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The Country Environmental Analysis (CEA) for Timor-Leste identifies environmental priorities through a systematic review of environmental issues in natural resources management and environmental health in the context of the country's economic development and environmental institutions. Lack of data has been the main limitation in presenting a more rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, the report builds on the best available secondary data, presents new data on the country's wealth composition, and derives new results on the costs of water and air pollution. The CEA calls for urgent attention to gaps in the environmental management framework, the lack of capacity to implement the few regulations in place, and the high cost of indoor air pollution and poor water, sanitation, and hygiene. Timor-Leste is a young country that regained independence in 2002, and it has emerged from a bitter past burdened by colonialism and violent conflicts. It is still a fragile state facing enormous challenges. The report also points out the lack of clean water, appropriate sanitation, and hygiene as an environmental priority. The CEA estimates that this imposes an economic cost of about $17 million per year by way of illness and premature death. The CEA also looks at outdoor air pollution and at natural resource management for land, forestry, and coastal and marine resources. Outdoor air pollution is not a serious problem for the time being, but it could become so in the long run if the economy grows rapidly, urbanization continues, heavy industry emerges, and motorization increases rapidly. This underlines the need for good forward territorial and development planning. In conclusion, much good work has already been done to enhance the quality of the environment in Timor-Leste. Efforts are under way to improve the data base for environmental management.

Despite the recent slowdown, the underlying growth of the global economy remains solid. After a 4 percent growth in 2010, Russia's real output is expected to grow 4.4 percent in 2011, increasingly driven by domestic demand. Russia's households have absorbed the food price shock thanks to a combination of higher wages and pensions, and resort to private and public safety nets. The country emerged from the global recession with lower unemployment and poverty than feared. But global risks and uncertainties increased with the new oil shock. Although the short-term impact will be positive for Russia's export and fiscal revenues, there is no room for complacency. Macroeconomic policy should focus on the short-term objective of controlling inflation and medium-term fiscal adjustment towards long-term, sustainable level of non-oil fiscal deficit. Improving the efficiency of public expenditure to create fiscal space for productive infrastructure and strengthening the investment climate for the private sector remain among key long-term challenges. The ongoing rethinking of the government's long-term strategy and a period of high oil revenues provide an opportunity to focus on these long-term issues more forcefully than during the global crisis.

