valuation. Address: Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; e-mail: bpowley@stanford.edu . Jay Simon (" A Multiattribute Sealed-Bid Procurement Auction with Multiple Budgets for Government Vendor Selection " and " Consistency Among Elicitation Techniques for Intertemporal Choice: A Within-Subjects Investigation of the Anomalies ") is an assistant professor at the Defense Resources Management Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he teaches a wide range of topics in quantitative analysis, decision-maker preferences, uncertainty, risk, logistics, and economics. He received his Ph.D. in operations and decision technologies from the University of California, Irvine. His main research focus is multiattribute preference modeling, particularly involving outcomes that occur over time, space, or groups of people. His current work is on the topics of reference-dependent utility, preferences over geographical data, altruistic utility, use of military reserves, and resource usage in military operations. He is a member of INFORMS and the Decision Analysis Society. Address: Defense Resources Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93943; e-mail: jrsimon@nps.edu .

The paper attempted to assess the domestic and export market performance and prospects of Philippines cocochemicals. The Philippines holds the distinction of having the first oleochemical business venture in the ASEAN region. As of CY 2000, there were 18 manufacturers of cocochemicals registeres with the BOI with an aggregate production capacity of 678,301 mt. However, only 15 plants with a combined production capacity of 504,501 mt. were operating as of this year. Apart from the manufacturers of cocochemicals, there were two palm-based oleochemical manufacturers registered with the BOI in the same year. These were the Zambosur Oil Refinery Corporation and the Vegeoil Philippines, Inc. was operating in the year 2000. The industry is composed of the oleochemical producers of fatty alcohol, fatty acids, methyl esters, and glycerine as the by-product; and the surfactant or oleochemicals derivatives-producers involved in the manufacture of alcohol sulfates, alkyl phosphates, amines, distearates, etc.The oleochemicls derivative-producers source their raw materials from the basic oleochemicals producers. Thirteen Luzon-based plants accounted for 68.39 percent of the total oleochemical production capacity (504,501 mt.) in the year 2000. Two Mindanao-based plants captured 31,49 percent of the aggregate olechemical production capacity. Meanwhile, there was only one operating plant in the Visayas region and this firm represented a miniscule share of only 0.12 percent of the total registered capacity nationwide. The major players in the oleochemical industry in the Philippines are the United Cocochemicals, Inc. which registeres a 23.14 percent share of the total registered capacity nationwide and Pilipinas Kao, Inc. with 21.74 percent share. The United coco chemicals Inc., and Pilipinas Kao, inc. dominated in Luzon and Mindanao, respectively. Primo oleochemicals, inc. ranked third among the operating plants nationwide with 10.26 percent share while Procter and Gamble Phils., ranked fourth with 8.62 percent share. Cocochemicals production in the Philippines exhibited an erratic trend from 1989 to 1995. Since crude coconut oil is the feedstock or raw material in cocochemical production in the Philippines, cocochemical production in the country was influenced to a large extent by the availability of the price o crude coconut oil. However, the supply and price of crude coconut oil in the Philippines are highly unstable due to year-to-year weather variability. cocochemical production was found to be inversely related to the price of crude-coconut oil. Despite the fluctuating trend in cocochemical production, cocochemical production rose markedly from 71,799 mt in 1989 to 116,326 mt in 1995, or by 62 percent. Despite the lack of updated data on cocochemical production from 1996 to 2000, it is expected that the trend in cocochemical production in recent years will follow the trend in the domestic price of crude coconut oil and the quantity of availability crude coconut oil in the same period From 16,955 mt in 1989, domestic consumption of cocochemicals in copra terms increased markedly to 28,817 mt in 1995, or by 67 percent. on the average, domestic consumption of cocochemicals grew an an average of 52.3 percent per year during the period 1989-1995 could be attributed to the implementation of Executive Order (E.O.) 259 in 1989. The said executive order required the substitution of petroleum-based hard alkyl benzene, a non-biodegradable chemical used in the manufacture of soap detergents, with coco-fatty alcohol sulfate, which is biodegradable. An examination of the average annual cocochemical production vis-a-vis consumption during the period 1989-1995 showed that 34.2 percent was consumed by the domestic market. Several industries in the country utilize cocochemicals to manufacture soaps, shampoo, hair rinse, cosmetics, household detergents, textile/industrial detergents, agrichemicals toiletries (e.g. deodorants, bath oils, toothpastes and synthetic perfumes), polyyurethane, tobacco, base material in paints, explosive, propellants and pharmaceuticals. Currently, about 90 percent of domestic cocochemical consumption went to detergents compared to 59 percent in 1989. The increase in the percentage share of the househol detergent industries could be attributed to the passage of E.O. 259. It is expected that the domestic market potential of cocochemicals in great due to its wide application in local manufacturing industries and the growing end-use markets as a result of the country's increasing population and the real income per capital. The country's