UNTEILBAR UND UNTRENNBAR Die Geschichte des Weltkrieges (-) Unteilbar und untrennbar (1,1919) ( - ) Einband ( - ) [Abb.]: Kaiser Franz Josef. ( - ) Titelseite ([I]) Mit höchster Genehmigung ehrfurchtsvoll gewidmet Seiner k. und. k. Hoheit dem durchlauchtigsten Herrn Feldmarschall Erzherzog Friedrich. ([III]) [Vorwort] ([V]) Verzeichnis der Kunstbeilagen. ([VII]) Geleitwort. ([IX]) Inhaltsverzeichnis. ([XIII]) Beilagen. (XVI) Verzeichnis der Mitarbeiter. (XVI) Vor dem Sturm. ([1]) Europa zur Jahrhundertwende. ([3]) [Abb.]: ([3]) [Abb.]: Der Friedenszar Nikolaus II., Kaiser von Rußland. (4) [Abb.]: Königin Viktoria von Großbritannien und Irland, Kaiserin von Indien. (5) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die europäische Familie. Zar Nikolaus II. Herzog Alfred von Koburg-Gotha. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Prinz Eduard von Wales. Königin Viktoria. Kaiserin Friedrich. (2)Leopold II., König der Belgier. (6) [Abb.]: Der Friedenspalast in Haag. (7) Serbien und der Panslawismus. (7) [2 Abb.]: (1)Königin Draga von Serbien. (2)König Alexander von Serbien. (8) [Abb.]: Peter Karageorgievic als Prätendent. (9) [Abb.]: Nikola Pašić [Pasic], der serbische Ministerpräsident. (10) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Offizierskasino in Belgrad, der Hauptsitz der großserbischen Bewegung. (2)Das kaiserliche Jagdschloß Mürzsteg. (11) [Abb.]: Abzeichen der "Narodna odbrana". (12) Beginn der Einkreisung der Zentralmächte. (13) [Abb.]: König Eduard VII. von Großbritannien und Irland, Kaiser von Indien. (13) [Abb.]: Der Hafen von Port-Arthur. (14) [Abb.]: Blick auf Rabat. (Marokko.) (15) [3 Abb.]: (1)Delcassé, der französische Minister des Auswärtigen. (2)Clémenceau, der einflußreiche Politiker Frankreichs. (3)Jaurès, der französische Sozialistenführer. (16) [Abb.]: Herzog Freidrich ( - ) [Abb.]: Die Erneuerung der franco-russischen Allianz (Zarenbesuch in Cherbourg am 31. Juli 1909). (17) Von Mürzsteg bis zur türkischen Revolution (1903 - 1907). (18) [Abb.]: Graf Goluchowski, österreichisch-ungarischer Minister des Auswärtigen. (18) [2 Abb.]: (1)General Kuropatkin, der russische Kriegsführer. (2)Graf Witte, der russische Ministerpräsident. (19) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Gebäude der Duma. (2)Zarskoje Selo, die Residenz des Zaren. (20) Die Annexion 1908. (21) [Abb.]: Graf Ährenthal, der österreichisch-ungarische Minister des Auswärtigen. (22) [Abb.]: Iswolski, der russische Minister des Auswärtigen. (23) [Abb.]: Bosnisch-Herzegovinisches Infanterieregiment bezieht die Burghauptwache in Wien. (24) [2 Abb.]: (1)Tunneleinfahrt in der Pracaschlucht. (2)Kronprinz Georg von Serbien. (25) [2 Abb.]: (1)Drinabrücke der bosnischen Ostbahn. Der rechte Tunnel führt nach Uvac, der linke nach Višegrad [Visegrad]. (26) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Landesspital in Sarajewo. (2)Die Eisenwerke in Zenica. (27) [2 Abb.]: (1)Weinbau-Versuchsstation bei Mostar. (2)Kohlengruben an der Kreka. (28) [Abb.]: Straße im Vrbastal. (29) Die vollendete Einkreisung Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns. 1908 - 1912. (29) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fürst Bernhard Bülow, deutscher Reichskanzler. (2)Der "Imperator" der Hamburg-Amerika-Linie. (30) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kiderlen-Wächter, deutscher Stattssekretär des Auswärtigen. (2)Raymond Poincaré, Ministerpräsident und später Präsident Frankreichs. (31) [Abb.]: Bethmann Hollweg, der deutsche Reichskanzler. (32) [Abb.]: Erzherzog Karl. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Grey, englischer Minister des Auswärtigen. (2)König Georg V. von Großbritannien und Irland, Kaiser von Indien. (33) Tripolis und der Balkankrieg. 1912 - 1913. (34) [Abb.]: König Viktor Emanuel III. von Italien mit dem Kronprinzen. (35) [2 Abb.]: (1)Perabrücke in Konstantinopel. (2)Enver Pascha, der türkische Kriegsminister. (36) [Abb.]: Die Fürsten des Balkanbundes. König Peter. König Nikita. König Ferdinand. König Georg. (37) [2 Abb.]: (1)Graf Berchtold, der österreichisch-ungarische Minister des Äußeren. (2)Ansicht von Cetinje. (38) [Abb.]: Regierungsgebäude in Cetinje. (39) Die Balkankriege, die Londoner Konferenz und Albanien. 1913. (39) [Abb.]: Plevlje im Sandschak. (40) [Abb.]: Durazzo. (41) [3 Abb.]: (1)Skutari mit dem Tarabosch. (2)Essad Pascha, der albanische Kondottiere.(3)Danew, der Ministerpräsident Bulgariens. (42) [2 Abb.]: (1)König Carol I. von Rumänien. (2)Saloniki. (43) [2 Abb.]: (1)König Konstantin von Griechenland. (2)Fürst Wilhelm von Albanien. (44) Die Ermordung des Thronfolgers. 1914. (45) [Abb.]: Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este (46) [Abb.]: Das Belvedere in Wien, Residenz des Thronfolgers Franz Ferdinand. (47) [Abb.]: Das Thronfolgerpaar in Sarajewo, kurz vor der Ermordung. (48) [Abb.]: Erzherzog Eugen. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die Festnahme des Attentäters Princip. (2)Hartwig, der russische Gesandte in Belgrad. (49) [Abb.]: Konopischt [Konopiště), das Schloß des Erzherzog-Thronfolgers. (50) [2 Abb.]: (1)Geburtshaus des Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand in Graz. (2)Schloß Artstetten (die Grabstätte des Thronfolgerpaares). (51) Die Kriegserklärung. 1914. (51) [Abb.]: Kronprinz Alexander von Serbien. (52) [Abb.]: Baron Giesl, der österreichisch-ungarische Gesandte in Belgrad. (53) [Abb.]: Der Besuch Poincarés in Petersburg. (55) [2 Abb.]: (1)Sassonow, der russische Minister des Äußeren. (2)Marchese die San Giuliano, der italienische Minister des Äußeren. (56) [Brief]: "An meine Völker" (57) [Tabelle: Uebersicht der wichtigsten politischen Ereignisse der letzten zehn Jahre (1903 - 1914.) (59) Die Welt in Waffen. ([63]) Sinn und Wesen der modernen Kriegskraft. ([65]) [Abb.]: ([65]) [Abb.]: Englische Rekruten werden nach Anwerbung beeidet. (66) [Abb.]: Radfahrerkompagnie im Gefecht. (68) [Abb.]: Skipatrouille. (69) Waffen, Munition, Kriegsbauten, -mittel und -maschinen der Landmacht. (70) [Abb.]: Dum-Dum-Geschosse. (70) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehr. (71) [Abb.]: Feldgeschütz. (72) [3 Abb.]: Artilleriemunition (1) I. Schrapnell. II. Brandgranate. (2)III. Einheitsgeschoß (Granatschrapnell). IV. Stahlgranate (Bombe). (3)Französischer Lufttorpedo. (73) [Abb.]: Minenwerfer. (74) [2 Abb.]: (1)Soldat, durch Maske gegen giftige Gase geschützt, wirft eine Handgranate. (2)Minen und Gegenminen. (75) [2 Abb.]: (1)Schützengraben mit schrapnellsicheren Unterständen. (2)Wallspiegel. Zielvorrichtung am Gewehr zum gedeckten Schhießen. (76) [5 Abb.]: (1)Wolfsgruben und Drahtverhau. (2)Fliegerpfeil. (3)Fliegerbombe. (4)Scheinwerfer. (5)Kampfflugzeug. (77) [3 Abb.]: (1)Feldtelegraphenstation. (2)Telephonzentrale im Felde. (3)Pferdefeldbahn. (78) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fesselballon. (2)Panzerzug. (79) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehr mit Hundebespannung. (80) Ausrüstung, Verpflegung und Uniformierung der Landmacht. (80) [Abb.]: Kavalleristen beim Übersetzen eines Flußes auf Schwimmsäcken. (80) [Abb.]: Österreicher und Ungarn. 1. Tiroler-Landesschütze. 2. Ulanen-Offizier. 3. Infanterist. 4. Pionier. 5. Dragoner. 6. Reitende Artillerie. ( - ) [Abb.]: Pontonbrücke. (81) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fahrküche. (2)Feldbäckerei in Betrieb. (82) Sanitätswesen, Verbindung mit der Heimat. (83) [Abb.]: Sanitätswagen, offen zur Aufnahme der Verwundeten. (83) [Abb.]: Operation im Feldspital. (84) Heerführer. (84) Die Seemacht. (85) [Abb.]: "Dreadnought." (86) [Abb.]: Kreu (87) [Abb.]: Torpedoboot. (88) [Abb.]: Unterseeboot. (89) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Innere eines Unterseebootes. (2)Turmanlage eines Schlachtschiffes. (90) [2 Abb.]: (1)Seemine. (2)Wasserflugzeug. (91) Österreich-Ungarn. (92) [Abb.]: Lazarettschiff. (92) [Abb.]: Generaloberst Alexander Frh. v. Krobatin, k. und k. Kriegsminister. (94) [Abb.]: General der Infanterie Friedrich Frh. von Georgi, k. k. Minister für Landesverteidigung. (95) [3 Abb.]: (1)G. d. I. Samuel Frh. v. Hazai, k. ung. Landesverteidigungsminister. (2)Generaladjutant Seiner Majestät: Generaloberst Eduard Graf Paar. (3)Generaladjutant Seiner Majestät und Chef der Militärkanzlei: Generaloberst Artur Frh. v. Bolfras. (96) [Abb.]: Österreicher und Ungarn. 1. Husar. 2. Bosnisch-Hercegowinischer Hornist. 3. Jägeroffizier. 4. Marineoffizier. 5. Matrose. 6. Honvéd-Infanterist. ( - ) [Abb.]: Generalmajor Ferdinand von Kaltenborn, Chef der Detailabteilung. (97) [Abb.]: Generaloberst Franz Freiherr Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chef des Generalstabes für die gesamte bewaffnete Macht. (98) [Abb.]: F.M.L. Franz Höfer v. Feldsturm, Stellvertreter des Chefs des Generalstabes. (99) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Joseph Metzger, Chef der Operationsabteilung. (2)GM. Maximilian Ritter v. Hoen, Kommandant des Kriegspressequartiers. (100) [2 Abb.]: (1)FZM. Erzherzog Leopold Salvator, Generalartilleriedirektor. (2)FML. Franz Kanik, Generalquartiermeister. (101) [Abb.]: GdR. Erzherzog Joseph. (102) [2 Abb.]: (1)GdR. Erzherzog Franz Salvator, Generalinspektor der freiwilligen Sanitätspflege. (2)Admiral Erzherzog Carl Stephan. (103) [Abb.]: Generaloberst Erzherzog Joseph Ferdinand. (104) [Abb.]: Großadmiral Anton Haus, Marinekommandant. (105) [Abb.]: Tiroler Landesschützen. (106) [2 Abb.]: (1)Infanterie. (2)Ulanen. (107) [2 Abb.]: (1)Husaren. (2)Feldartillerie im Feuer. (108) [2 Abb.]: (1)Gebirgsartillerie auf dem Marsche. (2)Schwere Haubitze in Feuerstellung. (109) Das Deutsche Reich. (110) [2 Abb.]: (1)Deutsche Militärmusik. (2)Deutsche Infanterie im Gefecht. (111) [Abb.]: Deutsche Kürassiere. (112) [Abb.]: Rekrutentypen aus Österreich-Ungarn. 1. Pole. 2. Ungar. 3. Ruthene. 4. Steirer. 5. Ungar. 6. Dalmatiner. 7. Egerländer. 8. Hanake. 9. Tiroler. 10. Kroate. 11. Rumäne. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Deutsche Garde-Maschinengewehr-Abteilung. (2)Deutsche Feldartillerie. (113) [Abb.]: Eine Pionierkolonne führt Pontons heran. (114) [Abb.]: Friedrich Wilhelm, Kronprinz des Deutschen Reiches und Kronprinz von Preußen. (115) [4 Abb.]: (1)Generaloberst Freiherr v. Hausen, Sächsischer Kriegsminister. (2)G. d. R. Frh. Kreß v. Kressenstein, Bayerischer Kriegsminister. (3)Generaloberst v. Moltke, Chef des Deutschen Generalstabes. (4)Generalleutnant v. Stein, Generalquartiermeister. (116) [2 Abb.]: (1)Generaloberst Erich v. Falkenhayn, Preußischer Kriegsminister. (2)Generalfeldmarschall Graf v. Häseler (117) [2 Abb.]: (1)Prinz Heinrich von Preußen, Generalinspekteur der deutschen Marine. (2)Großadmiral v. Tirpitz. (118) Rußland. (119) [Abb.]: Zar Nikolaus II. und Großfürst Nikolaj Nikolaewitsch. (120) [2 Abb.]: (1)General Suchomlinow, russischer Kriegsminister zu Beginn des Krieges. (2)Kriegs- und Marineministerium in Petersburg. (121) [2 Abb.]: (1)Russische Infanterie. (2)Sibirische Schützen. (122) [2 Abb.]: (1)Russisches Maschinengewehr. (2)Kosaken. (123) [Abb.]: Russische Feldartillerie. (124) [Abb.]: Reiterkunststück der Kosaken. (126) [Abb.]: Russische Offiziere. (127) [Abb.]: General Januschkewitsch, Chef des russischen Generalstabes. (130) Serbien. (131) [Abb.]: Serbische Infanterie. (131) [2 Abb.]: (1)Serbische Regimentsmusik der Garde. (2)Serbisches Maschinengewehr. (132) [Abb.]: Serbische Kavallerie. (133) [Abb.]: Serbische schwere Artillerie. (134) [Abb.]: Serbische Bandenführer. - Komite. (136) [2 Abb.]: (1)Vojvode Putnik, Führer der serbischen Armee. (2)General Stefanovic, serbischer Kriegsminister. (137) Montenegro. (138) [Abb.]: König Nikola fährt zur Front. (138) [2 Abb.]: (1)Danilo, Kronprinz von Montenegro. (2)General Vukotic, montenegrinischer Kriegsminister. (139) [Abb.]: Montenegrinische Infanterie. (140) [Abb.]: Montenegrinischer Landsturm. (141) Frankreich. (142) [2 Abb.]: (1)Französische Infanterie. (2)Millerand, französischer Kriegsminister zu Beginn des Krieges. (143) [2 Abb.]: (1)Französische Kürassiere. (2)Französische schwere Artillerie. (144) [Abb.]: Franzosen. 1. Infanterie-Korporal (neue Felduniform). 2. Infanterist (alte Uniform). 3. Kürassier. 4. Marokkanischer Spahi. 5. Algerischer Schütze. 6. Marine-Füsilier. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: (1)Französische Alpenjäger. (2)Turkos. (145) [3 Abb.]: (1)General Joffre, Generalissimus der französischen Armee. (2)Senegalschütze mit Weib und Kind. (3)General Pau. (146) Großbritannien. (147) [Abb.]: Englisch-indisches Maschinengewehr. (147) [3 Abb.]: (1)Englische Infanterie. (2)Gurthas. (3)Englische Feldartillerie. (148) [Abb.]: Schottische Dudelsackpfeier. (149) [2 Abb.]: (1)Feldmarschall Lord Kitchener of Chartum, engl. Kriegsminister. (2)Feldmarschall French. (150) [2 Abb.]: (1)Flottenschau bei Spithead. (2)Admiral Jellicoe, erster Seelord der englischen Flotte. (151) [2 Abb.]: (1)Winston Churchill. (2)Herbert Henry Asquith, Premierminister. (152) Belgien. (152) [2 Abb.]: (1)Belgische Infanterie. (2)Belgische Ulanen. (153) Japan. (154) [2 Abb.]: (1)Japanische Festungsartillerie. (2)Japanische Infanterie. (155) Schlußwort. (156) Militärgeographie. ([157]) Der südöstliche Kriegsschauplatz. ([159]) [Abb.]: ([159]) [2 Abb.]: (1)Belgrad. (2)Der Kazan. (160) [Abb.]: Engländer. 1. Bengalischer Lanzenreiter. 2. Kavallerist. 3. Schottländer. 4. Infanterist. 5. Matrose. 6. Seeoffizier. ( - ) [4 Abb.]: (1)Zvornik. (2)Die Drinaschlucht, aufwärts von Bajinabasta [Bajina Bašta]. (3)Visegrad mit der Straße nach Rogatica. (4)Die Drinabrücke bei Megjegja. (161) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kragujevac. (2)Foca [Foča]. (162) [Abb.]: Die Taraschlucht. (163) [2 Abb.]: (1)Semendria. (2)Der Metalkasattel. (164) [3 Abb.]: (1)Podgorica. (2)Aus dem Durmitorgebirge. (3)das Volujakgebirge. (165) [2 Abb.]: (1)Cehotinaschlucht. (2)Oberer Teile des alten Weges von Cattaro nach Njegos ein typischer Karstweg. (166) [Abb.]: Cattaro mit dem Lovcen [Lovćen]. (167) [Abb.]: Montenegrnische Grenzforts bei Virpazar. (168) [3 Abb.]: (1)Aus Mostar, an der Bahn Sarajewo - Ragusa - Cattaro. (2)Das Sudjeskadefilee. (3)Gorazde [Goražde]. (169) [2 Abb.]: (1)Blick von der Romanja planina gegen Mokro. (2)Neu Bileca [Bileća]. (170) Der russische Kriegsschauplatz. (170) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die Dreikaiserecke bei Myslowitz (österreichisch-deutsch-russische Grenze). (2)Lötzen am Mauersee, typische masurische Landschaft. (171) [Abb.]: Aus den Rokitnosümpfen. (172) [Abb.]: Zaleszczyki am Dniestr. (173) [2 Abb.]: (1)Biala mit dem Panorama der Beskiden. (2)Panorama der Tátra. (174) [2 Abb.]: (1)Durchbruch des Dunajec am Pieniny. (2)Polnischer Bauer. (175) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der Lupkowerpaß. (2)Delatynpaß bei Körösmezö. (176) [2 Abb.]: (1)Przemysl. (2)Lemberg. (177) [2 Abb.]: (1)Ruthene. (2)Czernowitz. (178) [2 Abb.]: (1)Czenstochau. (2)Das Narewtal, südlich Pultusk, kurz vor dem Zusammenfluß mit dem Bug. (179) [Abb.]: Blick auf Tilsit. (180) [2 Abb.]: (1), (2)Russische Volkstypen. (181) Der Seekrieg 1914. ([183]) Die Aktionen der k. u. k. Kriegsmarine. ([185]) [Abb.]: ([185]) Die Kriegsereignisse in der Adria. (186) Die maritime Lage im Mittelmeer zu Anfang 1914. (186) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der russische Torpedobootszerstörer "Novik". (2)Blick auf Gibraltar mit den Schützengalerien oberhalb des ersten Felsabhanges. (187) [Abb.]: die französische Mittelmeerflotte in der Adria. (188) [Abb.]: Das Stärkeverhältnis der Mittelmeerflotten Anfang 1914. (189) [Abb.]: Pola: Kriegshafen I. (190) [Abb.]: Pola: K. u. k. Hafenadmirats- und Seearsenalskommando-Gebäude. (191) [2 Abb.]: (1)Treist vom Leuchtturm aus. (2)Kontreadmiral Souchon. (192) [Abb.]: "Hamidite". (193) Die Mittelmeer-Situation unmittelbar vor dem Kriegsausbruche. (193) [Abb.]: "Reschad V". (193) [Abb.]: "Indefatigable". (194) [2 Abb.]: (1)Vizeadmiral Karl Kailer von Kaltenfels, Stellvertreter des Marinekommandanten. (2)Marinekommando-Jacht "Lacoma". (195) [Abb.]: Großkampfschiff "Viribus Unitis". (196) Die Flottenmobilisierung bei Kriegsausbruch. (197) [Abb.]: Großkampfschiff Typ "Tegetthoff". (197) [2 Abb.]: (1)Rapidkreuzer "Admiral Spann". (2)Torpedofahrzeug "Magnet". (198) [2 Abb.]: (1)Torpedozerstörer in Fahrt. (2)Panzerkreuzer "St. Georg". (199) [2 Abb.]: (1)Torpedofahrzeug "Huszár". (2)Turmschlachtschiff "Erzherzog Carl" feuernd. (200) [2 Abb.]: (1)Turmschlachtschiff "Monarch". (2)Turmschlachtschiff "Habsburg". (201) [Abb.]: Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère, Kommandant der französischen Mittelmeerflotte. (202) [Abb.]: Das Tegetthoff-Denkmal in Pola. (203) [Abb.]: Panorama von Pola. (204) [2 Abb.]: (1)Madonna del Mare. (2)Die Arena von Pola. (205) [Abb.]: Blick gegen Catene. (207) [Karte]: Plan eines befestigten Hafens. (209) [Abb.]: Französische Seemine. (210) [Abb.]: Auffischen verankerter Seeminen durch Schlepper. (211) Die Kriegsereignisse in der Adria (Bis Ende des Jahres 1914.) (212) [2 Abb.]: (1)Torpedo im Augenblick des Abfeuerns. (2)Der Hafen von Antivari. (212) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kleiner Kreuzer "Breslau". (2)Schlachtkreuzer "Goeben". (213) [Abb.]: Der österreichische Lloyddampfer "Baron Gautsch". (215) [Abb.]: S. M. S. "Zenta". (216) [Abb.]: Torpedofahrzeug "Ulan". (217) [Abb.]: Fregattenkapitän Paul Pachner. (218) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Kaiser Karl VI." (220) [Abb.]: Punta d'Ostro. (222) [Abb.]: Turmschlachtschiff "Radetzky". (224) [Abb.]: "Zenta" und "Ulan" im Kampfe. ( - ) [Abb.]: Im Kesselraum eines Schlachtschiffes. (225) [Abb.]: Leuchtturm der Insel Pelagosa. (226) [Abb.]: Turmschlachtschiff "Zrinyi". (227) [Abb.]: K. u. k. Seeflugzeug vor dem Aufstieg. (229) [2 Abb.]: (1)Seeflugzeug im Aufstieg. (2)Seeflugzeug im Fluge. (231) [Abb.]: Torpedofahrzeug "Tátra". (233) [Abb.]: Ragusa. (235) [Abb.]: Das französische Tauchboot "Eurie". (237) [Abb.]: Österreichisch-ungarisches Unterseeboot. (238) [Abb.]: Das französische Flaggschiff "Courbet". (239) [Abb.]: Torpedierung des französischen Flaggenschiffes duch S. M. U-Boot XII am 21. Dezember 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: K. u. k. Linienschiffsleutnant Egon Lerch der heldenmütige Kommandant des "U 12". (241) [2 Tabellen]: (1)Österreichische Handelsmarine. (2)Ungarische Handelsmarine. (243) [Abb.]: Seespitalschiff "Tirol". (244) Die Aktionen der k. u. k. Donauflottille. (246) [3 Abb.]: Unsere gepanzerten Flußfahrzeuge. (1)S. M. S. "Maros", "Leitha", 310 T Deplacement. (2)S. M. S. "Szamos", "Körös", 448 T Deplacement. (3)S. M. S. "Temes", Bodrog", 448 T Deplacement. (247) [Abb.]: Fliegerabwehr (249) [Abb.]: Geschützwechsel auf Monitor "Körös". (250) [Abb.]: Donaumonitor "Szamos". (251) [Abb.]: Patrouillenboot "C". (253) [Abb.]: 12 cm-Geschützturm auf Donaumonitor "Bodrog". (255) [Abb.]: Aufgefischte serbische Flußmine. (256) [Abb.]: Donaumonitore "Temes" und "Bodrog". (257) [Abb.]: "Körös" mit Abstreifvorrichtung gegen Treibminen. (259) S. M. S. "Kaiserin Elisabeth" bei der Verteidigung von Tsingtau. (261) Die Vorgeschichte von Japans Teilnahme am Weltkrieg. (261) [Abb.]: Panorama von Tsingtau. (261) Das deutsche Schutzgebiet in Tsingtau - Kiautschau. (262) [Abb.]: Linienschiffskapitän Richard Makoviz. (262) Beschreibung S. M. S. "Kaiserin Elisabeth". (263) [2 Abb.]: (1)Matrosen der "Elisabeth" in Tsingtau. (2)Deutsche Matrosen in Tsingtau. (263) [Karte]: Plan von Tsingtau. (264) Die Aufgabe S. M. S. "Kaiserin Elisabeth" und des deutschen Verteidigungsaufgebotes. (264) [Abb.]: Torpedo-Rammkreuzer "Kaiserin Elisabeth". (265) Der Verlauf der Belagerung bis zum Fall der Seefestung. (266) [Abb.]: Kapitän zur See v. Meyer-Waldeck kaiserlich deutscher Gouverneur in Tsingtau. (266) Berichte von Mitkämpfern. (267) [Abb.]: Kanonenboot "Jaguar". (267) [Abb.]: Der japanische Kreuzer "Takachito". (269) Die maritimen Kriegsereignisse außerhalb der Adria. (272) [Abb.]: Der kleine Kreuzer "Augsburg". (273) Der Seekrieg in den nordeuropäischen Gewässern. (273) [2 Abb.]: (1)"Königin Luise". (2)Der englische Kreuzer "Amphion". (274) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der deutsche Kreuzer "Straßburg" vernichtet ein englisches Unterseeboot. (2)Der englische Schlachtschiffkreuzer "Lion". (275) [Abb.]: Deutscher Passagierdampfer "Kaiser Wilhelm der Große". (276) Die Handelssperre Englands durch deutsche Unterseeboote. (277) [Abb.]: Der britische Hilfskreuzer "Oceanic". (277) [Abb.]: Deutsche Unterseeboote im Hafen. (278) [Abb.]: Englisches Torpedofahrzeug "Swift", Geschwindigkeit 36 Seemeilen. (279) [Abb.]: Kapitänleutnant Weddigen, Kommandant des "U 9". (280) [Abb.]: Das deutsche "U 9". (281) [Abb.]: Torpedierung eines Dampfers durch ein deutsches U-Boot. (282) [Abb.]: Der "Audacous" im Sinken. (283) [2 Abb.]: (1)Der deutsche Panzerkreuzer "Yorck". (2)Das englische Linienschlachtschiff "Bulwark". (284) [Abb.]: Der englische Panzerkreuzer "Hawke" (285) [Abb.]: Englisches U-Boot größter Type. (286) Der Kreuzer- und der Kolonialkrieg in den Weltmeeren. (287) A) Der Kreuzer- und Kolonialkrieg in den westlichen Weltmeeren. (287) [Abb.]: Vizeadmiral Graf Spee. (288) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Scharnhorst". (289) [Karte]: Situationsplan der Schlacht bei Santa Maria. (290) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Good Hope". (290) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "invincible". (291) [2 Abb.]: (1)Kleiner Kreuzer "Leipzig". (2)Kreuzer "Nürnberg". (292) [Abb.]: Panzerkreuzer "Gneisenau". (293) [Abb.]: Kleiner Kreuzer "Dresden". (294) [Karte]: Situationsplan der Seeschlacht bei den Falklands-Inseln. (295) [2 Abb.]: (1)Fregattenkapitän Köhler. (2)Kreuzer "Karlsruhe" versenkt einen Dampfer. (296) [Abb.]: Der Kreuzer "Emden". (297) B) Der Handelsdampferfang im Stillen Ozean. (297) [Abb.]: Fregattenkapitän Karl v. Müller, Kommanadant der "Emden". (298) [2 Abb.]: (1)Das Wrack der "Emden" bei den Kokosinseln. (2)Der englische Kreuzer "Minotaur". (299) [Abb.]: "Ayesha". (300) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die Königsberg im Rufidschifluß. (2)Kapitänleutnant von Mücke. (301) Schlußwort. (302) Die Verlustlisten des Jahres 1914 ergaben folgende Einbuße an Kriegsschiffen: Auf Feindesseite: (303) Krieg gegen Rußland 1914. ([305]) Einleitungs-Feldzug. (August und erste Hälfte September.) ([307]) Mobilisierung und Aufmarsch. ([307]) [Abb.]: ([307]) [Abb.]: Landsturm auf dem Marsche. (308) [2 Abb.]: (1)Sanitätskolonne. (2)Kavallerie im Aufklärungsdienste durchschreitet einen Fluß. (309) [Abb.]: Zeltlager einer Pionierkompagnie. (310) [Abb.]: Infanterielager im Walde. (311) Grenzkämpfe. (312) [2 Abb.]: (1)Hauptmann Max von Merten. (2)Russischer Grenzwachturm bei Chwalowice [Chwałowice]. (313) [3 Abb.]: (1)Rittmeister Isidor Petrovic. (2)Gendamerieoberleutnant v. Manovarda. (3)Die Grenzstation Podwoloczynska [Podwołoczyska]. (314) [Abb.]: Sandomierz. (315) Vorstoß gegen Lublin. (316) Einmarsch der Armeegruppe Kummer in Russisch-Polen. (316) [Abb.]: Gd.R. Heinrich Kummer, Ritter von Falkenfehd. (316) [2 Abb.]: (1)GdI. Remus von Woyrsch. (2)Der Ringplatz in Kalisch. (317) [2 Abb.]: (1)Gd.K. Ignaz Edler von Korda. (2)Kielce. (318) [Abb.]: Die Eidesleistung am 18. August in Padew Nadworna. (319) [Abb.]: Die erste Kompagnie der polnischen Legion beim Abmarsch von Wien. (320) [Abb.]: Russen. 1. Sibirischer Schütze. 2. Tscherkesse. 3. Infanterist. 4. Artillerieoffizier. 5. Kosak. 6. Infanterieoffizier. ( - ) Sieg der Armee Dankl bei Krasnik. (321) [Abb.]: GdR. Viktor Dankl. (321) [Abb.]: Oberst Anton Rada. (322) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant Erzherzog Karl Albrecht. (324) [2 Abb.]: (1)FML. Adolf Ritter von Brudermann. (2)Transport auf der Weichsel bei Annopol. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (325) [2 Abb.]: (1)Rittmeister Karl Frh. von Handel. (2)Grenzgefecht bei Borów südöstl. Zawichost am 21. August. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (327) [Abb.]: Rammbrunnen zur Wassergewinnung in wasserarmen Gegenden. (328) [2 Abb.]: (1)Oberst Johann Boerin. (2)GM. Rudolf Ritter von Willerding. (329) [Abb.]: GdR. Karl Freiherr von Kirchbach auf Lauterbach. (331) [2 Abb.]: (1)Bei Annopol am 23. August gefangene Russen. (2)FML. Paul Kestranek. (332) [2 Abb.]: (1)FZM. Paul Puhallo von Brlog. (2)Aushebung von Deckungen bei Ksiezomiesz [Księżomiesz]. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (333) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Richard Kutschera. (2)GdI. Hugo Meixner von Zweienstamm. (334) [Abb.]: Russische Geschütze; erobert von den österreichisch-ungarischen Truppen in den Kämpfen bei Krasnik [Kraśnik], vor dem Wiener Arsenal aufgestellt. (335) [Abb.]: Rallierung der 23. Infanterie-Brigade zum Vormarsch gegen Lublin am 27. August. Aufnahme von Oblt. v. Cunz. (336) Das Ringen um Lublin. (26. August bis 3. September.) (336) [Abb.]: Gefechtsfeld vor Lublin. Am Hang links Infanterieregiment Nr. 100, rechts anschließend im Walde Infanterieregiment Nr. 56, über die Höhe rechts die Straße nach Borzechów. (337) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehrabteilung I./56 im Gefecht bei Klodnica [Kłodnica] am 26. August. Aufnahme von Oblt. Cunz. (338) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Ernst Wossala. (2)FML. Georg Schariczer von Rény. (339) [Abb.]: GM. Joseph Lieb. (340) [Abb.]: Oberst Karl Magerl von Kouffheim. (341) [Abb.]: GM. Augustin von Rochel. (344) [Karte]: Skizze zum Gefechte bei Tarnawka und Wysokie am 27. August 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: Lublin. (345) Vorstoß der Armee Auffenberg zwischen Wieprz und Bug. (346) Einleitungskämpfe. (346) [Abb.]: GdI. Moritz von Auffenberg. (347) [2 Abb.]: (1)FML. Rudolf Strauß, Generalstabschef der 4. Armee. (2)Rawa Ruska. (348) [Abb.]: Oberst Ludwig Freiherr von Holzhausen. (349) Der Sieg bei Zamosc [Zamość]. (349) [Abb.]: GdJ. Blasius Schemua. (350) [2 Abb.]: (1)Gen. Obst. Svetozar Boroevic v. Bojna. (2)GM. Oskar Bolberitz von Bleybach. (351) [Karte]: Skizze zu den Kämpfen der 4. Armee Auffenberg 1914. ( - ) [2 Abb.]: Die russische Grenze wird überschritte (353) [2 Abb.]: Aufnahmsstation für drahtlose Telegraphie. (354) [Abb.]: GM. Kletus Pichler. (355) [Abb.]: FML. Emmerich Hadfy von Livno. (357) [Abb.]: Russische Stellung. (359) [Abb.]: FZM. Johann Freiherr von Friedel. (360) [2 Abb.]: (1)Oberst Oskar Esch. (2)Oberst Karl von Stöhr. (361) [Abb.]: FML. Erzherzog Peter Ferdinand. (362) [Abb.]: FML. Eduard Edler von Kreysa. (363) Der Sieg bei Komarów. (364) [Abb.]: Oberst Adolf Sterz von Ponteguerra. (365) [Abb.]: GdI Erzherzog Joseph Ferdinand. (367) [Abb.]: Von den Kaiserjägern erstürmte Stellung. (369) [Abb.]: GM. Otto Gößmann. (371) [Abb.]: Russische Gefangene in Zamosc [Zamość]. (372) [Abb.]: Leichtverwundete. (373) [Abb.]: GdI. Johann Freiherr von Kirchbach auf Lauterbach. (374) [Abb.]: GM. Emil Herzberg. (375) [Abb.]: Artilleriestellung an der Huczwa. (377) [Abb.]: Russische Kriegsgefangene und Heimatlose. (379) [Abb.]: Oberst Franz Hill. (380) [2 Abb.]: (1)GM. Gregor Miscevik. (2)Oberst Johann Reyl-Hanisch, Ritter von Greiffenthal. (381) [Abb.]: Oberst Arthur Iwanski von Iwanina. (382) [Abb.]: FML. Ferdinand Kosak. (383) [Abb.]: Oberst Franz Hassenteufel. (385) [Abb.]: Kampfflugzeug. (387) [Abb.]: Oberst Dr. Karl Bardolff. (388) [Abb.]: Korps-Generalstabschef am Telephon während des Gefechtes. (389) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant Wladimir Terbojevic. (391) [Abb.]: Abfertigung eines Feldpostwagnes. (392) [Abb.]: Munitionskolonne. (393) [Abb.]: GM. Alfred Edler von Schenk. (394) [Abb.]: Ordonanzauto auf dem Schlachtfelde. (395) [Abb.]: Feldbäckerei im Betrieb. (396) [Abb.]: GM. Karl Englert. (397) [Abb.]: Russische Fahrküche. (399) [Abb.]: GM. Hugi Reymann. (400) [Abb.]: Wirkung einer Fliegerbombe. (401) Kämpfe in Ostgalizien. Schlachten bei Zlozów und Przemyslany. (402) [Abb.]: Tarnopol. (403) [Abb.]: GdR. Rudolf Ritter v. Brudermann. (404) [2 Abb.]: (1)Brzejany. (2)GdI. Emil Colerus v. Geldern. (405) [Abb.]: GdI. Hermann Köves v. Kövessháza. (407) [Abb.]: Von den Russen mitgeführte Lokomotive für unsere Spurweite. (408) Schlacht bei Lemberg. (409) Bereitstellung der k. u. k. Streitkräfte. (409) [2 Abb.]: (1)Die gesprengte Eisenbahnbrücke bei Zaleszczyki. (2)Der Nordostrand von Lemberg gegen Kulików. (410) [Abb.]: GdI. Artur Arz v. Straußenburg. (411) Entreten der 4. Armee GdI. v. Auffenberg in die Schlacht. (411) [Abb.]: GdI. Karl Kritek [Křitek]. (413) [2 Abb.]: (1)Oberst Karl Brosch v. Aarenau. (2)Brücken bei Jozesow [Józefów&. (414) [2 Abb.]: Feldspital bei Radlin. (415) [2 Abb.]: Transport gefangener Russen durch Lemberg. (417) Das Ringen um den Sieg. (418) [Abb.]: GO. Eduard v. Böhm-Ermolli. (419) [Abb.]: GdR. Oskar v. Wittmann. (421) Organisation der Karpathenverteidigung. Abweisung des ersten russischen Einfalles in Oberungarn. (24. September bis 8. Oktober.) (423) [Abb.]: FML. Wilhelm Graf Attems-Petzenstein. (424) [Abb.]: Der Hauptplatz in Máramos Sziget. (425) [Abb.]: FML. Karl Durski von Trzasko. (426) Die Bukowina im Kriege. (Bis zur ersten Befreiung von Czernowitz.) (427) [Abb.]: Oberst Eduard Fischer. (427) [Abb.]: Auszug der Russen aus Czernowitz. (429) [Abb.]: Dr. Rudolf Graf Meran. (431) [Abb.]: Russischer Munitionspark auf dem Elisabethenplatz in Czernowitz, der nach dem Abzug der Russen von uns erbeutet wurde. (434) [Abb.]: Oberst Arintinow beim Einmarsch der Russen in Czernowitz. (435) [Abb.]: Erzbischöfliche Residenz in Czernowitz. (436) [Abb.]: Vom Magistrat der Stadt Czernowitz ausgegebenes Notgeld. (437) [2 Abb.]: Das Schloß in Panka vor und nach der Brandschatzung. (439) Die erste Belagerung von Przemysl. (441) [Abb.]: FZM. Daniel Freiherr von Salis-Soglio. (441) [Abb.]: Panorama von Przemysl. (442) [Abb.]: Panorama von Przemysl. (443) [Abb.]: FML. Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustädten. (444) [Abb.]: Fliegerpost für Przemysl. (445) [Abb.]: Hauptmann Janko Svrljuga. (446) [Abb.]: General Radko Dimitriew. (447) [Abb.]: Mit Drahtverhau gesperrte Straße im Festungsgebiet. (448) [Abb.]: Nach dem Entsatz von Przemysl. Kundgebung der Bevölkerung vor dem Festungskommando; FML. Kusmanek bringt ein Hoch auf den Kaiser aus. ( - ) [Abb.]: FML. Arpád Tamásy von Fogaras. (451) Herbstfeldzug 1914 am San und an der Weichsel. (12. September bis 5. November.) (453) Neugruppierung der Verbündeten nach dem Einleitungsfeldzug. (12. September bis 3. Oktober.) (453) [Abb.]: GM. von Lilienhoff-Adelstein. (453) [Abb.]: Bosnisch-Hercegovinische Infanterie auf dem Marsche bei Eisna. (454) [Abb.]: FML. Peter Hofmann. (455) [Abb.]: Das Ungtal vom Uzsoker Paß. (456) [Abb.]: GdR. Erzherzog Joseph. (457) Vormarsch der Verbündeten an den San und die Weichsel (4. bis 9. Oktober). (458) [Abb.]: Ringplatz in Rzeszów. (459) [Abb.]: Ringplatz in Turka nach Abzug der Russen. (461) Einleitung der großen Kämpfe an der Front Stary Sambor - Warschau. (10. bis 12. Oktober.) (461) [Abb.]: Haubitzenbatterie vor der Magiera-Höhe an der Straße Hermanowice - Drozdowice am 16. Oktober 1914. (463) [Abb.]: GdK. Karl Tersztyánszky von Rádas. (464) [Abb.]: General v. Morgen. (Phot. R. Mohrmann, Lübeck.) (465) Schlacht bei Chyrów. (466) Abwehr des russischen Durchbruchsversuches. (13. bis 20. Oktober.) (466) [Abb.]: Flugzeug im Schrapnellfeuer (Fliegeraufnahme). (467) [Abb.]: Die gesprengte Eisenbahnbrücke bei Nowe Miasto. Infanterie passiert die Notbrücke im Artilleriefeuer am 16. Oktober 1914. (468) [Abb.]: Unterstände der Tiroler Landesschützen bei Tyszkowice. (469) Russische Flankenangriffe gegen die 2. Armee. (16. bis 20. Oktober.) (470) [Abb.]: FML. Johann Freiherr Karg von Bebenburg auf der Magurahähe im Gefecht bei Podbuz am 15. Oktober 1914. (471) Offensive des Karpathenkorps Hofmann (9. bis 22. Oktober.) (471) [Abb.]: Marktplatz in Stryi. (Phot. Leipziger Presse-Büro, Leipzig.) (472) Krise am Südflügel. (21. bis 27. Oktober.) (473) [Abb.]: Dorf Uzsok in Brand. (474) [Abb.]: Verwundetentransport auf der Legionenstraße im Pantyr-Paß. (475) [Abb.]: Der Jablonica- oder Tataren-Paß. (476) Kämpfe am San. Vorstöße der 4. Armee über den San (13. bis 17. Oktober.) (477) [Abb.]: Österreichisch-ungarische und deutsche Infanterie im Vormarsche. (477) Kämpfe in Russisch-Polen. Bereitstellung der 1. Armee zum Vorstoß gegen Iwangorod. (13. bis 21. Oktober.) (478) Kämpfe am San. Gegenangriffe der Russen. (18. bis 27. Oktober.) (480) [Karte]: Skizze zu den Kämpfen der 2. und 3. Armee im Raume um Chyrów (Schlacht bei Chyrów) 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: Batterie-Telephonstelle im Gefecht. (481) Kämpfe in Russisch-Polen. Schlacht bei Iwangorod. (22. bis 27. Oktober.) (482) [Abb.]: Mühsamer Nachschub von Munition. (483) Schlacht bei Chyrów. Siegreiches Vordringen des Südflügesl der 2. Armee. (28. Oktober bis 2. November.) (485) [Abb.]: Eine Proviantkolonne vor Przemysl. (Phot. Ed. Frankl, Berlin-Friedenau.) (486) [Abb.]: FML. Vinzenz Fox. (487) Kämpfe in Russisch-Polen. (28. Oktober bis 5. November.) Schlacht an der Opatówka. (31. Oktober bis 2. November.) (487) [Abb.]: Sulejów, wo die Russen den Übergang über die Weichsel versuchten. (488) [Abb.]: Hauptplatz in Piotrków. (489) Abbrechen der Kämpfe in Galizien. (3. bis 5. November.) (490) [Abb.]: Husaren in Infanterie-Ausrüstung auf dem Marsche durch Delatyn. (492) Der Feldzug von Krakau. (6. November bis 17. Dezember 1914.) (493) Bereitstellung zum neuen Angriff. (493) [Abb.]: GdR. Leopold Freiherr von Hauer. (494) [Abb.]: Das Schloß in Krakau. (495) Schlacht bei Krakau. (15. bis 24. November.) (497) [Abb.]: Ruine Smolen [Smoleń] (Westseite) südlich von Pilica. Am Fuße russische Schützengräben. (498) [Abb.]: GdI. Josef Ritter Roth von Limanowa - Lapanów. (500) [Abb.]: FZM. Stephan Freiherr von Ljubicic [Ljubičić] mit seinem Generalstabschef Oberst Franz Riml. (501) [Abb.]: Oberst Viktor Severus Edler von Laubenfeld. (502) [Abb.]: Höhe 470 südwestlich Kotowice, Angriffsfeld der Kopal-Jäger. (503) Eingreifen der russischen 3. Armee in die Schlacht bei Krakau. (16. bis 24. November.) (505) [Abb.]: Blick auf Tarnów, (Phot. Stern & Schiele, Berlin.) (506) [Abb.]: Zusammenfluß der Weichsel und des Dunajec bei Opatowice. (507) [Abb.]: Major Karl Hauska. (508) Zweiter russischer Einbruch in Nordungarn. (15. November bis 2. Dezember.) (508) [Abb.]: Das Schloß in Homonna. (509) [Abb.]: FML. Alexander Szurmay. (511) Umgruppierung der k. u. k. 4. Armee. (25. November bis 2. Dezember.) (512) [Abb.]: Regimentskommandant J. Piludski. (513) Die Schlacht bei Limanowa - Lapanów. (3. bis 14. Dezember.) (514) [Abb.]: Platz in Limanowa. (516) [Abb.]: Eine 30,5 cm-Mörserbatterie auf dem Vormarsch. (519) [Abb.]: Maschinengewehr-Abteilung der I. Brigade der polnischen Legion. (525) [Abb.]: FZM. Karl Kuk. (528) [Karte]: Skizze zur Schlacht bei Limanowa - Lapanów 1914. ( - ) [Abb.]: Das Birkenwäldchen bei Limanowa. (529) [Abb.]: Oberst Othmar Muhr von Limanowa. (532) [Abb.]: GM. Desiderius Molnár von Péterfalva. (535) [Abb.]: Ordnen der Beute auf dem Schlachtfelde von Limanowa - Lapanów. (Welt-Preß-Photo, Wien.) (536) Vertreibung der Russen aus Nordungarn. (8. bis 12. Dezember.) (537) Treffen bei Belchatów. (1. bis 14. Dezember.) (540) [Abb.]: FML. Kasimir Freiherr von Lütgendorf. (541) Allgemeine Verfolgung der Russen. (15. bis 27. Dezember.) (542) [Abb.]: GdA. v. Gallwitz. (542) [Abb.]: Unterstände in einem Hohlwege bei Zaklicyn. (543) Die Kämpfe der Armeegruppe GdK. Freiherr v. Pflanzer-Baltin. Anfang November bis Ende Dezember 1914. (544) [Abb.]: GdK. Karl Freiherr v. Pflanzer-Baltin. (545) [Abb.]: Schützengräben der polnischen Legion bei Nadwórna. (546) Feldzug 1914 gegen Serbien und Montenegro. ([549]) Kriegsvorbereitungen. ([551]) [Abb.]: ([551]) [Abb.]: FZM. Oskar Potiorek. (552) [2 Abb.]: (1)GdI. Liborius Ritter v. Frank. (2)Die Eisenbahnbrücke Zemun - Belgrad, am 29. Juli von den Serben gesprengt. (553) Erste Offensive gegen Valjevo. (12. bis 23. August.) (554) [Abb.]: GdK. Freiherr Giesl von Gieslingen. (554) [Abb.]: Schwebender Steg über einen 7 Meter tiefen Sumpf in der Macva. (555) [Abb.]: Offiziere des Warasdiner Infanterie-Regiments Nr. 16, vor der Abreise auf den Kriegsschauplatz. (557) [Abb.]: General Petar Bojovic. (558) [Abb.]: Kriegsbrücke zwischen Sabac und Klenak; ein Dampfer wird durchgelassen. (559) Vorstoß der 6. Armee über den Lim und die Drina. (12. bis 22. August.) (559) Treffen bei Visegrad [Višegrad]. (20. und 21. August.) (560) [Abb.]: Rudo in Bosnien. (560) [Abb.]: Brücke von Visegrad [Višegrad], im Hintergrund der Panos. (561) Treffen bei Priboj. (20. bis 22. August.) (562) Einbruch der Serben in Syrmien und in das Banat. (6. bis 14. September.) (562) [2 Abb.]: (1)FML. Alfred Krauss. (2)Gefangene Serben. (563) [Abb.]: Gebirgsbatterie übersetzt die Drina am 8. September. (564) [Abb.]: Bataillon IV/8I der 6. Gebirgsbrigade durchfurtet die Drina am 8. September. (565) [Abb.]: Lipnicko brdo und Jagodnja. (567) Schlacht an der Drina. (14. bis 25. September.) (568) [Abb.]: Vlasenica. (569) [Abb.]: Serbische Uferbefestigung an der Save bei Sabac - von rückwärts gesehen. (570) [Abb.]: Fliegeraufnahme. 1. Straße nach Ravnje. 2. Vorbereitete zweite Linie. 3. Straße nach Vrbovac. 4. Laufgraben. 5. Hohlweg mit serbischer Infanterie. 6. Eigene Infanteriedeckungen. 7. Sumpf. 8. Eigene Sappen und Infanteriedeckung. 9. Straße nach Zasavica grn. (571) [Abb.]: In den Kämpfen um die Jagodnja zieht die Geschützbedeckung die Geschütze auf die Anhöhe. (572) [Abb.]: Erobertes serbisches Geschütz wird gegen den Feind verwendet. (573) Einbrüche der Serben und Montenegriner in Bosnien und in die Hercegovina. (7. August bis 17. Oktober.) (574) [Abb.]: Kampfgelände der 3. Gebirgsbrigade bei Avtovac. (575) [Abb.]: GM. Heinrich Pongrácz de Szent-Miklós et Ovár. (576) [Abb.]: Serben. 1. Kavallerist. 2. Infanterist. 3. Artillerie-Offizier. 4. und 5. Komitatschi. ( - ) [Abb.]: Der erbeutete "Lange Tom" in Bileca; die Offiziere und Mannschaft von der Einwohnerschaft mit Tüchern geschmückt. (577) [Abb.]: Ustipraca [Ustiprača]. (578) [Abb.]: Montenegrinische Gefangene von bosnischem Landsturm bewacht. (579) [Abb.]: Kalinovik. (580) [Abb.]: Krbljina. (581) Vertreibung des Feindes aus Bosnien. (18. bis 30. Oktober.) (582) [Abb.]: GdI. Michael Edler von Appel. (582) [2 Abb.]: (1)Vom 3. Bataillon des 6. k. ung. Landsturm-Infanterieregiments am 28. September bei Surcin [Surčin] zurückeroberte Geschütze. (2)Der Kalimegdan in Belgrad nach der Beschießung. (583) [2 Abb.]: Von den eigenen Truppen zerstörte Gendameriekaserne bei Gat. (584) Schlacht auf der Romanja planina. (585) [Abb.]: FZM. Wenzel Wurm. (585) [Abb.]: Bei Slap. Blick flußabwärts. (586) [Abb.]: Eine originelle "Ausräucherung". Um den Feind aus dem Walde zu vertreiben, wird der Boden mit Petroleum bespritzt und angezündet. (587) Siegreiche Beendigung der Schlacht an der Drina. (Mitte Oktober bis 9. November.) (589) [Abb.]: Befestigung bei Glusci [Glušci] in den Bitvasümpfen. (590) [Abb.]: Unterstände an der Drina bei Ernabara. (591) [Abb.]: Zerschossene Kirche von Sabac. (592) [Abb.]: Die Drina bei Staribrod. Blick flußaufwärts. ( - ) [Abb.]: Monitoren bei Petrovaradin. (593) [Abb.]: Drinaübergang bei Drinjaca. (594) [Abb.]: Proviantkolonne auf dem Marsche durch Sabac. (595) Einnahme von Valjevo. (10. bis 15. November.) (596) GdI. Adolf Freiherr von Rhemen zu Barensfeld. (597) [Abb.]: GL. Paul Jurisic (Sturm). (598) [Abb.]: Brücke über die Kolubara in Valjevo. (599) Einleitung zur Schlacht an der Kolubara. (16. bis 22. November.) (600) [Abb.]: Visegrad [Višegrad]. (601) [Abb.]: Von den Serben gesprengte Brücke über die Kolubara bei Slovac. (602) [Abb.]: Brückenschlag über die Kolubara. (603) Die Schlacht an der Kolubara. (23. bis 29. November.) (603) [Abb.]: Die 6. Gebirgsbrigade im Anmarsch auf den Rajac. (605) [Abb.]: Wald auf dem Rajac im Rauhreif am 25. November. (606) [Abb.]: Gefechtsfeld am Silijak [Šiljak] am 26. und 27. November. (607) [Abb.]: Montenegriner. 1. Infanterie-Hauptmann und Soldat. 2. Fahnenträger. 3. Leibgarde. 4. Landsturm. ( - ) Die Einnahme von Belgrad. (30. November bis 2. Dezember.) (609) [Abb.]: Dekorierung ungarischer Feldgendarmen im Hofe des Konaks in Belgrad. (610) [Abb.]: Petrovaradin. (611) Schlacht bei Arangjelovac. (3. bis 9. Dezember.) (611) [Abb.]: Kronprinz Alexander mit General Pau und Minister Pasic [Pašić]. (613) [Abb.]: Husaren auf dem Marsche auf grundlosen Wegen. (Phot. Ed. Frankl, Berlin-Friedenau.I (615) Zurücknahme der k. u. k. Balkanstreitkräfte hinter die Save. (10. bis 15. Dezember.) (617) [Abb.]: Sümpfe bei Obrenovac. (617) [Abb.]: Zemun. (618) Appendix ([621]) 1) Handschreiben Seiner Majestät des Kaisers und Königs anläßlich der Ermordung des Thronfolgers. ([623]) 2) Die Note an Serbien nebst dem beigefügten Memoire an die Großmächte. ([623]) 3) Das Kriegsmanifest des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. (626) 4) Notifizierung der österreichisch-ungarischen Kriegserklärung an die Mächte. (626) 5) Kriegssitzung des ungarischen Abgeordneten- und Magnatenhauses. (627) 6) Sitzung des Wiener Gemeinderates. (629) 7) Reden des deutschen Kaisers und des deutschen Reichskanzlers an die Berliner Bevölkerung. (629) 8) Telegrammwechsel zwischen Kaiser Wilhelm und dem Zaren. (630) 9) Thronrede des Deutschen Kaisers und Parlamentstagung. (631) 10) Kriegserklärung Österreich-Ungarns an Rußland. (635) 11) Armee- und Flottenbefehl des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. (635) 12) Armee- und Flottenbefehl des Deutschen Kaisers. 13) Kaiser Wilhelm an das deutsche Volk. 14) Aufruf an die Polen beim Ueberschreiten der Grenze. (636) 15) Telegrammwechsel zwischen Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. und der Armee. (636) 16) Armeebefehl des Gen. d. R. Dankl nach der Schlacht bei Krasnik. 17. Depeschenwechsel zwischen Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. und der Armee (anläßlich des a. h. Namensfestes 4. Oktober). (637) 18) Wochenbericht der Gemeinde Wien. (638) 19) handschreiben des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. an Graf Stürgkh anläßlich der Invasion in Galizien. (638) 20) Handschreiben des Kaisers und Königs Franz Joseph I. an Graf Tisza. (639) 21) Briefwechsel zwischen Graf Tisza und dem Metropoliten Metianu. (639) 22) Telegramm zwischen Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. und dem Sultan. (640) [Abb.]: Kaiser Wilhelm ( - ) 23) Kriegserklärung des Sultans. (641) 24) Sitzung des ungarischen Magnatenhauses. (641) 25) Telegrammwechsel zwischen Erzherzog Friedrich und Hindenburg. (642) 26) Ungarischer Reichstag. (642) 27) Sitzung des Deutschen Reichstages. (644) 28) Depeschenwechsel zwischen dem deutschen Reichstagspräsidenten und dem ungarischen Angeordnetenhaus. 29) Depeschenwechsel zwischen Graf Berchtold und Bethmann Hollweg. (650) 30) Ansprache Kaiser Wilhelms. (650) 31) Dank und Armeebefehl des Feldmarschalls Erzherzog Friedrich. 32) Handschreiben des Kaisers und Königs an Gd I. Franz Frhr. Conrad von Hötzendorf. (651) 33) Thronrede des Sultans. (651) 34) Armee- und Flottenbefehl des Kaisers und Königs zum Jahresbeginn 1915. (652) [Abb.]: Waffensegen bei der Ausmusterung der neuernannten Offiziere aus der k. u. k. Franz Joseph-Militärakademie. Oktober 1914. (652) Kämpfe der Deutschen. ([653]) Deutsche. 1. Ulan. 2. Generalstabsoffizier. 3. Gardeinfanterist. 4. Garde-Maschinengewehr-Abteilung. 5. Matrose. 6. Landsturm. ( - ) [Abb.]: Das durch 42 cm-Mörser zerschossene Fort Loucin. (657) Im Westen. (658) Die ersten Kämpfe. (658) Die Ereignisse in Elsaß-Lothringen. (659) [Abb.]: Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern. (659) [Abb.]: Gen. Oberst von Kluck. (660) "Das Marne-Wunder." (660) [Abb.]: Gd I. von Beseler. (661) Der Fall Antwerpens. (661) Die Argonnen. (662) Die Kämpfe nach der Marneschlacht. - Um Calais! - Die Flut. (662) [Abb.]: Nach Abzug der belgischen Besatzung aus Antwerpen. (663) Der flandrische Wasserkrieg. - Dixmuden. - Gebirgskämpfe. - Joffres Offensivbefehl. (664) [Abb.]: Zerschossener Panzerturm vor Manbeuge. (665) Die ringenden Fronten bis Jahresschluss 1914. (665) Im Osten. (Bis Ende des Jahres 1914.) (666) [Abb.]: Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg und Generalleutnant Ludendorff. (667) [Abb.]: General Rennenkampf im "Dessauer Hof" in Insterburg. (669) [Abb.]: Das Schlachtfeld von Tannenberg mit dem Gedenkstein an die Schlacht vom 15. Juli 1914. (670) [Abb.]: G d K. von Mackensen. (673) In den Kolonien. (Bis Ende des Jahres 1914.) (674) [Tabelle]: Zu Beginn des Krieges umfaßten die deutschen Schutzgebiete die nachstehenden Flächeninhalte bzw. Bevölkerungsziffern: (674) [Abb.]: Deutsche Schutztruppe. (675) Togo. (676) [Abb.]: Teilansicht von Lome, der Hauptstadt der deutschen Kolonie Togo, die von den Engländern vorläufig besetzt wurde. (677) Kamerun. (678) [Abb.]: Deutsche Kamelreiter. (Photogr. Aufnahme von Gebrüder Haeckel, Berlin.) (680) Deutsch-Ostafrika (682) [Abb.]: Dar-es-Salam, die Hauptstadt von Deutsch-Ostafrika. (Photgr. Aufnahme von Gebrüder Haeckel, Berlin.) (683) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant von Lettow-Vorbeck. (684) [Abb.]: Oberleutnant von Heydebreck. (685) Deutsch-Südwest-Afrika (686) In der Südsee (687) [Abb.]: Patrouille im Swakoprevier. (Photogr. Aufnahme von Gebrüder Haeckel, Berlin.) (688) Krieg der Türkei. ([691]) [Abb.]: ([693]) [Abb.]: Verlesung des Fetwa im Hofe der Fath-Moschee. (695) [Abb.]: Abmarsch türkischer Infanterie aus Konstantinopel. (696) [Abb.]: Türkische Kavallerie, (699) [Abb.]: Türkisches Maschinengewehr. (700) [Abb.]: Kameltrain. (703) [Abb.]: Enver Damai Pascha. (705) Wien im Kriege. ([707]) Kriegserklärung. ([709]) [Abb.]: ([709]) [Abb.]: Kaiser und König Franz Joseph I. nach der Rückkehr von Ischl mit dem Erzherzog-Thronfolger Karl Franz Joseph. (710) [Abb.]: Armee-Oberkommandant FM. Erzherzog Friedrich nimmt vor dem Kriegsministerium die Defilierung eines ausmarschierenden Infanterie-Regiments ab. (711) Mobilisierung. (712) Das Gerücht. (712) Die Frauen und der Krieg. (713) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Zita. (Phot. H. Kosel, Wien.) (714) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Maria Josepha. (Phot. K. Pietzner, Wien.) (715) Kriegsfürsorge. (715) Das Rote Kreuz. (715) Das Reservespital. (716) Kriegshilfsbüros. (716) Kriegsfürsorgeamt. (717) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Maria Theresia (Kilophot, Wien.) (717) Wohltätigkeit. (718) Beim Kader. (719) [Abb.]: Erzherzogin Marie Valerie, (Phot. K. Pietzner, Wien.) (719) [Abb.]: Das kaiserliche Luftschloß Schönbrunn. ( - ) Finanzwirtschaft. Kriegsanleihe. (721) [Abb.]: Wiener Pfadfinder sammeln Liebesgaben. (722) [Abb.]: Ausmarsch des k. u. k. Infanterie-Regiments Hoch- und Deutschmeister Nr. 4 aus Wien. (723) Die Jugend. (723) Feldpost. (724) Abmarsch ins Feld. (725) Bestellschein. ( - ) [3 Karten]: (1)Übersichtskarte zum Krieg gegen Rußland 1914 mit 2 Detailskizzen. (2)Skizze zur Schlacht bei Krakau (Südflügel) 1914. (3)Umgebung des Uzsoker Passes. ( - ) Einband ( - ) Einband ( - )

Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.







ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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"Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.). Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolutionDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/docCIDOB.2024.15/enE-ISSN: 2339-9570

Documents CIDOB: 15Winner of the Global Talent Award, launched by CIDOB and Banco Sabadell Foundation in the framework of Programa Talent Global.ABSTRACTThis study offers a comprehensive overview of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process as a facilitator of the peace talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition. It explains what Norway does as a facilitator (the process), as well as how (approach) and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests), not only in terms of the characteristics making Norway a suitable facilitator, but also its interests and motivations. The main goal is to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. The study concludes that, for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and role conception. 1. INTRODUCTIONSince the early 2010s, Venezuela has been embroiled in a grave economic, political, and humanitarian crisis resulting in institutional disarray that reached critical point in 2017. It was in this year that the constitutional order was broken after Decision 156 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice in Venezuela, whereby this organ attributed to itself the functions of the National Assembly, the country's legislative organ. Deemed unconstitutional by the political parties with a majority in the National Assembly, this move led to mass protests. The government reacted by calling for a new constitution to be drafted by a newly created Constituent National Assembly which, in August 2017, granted itself powers to pass legislation, thus overriding the National Assembly (Bronstein & Cobb, 2017). This was not recognised by the National Assembly but, in 2018, the Constituent National Assembly went ahead and blocked the participation of the main opposition parties in the presidential elections that year. These elections were rejected by a broad sector of the international community, among them the European Union (EU) and the Lima Group.1From 2017, Norway, with a population of just 5.5 million, has been exploring possibilities in Venezuela for political dialogue between the government of Nicolás Maduro and the opposition, first through the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution (NOREF), an independent foundation that receives funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and later, after 2019, with direct state involvement. Norway has built an image as a peace broker with its success in processes like the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), and in the talks between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But why did Norway decide to facilitate the peace talks in Venezuela? How does Norway approach peacebuilding in this conflict? This article aims to analyse the causes, process, approaches, and motivations for Norwegian mediation in Venezuela, in order to draw attention to the importance and the usefulness of soft power tools for the achievement of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, peace-making. I therefore explore the comprehensive role of Norway in the Venezuelan peace talks, the background, the process, and Norway's possible interests as a facilitator. I argue that,for Norway, mediation as foreign policy is, in general, but also in the case of Venezuela, the result of a combination of idealist, value-oriented motivations (humanitarian reasons and international stability), and realist, non-altruistic interests (status and access) arising from its constructed national identity and the way it perceives its role as a peace-making nation. As mentioned above, the Norwegian state became officially involved in the Venezuelan conflict in 2019. The domestic situation had come to a head on 23rd January when Juan Guaidó, leader of the opposition and president of the National Assembly, rejected the authority of Nicolás Maduro and declared himself acting president of Venezuela. However, the strategy failed when the military remained loyal to Maduro. Negotiation then became a last resort (NUPI 2020) and Norway began to facilitate negotiations between government and opposition, first in Oslo and then in Barbados, in 2019. These efforts led to further discussion between the parties through 2021 and 2022, in Mexico. In 2022, the war in Ukraine prompted changes in the positions regarding Venezuela of certain actors, notable among them the United States (U.S.) and the EU. As the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies (Remacha, 2023) points out, U.S. concerns about energy security made it necessary to find a way of guaranteeing the international supply, and Venezuela was (and is) considered to be a strategic source. Contacts between the U.S. and Venezuela were made in 2022, and talks began about removing the sanctions imposed on the country. Given its economic situation, and the presidential elections due in 2024, Venezuela welcomed the rapprochement. If the sanctions were to be removed (at least partially), it was necessary to resume dialogue with the opposition, so in November 2022, negotiations recommenced in Mexico with Norway's mediation. Significant progress was made, and the release of previously frozen international funds was agreed upon (up to 3,000 million dollars earmarked mainly for public health, education, and food), as well as the lifting of some sanctions. Maduro's government is also aware that the 2024 elections should be held according to a model that respects democratic safeguards, with unrestricted participation by the opposition, so that results will be internationally recognised. Venezuela would then be able to resume relations with countries and regions like the U.S. and the EU, thus enabling international investment, particularly in the oil industry, and an improved economic situation (NUPI, 2020). Although the presidential crisis formally lasted until 5th January 2023 when Guaidó's acting presidency was abolished by the National Assembly, the political crisis with the opposition continues to the present day, in November 2023. 1.2. Research goals and objectivesThis study aims to explore the role of Norway as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace talks, focusing on what it does (the process), how (approach), and why (characteristics of Norway as a suitable mediator, and possible interests). It seeks to demonstrate that, given Norway's national conception as a peacemaker, its strategy in Venezuela expresses a broad foreign policy endeavour that has humanitarian but also reputational and political motivations. More broadly, the importance of soft power tools for state actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives is discussed. Constructivism and Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) help to explain Norway's self-image as a peacemaker, while idealism and realism, together with Touval's "mediation as foreign policy" theory shed light on Norway's use of mediation as a foreign policy tool. Qualitative methods based on analysis of primary and secondary sources, complemented with semi-structured interviews with experts and officials of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been used. 1.3. Relevance and justificationNorway is a small country in terms of population but one with a notable ability to influence international affairs thanks to soft power. One of ways it exercises its influence is its internationally recognised image as a peacemaker, evidenced through its involvement in several peace processes. Indeed, since 1993, Norway has been engaged in 11 different peace processes (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) with some major successes but also others that were limited. The case of Norwegian facilitation of the Venezuelan peace talks is studied for two main reasons. First, is its relevance in terms of policy significance, as it is an ongoing process, which leads to questions about why Norway acts as a facilitator, and the possible interests it has in doing so, apart from the goal of peace itself. Second, is the practical reason of the author's knowledge of the three languages relevant for this research (English, Spanish, and Norwegian), which is a valuable asset in terms of good understanding of the information from primary and secondary sources written in the three languages. This is an advantage in the research, as it allows cross-checking of information, and offers a broader perspective on the topic. 2. NORWAY AS A PEACEBUILDING NATIONScholars offer several explanations of Norway's involvement in peace processes arising from international conflicts. The result of a pragmatic foreign policy, it combines idealist and realist elements in a seemingly contradictory policy which, in fact, accommodates different domestic interests and maintains inter-party foreign policy consensus (Riste, 2001; Ekengren, 2022).From a constructivist perspective, the notion of Norway as a nation for peace partly comes from its conception of its role as a small, rich, peaceful state, with a clear focus on human rights and humanitarian assistance (Leira et al., 2007). While it is true that the so-called value-oriented (idealist) diplomacy wasstrengthened, above all in the 1990s, with the increased involvement of Norway in several peace processes, its self-image as a peacebuilding nation has always been present (Leira, 2015). The Norwegian peace activist and later Foreign Affairs Minister, Halvdan Koht (1873-1965), argued in 1902 that, although the fact of its being a small state could limit its flexibility in foreign policy actions, Norway could and should secure its status by promoting peace and development. More than 80 years later, in 1989, Jan Egeland, who would become State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1990 to 1997, argued that a small, rich country like Norway could be more effective in promoting human rights and peace than old colonial powers or superpowers with their historical baggage and policies based on self-interest and dominance (Sørbø, 2018).Moreover, the notion of status, which is closely linked with the concept of identity, has been prominent in Norway since the nation's beginnings. Leira (2015) describes the pursuit of status as a peace-making nation in the 19th and early 20th century as a way of achieving independence (through moral authority), a means of saving money (as the policy for peace was cheaper than power politics), and as sound realpolitik for a small state. He also refers to the words of Ole Jacob Broch in 1864 when he argued that, when small states need to "engage in the strife of other states", they should do it decisively because, "for them, honour and prestige are even more important than for the greater powers" (Broch cited in Leira 2015, p.22).The role performance of Norway, or itsbehaviour with, and approach to foreign policy actions is, according to Gulbrandsen (2022), influenced by the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen, 1998), dictated by the image the state has of itself, and constituting a basis for adopting a role in any specific context. In Holsti's view (1970), the main explanation for the role performance of a state arises from policy makers' conceptions of the role of the nation in a system (National Role Conception), but adoption of a role is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment. In this case, if the Norwegian government and the Norwegian people have an image of Norway as a nation for peace, and if the external image they project in other countries is also that of a nation for peace, the logic of appropriateness and the role prescription will dictate that Norway will have to behave as a nation for peace, and thus engage in peacebuilding policy.For Skånland (2010) the Norwegian involvement in peace processes is the result of a discursive construction, amplified by the media, above all after 1993. Media coverage of the Norwegian involvement in the Middle East peace process gave a very positive picture of Norway in general, an image that was strengthened thanks to the perceived successes in the peace processes of Sri Lanka, Guatemala, and Mali. All this crystallised into three main discursive constructions: (1) the decisive significance of the Norwegian contribution for the outcome of peace processes, (2) the importance of peace promotion as a foreign policy tool, and (3) Norway's distinctive approach for peace promotion.Other authors emphasise Norway's peace engagement efforts from a more realist perspective and, in particular, as a policy instrument in its own right (Touval, 2003). Some, like Matlary (2002) argue that mediation is used as an institutionalised strategy for dealing with some of the challenges of being a small state, as well as for promoting Norway's interests in the international arena, and having some influence in international relations. As Stokke (2014) notes, although it has a small population, Norway has a disproportionate importance in other areas (fishing, oil and gas, shipping etc.), thus implying interests beyond its borders as well as influence in other domains because of this prominence. According to Matlary (2002), some Norwegian interestsidentified from a realpolitik standpoint are security (addressed through NATO), economic interests vis-à-vis the EU, access to political decision-making power in the EU and, outside the West, considerable economic interests in oil prices and oil export. Matlary, who collected data through a series of anonymous interviews with diplomats and politicians, alludes to the effects of value-oriented diplomacy in matters of matters and concludes that, apart from a good image and profile, what value-oriented diplomacy provides is access to other arenas where one needs the best possible entry. Her interviewees referred, above all, to access to the leaders of the U.S. Department of State through the policy of peace engagement, especially in the Middle East and, to a much lesser extent, to leaders of EU states. However, she says, it was difficult to collect specific insights into the effects of such access, a perspective shared by Stokke (2010, p.166) who argues that "the extent and manner in which recognition is translated into international influence is complex and may vary from one policy field to another and between different arenas of international relations. This means that it is notoriously difficult to detect and measure the direct benefits from peace engagement". Finally, another interesting perspective is that provided by Neumann (2011). For him, the peace and reconciliation efforts of medium and small countries are a means to maintain a system with which they are reasonably satisfied, because they are not as well equipped as bigger powers to deal with other (more violent) types of conflict resolution methods, and he refers specifically to the institutionalisation of peace and reconciliation efforts by Norway.To conclude, Norway's peacebuilding policy may be understood as apparently idealist (value-oriented diplomacy) and based on a self-image as a nation for peace, which includes both idealist (moral responsibility) and realist (influence in the international arena and security) motivations. Until now, there have been no major conflicts between those two angles (Stokke, 2014), but in an increasingly polarised world, it is becoming more and more difficult for Norway to maintain a balanced policy in peacebuilding processes. 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKThis study draws on the theory of constructivism to explain Norway's national role conception and considers the notions of idealism and realism to explain mediation as its foreign policy. A theoretical framework based on such apparently antagonistic ideas is, perhaps, not very common but, as Barkin (2003) puts it, a constructivist epistemology and a classical realist theory are, in fact, compatible and, moreover, this kind of framework can be useful in International Relations (IR) theory, as it can specify the relationship between the study of power in IR and the study of IR as social constructions. Indeed, constructivism and perceptions can—and are—often applied to fulfil or justify realist objectives and policies.For the purposes of this study, I consider that mediation as foreign policy is a result of idealist (value-oriented) and realist (power) motivations arising from a constructed national identity and role conception.3.1. Constructivism and national role conceptionFor Barnett (2018), constructivism as an international relations social theory is "concerned about how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures, but it is not a substantive theory" (p.88). The basic premise is that the world is socially constructed, which means that "social reality is a product of human consciousness. Consciousness is created and constituted through knowledge that shapes meaning and categories of understanding and action; such knowledge and meanings can be institutionalised in social life; and this institutionalisation, in turn, shapes the construction of social reality" (p.88). These categories shape not only external reality but also its actors, which is an indicator of the importance of the social construction of interests and identity. For example, Norway's identity may shape its national interests, and one of those interests might be security, but the concept of security and how it can be achieved may be linked to Norway's identity.National Role Conceptions, a concept first developed by Holsti (1970), is defined as "the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform [...] in the international system" (p. 245-246). These are, as mentioned in section 2, the main explanation for the role performance of a state, understood by Holsti as the "general policy behaviour of governments" (p. 245). Role performance is also influenced by what he calls role prescriptions, which come from the external environment and have, as some of their sources, system-wide values, the structure of the international system, and the traditions, rules and expectations of states expressed through various legal instruments (p. 246).The notion of national role conception is related to that of politics of identity, which, in Aggestam's words (1999), is a set of ideas that policymakers use to create a sense of solidarity and cohesion and thus to legitimise general trust in a nation's foreign policy. She argues that speeches sometimes reveal subjective we-feelings of a cultural community related to territory, myths, rituals, institutions, and customs, and she refers to the "institutionalisation" of national identity, which makes identity constructions relatively resistant to change. Moreover, citing March & Olsen (1998), she indicates that certain practices and rules of behaviour that legitimise and explain specific identity constructions are reinforced by such institutionalisation.The starting point of the present study is, therefore, the idea that Norway's national role conception is that of a small, rich, peaceful, democratic state, whose official discourse in peace engagement, especially since the 1990s, emphasises its altruistic contribution as a "peaceful nation that has the values, competences and economic resources" for such an endeavour, but whose work is also "beneficial for Norway's own interests" (Stokke, 2014, p.8).3.2. Idealism, realism, and mediation as foreign policyThere is no generally accepted definition of idealism because there is no settled ontology of the term but, according to Wilson (2012), it generally refers to any goal, idea, or practice that is considered impractical from a state perspective, for example the prohibition and disarmament of nuclear weapons, or global eradication of poverty. In IR it is normally used in both the broad and narrow senses. Broadly speaking, idealism seeks to transcend anarchy to create a more harmonious world order while, in the narrow sense, it is a doctrine tied to the inter-war period (1919-1939) and seen as emphasising the growing interdependence of mankind. I shall focus on the first meaning, which refers to "an approach to international politics that seeks to advance certain ideals or moral goals, for example, making the world a more peaceful or just place" (Wilson, 2019).Realism is a substantive theory of IR that considers states to be the main actors in the international arena, and mainly concerned with the pursuit of their own national interests, security, and struggle for power. Realists view the international arena as a sphere without justice, and with active or potential conflict among its members. They show scepticism about the relevance of ethical norms (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). This theory has a variety of ramifications but in this study I consider, first and foremost, classical realism because, although idealism is usually heavily criticised by realists, according to Barkin (2003), classical realism perceives the art of international politics as "the practical balancing of the demands of power on the one hand and morality on the other—a dialectic between power and morality [...]. Idealism, for the classical realist, is necessary to inform our actions and underlie our interests in the pursuit of international politics, but realism will always remain a necessary part of relations among states" (p.333). Also relevant is the perspective of neoclassical realism because, while classical realism focuses on the system-level factors, neoclassical realism considers domestic-level factors as variables that can shape foreign policy, which is highly pertinent if NRC theory is used to explain Norway's behaviour in the international arena. Neoclassical realism considers that "objective reality exists, but decision making is impaired by uncertainty and the complexity of the environment" (Rathbun, 2008, p.296).According to Touval (2003), mediation as foreign policy needs to be understood as a policy instrument, as distinct from mediation theory. He argues that it derives from the mediator's perception of the international system, its foreign policy objectives and strategies, and domestic needs. I would also argue that it stems from the mediator's own national role conception and self-perception. Touval (2003) considers that ending a conflict is no longer the main concern of the mediating state, but only a part of a broadly conceived foreign policy as the mediation is also shaped by affairs that are external to the conflict. He highlights three issues arising from a state's international and domestic concerns: (1) mediation is perceived by the public and the officials engaged in it as a moral obligation, which is seldom criticised; (2) foreign and domestic motivations, apart from being an incentive for states to engage in mediation, also shape their strategies and tactics of the mediation; (3) the mediation is evaluated not only in terms of settlement of a dispute, but also the primary goals motivating the mediation. Beriker (2017) offers an expanded perspective of Touval's work, arguing that once mediation is proven to be a viable foreign policy tool, engaging in mediation enables medium-sized powers to create a political space that otherwise would not be available. 4. METHODOLOGYThis study is both descriptive and explanatory, as it inquires more deeply into the events as well as exploring why and how Norway became involved in the Venezuela peace process from 2017 to May 2023. In a deductive approach, existing theories —NRC, mediation as foreign policy, idealism, and realism— are drawn on to explain Norway's behaviour in its peacebuilding policy. The epistemology used is empiricism, since the focus is explanation rather than interpretation, and the ontology is pragmatist because, while the world is understood as existing independently from social actors, the influence of these actors to shape social realities should also be taken into account, together with the fact that, in some cases, this may affect realities existing independently of them.The methods are qualitative, as information provided with quantitative methods would be too superficial for a study that seeks to determine the existence and the characteristics of Norway's engagement in the Venezuelan peace process. The analysis is primarily based on a range of online primary and secondary sources, including government reports, memorandums of understanding, recorded interviews, articles, and academic publications. I consulted these sources, first, for better understanding of the issues and to organise this material around the research question, as well as to identify possible gaps of knowledge. I then conducted semi-structured interviews, with an official from the Norwegian MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and a Norwegian academic, to fill some of the previously identified knowledge gaps, to record their perceptions, and to triangulate the documentary information thus gathered.The first interview, conducted by videoconference on 2 August 2023, was with Professor Benedicte Bull, from the University of Oslo and, inter alia, president of the Nordic Institute for Latin American Studies, whose research has been focused on Venezuela in recent years. The second was with David C. Jourdan, who coordinates the Norwegian MFA's facilitation team in the Venezuelan peace process. This interview was conducted in Oslo on 8 August 2023. Both Bull and Jourdan have given their consent to use their names in the present study. NOREF was also contacted but stated that it could not give interviews on the Venezuelan peace process. 5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION5.1. Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace processNo official documentary information about the specific manner Norway engaged in the Venezuela conflict during 2017 and 2018 has been found, apart from the mere fact stated in the NOREF website that it was engaged in talks on the conflict in those years. According to its strategic plan 2019-2023, NOREF is a "non-state actor that is able to complement formal Norwegian peacemaking efforts [... and] build directly on the Norwegian tradition of informal conflict resolution". This makes it possible "to support formal peace processes (track I), and informal back-channel conflict diplomacy (track 1.5 and 2)" (NOREF, 2019). This institution has a permanent staff of professionals, experts in conflict resolution, and is governed by a board whose director is appointed by the Norwegian MFA, and whose members come, in general, from different areas of the public sector. In the interview with David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), he confirmed that NOREF's engagement consists of track 2 approaches. Moreover, he stressed that, although NOREF receives public funds and works closely with the Norwegian state, it is a separate, independent institution. Norway's involvement in the peace process after 2019, when it became public, is described in some detail below. 2019: the first official talksAccording to the Norwegian MFA (2023), Norway has been involved in Venezuela since 2018. However, it was only in May 2019 that talks between the Venezuelan parties, facilitated by Norway, first became public. In this early stage, the negotiations between the delegations of Nicolás Maduro and Juan Guaidó lasted until August 2019, and although significant progress was made, no agreements for solving the political conflict were reached. However, the Norwegian MFA (2023) stresses that these negotiations were a stepping-stone for further talks between the parties, which signed a collaboration agreement in June 2020, with the objective of using frozen funds in the U.S. for a joint response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with support from the Pan American Health Organisation. Several newspaper articles describing the negotiations during that year provide additional information that has been used in this study.In May 2019, Juan Guaidó sent a delegation to Oslo to participate in exploratory talks with representatives of Maduro's government to try to find a solution to the political crisis the country had faced since Guaidó declared himself acting president of Venezuela at the beginning of that year (NRK, 2019a), information that was confirmed by Jorge Valero, Venezuela's ambassador to the UN in Geneva, and the UN spokesperson in New York, Stephane Dujarric. The Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK) reported the talks for the first time on 15 May but, according to an anonymous source, this was the second time that the parties had been in Oslo, and negotiations had previously been taking place in Cuba.Shortly afterwards, on the night between 16 and 17 May, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a press release confirming that there had been contacts between key political actors in Venezuela as a part of an exploratory phase aiming to find a solution to the country's situation. The Maduro government representatives present at the talks were Héctor Rodríguez, governor of the province of Miranda, and Jorge Rodríguez, minister of Communication. The opposition representatives were Gerardo Blyde, member of parliament, and Fernando Martínez Mattola, who had been minister during the government of President Carlos Andrés Pérez.In the last week of May 2019, the Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the parties would travel again to Oslo during the following week to continue with the process (NRK, 2019b). Almost at the same time, Juan Guaidó insisted that the meetings in Oslo were not part of a dialogue or negotiation, but a mediation in Norway (El Nacional, 2019). According to Voice of America/Voz de América (VOA) (2019a), Nicolás Maduro appeared a few days later on the Venezuelan public TV channel after the opposition declared that the conversations in Oslo that week had ended on 29 May without any agreement being reached. Maduro stated that conversations had been taking place in secret during the three previous months, that he was proud of his delegation, and that dialogue with the opposition had been constructive. Moreover, he insisted on his wish to find a peaceful solution for Venezuela. Indeed, VOA pointed out that Dag Nylander, a Norwegian diplomat who would become chief facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, had been travelling to Caracas and meeting with the political actors involved in the crisis since January 2019.The peace talks resumed one month later in Barbados. On 11 July 2019, after three days of conversations, Norway announced that the negotiations would continue (Reuters, 2019). Yet, only a few weeks later, the Maduro government withdrew from the talks when the U.S. president, Donald Trump, announced his decision to block U.S. citizens from engaging in business in Venezuela and to freeze the country's assets in the U.S. According to the Venezuelan government, this had been instigated by Juan Guaidó, while the opposition accused the government of reneging on its commitment to dialogue. Norway's facilitator, Dag Nylander, took note that the planned meetings would not take place and emphasised Norway's role as a facilitator acting at the request of the parties and planning the meetings according to their availability. He added that the facilitation process would continue as long as the parties wished, and provided that there was a realistic position on a solution in the best interests of the Venezuelan people (VG, 2019).According to Bull (2023), Norway, as the facilitating country, was displeased when the talks went public in May, believing that this was premature and that it would complicate the peace process. She also stresses that the Trump administration had no clear strategy for ending the conflict and that, when the U.S. sanctions were announced, there had not been any proper coordination with Norway. She also notes that mentions of the U.S. seem to refer to a single homogeneous actor, when the reality is that there are many actors involved, among them the Pentagon and the Department of State, and these actors may work in different directions, sometimes disrupting a given policy. The Norwegian MFA (2023) confirms it was not aware of the U.S. sanctions that were announced in early August 2019. Both parties and facilitator were taken by surprise.2021: The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding and negotiation rounds in MexicoA year and a half later, in March 2021, new exploratory talks began after the Biden administration's position on Venezuela allowed the parties to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which led to the launch of a new negotiation process, starting in August that year. On 5 August, the Mexican President, Manuel López Obrador confirmed that Mexico would host talks between the government of Venezuela and the opposition (Reuters, 2021) and, a few days later, the Norwegian government confirmed its involvement with a tweet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). The new negotiation process was launched in Mexico City on 13 August, with Dag Nylander as chief facilitator, Jorge Rodríguez representing the Venezuelan (Maduro's) government, and Gerardo Blyde representing the Unitary Platform (the opposition). A MoU —which I refer to in more detail in section 5.3— was released, defining the objective, agenda, method, and composition of the negotiation team. The Norwegian minister of Foreign Affairs, Ine Eriksen Søreide, declared in a press note that the parties were ready to negotiate constructively and that, in the process, they would consult members of civil society as well as political actors. She also noted that there was mutual agreement on the sensitive nature of the negotiations, which was necessary for giving the parties space to make progress (Norwegian MFA 2021b).A second round of negotiations took place at the beginning of September 2021. The parties released a joint statement reporting that two agreements had been reached, the first being to act jointly in the claim of Venezuelan sovereignty over Guyana Esequiba, and the second, a "partial agreement on the social protection of the Venezuelan people". The parties conveyed that the points to be addressed in the following round of negotiations would be "respect for the Constitutional Rule of Law", protection of the national economy, and measures for the social protection of the Venezuelan people.Between the second and the third rounds of negotiation, Erna Solberg, the Norwegian Prime Minister, spoke at the UN General Assembly on 21 September, referring to Venezuela as a country where human right violations were occurring. Her comment was criticised by Dag Nylander as it could, he said, damage the credibility of Norway's role. In a tweet on 25 September, the MFA reaffirmed its commitment as an impartial facilitator in the negotiations and declared that the statement in the UN should not be interpreted as being inconsistent with that (NRK, 2021). The Venezuelan government responded to this diplomatic hitch with a slight delay in proceedings when its representatives arrived one day late at the negotiation round scheduled in Mexico from 24 to 27 September, but which finally took place after 25 September (Euronews, 2021).After this third round of negotiations, the parties released a new joint statement, focused this time on the issue of inclusion and, specifically, on the need for a gender focus in the negotiations, identification of inclusive consultation mechanisms for political and social actors, and condemnation of xenophobic attacks on Venezuelan migrants that had recently occurred in Chile. According to an article by Diego Santander in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo (2021), this third round was so fraught with problems that no specific agreements were reached. Maduro's delegation insisted on its plans to include Alex Saab in the negotiation. Saab, a Venezuelan businessman, was accused of being Maduro's front man, and a key figure in the international economic and financial activities to circumvent the U.S. economic sanctions against his government. However, Saab had been arrested for money laundering in June 2020 in Cabo Verde and was extradited to the U.S. on the weekend of October 16.Negotiations, set for 17 October, were suspended on 16 October when the Maduro government decided not to participate in the next round of negotiations, because of Saab's extradition, which Jorge Rodríguez referred to as a "kidnapping" as it had been carried out "without a warrant and without due process" and accused the U.S. of trying to prevent the dialogue (Gilbert, 2021). The Norwegian government then tweeted that it was still convinced that the negotiations were the only solution for Venezuela, and that it would keep working to encourage the parties to continue (Norwegian MFA, 2021c). In Bull's opinion (2023), while the U.S. system may have its faults, the legal proceedings are independent from political powers so, on that occasion, there was little that U.S. politicians could do to stop the extradition.2022 — 2023: talks after the beginning of the war in UkraineIn March 2022, a new chapter of the dialogue began after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A U.S. delegation formed by members of the Department of State visited Caracas to meet with the Venezuelan government and discuss an eventual isolation of Vladimir Putin. Some analysts also indicated that Venezuela was seen as a possible alternative oil supplier if the U.S. opted to restrict oil exports from Russia, which meant that removal of the sanctions on Venezuela could be considered (VOA, 2022a). Indeed, in May 2022, the U.S. announced that economic sanctions against Venezuela would be eased as a gesture in favour of reactivating the dialogues and also allowing the U.S. company Chevron to negotiate potential future activities with the state-owned oil and natural gas company PDVSA (Agobian, 2022). According to the Norwegian MFA (2023), these actions were a catalyst for the reactivation of the negotiations.Immediately after the announcement, Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde met to discuss renewal of the talks (Ocando Alex, 2022a) but, by the end of May, according to Reuters, the Venezuelan government had demanded the withdrawal of Norway as a facilitator, and the presence of Russia (formally an accompanying country in the negotiations after 2021) as conditions for reactivating the negotiations. However, convinced that the Norwegians were their only guarantee for a successful process, the opposition disagreed (Oré, 2022). Bull (2023) specifies that the stance of the Venezuelan government might have been because it saw Norway as taking an excessively "pro-allies" position after the start of the war in Ukraine. She adds that Norway prefers to involve Russia and other big powers in the negotiations rather than excluding them, as they would provide legitimacy to the Mexico talks as the only acceptable platform for solving the Venezuelan political crisis. When interviewed, David C. Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023), made it clear that Norway was never asked to relinquish its role as facilitator. Management of the process resides with the parties, which have remained committed to the MoU that names Norway as the facilitating country.On 21 and 22 June 2022, the Norwegian government held the Oslo Forum, an annual retreat focused on conflict mediation and peace processes. Around 100 conflict mediators, experts, peace process actors, and high-level decision makers from around the world gathered at Losby Gods Manor with the goal of sharing their experience on conflict resolution and peace diplomacy (Norwegian MFA, 2022). Among the peace process actors who attended the Oslo Forum were Jorge Rodríguez and Gerardo Blyde. A Norwegian source told VOA (2022b) that it was "probable" that the conversations would be initiated again, but "not immediately".On 14 September 2022, a group of 18 countries from the Americas and Europe agreed to call upon Maduro and the opposition to urge a resumption of the negotiations in Mexico (Ocando Alex, 2022b).Official negotiations began again on 26 November 2022. This time, a joint statement was issued indicating that the main agenda of the meeting would be social protection of the people. A partial agreement was reached, in which the measures agreed upon were: 1) creation of an organism to implement specific actions and programmes for the social protection of the Venezuelan people (Mesa Nacional de Atención Social, or MNAS); 2) creation of an organism auxiliary to the MNAS to evaluate its processes and the effects of implementation of the measurements adopted; 3) definition of the social areas which, requiring the most urgent attention, needed to be addressed through specific programmes, in particular the public health system, the national electrical system, development of the World Food Programme, educational infrastructure, and rebuilding of the infrastructure damaged as a consequence of the torrential rains in the latter half of 2022; 4) requesting from the UN support for the design and creation of a fund for social support of the Venezuelan people; 5) identification of frozen assets belonging to the Venezuelan state that might be progressively accessed and incorporated into this fund; 6) creation of a commission to assess and verify implementation of the agreement.After this meeting, the negotiations stalled again when the Venezuelan government accused the opposition of not complying with the agreement reached but, mainly and above all, because the frozen US$3,000 million that were to be incorporated into the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People had not yet been released (August 2023). According to Maduro, this was a condition sine qua non for resuming the talks. The Colombian president, Gustavo Petro, organised a conference on 25 April 2023 in Bogotá, with representatives from numerous countries to discuss the Venezuelan situation. The shared positions of the Venezuelan government and the opposition were explained to the international community, in particular regarding the removal of sanctions, free elections, and reactivation of the peace talks. One of the shared positions for renewal of the talks was that of establishing the Fund for the Social Protection of the Venezuelan People (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde, 2023). The message that came out of the Venezuela Conference of Bogotá was very clear: the UN trust fund for Venezuela should be set up as swiftly as possible. According to a Reuters report by Spetalnik, Sequera and Armas (2023), on 19 May the Biden administration notified the UN that the money could operate within the U.S. financial system, and that there would be no risk of creditors seizing it to repay the outstanding Venezuelan debt. Accordingly, the UN-administered fund could have been operative at the end of May 2023. However, the decision to establish the trust fund ultimately lies with the UN Secretariat in New York and some insiders allude to the complexity of the process involved and stress that establishing the fund depends on a number of factors. As of late August 2023, it had not been established by the UN. 5.2. Norway's distinctive approach to peace diplomacyIn an interview for the Centre of Humanitarian Dialogue, when asked about the distinctive approach of Norwegian diplomacy in international conflicts, Dag Nylander (2020) identified four main elements: (a) collaboration with Norwegian and international NGOs, (b) low-key diplomacy, (c) long-term commitment, and (d) the ability to make quick decisions.[5] In this section, these four elements will be briefly discussed.Norway's distinctive approach to its engagement in peace processes and with non-state actors was defined after the decentralisation of its foreign policy in the early 1990s. Humanitarian assistance and development policies called for closer cooperation between the Norwegian MFA and non-governmental actors and, according to Lehti (2014), this approach was extended to the area of peace-making. In the 1990s the Ministry responded positively to proposals and initiatives from various NGOs and well-connected individuals with regard to conflictive areas. The range of actors involved in peace-making was broadened, and Norway was then able to act beyond the bounds of government-centred diplomacy with a distinctive, more informal approach to peace diplomacy. Ann Kelleher and James Taulbe (2006) refer to this approach as "Track I½ Diplomacy", understanding Track I diplomacy as that with official representatives of governments and Track II diplomacy as that involving unofficial representatives and sectors of the civil society. An important feature of the collaboration between the state, NGOs and research institutions is that it is extensively funded by the state (Bandarage, 2011). Indeed, some Norwegian NGOs receive more than 90% of their funding from the state which, in Kelleher's view (2006), almost makes them quasi-governmental organisations.As for low-key diplomacy, Nylander (2020) affirms that activities pertaining to peace diplomacy rarely appear in the news, and that they are discreet and unnoticed, often with the involvement of low-level and mid-level diplomats, an approach that allows flexibility in seeking opportunities and in dealing with problems with relative freedom.Norway's long-term commitment to peace diplomacy is based on a broad political consensus for the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Hence, changes of government will not influence the country's engagement in any given conflict. According to the MFA (2000), the goal is not only ending violence but also support for economic, social, and political processes that lead to durable liberal peace in the country concerned.Finally, the ability of Norwegian diplomats to make quick decisions stems from the smallness of the country, not only in terms of population but also social distance. Dag Nylander (2020) mentions that the distance between a diplomat in the field and the ministry of Foreign Affairs is very short, and that it takes just a quick phone call or a text message, sometimes directly to the Minister, to obtain any clearance that may be needed. 5.3 Norwegian approach to facilitation the Venezuelan peace processNorway's approach to facilitation in Venezuela is consistent with its work in other peace processes. It began with secret talks between the parties (low-key diplomacy) and then, having advanced towards a more public and official format, it was formalised with the MoU signed in Mexico on 13 August 2021. In the MoU, the parties defined the agenda and methods for the talks. David Jourdan of the Norwegian MFA (2023) highlighted the importance of this Memorandum, which contains not only the agenda and format for the negotiations, but also a shared vision of the process and the country.As for the method, it is important to mention that it is based on a "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" principle (comprehensive approach), although partial agreements can be reached if the parties consider that a subject has been sufficiently discussed and urgent action is required. This was the case with the two partial agreements on the Guyana Esequiba, and Social Protection of the Venezuelan people signed at the end of the talks in Mexico. This approach has its advantages, such as ensuring "big picture" negotiation, but it also comes with the risk the parties can renege anytime on anything they have agreed to. It was first used in other peace processes including Britain-Ireland in 1995, Palestine-Israel, and in Cyprus and Colombia. The Norwegian MFA (2023) emphasises that understanding the needs of the parties and ensuring that they are in charge of the process, has been key to making progress throughout the negotiations. The Venezuelan conflict is political in nature and requires political solutions, and the negotiation process provides a confidential space where the two parties have an opportunity to reconcile their interests. David Jourdan, sharing the MFA's approach to the political process, points out that Norway has probably been a more active facilitator in the Venezuelan negotiations than in other peace processes.An essential point of the MoU is participation, as it establishes mechanisms of consultation for political and social actors. The aim is for the process to be as inclusive and legitimate as possible. However, there is little information available as to whether this is actually the case and David Jourdan (2023) admits that it is not yet possible to speak of results in this area.Moreover, it should be noted that the Norwegian approach to facilitation, based on discretion and confidentiality, is one thing and how the parties actually behave is quite another matter. On more than one occasion, as can be seen in several documents and declarations, the Norwegian government has emphasised the need for the parties to be careful with their public declarations. In an interview with El País in February 2023, Anniken Huitfeldt, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, wryly acknowledges an anecdote sometimes repeated by high-profile Venezuelan politicians, according to which politicians will normally control themselves in public but, in private, tell someone else what they really think but, in Venezuela, the opposite occurs: what is said in private becomes amplified in front of a microphone (Lafuente 2023). Vicente Díaz, former director of the Venezuelan National Electoral Council, who participated in the talks held in the Dominican Republic, Oslo, and Barbados says that, since the process in Mexico was "very public" (as occurred in the Dominican Republic), it created difficulties for the parties, since national and international expectations were generated, which meant that more attention was given to audiences than to the talks (openDemocracy 2022). 5.4 Norwegian interests in VenezuelaIn this section and in keeping with the theoretical framework described above, I discuss four possible reasons for Norway's mediation in the Venezuelan conflict: (a) peace and stability (value-oriented diplomacy), (b) reputation, (c) political interests, and (d) economic interests.Value-oriented diplomacy focused on peace promotion makes sense for Norway, a country whose identity as a peaceful country and peace broker has existed at least since the late 19th century. Those values are so widely embedded that a broad political consensus exists among the population over a peace promotion policy, supported institutionally and by an extensive network of non-state actors coordinated by the state. Norway's constructed identity as a peace broker (especially intensified since the 1990s) means that the country acts as such. Moreover, promotion of such values makes even more sense when security has become globalised, and when a conflict in a faraway country can have humanitarian, political, economic, and ecological consequences in distant parts of the world. In this sense, value-oriented diplomacy may acquire realist motivations although, according to Bull (2023), this is discourse that appeared, above all from the 1980s, to justify Norway's involvement in peace processes. One of its proponents was the diplomat and former Labour Party politician, Jan Egeland.Ensuring peace and stability in Venezuela could, for example, (1) help to mitigate the external displacement crisis, which mainly affects neighbouring countries like Colombia and Ecuador as well as the U.S. and others in Europe, with all the humanitarian and economic consequences for those receiving refugees; (2) ensure Venezuela's participation, as a democratic state, in international organisations, thus promoting democratic values and human rights; (3) promote social and economic development in the country, which would create value for its nationals as well as attracting international investment and; (4) finally, through social and economic development, reduce the presence of paramilitary organisations in the country, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), which is involved in drug trafficking. During the interview with David Jourdan (2023), we shared these points and he replied that this may well be so, but that such possibilities could also arise as a consequence of a political settlement that includes the removal of the sanctions. He added that the main reasons for Norway's peace diplomacy are the goals of preventing and reducing human suffering, as well as contributing to peaceful societies and stability.Peace diplomacy does not give rapid results (when it actually gives results), but Norway sees it as a policy consistent with its values, and as one whose long-term effects are sufficiently relevant as to justify investment in it.When it comes to image and reputation, Norway's approach on peace has been used as a public diplomacy branding tool, together with the country's natural environment and gender equality, to solve one of the image problems of small countries: invisibility.Indeed, discretion and a low profile do not necessarily mean invisibility, and as long as the right aspects of Norway's peace diplomacy are emphasised in a public diplomacy strategy —for example its role as a facilitator, an engaged partner, and good multilateralist— the discretion that peace diplomacy requires would not be jeopardised (Leonard and Small, 2003). Success in mediation of the Venezuelan conflict would, of course, be positive for Norway's image as a peace broker, although this constructed image is also enhanced through pertinent media coverage mentioning the Norwegian involvement during the Venezuelan peace process. This can be explained by NRC theory since the Norwegian image is constructed not only through success in a certain process but also through the mediating process itself. To give one example, the Google search "peace talks Venezuela Norway" offers almost 4.85 million results, while the Spanish search with "mediación de paz Venezuela Noruega" offers 1.28 million results. Moreover, when Norway uses the word "facilitation"2 it transfers responsibility for the results to the parties, implying that it has the role of supporting and accompanying them, but it will not be responsible if the parties decide that they do not want to continue with the process. This safeguard for Norway's image as a peace broker applies to the Venezuelan case.Political influence has also been identified as one of Norway's possible interests. As Matlary (2003) notes, access to key international actors can result from Norway's engagement in peace processes, including in the case of Venezuela, especially in a context of international energy insecurity, and political tensions due to the high-profile conflict between Russia and Ukraine. In my interview with David Jourdain (2023), "close dialogue with key international stakeholders" together with increased political capital were mentioned as benefits that Norway could reap by engaging in Venezuela. He also pointed out that one of the key features of this conflict is the importance of the U.S. as an actor with the capacity to contribute to the outcome of the peace process.The U.S. is now particularly concerned to find new energy suppliers, and ensuring political stability in Venezuela could provide international legitimacy for oil and gas transactions with its government. Giovanna de Michele, internationalist lecturer at the Central University of Venezuela, told VOA that the best way to extract oil from Venezuela would be through U.S. companies, but the sanctions would have to be eased if this was to happen (Ramírez Vargas & Alcalde 2023). Norway offers an internationally recognised platform for making this possible: the talks in Mexico. It could therefore be a key actor in helping to resolve the political crisis in Venezuela while also supporting an ally, which would contribute to its status as a reliable partner of the U.S. However, as Matlary notes, it is difficult to quantify or define the scope of the access Norway gleans from its peace policy.Finally, with regard to economic interests, there are currently no Norwegian state-owned companies operating in Venezuela, although they can be represented through the investments of the Norwegian National Pension Fund3 in foreign companies that do operate in the country, for example, some Colombian companies, among them Bancolombia, Banco Popular, Banco Davivienda, and Cementos Argos. And, at the beginning of 2023, Ecopetrol, which is financed by Norfund, asked the U.S. for permission to negotiate with the state-owned company PDVSA to explore gas imports from Venezuela to Colombia (Quesada 2023). Among Norwegian investments in the U.S. are Chevron and Occidental Petroleum Corp, and the U.S. has recently given permission to Chevron to negotiate with the PDVSA and, at the end of 2022, a United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) court found that Venezuela was liable for discriminatory conduct in its payment of dividends from an oil and gas venture and ordered Venezuela to pay US$105 million to a Barbadian subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum Corp (Ballantyne 2022). If an improved political situation in Venezuela increases the revenues of these companies, it could also be positive for Norwegian investments.It should be added that, until 2021, Statoil (later Equinor), the national oil company of Norway, was present in Venezuela where it invested more than one billion dollars between 1995 and 2013 and participated in the Sincor heavy crude oil project with Total and PDVSA. However, due to concerns about the workforce and practical difficulties, Equinor pulled out of the project and transferred its 9.67% participation to CVP, a subsidiary of PDVSA, although it did keep its 51% stake in the exploration license of block 4 on Plataforma Deltana off Cocuina(Øye Gjerde, n.d.). Accordingly, Equinor participation in Venezuela is currently on hold but a greater presence in Venezuela of Norwegian companies, in particular from the oil and gas sector is possible if the country's situation improves.To sum up, although economic links between Norway and Venezuela do exist, they would seem to be limited and not sufficient to explain Norway's participation as a facilitator in the Venezuelan peace process. 6. CONCLUSIONSThe core question of this study is why and how does Norway facilitate the Venezuela peace talks? The results suggest that, for Norway as a facilitator of the Venezuelan peace process, the main goals of mediation-as-foreign-policy are humanitarian, security (better understood as promoting stability in the region), projection of its image as a peaceful nation and a peacemaker, and of its status vis-à-vis key international actors (especially the U.S.).All these goals can be explained through the Holsti's theory of National Role Conceptions (NRC) and Norway's own role prescription as a small, democratic, and peaceful nation, which means it would promote these values through altruistic (idealist) and non-altruistic (realist) actions and perspectives.Interestingly, economic factors do not seem to play a major role as a mediation-as-foreign-policy objective. The economic ties between Norway and Venezuela are presently not significant and, thanks to the diversification of the investment portfolio of the Norwegian National Pension Fund, Venezuela only represents a very small part of Norwegian economic interests.It is therefore relevant to consider the importance of constructivist aspects such as national values and self-conception in shaping the foreign policy of small countries, despite the apparent predominance of realpolitik aspects in an international context of increasing competition. These constructivist aspects offer key information for understanding and explaining the behaviour of small countries and should not be overlooked.Besides, it is worth reflecting on the definition of a mediation success in real, and in mediation-as-foreign policy terms. In the real sense, mediation is successful when it produces long-term reconciliation between the parties, in the eyes of a domestic audience while, for an audience external to the conflict, mediation may be successful simply when a peace agreement between the parties is signed. Meanwhile, for the mediating country or its allies, a mediation is deemed effective when foreign policy objectives are achieved. The approach used by Norwegian mediators in the Venezuelan process is similar to that of previous peace processes. It starts with the organisation of secret meetings and then advances towards a more public and official format. However, some distinctive traits of this peace process have been (1) a somewhat more active role of Norway as a facilitator when compared to other peace processes, (2) the weighty influence of the U.S. in causing setbacks or advances in the negotiations , and (3) premature publicity of this process, when the parties have been too eager to share their views with the press and the public, which may have been an obstacle for achieving progress. Despite these challenges, as of November 2023, Norway has continued to honour its long-term commitment to achieving a peaceful solution to the Venezuelan conflict.This study has created a first timeline of the Norwegian involvement in the Venezuelan peace process by means of consulting information in primary and secondary sources and, when relevant, adding further details obtained in interviews with two experts. This timeline provides an overview of the main milestones of the peace process while highlighting Norway's role as a facilitating country. Possible reasons for its engagement in the Venezuelan peace process have been identified. At a tactical level, the moral and security elements seem to be a high priority for people working in the field. These actors have considerable expertise in conflict resolution and perform their duties diligently. At a more strategic and state-centred level, besides the moral and security components, attention is given to building political capital by means of offering an attractive image to international stakeholders, especially close allies like the U.S. This is, therefore, an excellent example of the importance of peace diplomacy as a soft power tool for a middle-level country like Norway.The limits of the study arise from the nature of an ongoing mediation process. Since silence sometimes carries more weight than words and as discretion is necessary for the process to move forward, only limited information could be directly obtained from relevant actors in the peace talks. In terms of Norway's interests in certain areas, the limits of qualitative methods have not allowed quantification of the importance of each of these interests. The aim of the interviews was to obtain in-depth information that could confirm that such interests exist, and to provide distinctive details that might enrich knowledge of this peace process, rather than quantifying the results. Finally, now that Norway's possible interests as a facilitator have been identified, future research could be addressed at quantifying the weight of each of them in Norway's peacebuilding policy over the last two decades. 7. ReferencesAggestam, Lisbeth. "Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy". ARENA Center for European Studies Working Paper, vol. 99/8 (1999). 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Reuters (8 August 2021), (on-line) [Date accessed 16.05.2023]: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-host-negotiations-between-venezuelan-government-opposition-2021-08-05/ Riste, Olav. Norway's Foreign Relations - A History. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2001. Rodríguez, Jorge & Blyde, Gerardo. "Memorando de entendimiento". (13 August 2021), (on-line) [Date accessed 20.06.2023]: https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/d62443bc624041238af2902d356f949c/memorando-de-entendimiento.pdf Santander, Diego. "Nueva ronda de negociación entre Maduro y la oposición finaliza sin acuerdos". El Mundo, (28 September 2021), (on-line) [Date accessed 16.05.2023]: https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2021/09/27/61520d3d21efa0703d8b461c.html Skånland, Øystein Haga. "'Norway is a peace nation': A discourse analytic reading of the Norwegian peace engagement". Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 45, no. 1, (April 2010), p. 34–54, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836709347212 Sørbø, Gunnar M. "The Norwegian peace engagement: New challenges in a new world order". NORAD, (20 August 2018), (on-line) [Date accessed 25.04.2023]: https://www.norad.no/en/front/evaluation/news/2018/evaluation-views-the-norwegian-peace-engagement---new-challenges-in-a-new-world-order/ Spetalnik, Matt, Vivian Sequera et al. "US tells UN it will shield Venezuelan humanitarian fund from creditors". Reuters, (19 May 2023), (on-line) [Date accessed 20.05.2023]: https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-tells-un-it-will-shield-venezuela-humanitarian-fund-creditors-sources-2023-05-18/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Political Realism in International Relations. plato.stanford.edu, (2017) (on-line) [Date accessed 08.05.2023]: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/ Stokke, Kristian. "Peace-building as Small State Foreign Policy: Norway's Peace Engagement in a Changing International Context". International Studies, vol. 49, no. 3-4, (September 2014), p. 207-231, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/002088171453233 Stokke, Kristian. "The Soft Power of a Small State: Discursive Constructions and Institutional Practices in Norway's Peace Engagement". Power, Conflict, Democracy Journal, vol. 2, no.1, (2010), p. 138-173, DOI: 10.22146/pcd.25724 Touval, Saadia. "Mediation and Foreign Policy". International Studies Review, vol.5, no. 4, (December 2003), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504009.x, p. 91–95. The Venezuelan Negotiation Process, Oslo, regjeringen.no (2023) [Date accessed 13.05.2023]: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/venezuela_negotiations/id2674295/ Voz de América. "Diálogo: Opción que Guaidó y Maduro no descartan para salvar a Venezuela". Voz de América, (30 May 2019), (on-line), [Date accessed 12.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/venezuela-noruega-negociaciones-para-poner-fin-a-la-crisis-/4936901.html Voz de América. "Tras fracaso en Barbados, Venezuela sigue esperando una solución". Voz de América, (11 August 2019), (on-line) [Date accessed 14.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/tras-fracaso-en-barbados-venezuela-sigue-esperando-una-solucion/5037644.html Voz de América. "Funcionarios de EE.UU. viajan a Venezuela y se reúnen con oficiales del gobierno: según medios". Voz de América, (6 March 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/funcionarios-eeuu-viajaran-venezeula-reunen-oficiales-gobierno-/6472694.html Voz de América. "Gobierno y oposición de Venezuela coinciden en Noruega". Voz de América, (20 June 2022), (on-line) [Date accessed 18.05.2023]: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/delegaciones-maduro-dialogo-noruega-/6625220.html Wilson, Peter. "Idealism in international relations" in: Dowding, Keith (ed.) Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 332-333.Notes:1- Originally consisting of 12 Latin American nations and formally created on 8 August 2017, the Lima Group is a multilateral body whose goal is to explore mechanisms for a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Venezuela and restoration of a democratic order (Government of Colombia 2017).2- In this study, I use the terms "mediation" and "facilitation" interchangeably. However, mediation normally involves a formal mandate from the parties of a conflict, covering involvement in both the substance and process of the negotiation, while a facilitator is less directive (Greminger 2007).3- The Norwegian National Pension Fund, the world's largest sovereign fund, has investments in over 9,000 companies in 70 countries (Oljefondet n.d.).Key words: Venezuela, Norway, national role conception, mediation, peacebuilding, foreign policy, conflict resolution