population increased as an average of 2.4 percent annually from 1990-1999 while the average annual growth rate in real income per capita was 1.01 percent. Real income per capita is a measure of the purchasing power of each individual consumer. Hence, a projected rise in consumers' purchasing power will allow increased purchase beyond the essentials of food, clothing, and shelter into personal care products, soap, detergents, and other products which rely on cocochemicals, Among the end-use markets, major growth areas will be in the soap and detergent market and the personal care product market. The demand for drugs, lubricants, and motor oil which use oleochemicals as inputs is also projected to continue growing. The Philippine oleochemical industry is largely export-oriented. An average of 65.2 percent of the total cocochemical production in the country during the period 1989-1995 was exported. The major cocochemicals exported by the Philippines as fatty alcohol, fatty acid, and methyl ester. other cocochemical exports include refined glycerine, crude glycerine, alkanolamide, and coco acid oil. During the nine-year period under review, the Philippines generally did not perform well in exporting cocochemicals as evidenced by the negative growth rate in the aggregate volume of exports of all types of cocochemicals (-1.2%/year). This could be largely attributed to the significant decline in the volume of methyl ester exports and to a lesser degree to the drop in the volume of exports of alkanolamide, coco acid oil, and crude glycerine. However, despite the negative trend in the aggregate export volume of all types of cocochemicals, overall export receipts generated grew by an average of 10.2 percent per year due to the rising export prices of cocochemicals (9%/year). Among the cocochemical exports of the Philippines, fatty alcohol, fatty acid, and refined glycerine appear to have bright export market prospects as evident from the increase in the number of foreign buyers and the positive trend in export volume, value and price of these cocochemicals. Oleochemical firms forecast that the world demand for natural oleochemicals will grow at 3-4 percent per year due to the world population growth and increased standards of living. The main markets of natural oleochemicals in the world will cntinue to be the United states, Europe and Japan, partly due to the high level of environmental awareness or conciuousness in these countries. For Philippine oleochemicals, the emerging major market is the people's Republic of china. Moreover, the demand for fatty alcohols to be used in the production of surfactants for the laundry and detergent industries in the United States, the People's Republic of China and Taiwan is projected to continue increasing. Considering that the demand for personal care products in Japan, the United States, and Europe is also growing, this, in turn, will increase the demand for fatty amines and derivatives has strong growth, partly due to the growing use in "ultra" liquid detergents and in hair-conditioning products and shampoos. The demand for fatty alcohol is also projected to increase because of the development of new uses of natural fatty alcohols such as the production of alkyl polyglucoside. On the other hand, there are indications that China will show strong growth in fatty acid demand and capacity in the coming applications. Drugs and personal care are by far the most important end-use markets especially in the United States , Western Europe, and Japan, followed by tobacco/triacetin in the United states and Western Europe, Glycerine is also used in manufacturing polyether polyols, alkyd resins, cellophane, explosives and food, among others. Despite the favorable market prospects of oleochemicals in the Philippines is confronted with the following problems which might constrain in the country from capturing a bigger share in the world market for oleochemicals; (1) stagnant coconut production and low coconut productivity; (2) high price of coconut oil and stiff competition with palm kernel oil-based oleochemicals from Malaysia and Indonesia; (3) price competitiveness of ethylene-based synthetic alcohols; (4) new competition coming from rapessed oil and cuphea as a feedstock in olechemicals production due to biotechnological development; (5) negative effects of trade liberaization ; and (6) smuggling of detergents. The future of the local oleochemical industry hinges on the reliability of coconut supply and the price competitiveness of coconut oil vis-a-vis palm kernel oil and ethylene. Unless coconut production is increased and prices of coconut oil are competitive, the country's cocochemical industry will face a bleak future. Given threat facing the local cocochemical industry from palm kernel-based olechemical industries in Malaysia and Indonesia and from synthetic capacities, concerted efforts of both the philippine government and the private sector in undertaking a large-scale replanting program in the country are urgently needed. To be globally conpetitive in the world oleochemical market, the Philippines should not only be cost-efficient in copra/coconut oil production. but in oleochemical manufacturing as well. To expand the domestic and export markets of locally manufactured cocochemicals, researches aimed at developing new uses of cocochemicals must also be accorded priority in terms of budgetary allocation by local research funding institutions.

Weit entfernt von nationaler Einheit : die von den Vereinten Nationen eingesetzte Regierung in Tripolis kann die zahlreichen Konflikte in Libyen nicht lösen. Im Gegenteil. Der Staat zerfällt, kriminelle Banden treiben grenzüberschreitenden Handel mit Waffen und Menschen, die aus Westafrika nach Europa gelangen wollen. Und die EU schaut nur zu. (IP)