Timothy Mitchell on
Infra-Theory, the State Effect, and the Technopolitics of Oil










This is the first in a series of Talks dedicated to the technopolitics of International Relations, linked to the forthcoming double volume 'The Global Politics of Science and Technology' edited by Maximilian Mayer, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich 







The unrest in the Arab
world put the region firmly in the spotlights of IR. Where many scholars focus
on the conflicts in relation to democratization as a local or regional dynamic,
political events there do not stand in isolation from broader international
relations or other—for instance economic—concerns. Among the scholars who has
insisted on such broader linkages and associations that co-constitute political
dynamics in the region, Timothy Mitchell stands out. The work of Mitchell has
largely focused on highly specific aspects of politics and development in Egypt
and the broader Middle East, such as the relations between the building of the
Aswan Dam and redistribution of expertise, and the way in which the differences
between coal and oil condition democratic politics. His consistently nuanced
and enticing analyses have gained him a wide readership, and Mitchell's
analyses powerfully resonate across qualitative politically oriented social
sciences.  In this Talk, Timothy Mitchell discusses, amongst others, the birth of 'the
economy' as a powerful modern political phenomenon, how we can understand the
state as an effect rather than an actor, and the importance of taking
technicalities seriously to understand the politics of oil.







Print version of this Talk (pdf)



What is, according to you,
the biggest challenge / principal debate in current globally oriented studies?
What is your position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



I'm not myself interested in, or good at, big debates,
the kinds of debates that define and drive forward an academic field. The
reason for that is partly that once a topic has become a debate, it has tended
to have sort of hardened into a field, in which there are two or three
positions, and as a scholar you have to take one of those positions. In the
days when I was first trained in Political Science and studied International
Relations, that was so much my sense of the field and indeed of the whole
discipline of political science. This is part of one's initially training in
any field: it is laid out as a
serious debate. I found this something I just could not deal with; I did not
find it intellectually interesting which I think sort of stayed with me all the
way through to where I am now. So although big debates are important for a
certain defining and sustaining of academic fields and training new generations
of students, it is not the kind of way in which I myself have tended to work. I
have tended to work by moving away from what the big debates have been in a
particular moment. My academic interests always started when I found something
curious that interests me and that I try to begin to see in a different way.



However, I suppose with my most recent book Carbon Democracy (2011), in a sense there was a big debate going on, which was the debate about the resource
curse and oil democracy. That was an old debate going back to the 70's, but had
been reinvigorated by the Iraq war in 2003. But that to me is an example of the
problem with big debates, because the terms in which that debate was argued
back and forth—and is still argued—did not seem to make sense as a way to
understand the role of energy in 20th century democratic politics.
Was oil good for democracy or bad for democracy? The existing debate began with
those as two different things—as a dependent or independent variable—so you
would already determine things in advance that I would have wanted to open up.
In general I'm not a good person for figuring out what the big debates are.



But I think, moving from International Relations as a
field to 'globally oriented studies', to
use your phrase, one of the biggest
challenges—just on an academic level, leaving aside challenges that we face as
a global community—is to learn to develop ways of seeing even what seem like
the most global and most international issues, as things that are very local.
Part of the problem with fields such as 'global studies', the term
'globalization', and other terms of that sort, is that they tend to define
their objects of study in opposition to the local, in opposition to even
national-level modes of analysis. By consequence, they assume that the actors
or the forces that they're going to study must themselves be in some sense
global, because that is the premise of the field. So whether it is nation
states acting as world powers; whether it is capitalism understood as a global
system—they have to exist on this plane of the global, on some sort of
universal level, to be topics of IR and global studies. And yet, on close
inspection, most of the concerns or actors central to those modes of inquiry
tend to operate on quite local levels; they tend to be made up of very small
agents, very particular arrangements that somehow have managed to put
themselves together in ways that allow them take on this appearance and
sometimes this effectiveness of things that are global. I'm very interested in
taking things apart that are local, on a particular level, to understand what
it is that enables such small things, such local and particular agents, to act
in a way that creates the appearance of the global or the international world.



Now this relates back to the second part of your
question, about substantive concerns that we face as a global community. When I
was writing Carbon Democracy there
was all this attention on the problem of 'creating a more democratic Middle
East', as it was understood at the time of the Iraq war. It struck me that when
debating this problem—of oil and democracy, of energy and democracy—we saw it
as somehow specific to these countries and to the part of the world where many
countries were very large-scale energy producers. We were not thinking about
the fact that we are all in a sense caught up in this problem that I call
carbon democracy, and that there are issues—whether it is in terms of the
increasing difficulty of extracting energy from the earth, or the consequences
of having extracted the carbon and put it up in the atmosphere—that we, as
democracies, are very, very challenged by. Those issues—and I think in
particular the concerns around climate change—when you look at them from the
perspective of U.S. politics, and the inability of the U.S. even to take the
relatively minor steps that other industrialized democracies have taken: this
inaction suggests a larger problem of oil and democracy that needs explaining
and understanding and working on and organizing about. I also think there is a
whole range of contemporary issues related to energy production and consumption
that revolve around the building of more egalitarian and more socially just
worlds. And, again, those issues present themselves very powerfully as concerns
in American politics, but are experienced in other ways in other parts of the
world. I would not single out any one of them as more urgent or important than
another, and I do think we still have a long struggle ahead of us here. 





How did
you arrive at where you currently are in your approach to issues?



Well,
I had a strange training as a scholar because I kept shifting fields. I
actually began as a student of law and then moved into history while I was
still an undergraduate, but then became interested in political theory; decided
that I liked it better than political science. But by the time I arrived in
political science to study for a PhD, I had become interested in politics of
the Middle East. This was partly from just travelling there when I was a
student growing up in England, but I also suppose in some ways the events of
the seventies had really drawn attention to the region. So the first important
thing that shaped me was this constant shifting of fields and disciplines,
which was not to me a problem—it was rather that there was a kind of
intellectual curiosity that drove me from academic field to field. And so if
there was one thing that helped me arrive at where I am, it was this constant
moving outside of the boundaries of one discipline and trespassing on the next
one—trying to do it for long enough that they started to accept me as someone
who they could debate with. And I think all along that has been important to
the kind of scholarship I do; yet therefore I would say where I currently am in
my thinking about my field is difficult in itself to define. But I think it is
probably defined by the sense that there are many, many fields—and it is moving
across them and trying to do justice to the scholarship in them, but at the
same time trying to connect insights from one field with what one can do in
another field. I have always tried to draw things together in that sense, a
sense that one can call an interdisciplinary or post-disciplinary sensitivity.



I
think the other part of what has shaped me intellectually was that, in ways I
explained before, I was always drawn into the local and the particular and the
specific and I was never very good at thinking at that certain level of
large-scale grand theory. So having found myself in the field of Middle Eastern
politics in a PhD-program, and being told that it involves studying Arabic which
I was very glad to do, I then went off to spend summers in the Arab world, and
later over more extended periods of time for field research. But to me, Egypt
and other places I've worked—but principally Egypt—became not just a field
site, but a place where I have now been going for more than 30 years and where
I have developed very close ties and intellectual relationships, friendships,
that I think have constantly shaped and reshaped my thinking. And even when I
am reading about things that are not specifically related to Egypt—the work I
do on the history of economics, or the work I have done on oil politics that
are not directly connected with my research on Egypt—I am often thinking in
relation to places and people and communities there that have profoundly shaped
me as a scholar. 



So
traveling across different contexts I'd say I have not developed a kind of set
of theoretical lenses I take with me. Rather, I would say I have developed a way of seeing—I would not
necessarily call it 'meta', I see it as much more as sort of 'infra': much more
mundane and everyday. While I have this sort of intellectual history of moving
across disciplines and social sciences in an academic way, there is another
sort of moving across fields, another sensibility, and that sensibility
provides me with a sense of rootedness or grounding. And that is a more
traditional way of moving across fields, because whether when one is writing
about contemporary politics or more historically about politics, one is dealing
constantly with areas of technical concern of one sort or another, with
specialist knowledge. Engaging with that expert knowledge has always provided
both a political grounding in specific concerns and with a kind of concern with
local, real-world, struggles on the ground. So that might have been things like
the transformation of irrigation in nineteenth-century Egypt, or the remaking
of the system of law; or it might be the history of malaria epidemics in the
twentieth century, or the relationship between those epidemics and
transformations taking place in the crops that were grown; or, more
recently—and more obviously—of oil and the history of energy, and the way
different forms of energy are brought out of the ground. And I should mention
beside those areas of technical expertise already listed, economics as well: a
discipline I was never trained in, but that I realized I had to understand if I
was to make sense of contemporary Egyptian politics—just as much as I had to
understand agricultural hydraulics or something of the petroleum geology as a
form of technical expertise that is shaping the common world.



In
sum, what keeps me grounded is the idea that to really make sense of the
politics of any of those fields, one has got to do one's best to sort of enter
and explore the more technical level—with the closest attention that one can
muster to the technical and the material dimensions of what is involved—whether
it is in agricultural irrigation, building dams or combating disease. And
entering this level of issues does not only mean interviewing experts but
arriving at the level of understanding the disease, the parasite, the modes of
its movement, the hydraulics of the river, the properties of different kinds of
oil... So as you can see it is not really 'meta', it really is 'infra' in the
anthropological way of staying close to the ground, staying close to processes
and things and materials.





What
would a student need to become a specialist in IR or understand the world in a
global way?



A
couple of things. I think one is precisely the thing I just mentioned in answer
to your last question: that is, the kind of interest in going inside technical
processes, learning about material objects, not being afraid of taking up an
investigation of something that is a body of knowledge totally outside one's
area of training and expertise. So, if I was advising someone or looking for a
student, I would not say there is a particular skill or expertise, but rather a
willingness to really get one's hands dirty with the messy technical details of
an area—and that can be an area of specialist knowledge such as economics, but
also technical and physical processes of, for instance, mineral extraction. I
think to me this is—for the kind of work I am interested in doing—enormously
important.



The
other thing that I would stress in the area of globally-oriented studies, is
that one could think of two ways of approaching a field of study. One is to
move around the world and gather together information, often with a notion of
improving things, such as development work, human rights work, international
security work. This entails gathering from one's own research and from other
experts in the field, with a certain notion of best practices and the state of
field, and of what works, and therefore what can then be moved from one place
to another as a form of expert knowledge. Some people really want that mobile
knowledge, which I suppose is often associated with the ability to generalize
from a particular case and to establish more universal principles about
whatever the topic is. And in this case one's own expertise becomes the
carrying or transmission of that expert knowledge. One saw a lot of that around
the whole issue of democratization that I mentioned before in the Middle East,
around the Iraq war when experts were brought in. They had done democracy
elsewhere in the world and then they turned up to do it in Iraq, and again
following the Arab Spring.



Against
that, to me, there is another mode of learning, which is not to learn about what is happening but to learn from. So to give the example, if there
is an uprising and a struggle for democracy going on in the streets of Cairo,
one could try and learn about that and then make it fit one's models and
classify it within a broader range of series of democratizations across the
world, or one could try and learn from it, and say 'how do we rethink what the
possibilities of democracy might be on the basis of what is happening?' To me
those are two distinct modes of work. They are not completely mutually
exclusive, but I think people are more disposed towards one or the other. I
have never been disposed, or good at, the first kind and do like the second, so
I would mention that as the second skill or attitude that is useful for doing
this sort of work.





In which discipline or field would you situate
yourself, or would we have to invent a discipline to match your work?



I
like disciplines, but I do not always feel that I entirely belong to any of
them. That said, I read with enormous profit the works of historians, political
theorist, anthropologists, of people in the field of science and technology
studies, geographers, political economists and scholars in environmental
studies. There are so many different disciplines that are well organized and
have their practitioners from which there is a lot to learn! But conversely, I
also think, in ways I have described already, there is something to be learnt
for some people from working in a much more deliberately post-disciplinary
fashion. The Middle East, South Asian and African Studies department to which I
have been attached here in Columbia for about five years, represents a
deliberate attempt by myself and my colleagues to produce some kind of
post-disciplinary space. Not in order to do away with the disciplines, but to
have another place for doing theoretical work, one that is able to take
advantage of not being bound by disciplinary fields, as even broad
disciplines—say history—tend to restrict you with a kind of positive liberty of
creating a place where you can do anything you want—as long as you do it in an
archive. I quite deliberately situate myself outside of any one discipline,
while continuing to learn from and trespass into the fields of many individual
disciplines. They range from all of those and others, because I am here among a
community of people who are also philologists; people interested in Arabic
literature and the history of Islamic science; and all kinds of fields, which I
also find fascinating. The first article I ever published was in the field of
Arabic grammar! So I have interests that fit in a very sort of
trans-disciplinary, post-disciplinary environment and I thrive on that.



Yet
doing this kind of post-disciplinary work is in a practical sense actually
absolutely impossible. If only for the simple fact that if it is already hardly
possible to keep up with 'the literature' if one is firmly situated within one
field, then one can never keep up with important developments in all the
disciplines one is interested in. There are some people that manage to do this
and do it justice. My information about contemporary debates in every
imaginable field is so limited; I do not manage to do justice to any field. In
the particular piece of research I might be engaged in, I try to get quickly up
to pace on what's going on, and I often come back again and again to similar
areas of research. I am currently interested in questions around the early
history of international development in the 1940's and 1950's, and that is
something I have worked on before, but I have come back to it and I found that
the World Bank archives are now open and there is a whole new set of
literatures. I had not been keeping up with all of that work. It is hard and
that is why I am very bad at answering emails and doing many of the other
everyday things that one is ought to do; because it always seems to me, in the
evening at the computer when one ought to be catching up with emails, there is
something you have come across in an article or footnotes and before you know
it you are miles away and it has got nothing to do with what you were working
on at the moment, but it really connects with a set of issues you have been
interested in and has taken you off into contemporary work going on in law or
the history of architecture… The internet has made that possible in a
completely new way and some of these post-disciplinary research interests are
actually a reflection of where we are with the internet and with the
accessibility of scholarship in any field only just a few clicks away. Which on
the one hand is fascinating, but mostly it is just a complete curse. It is the
enemy of writing dissertations and finishing books and articles and everything
else!





What role does expertise, which is kind of a central
term in underpinning much of the diverse work or topics you do, play in the
historical unfolding of modern government?



That
is a big question, so let me suggest only a couple of thoughts here. One is
that modern government has unfolded—especially if one thinks of government itself
as a wider process than just a state—through the development of new forms of
expertise, which among other things define problems and issues upon which
government can operate. This can concern many things, whether it is problems of
public health in the 19th or 20th century; or problems of
economic development in the 20th century; or problems of energy,
climate change and the environment today. Again and again government itself
operates—as Foucault has taught us—simultaneously as fields of knowledge and fields
of power. And the objects brought into being in this way—defined in important
ways through the development of expert knowledge—become in themselves modes
through which political power operates. Thanks to Foucault and many others,
that is a way of thinking or field of research that has been widely developed,
even though there are vast amounts of work still to do.



But
I think there is another relationship between modes of government and
expertise, and this goes back to things I have been thinking about ever since I
wrote an article about the theory of the state (The Limits of the State, pdf here) that was published in American
Political Science Review a long time ago (1991). The point I made then, is that
it is interesting to observe how one of the central aspects of modern modes of
power is the way that the distinction between what is the state and what is not
the state; between what is public and what is private, is constantly elaborated
and redefined. So politics itself is happening not so much by some agency
called 'state' or 'government' imposing its will on some other preformed
object—the social, the population, the people—but rather that it concerns a
series of techniques that create what I have called the effect of a state: the very distinction between what appears as a
sort of structure or apparatus of power, and the objects on which that power
works.



More
recently one of the ways I have thought about this, is in terms of the history
of the idea of the economy. Most people think of 'the economy' either as
something that has always existed (and people may or may not have realized its
existence) or as something that came into being with the rise of political
economy and commercial society in the European 18th and 19th
century. One of the things I discovered when I was doing research on the
history of development, is that no economist talked routinely about an object
called 'the economy' before the 1940's! I think that is a good example of the
history of a mode of expertise that exists not within the operations of an
apparatus of government but precisely outside of government.



If
you look in detail at how the term 'the economy' was first regularly used, you
find that it was in the context of governing the U.S. in the 1940's immediately
after the Second World War. In the aftermath of the war there was enormous
political pressure for quite a radical restructuring of American society: there
were waves of strikes, demands for worker control of industries, or at least a
share of management. And of course in Europe, similar demands led to new forms
of economy altogether, in the building of postwar Germany and in the forms of
democratic socialism that were experimented with in various parts of Western
Europe. As we know, the U.S. did not follow that path. And I think part of the
way in which it was steered away from that path, was by constructing the
economy as the central object of government, coupled with precisely this
American cultural fear of things where government did not belong. So this was
radically opposed to how the Europeans related government to economy: European
governments had become involved in all kinds of ways, deciding how the relation
between management and labor should operate in thinking about prices and wages;
instituting forms of national health insurance and health care; and the whole
state management of health care itself... Now this was threatening to emerge in
the U.S., and was emerging in many ways in the wartime with state control of
prices and production. In order to prevent the U.S. from following the European
path after the war, this object outside of
government with its own experts was
created: the economy. And the economists were precisely people who are not in government, but who knew the laws and
regularities of economic life and could explain them to people. It is
interesting to think about expertise both as something that develops within the
state, but also as something that happens as a creation of objects that
precisely represent what is not the
state, or the sphere of government.





Your most recent book Carbon Democracy (2011) focuses on the political structures
afforded, or engendered, by modes of extraction of minerals and investigates
how oil was constitutes a dominant source of energy on which we depend.
Can you give an example of how that works?



Let
me take an example from the book even though I might have to give it in very a
simplified form in order to make it work. I was interested in what appeared to
be the way in which the rise of coal—the dominant source of energy in the 19th
century and in the emergence of modern industrialized states—seemed to be very
strongly associated with the emergence of mass democracy, whereas the rise of
oil in the 20th century seemed to have if anything the opposite set
of consequences for states that were highly dependent on the production of oil.
I wanted to examine these relations between forms of energy and democratic
politics in a way that was not simply some kind of technical- or energy
determinism, because it is very easy to point to many cases that simply do not
fit that pattern—and, besides, it simply would not be very interesting to begin
with. But it did seem to me, that at a particular moment in the history of the
emergence of industrialized countries—particularly in the late 19th
century—it became possible for the first time in history and really only for a
brief period, to take advantage of certain kinds of vulnerabilities and
possibilities offered by the dependence on coal to organize a new kind of
political agency and forms of mass politics, which successfully struggled for
much more representative and egalitarian forms of democracy, roughly between
the 1880's and the mid 20th century. In general terms, that story is
known; but it had been told without thinking in particular about the energy
itself. The energy was just present in these stories as that which made
possible industrialization; industrialization made possible urbanization;
therefore you had lots of workers and their consciousness must somehow have
changed and made them democratic or something.



That
story did not make sense to me, and that prompted me to research in detail, and
drawing on the work of others who had looked even more in detail at, the
history of struggles for a whole set of democratic rights. The accounts of
people at the time were clear: what was distinctive was this peculiar ability
to shut down an economy because of a specific vulnerability to the supply of
energy. Very briefly, when I switched to telling the story in the middle of the
20th with oil, it is different: partly just because oil was a
supplementary source of energy—countries and people now had a choice between
different energy sources—but also because oil did not create the same points of
vulnerability. There are fewer workers involved, it is a liquid, so it can be
routed along different channels more easily; there is a whole set of technical
properties of oil and its production that are different. That does not mean to
say that the energy is determining the outcome of history or of political
struggles, and I am careful to introduce examples that do not work easily one
way or the other in the history of oil industry in Baku,
which is much more similar to the history of coal or the oil industry in
California for that matter. But you can pay attention to the technical
dimensions in a certain way, and the to the sheer possibilities that arise with
this enormous concentration of sources of energy—which reflects both an
exponential increase in the amount of energy but also an unprecedented
concentration of the sites at which energy is available and through which it
flows—that you can tell a new story about democratic politics and about that
moment in the history of industrialized countries, but also the subsequent
history in oil-producing countries in a different way. That would be an example
of how attention for technical expertise translates into a different
understanding of the politics of oil.





This leads to my next question, which is how do you
speak about materials or technologies without falling into the trap of either
radical social reductionism or a kind of Marxist technological determinism? Do
you get these accusations sometimes?



Yes,
I think so, but more so from people who have not read my work and who just hear
some talks about it or some secondary accounts. To me, so much of the
literature that already existed on these questions around oil and democracy, or
even earlier research on coal, industrialization and democracy, suffered from a
kind of technical determinism because they actually did not go into the
technical. They said: 'look, you've got all this oil' or 'look, you had all that
coal and steam power' and out of that, in a very determinist fashion, emerged
social movements or emerged political repression. This was determinist because
such accounts had actually jumped over the technical side much too fast:
talking about oil in the case of the resource curse literature, it was only
interested in the oil once it had already
become money. And once it was money, then it of course corrupts, or you buy
people off, or you do not have to seek their votes. The whole question of how
oil becomes money and how you put
together that technical system that turns oil into forms of political power or
turns coal into forms of political power, does not get opened up. And that to
me makes those arguments—even though there is not much of the technical in
them—technically very determinist. Because as soon as you start opening up the
technical side of it, you realize there are so many ways things can go and so
many different ways things can get built. Energy networks can be built in
different ways and there can be different mixes of energy. Of course most of
the differences are technical differences, but they are also human differences.
It is precisely by being very attentive to the technical aspects of
politics—like energy or anything else, it could be in agriculture, it could be
in disease, it could be in any area of collective socio-technical life—that one
finds the only way to get away from a certain kind of technical determinism
that otherwise sort of rules us. In the economics of growth, for instance,
there is this great externality of technological change that drives every sort
of grand historical explanation. Technology is just something that is kept
external to the explanatory model and accounts for everything else that the
model cannot explain. That ends up being a terrible kind of technical
determinism.



The
other half of the question is how this might differ from Marxist approaches to
some of these problems. I like to think that if Marx was studying oil, his
approach would be very little different. Because if you read Marx himself,
there is an extraordinary level of interest in the technical; that is, whether
in the technical aspects of political economy as a field of knowledge in the 19th
century, or in the factory as a technical space. So, conventional political
economy to him was not just an ideological mask that had to be torn away so
that you could reveal the true workings of capitalism. Political economy has
produced a set of concepts—notions of value, notions of exchange, notions of
labor—that actually formed part of the technical workings of capitalism. The
factory was organized at a technical level that had very specific consequences.
The trouble with a significant part of Marx's theories is that he stopped doing
that kind of technical work and Marxism froze itself with a set of categories
that may or may not have been relevant to a moment of 19th century
capitalism. There is still a lot of interesting Marxist theory going on, and
some of the contemporary Italian Marxist theory I find really interesting and
profitable to read, for example. Some of the work in Marxist geography
continues to be very productive. But at the same time there are aspects of my
work that are different from that—such as my drawing on Foucault in
understanding expertise and modes of power.





How come so many of the social sciences seem to stick
so rigidly to the human or social side of the Cartesian divide? It seems to be
constitutive of social science disciplines but on the other hand also radically
reduces the scope of what it can actually 'see' and talk about. 



I
think you are right and it has never made much sense to me. I suppose I have
approached it in two kinds of ways in my work. First, this kind of dualism was
much more clearly an object of concern in some of the early work I published on
the colonial era, including my first
book, Colonising Egypt (1988), where
I was trying to understand the process by which Europeans had, as it were, come
to be Cartesians; had come to see the world as very neatly defined it into mind
on the one hand and matter or on the other—or, as they tended to think of it,
representations on the one hand and reality on the other. And I actually looked
in some detail, at the technical level, at this—beginning with world
exhibitions, but moving on to department stores and school systems and modern
legal orders—to understand the processes by which our incredibly complicated
world was engineered so as to produce the effect of this world divided into the
two—of mind or representation or culture on the one hand, and reality, nature,
material on the other.



Second,
what were the effects, what were the repetitive practices, that made that kind
of simple dualism seem so self-evident and taken for granted? All that early
work still informs my current work, although I do not necessarily explore this
as directly as I did. One of the things I try to do is avoid all the vocabulary
that draws you into that kind of dualism. So, nowhere when I write, do I use a
term like 'culture', because you are just heading straight down that Cartesian
road as soon as you assume that there is some hermetic world of shared meanings—as opposed to what? As opposed to
machines that do not involve instructions and all kinds of other things that we
would think of as meaningful? So I just work more by avoiding some of the
dualistic language; the other kind would be the entire set of debates—in almost
every discipline of the social sciences—around the question of 'structure
versus agency' which just doesn't seems to me particularly productive. And I
have been very lucky, recently, in coming across work in the fields of science
and technology studies, because it is a field of people studying machines,
studying laboratories and studying people, a field that took nature itself as
something to be opened-up and investigated. In taking apart these things, they
realized that those kinds of dualisms made absolutely no sense. And they have
done away with them in their modes of explanation quite a long time ago. So
there was already a lot in my own work before I encountered Science and
Technology Studies (STS) that was working in that direction; but the STS people
have been at it for a long time and figured out a lot of things that I had only
just discovered.





Can you explain why it seems that perhaps implicitly
decolonization, or the postcolonial moment—which is understood within political
science and in development literature as a radical moment of rupture in which a
complete transfer of responsibility has taken place, instituted in sovereignty—is
an important theme in your work?



I
have actually been coming back to this in recent work, because I am currently
looking again at that moment of decolonization in Egypt. The period after World
War II, around the 1952 revolution and the debacle around the building and the financing of the Aswan Dam,
constitutes a wonderful way to explore questions on how much change
decolonization really engendered and to see how remarkably short-lived that
sort of optimism about decolonization, meaning a transfer of responsibility and
sovereignty, actually was. Of course decolonization did transfer responsibility
and sovereignty in all kinds of ways, but then that was exactly the problem for
the former colonial regimes: because, from their perspective, then, how were
all the people who had profited before from things like colonialism to continue
to make profits? The plan to build the High Dam at Aswan—although there has
always been Egyptians interested in it—initially got going because of some
German engineering firms… For them, there was no opportunity in doing any kind
of this large-scale work in Europe at
the time because of the dire economic situation there. But they knew that Egypt
had rapidly growing revenues from the Suez Canal and so they got together with
the British and the French, and said: let's put forward this scheme for a dam
so that we can recycle those revenues—particularly the income from the Suez
Canal, which was about to revert to Egyptian ownership—back into the pockets of
the engineering firms, or of the banks that will make the loans and charge the
fees. And that is where the scheme came from. Then the World Bank got involved,
because it too had found it had got nothing to do in Europe in the way of
development and reconstruction, so it invented this new field of development.
And it became a conduit to get the Wall Street banks involved as well. And the
whole thing became politicized and led to a rupture, which provided then the
excuse for another group, the militarists, the MI6 people, to invade and try to
overthrow Nasser. So just in the space of barely four years from that moment of
decolonization, Egypt had been reinvaded by the French, the British, working
with the Israelis, and had to deal with the consequences and the costs of
destroyed cities and military spending. That is an example of how quickly
things went wrong; but also of how part of their going wrong was in this
desperate attempt by a series of
European banks and engineering firms trying to recover the opportunities for a
certain profit-making and business that they had enjoyed in the colonial period
and now they suddenly were being deprived of. 






Last question. Has your work helped you make sense of
what is currently going on in Egypt and would you shine your enlightened light
on that a bit? Not on the whole general situation but perhaps on parts which
are overlooked or which you find particularly relevant. 



May
be in a couple of aspects. One of them is this kind of very uneasy and
disjunctive assemblage relationship between the West and forms of political Islam.
It sometimes seemed shocking and disturbing and destabilizing that the
political process in Egypt led to the rise and consolidation of power of the
Muslim Brotherhood. But of course the U.S. and other Western powers have had a
very long relationship going back at least to the 1950's—if not before—with
exactly these kinds of political forces or people who were locally in alliance
with them, in places like Saudi Arabia. I have a chapter in Carbon Democracy that explores that
relationship and its disjunctions. And I think it is important to get away from
the notion that is just a sort of electoral politics and uneasy alliances, but
it is actually the outcome of a longer problem. Both domestically within the
politics in the Arab states, of how to found a form of legitimacy that does not
seem to be based on close ideological ties with the West, but at the same time
operates in such in a way, that in practical terms, that kind of alliance can
work. So that would be one aspect of it, to have a slightly longer-term
perspective on those kinds of relationships and how disjunctively they
function.



The
other thing, drawing it a little more directly on some of the work on democracy
in Carbon Democracy, is that so much of the scholarship on democracy is about
equipping people with the right mental tools to be democrats; the right levels
of trust or interpersonal relations or whatever. There is a very different view
in my book, that the opportunities for effective democratic politics require
very different sets of skills and kinds of actions—actions that are much more
as it were obstructionist, and forms of sabotage, quite literally, in the usage
of the term as it comes into being in the early 20th century to
describe the role of strikes and stoppages. These are, I attempt to show, the
effective tools to leverage demands for representation in more egalitarian
democratic politics. I have been very interested in the case of Egypt, in the
particular places and points of vulnerability, that gave rise to the
possibility of sabotage. For instance, one of the less noted aspects of the
Egyptian revolution in general, was the very important role played by the labor
movement; this was not just a Twitter or Facebook revolution, but that was
important as well. Although the labor movement was very heavily concentrated in
industries—in the textile industry—the first group of workers who actually
successfully formed an independent union were the property tax collectors. And
there is a reason for that: there was a certain kind of fiscal crisis of the
state—which had to do with declining oil revenues and other things—and there
was the attempt to completely revise the tax system and to revise it not around
income tax—because there were too few people making a significant income to
raise tax revenues—but around property taxes.
And that was a point of vulnerability and contestation that produced not just
some of the first large-scale strikes but strikes that were effective enough
that the government was forced to recognize a newly independent labor movement.
This case is an instance of how the kind of work I did in the book might be
useful for thinking about how the revolutionary situation emerged in
Egypt. 



Timothy Mitchell is a political theorist and historian. His areas of research
include the place of colonialism in the making of modernity, the material and
technical politics of the Middle East, and the role of economics and other
forms of expert knowledge in the government of collective life. Much of his
current work is concerned with ways of thinking about politics that allow
material and technical things more weight than they are given in conventional
political theory.  Educated at Queens' College, Cambridge, where he
received a first-class honours degree in History, Mitchell completed his Ph.D.
in Politics and Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University in 1984. He joined
Columbia University in 2008 after teaching for twenty-five years at New York
University, where he served as Director of the Center for Near Eastern
Studies. At Columbia he teaches courses on the history and politics of the
Middle East, colonialism, and the politics of technical things.





Related links:





Faculty Profile at Colombia University
Read
Mitchell's Rethinking Economy (Geoforum
2008) here (pdf)
Read
Mitchell's The Limits of the State:
Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics (The American Political Science
Review 1991) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's McJihad: Islam and the U.S.
Global Order (Social Text 2002) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's The Stage of Modernity (Chapter
from book 'Questions of Modernity', 2000) here (pdf) 
Read
Mitchell's The World as Exhibition
(Chapter from book 'Colonising Egypt' 1991) here (pdf) 



Print version of this Talk (pdf)



  

In this dissertation I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyse the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. Despite attempts by developing countries to alleviate this imbalance through the New International Economic Order (NIEO), a multitude of soft law initiatives and the reluctance to address human rights issues in MNCs at the level of the United Nations failed to make MNCs incorporate human rights standards in their operations. The merging of the two concepts became increasingly more challenging throughout the 70s and 80s when the world was faced with the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism. This shift in the global legal architecture forced the Third World to take a new approach to tackle the conceptual gap, this resulted in the emergence of the Third generation of human rights and ultimately, the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. CSR presented a platform for global soft law initiatives to minimise the conceptual gap they had created over throughout the preceding decades. This allowed people such as John Ruggie to develop the Guiding Principles, the most successful initiative to date. This dissertation will provide its readers with a fruitful understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and further, what implications this had on the political and economic level. - Introduction In the words of Sundhya Pahuja and Anna Saunders, the second half of the twentieth century staged a 'series of encounters between rival practices of world making, each of which travelled with rival accounts of international law'.[1] Anti-colonial disputes, the Cold War, the rise of developmental issues and the increasing popularity of neoliberalism are only some of the events that generated these competing views of the international legal order. These events brought different coalitions across the Global North and Global South, and different 'alliances of interest between 'public' and 'private' actors'.[2] At the heart of the system that emerged lie two fundamental elements: the modern multinational corporation and human rights. How to conceptualize multinational corporations (MNCs) and how to define their relation to the law and the State was part of these rival stories. In this paper I explore the co-emergence of multinational corporations and the consolidation of the discourse on human rights at the level of the United Nations throughout the second half of the twentieth century and analyze the resulting conceptual gap that created tensions in the international legal order. In particular, I examine how this encounter, which became evident as calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were being advanced within the UN, came to produce the idea of 'Corporate Social Responsibility' (CSR). I show that CSR emerged from the failure of the NIEO, particularly in relation to the roles and responsibilities of private actors in the global economy and how this can be traced to the limits of initiatives addressing the tensions between human rights claims and the interests of multinational corporations. In so doing I provide an understanding of the crucial role that international law played in this development and the implications this had at the political and economic level. The first section of this essay examines the lack of direct use of human rights language in the UN literature focusing on MNCs and their role in world development from the 1960s to the 1970s. This includes an analysis of the report entitled 'Multinational Corporations in World Development'.[3] I demonstrate the emphasis and enthusiasm for multinational corporations displayed at the level of the United Nations and how the concepts of the corporation and human rights were kept separate due to their respective supporters during the Cold War. I then focus on the attempts by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the 'Group of 77' (G77) to bridge this conceptual gap through the imposition of policies and initiatives, though without major success. The second section analyzes the influence of the oil crisis and the rise of neoliberalism on the shift of the global legal architecture, ultimately promoting the birth of the new developmental state. Here concern is with the new legal structures' attempt to merge the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights through a third generation of human rights, [4] and I engage in theoretical approaches by legal scholars such as Samuel Moyn and Antonia Darder. In the third section investigates the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and analyzes its application and limitations. CSR is a concept of international private business self-regulation that aims at merging human, socio-economic, and political rights into the world of the corporation. As a response to the concerns for human rights violations by corporate actors, CSR slowly came to the forefront of the global business scene to enable the continuation of the operation of multinational enterprises. I demonstrate how CSR aspired to close a gap between human rights and corporate action in a way that would harmonize them through a multitude of soft law initiatives. This leads to the question of whether direct regulations can apply to MNCs under international law and a discussion of the UN Global Compact, at the time the world's largest and most far-reaching CSR initiative.[5] Finally, this paper closes with the most recent developments in the global legal order designed to tackle the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights, namely through the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises[6] and the development of the Guiding Principles. Dawn of co-existence The United Nations lies at the heart of the international regime with its normative, institutional and procedural human rights activities.[7] By adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the UN created a milestone document in the history of human rights. The Declaration has had an enormous influence on the world both in terms of 'spreading the philosophy of human rights, and in terms of inspiring legal texts and decisions'.[8] New states have used the Declaration as a basis for their constitutions, while domestic and international courts have invoked the Declaration in their judgments.[9] As human rights law developed, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, followed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, were both drafted under the auspices of the United Nations, adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976. Together, these three instruments make up the 'International Bill of Human Rights'.[10] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the world became a stage for global changes that altered the legal order. The end of colonialism dawned in the Global South, and during the height of the Cold War the West faced the Soviet Bloc and its mission of 'exporting revolution'.[11] Leaders of nationalist resistance movements received military as well as financial aid from the Soviet Bloc which intensified anti-colonial mobilization for self-determination.[12] Simultaneously, globalization was increasing rapidly, with multinational corporations emerging onto the global scene with heightened awareness of their existence as an entity with legal personality. As outlined by Sornarajah, their distinct bases of power allowed them to assert their interests through the law. With economic resources often exceeding those of their host state, MNCs had the ability to sculpt and manipulate legal outcomes through arbitration processes concerning foreign investment protection. This was done by exerting lobbying pressure on a host state which might be reluctant or even unable to object to the activities of MNCs.[13] The 'Multinational Corporations in World Development', report drafted by the UN Secretariat's Department on Economic and Social Affairs in 1973, considers 'the role of multinational corporations and their impact on the process of development, especially that of developing countries [.] [and] international relations'.[14] From the outset, the Report identifies the emerging phenomenon of the MNC in international economic affairs, how its size and spread has increased, and identifies the wide array of its activities and its use of natural resources which 'rival traditional economic exchanges between nations'.[15] It is surprising therefore, that a Report from the Department on Economic and Social Affairs, does not contain the term 'human rights' throughout the entire document. In the Report's introduction the UN makes a clear distinction between the differing views of impacts MNCs have on host countries. While 'depicted in some quarters as key instruments to maximizing world welfare, [they] are seen in others as dangerous agents of imperialism'.[16] The fact the United Nations recognized the potential neo-colonial nature of multinational corporations further highlights the need for guidance on human rights violations by MNCs. Yet the Report's reluctance to engage in the area of human rights provides a first glimpse into the divergence of the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. An explanation for this can be identified by analyzing the Conventions, on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, with the UN's reluctance to avoid tensions between the supporters of both Conventions, respectively the United States and the Soviet Union. The US pushed for the development of civil and political rights, reflecting the protection of the freedom and liberties of individuals. Stemming from a Western philosophy, John Locke identified that in a 'state of nature' humans had 'natural rights' including the right to life, liberty and property. Similarly, French legal philosophers such as Rosseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire argued that such rights emerge from the inherent nature and virtue of man.[17] As Joseph and Castan argue, 'natural rights theories were highly influential [.] particularly in the revolutionary fervor of the United States'.[18] The advancement of civil and political rights reflects the capitalist ideology of the United States, conforming to the libertarian nature of Western capitalist societies.[19] In contrast, the Soviet Union pushed for the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights. These included the right to work, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the right to physical health. Contrary to the civil and political rights, these rights were based on the idea of equality, one deeply rooted in the political ideology of socialism. As the US would not commit to a proposition that there is a right to social goods, the US has never ratified this Convention.[20] The Soviet Bloc promoted the right of self-determination by providing military and financial aid to indigenous political activists in their fight for independence; an idea enshrined in Article 1 of the Covenant which states that: 'All peoples have the right to self-determination'.[21] For the Soviets 'national self-determination was an adjunct to revolutionary communism'.[22] They envisioned self-determination as the tool for the transition from dismantling a colonial empire to establishing a socialist state.[23] However, while the United Nations was reluctant to adhere to human rights in the framework of multinational corporations, other international institutions were motivated to develop this area. The OECD attempted to impose human rights on MNCs by adopting the Guidelines for MNCs (hereinafter 'OECD Guidelines') in 1976.[24] These were 'voluntary recommendations for business practices relating to human rights, disclosure of information, anti-corruption, labour relations, taxation, the environment and consumer protection'.[25] The Guidelines were intended to strengthen the international investment climate by improving the relationship and confidence between MNCs and host countries. National Contact Points (NCPs) were created that bore the responsibilities of enforcing and promoting the Guidelines, and any natural person could make a claim related to the violation of the Guidelines.[26] This aspect of the Guidelines provided an enforcing mechanism accessible to the public. But although the Guidelines were formally adopted by member states as a corporate responsibility instrument, they were subject to widespread criticism in the international legal order. As explained by Cernic, the Guidelines are ambiguous while the NCPs are limited in their influence on host states. Even though they outlined the need to respect human rights, the obligations were not framed in mandatory terms.[27]. Since the Guidelines lacked legal basis, the OECD was unable to assert sanctions on non-compliant corporations, and critics labeled them weak and ineffective. However, it was the intention of the OECD to guide rather than to legislate, because they saw voluntary versus legally binding standards as less of a dichotomy and more a continuum.[28] Although voluntary, corporations would be under scrutiny and potentially harm their reputation if they violated the Guidelines.[29] Yet, the Guidelines were hardly successful in the international legal order. A year later, in 1977, the ILO attempted to bridge this gap by adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning MNCs and Social Policy. These also attempted to 'encourage the positive contribution the MNEs can make to economic and social progress'.[30]. Article 8 emphasizes the respect for the Universal Declaration and the International Covenants. However, its voluntary and non-binding nature, as well as its weak monitoring process made this instrument as frail as the OECD Guidelines.[31] The lack of responsibility and perseverance stemming from international organizations and their disappointing attempt at bridging the gap between multinational corporations and human rights forced national and regional change. On the one hand, developing nations began taking matters into their own hands. To portray unity and solidarity throughout the 'Third World' the G77 coalition, formed in 1964 by developing member countries with the primary intention of promoting its members' economic and humanitarian interests through cooperation at the level of the United Nations, took a strong initiative. In the late 1970s the Group expressed its concern at the 'imbalance of negotiating power between TNCs [transnational corporations] and their host countries and inability on the part of the latter to control the activities of the TNCs within their territories'.[32] Simultaneously, home countries wanted to ensure their investments abroad would be protected, 'specifically from expropriation without a commitment to compensation based on international law'.[33] In accordance with the principles and concerns of the freshly adopted NIEO, developing countries raised the issue of the dominance of MNCs over natural resources and strongly urged the UN for a reaffirmation of their sovereignty over their resources. The NIEO was an attempt by Third World developing states, in the wake of decolonization, to deploy international law to achieve economic justice and improvements in the areas of development and socio-economic rights.[34] Pushed by the G77, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) member states devised a set of NIEO proposals in 1974 including (1) that developing states are entitled to control and regulate all activities of MNCs within their territory; and (2) that international trade must be based on equitable, stable and remunerative prices for raw materials.[35] Despite its impressive aims and careful compilation, the NIEO was unsuccessful. It failed 'to displace the power and advantage held by influential states', it failed to alter international law which favoured the economic interests of capital-exporting states and, most importantly, it demonstrated the Third World's acceptance of the economic ideology of the capitalist mindset, inflating the value of foreign capital including the exploitation of local labour in developing countries.[36] Consequently, the UN set up the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations which drafted a code of conduct for TNCs, one of the first formalized instruments drafted by the UN that set an obligation upon MNCs to respect human rights in host countries.[37] However while developing countries insisted on the idea of adopting an international instrument that was binding on MNCs, developed countries were not prepared to go beyond the voluntary sets of guidelines already in place.[38] On the other hand, due to the ineffectiveness of the international institutions, some MNCs that sought to abide by human rights law attempted to create some provisions themselves. An example is the Sullivan principles designed by Leon Sullivan, former member of the General Motors' Board of Directors. These principles included the elimination of discrimination based on race, and the concept of equality in the workplace. The objective was that by engaging in human rights concepts like dignity and respect, MNCs could be a lever for the elimination of apartheid in South Africa. However, like the previously established soft law on obligations on multinational corporations, these principles were voluntary and unlike the OECD Guidelines which had the NCPs, there was no enforcement mechanism. The great majority of MNCs that adopted his principles did so with the sole motive of being able to continue to prosper in South Africa.[39] In summary, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there were attempts at a variety of levels to bring together the concepts of human rights and multinational corporations. Though it was largely absent on the level of the United Nations until the late 1970s there were many first steps by international institutions to bridge this gap. The NIEO was the first set of concrete economic principles that were prescribed in international law 'articulating a form of justice based not on domination of one people over another'.[40] It was an 'effort to assert the sovereign autonomy of the non-western world',[41] exemplifying the importance of linking human rights and development, and the fundamental values of duties of international cooperation. However, there was still much to be done as the new decade of the 1980s saw a drastic restructuring of the global trade and investment system - ultimately ending in massive international debt and a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment. A Change in the Global Legal Architecture An accumulation of capital obtained by the main oil producing states in the Middle East led to the establishment of the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Cartel in 1972. With the intention of creating a monopoly and obtaining major profits, OPEC raised the price of oil by approximately 400%, with its members keeping revenue in US or European banks, from which developing countries regularly borrowed in the form of aid and loans.[42] However, banks were now lending at higher interest rates to these countries as they were deemed less creditworthy. As a result of sovereign debt and the surplus problem in the international banking system, developing states were forced to rely on foreign direct investment (FDI), as opposed to private borrowing. The very principle that developing states wanted to control with the establishment of the NIEO was now negated by Western states selling MNCs to the developing world as necessary for their survival.[43] Simultaneously to the effects of the oil crisis, the political ideology of neoliberalism emerged on the global scene. Conservative governments gained power in western countries, communism collapsed in Eastern Europe with a move towards market economics, and Latin America implemented stabilization policies to boost their economies.[44] This process saw neoliberalism became an enemy for structural equality, political inclusion, economic access and human rights.[45] Prior to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the relationship between multinational corporations and their host state was formed through the conflict between the host country's national developmental interests as opposed to the corporation's global investment interests. The state being the more powerful actor, attempted 'to channel its private investments to serve its own developmental objectives'.[46] However, as Michael Peters argues, neoliberalism provides 'a universalist foundation for an extreme form of economic rationalism'[47], which according to Paul Haslam, was a re-forming of the modern state rather than the perceived notion of the state 'unambiguously withering away'.[48] As a result, power shifted from host countries towards multinational corporations as the era was characterized by liberalization of foreign investment rules.[49] As the United Nations World Investment Report of 2000 showed, out of the 1035 changes made in national legislation regarding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 1991 to 1999, only 5.9% were directed at restricting FDI.[50] Now more than ever before, the existence and nature of human rights were jeopardized in the sphere of multinational corporations led by neoliberal politics. Yet when analyzing human rights and neoliberalism, the two concepts have a plethora of similarities that run counter to this assertion. Samuel Moyn states that human rights and neoliberalism share (1) a predecessor and (2) a target, namely the welfarist West and the post-colonial nation state seeking economic autarky respectively.[51] Both concepts emerged and were formalized in the West. As a target, developing countries need both economic (neoliberalism) and social (human rights) elements to establish economic control. Furthermore, the two concepts share key foundational building blocks. Firstly, the principle of prioritizing the individual 'whose freedoms matter more than the collectivist endeavours' and secondly, their shared antipathy toward the state due to their rejection of its moral credentials.[52] As described by Darder, neoliberalism is characterized by a rampant greed that subsumes any notions of equality and public responsibility.[53] At the heart of this lies the ultimate subversion of human rights. When faced with the powers of global capitalism, human rights struggle to maintain themselves in the Third World. A prime example countering this thesis is the idea that human rights are a handmaiden to neoliberal policies. The argument follows that human rights are so tightly related to the role of a freely functioning market that there could be no socio-economic rights without extreme capitalism.[54] Unfortunately under this notion, human rights fall victim to being seen as dependent upon the capitalist order, creating the illusion that multinational corporations enhanced and promoted human rights in the developing World. What Wolfgang Streeck termed as 'non-market notions of social justice' became impossible to secure. Any attempt to place social commitments over economic ones were expelled, leaving market pressures to form human obligations and be governed by the dictatorship of neoliberalism.[55] The World Bank and the IMF, backed by the United States and other western states, became key in the project for liberalization, privatization, and market-friendly policies, known as the Washington Consensus. MNCs were given the protection they needed to flourish, be it proprietary or intellectual property rights. The interests of human rights on the other hand were not regarded. Though excelling and growing more than ever before, human rights had done so 'on a discrete track spearheaded internationally through the UN'.[56] Directed by developing states, human rights were intentionally dealt with by the United Nations while international economic law was being dealt with by the international institutions where they hold the balance of power.[57] Simultaneously, the developing world saw the third generation of human rights emerge as a result of anti-colonialist movements in the post-Second World War era. Newly born independent nations voiced their concerns over repeating their colonial past and demanded a new set of rights. These included the right to self-determination, the right to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. These are reflected in Declarations and Conventions such as the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960, the Proclamation of Teheran of 1968 and the Stockholm Declaration of 1972.[58] What makes this generation of human rights exceptional however is that while they reflect neither the traditional individualistic approach of the first generation, nor the socialist tradition of the second generation, they simultaneously demand certain recognitions from the state while being able to be invoked against the state. Most importantly though, as articulated by Vasak, the third generation of human rights 'can be realized only through the concerted efforts of all the actors in the social scene: the individual, the State, public and private bodies and the international community'.[59] In other words, these rights belong to the community as a collective, rather than to an individual.[60] Drafted in 1986 by the UNGA, the Declaration on the Right to Development [61] (DRD) calls for effective international cooperation towards development objectives through the enhancement of human rights and the distribution of benefits.[62] The DRD gained inspiration from the NIEO as it relied on providing equal national opportunity through measures of fair distribution of natural resources and income. Alongside neoliberal policies, the two contradicting concepts were forced to work in tandem. Foreign investment in the developing world could proceed under the neoliberal ideology as long as it did not infringe the DRD. Interestingly, the right to development was coined by the former UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development, Arjun Sengupta, as 'growth with equity'. Growth should not only focus on the economic aspect, but also emphasize human rights and the principles of justice. This focus on equity, would require a 'a change in the structure of production and distribution in the economy to ensure growth was equitable', including the required international cooperation and not having to rely on the market.[63] Though the United Nations are promoting and enhancing the development of human rights, they are disregarding the fact that their work should be focused more on the human rights aspects entailed in the market, rather than solving human rights issues outside of the market framework. The development of human rights and the regulatory frameworks supporting multinational corporations attended very different interests. The new global legal architecture born of the oil crisis and rise of neoliberalism reorganized the relations between the Global South and Global North. At this point human rights and the regulation of corporations, with their distinctive genealogies, were forced to come together, but the failure of this exercise could not be challenged until the late 1980s when the third generation of human rights provided another opportunity for the merging of the two concepts. The outcomes of these new sets of discussions produced a more clearly defined relationship between human rights and multinational corporations which, although more sophisticated, was still unable to produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, the right to development began to take root in the corporate world. For the sake of their reputations, corporations were forced to appreciate the power held by vulnerable individuals that could act together as a strong collective.[64] As Claire Dickerson argues, multinationals became more aware of their relationship with human rights not only in regards to the individual, but rather to the society as a collective.[65] These were the first formalized steps to the recognition of what came to be known as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The Heterodox Approach What became apparent in the sphere of business and human rights were two situations, (1) that states were either unable or unwilling to implement human rights; and (2) that multinational corporations acting in such states were unprepared to deal with the risks of harming human rights through their activities. This was seen especially in the private extracting sector, such as oil, gas and coal, using aggressive means to exploit remote areas and leaving large physical and social 'footprints'. Local communities began resisting the activities by the multinationals and the language of human rights became increasingly popular in challenging corporate norms.[66] Some of the world's largest MNCs had become culprits of violating human rights standards, including Nike, Shell or Yahoo. Nike was guilty of using child labour, while Shell misused public funds to practice corruption and theft at all levels.[67] The effects were reflected in local communities that resorted to violence and criminal behaviour, significantly affecting the living conditions of these areas. In the early 1990s, some corporations began adopting measures to comply with responsible business conduct. CSR was a voluntary form of business self-regulation that attended the current societal goals. It involved the creation of monitoring schemes that regulated the workplace standards and policies of the global supply chains. However, what caused CSR to emerge, was not only pressure exerted by nations that felt their human rights had been impinged, but also a wider global political ethos. With its emphasis on privatization and deregulation, neoliberalism promoted CSR initiatives in order for corporations to gain self-control and rely less on direct government initiatives. Due to its voluntary nature, CSR was not conceived as a regulatory instrument but as a learning forum to promote strategies that enhanced socially responsible policies. This included the enhancement of human rights, environmental protection and anti-corruption efforts. [68] CSR had now progressed to the forefront of the global business scene by morphing out of corporate philanthropy.[69] Corporations began adopting voluntary schemes that not only adhered to social policy, but at times even went beyond the standard set by local requirements, which occasionally created conflict between the two.[70] Unilateral corporations produced company codes, with companies such as Gap and Nike adopting theirs in 1992. This involved internal audit teams and ethics officers to be established, verifying that contractors were complying with their company's codes of conduct. Gradually, social audit teams emerged onto the global scene. As one of the most prominent, the Fair Labour Association (FLA) monitored the working conditions for some of the top athletic brands such as Nike, Puma and Patagonia. In the food industry, the label of Fair Trade emerged, ensuring for local farmers the social, economic and environmental standards they deserved. Corporations adopted CSR measures mainly to improve their reputation. However, perhaps a greater incentive for corporations to adopt CSR measures lies in the financial risks posed by community pushback as a result of human rights violations. These pushbacks cause delays in design, operation, construction, siting, granting of permits etc. Further, they can create problems and relations with local labour markets, higher costs for financing, insurance and reduced output.[71] In a study of a large multinational company that wished to remain anonymous, Goldman Sachs found that it had accrued $6.5 billion in such costs over a two year period.[72] A great percentage of these costs could be related back to the staff time in managing conflicts that arise in communities as a result of human rights violations. In some instances between 50% and 80% of an assets manager's time can be devoted to these issues. Thus, it is clear that in this lose-lose situation, where MNCs violate human rights and thus incur losses, it makes sound corporate sense to adopt some sort of CSR measures.[73] Despite the improvements and the clear step forward the business world took in addressing human rights, CSR involved limitations and fragmentations that challenged its success. It was built on the assumption that it is an effective mechanism for a corporation to positively reconnecting with the community it is based in. Thus, in practice, CSR operates under the presumption that society has granted authority to corporations with naturally applying legal responsibilities.[74] In 2000 John Ruggie conducted research in the Fortune Global 500 and a wider range of corporations to assess the extent and success of voluntary initiatives promoting human rights. Staff monitoring schemes had evolved, demands by socially responsible investors had grown, and large public sector funds all aided in this development. However, the research also found 'company-based initiatives fell short as a stand-alone approach'.[75] Most companies still did not have the capabilities of managing human rights risks and instead were acting on a reactive based notion. Moreover, it was within the company's discretion to decide which human rights the company would address and furthermore how to define its measures. Thus, their voluntary nature could often be used as a camouflage to delay real reform.[76] A logical response to such a broad limitation would be to impose direct obligations under international law upon MNCs. Though only states and international organizations have legal standing in international law, the general view on this contention is that it would be possible to impose obligations upon MNCs due to their major economic and political influence as explained earlier, and their capabilities of influencing the enjoyment of human rights.[77] However, as explained by Zerk, the challenge lies in 'developing jurisprudence which refines and makes precise the vague aspirational statements [.] in the CSR debate'.[78] However, as the law stands, the most promising and efficient method for applying obligations on multinational corporations remains to be the national courts. Yet the fact that claims must be raised as a tort-based litigation proving a violation of domestic tort principles rather than claiming a violation under international human rights casts doubt over this method. An interesting exception to this is the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789. The tort states that district courts 'have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violations of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States'.[79] The original intention of the statute was to establish a civil remedy for violation of international law norms such as piracy, mistreatment of ambassadors and the violation of safe conducts.[80] This piece of legislation lay dormant until the 1980s when human rights lawyers discovered its potential for foreign plaintiffs to raise a claim for certain human rights abuses against an individual of any nationality, or a corporation as long as they had a presence in the United States. The question whether the Act could be enforced against a corporation was considered in 2012 in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Kiobel.[81] The court held that there was a presumption against extraterritoriality applying to claims under the Statute. There is therefore no application of the statute abroad unless it is explicitly stated in the international law which is the subject of the claim.[82] As stated by John Ruggie in his advice to the Human Rights Council in 2007 'no single silver bullet can resolve the business and human rights challenge. A broad array of measures is required, by all relevant actors.'[83] Ultimately, as a measure to seek guidance on the matter, this led to the UN Global Compact in 2000, the largest global CSR initiative.[84] The UN Global Compact was a strategic policy initiative posed by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that aimed at improving corporate conditions in areas such as human rights, environmental protection and labour rights.[85] It was a prospective and hopeful initiative that was designed as a learning forum to develop, implement and disclose sustainability principles among corporate actors.[86] At its time, the Global Compact was the most far-reaching, non-governmental set of policies aimed at catalyzing the voluntary nature in the corporate citizenship movement.[87] Legal scholars such as Meyer and Stefanova felt the Global Compact could shape the relationship between MNCs and human rights through 'rewarding responsible TNCs [MNCs], while shaming at least some of the irresponsible TNCs [MNCs] into better promoting human rights'.[88] Their only concern about the extent of the success of the Global Compact lay, in the Global Compact's voluntary nature. Comparing it to the OECD Guidelines implemented 25 years earlier, an initiative like the Global Compact will only be successful if there is commitment to the initiative at all levels of the international system. Thus, the main task is to put a human face on globalization through the values and principles shared by the people, the corporation and the state.[89] However, Aravalo and Fallon dispute this. Published in 2008, their Report uses the Compact Quarterly and UNGC Annual Review to critique the Global Compact's activities and practices throughout its eight years of existence. Published by local networks and the UN respectively, they evaluate new businesses adhering to the Global Compact, as well as Global Compact practices and responses. Aravalo and Fallon found that after evaluating the various progress reports, the Global Compact falls short of being a successful initiative. According to the UNGC Annual Review, there are a multitude of gaps existing in the Global Compact framework. Research instruments for instance, under the principles of human rights and labour protection, have been deemed as inadequate as participants have failed to voice their concern over the protection of such rights within their corporation. The Global Compact has solely used online surveys to administer data, which smaller businesses are often unwilling or unable to provide. The methodology applied by the Global Compact was ambiguous and did not show the extent of the success of CSR initiatives.[90] Alavaro and Fallon argue that it would be highly beneficial for the Global Compact to re-think its methodology process of evaluating its success by introducing a chronological component into its future research models. [91] It would allow for a clearer comparison not only for participants of the Global Compact, but also for the comparison with non-Compact companies in the area of corporate responsibility.[92] As a result of this poor research methodology, the Global Compact has difficulty assessing its direct influence on the broad and voluntary concept of CSR. There are key principles of CSR that fail to receive the attention they deserve in the scope of the Global Compact. However, this is not to say that the Global Compact has been an outright failure. The Annual Review, though lacking quantifiable data, has provided a wide array of case studies providing evidence for the practical influence of the Global Compact on participants. These include programs in education and working relationships the Global Compact has encouraged and facilitated. It can be said therefore, that the Global Compact is making a difference, even if only in these cases. Until shortly after the turn of the millennium, neither company codes nor multilateral initiatives such as Global Compact, successfully achieved the necessary, concrete obligations in regard to human rights and environmental protection demands. This was set to change with the arrival of the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Norms). Drafted in 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights attempted to merge the concepts of MNCs and human rights and transform these newly developed principles into hard law. The intention was to impose human rights obligations upon companies through the domestic legal systems of their host countries. The Norms clearly express that 'states retain primary, overarching responsibility for human rights protection' and that corporations are identified as 'Duty-bearers' based on that expectation of following human rights principles.[93] The expectations expressed by the Norms are supported by enforcement mechanisms for their implementation which address the requirements that MNCs must adopt in terms of their internal practice. Furthermore, there are a multitude of rights that go beyond what is traditionally accepted as international human rights law. Examples include rights associated with consumer protection, the environment or corruption which are covered by different areas of the law.[94] However, the Norms failed to achieve promising results. Described as a 'train wreck' by John Ruggie, the Norms fell under heavy criticisms for a plethora of reasons. Firstly, the Norms fall under heavy scrutiny for attempting to impose obligations upon corporations, while simultaneously imposing parallel obligations on the state. The intention was to address the fact that MNCs operate in a legal vacuum due to their status of acting as a multinational. To alleviate this issue, it was thought that binding MNCs to hard international law would be the best option. On the one hand, minimalists argue that binding multinational corporations to international law is not an appropriate method as this would go beyond the concept of soft law initiatives such as Global Compact. This argument is developed by stating that binding corporations to international law would 'privatise human rights'. The Norms would be placing obligations on an entity that was never democratically elected, nor eligible to make reasonable decisions in regard to human rights at the level of international law.[95] On the other hand, maximalists lobby for a judicial body solely focused on the practice of multinational corporations and argue that corporations should be bound by international law.[96] Secondly, there was severe backlash against the Norms from states, corporations and businesses who argued that there was a lack of consultation from the Sub-Commission when drafting the Norms. However, this argument has since been disputed by institutions such as the Corporate Europe Conservatory or the scholars Weissbrodt and Kruger.[97] In regard to the discontent presented by states, many argued that there was a lack of involvement on their behalf in the Norms' development. As stated by Kinely, Nolan and Zerial, it is of vital importance that in issues revolving around CSR and their wide variety of stakeholders, everyone's voice must be heard when protecting human rights.[98] Thirdly, issues were raised regarding the language used by the Norms. Terms like 'sphere of influence'[99] and 'complicity' were deemed as vague and unclear.[100] It is agreed upon, even by supporters of the Norms, that such terms must be defined more definitively and where possible, draw definitions from more grounded areas of the law like criminal law, tort or contract law. This attitude towards the Norms from corporations shows the extent of their distrust and the scare factor used to attempt to dismantle the Norms.[101] However, even though the Norms failed as a concept, as Kinley, Nolan and Zerial maintain, 'the Norms have been a beneficial and fruitful initiative, reinvigorating debate on business and human rights'.[102] Previous to the imposition of the Norms, CSR had found itself in a position that was stagnant, focusing solely on codes of conduct that should be implemented by corporations using a bottom-up approach. The Norms altered the position of CSR to now provide a top-down approach and provided human rights activists with hope that human rights protection in regard to multinational corporations was now in the hands of the United Nations. However, the reactions to the Norms from the CSR community varied. CSR had been a newly emerging concept which was still unclear when fitted into the international legal order. It was still in its early years of development with highly broad-reaching initiatives in the fields of both soft and hard law. The playing field for CSR was simply too big for such an underdeveloped concept to handle. Further, it was attempted to implement CSR through domestic laws and quasi-legal initiatives raised to the level of international law. It is therefore often perceived that the implementation of the Norms were an attempt to remedy CSR by uniting these various aspects into one document at the level of the United Nations. The Norms conjoined national and international levels of CSR while maintaining that states continued to hold the primary responsibility of ensuring that businesses protect human rights. The world was a 'deeply divided arena of discourse and contestation lacking shared knowledge, clear standards and boundaries; fragmentary and often weak governance systems concerning business and human rights in states and companies alike'.[103] A range of governments still expressed their demand for further attention to be given to the relationship between human rights and the practices of multinational corporations. Thus, the United Nations appointed a team led by John Ruggie to establish the Guiding Principles. Rather than establishing a new international framework as was previously attempted with the Norms, Ruggie was 'urged [.] to focus on identifying and promoting good practices and providing companies with tools to enable them to deal voluntarily with the complex cluster of business and human rights challenges'.[104] Ruggie moved away from the traditional 'mandatory approach' which involved the compliance of national laws in correspondence to a corporation's voluntary measures and practices, to a heterodox approach. This heterodox approach was devised to create an environment of mixed reinforcing policy measures that provided cumulative change and large-scale success. The Guiding Principles lay on three foundations: (1) the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; (2) the responsibility by corporations to respect human rights and the implied obligation of acting in due diligence; and (3) the need for greater access to remedies for victims. However, there are two things that the Guiding Principles fail to accomplish. Firstly, to create binding international law and instead rely on normative contributions which further elaborate the implications of existing standards. Secondly, the Guiding Principles 'fail to ensure the right to an effective remedy and the need for States' measures to prevent abuses committed by their companies overseas'.[105] Amnesty International goes further by reiterating that aside from lacking accountability measures, the Guiding Principles should mandate a due diligence approach rather than only recommending it, as this would solve internal as well as extraterritorial accountability issues. Alongside Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch criticized the Guiding Principles for not adopting a global standard in corporate responsibility, and instead resort to a 'sliding scale' based on a corporation's size and geographic location.[106] However, when compared to other governance regimes in the past and present, the Guiding Principles seem to be a robust framework. Although various human rights organizations and NGOs identify neglect of human rights in the framework of MNCs, the Guiding Principles reiterate business as an instrument to contribute to societal welfare.[107] Thus, it acts as a basis for the empowerment of society and a benchmark to judge practices and conduct of corporations and governments.[108] Conclusion The discourse of the co-emergence of multinational corporations and human rights took the world by storm. The ongoing globalization of multinational corporations and the evolution of the concept of human rights were born attending different aims in the global legal order. Their greatest challenge however was not necessarily their harmonization and co-existence, but more importantly co-existing under the intentional gap created through the world's largest and most influential actor, the United Nations. This was clearly visible in the 1960s and 1970s. Throughout the various Reports and Declarations that were passed through the international institution, the two concepts were kept separate. While the United Nations was enthusiastic for the growth of both MNCs and human rights, it intentionally avoided discussing the harmonization of both concepts. Due to the underlying pressures imposed on the United Nations by the tensions from the Cold War, the UN was left in a legal vacuum unable to merge the two distinctive genealogies. The global international legal order was unaware of the extent of the importance of such a gap being eradicated before adopting a resolution as complex as the NIEO. Thus, from this point onwards, the NIEO was therefore already bound to be unsuccessful. Not only had international law not developed enough to impose such obligations upon MNCs, the corporations themselves were not aware of the ramifications and necessity for abiding human rights obligations as I showed in the third section of this dissertation. Enthusiasm for further initiatives such as the push by the G77 or the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations was only short lived. The events of the 1980s greatly disrupted the already turbulent environment of the global international legal order creating a greater gap between the concepts of multinational corporations and human rights. The 1980s became a stage which saw a great change in the global legal structure. The NIEO was an already broken concept from the outset as the conceptual gap had already created a disparity in the relationship between MNCs and human rights. This meant that although they were not aware of it at the time, the Global South could not rely on the imposition of the NIEO. Fostering the Western neoliberal policies, the conceptual gap between MNCs and human rights was now well established. For human rights to become a globally instructed concept, MNCs are a useful tool to spread, promote and enhance human rights across the globe. This of course is under the condition that the MNC does not violate human rights. From the other perspective MNCs rely on human rights in terms of their societal and financial risks. It becomes clear that when this is not realized by the proponents of both concepts, it can lead to major discrepancies and disparities as was proven in the Global South during this period. If there had not been this conceptual gap, and instead there had been a clear and devised relationship between MNCs and human rights, the effects of the oil crisis and neoliberalism would not have left the detrimental mark in developing countries that they did, potentially allowing the NIEO to prevail. However, the ongoing persistence of developing countries and their call for the third generation of human rights to gain prominence forced MNCs to catch up with their relationship to human rights. What emerged, were essentially the first initiatives and practices of CSR. CSR was heavily affected by the fact that it relied on the voluntary nature of businesses to adhere to as well as practice CSR. Even though corporations had an incentive to adopt CSR measures, weak monitoring systems allowed violations to still occur on a grand scale. The issue was that the multinational corporation as a concept was still unclear and lacked definition and that tying MNCs down with hard international law was not possible due to the diversity of MNCs. CSR allowed for too large a divergence from the issue at hand and required to approach human rights at a different angle. This was the key reason for the partial success of the Guiding Principles. Ruggie's unconventional, heterodox approach provided clarity and distinct concepts that individuals, business and states could adhere to. Although the conceptual gap has still not vanished, the UN has after an array of various attempts, managed to narrow the gap that it had created almost sixty years ago by continuously forcing society to rethink and redefine the relationship. What exactly lies in the future is uncertain and impossible to foresee. It can be said with great certainty however, that if initiatives such as Global Compact or the Guiding Principles are enhanced and given more attention, the world will be faced with a much clearer and concise relationship between multinational corporations and human rights. Focusing on monitoring mechanisms, methodological research and greater transparency and accountability among all actors involved will undoubtedly seal the conceptual gap that has caused the international legal order to experience such unsettling times. [1] Pahuja, Sundhya. Saunders, Anna. Rival Worlds and the place of the Corporation in International Law in Dann and Von Bernstorff (eds). Decolonisation and the Battle for International Law (OUP, 2018) p.1 [2] Ibid. [3] UN, Multinational Corporations in World Development ST-ECA/190 [4] Linarelli, John. Salomon, Margot. Sornarajah M. The Misery of International Law. (OUP, 2018) p.245 [5] Ruggie, John. Just Business. (W.W. Norton & Company, 2013) p.70 [6] United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 [7] Alston, Philip. Mégret, Frédéric. (eds) The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Second Edition, OUP, 2020) p.1 [8] Clapham, Andrew. Human Rights: A Very Short Introduction (OUP, 2007) p.42 [9] (n.8) p.108. [10] ibid . p.109 [11] Allina, Eric. Imperialism and the Colonial Experience in Paul A. Haslam, Jessica Schafer and Pierre Beaudet, Introduction to International Development (3rd Edition, OUP, 2017), pp. 24-42. p.39 [12] Ibid. p. 40 [13] Sornarajah M. International Law on Foreign Investment (CUP, 2010) p.5 [14] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Multinational Corporations in World Development, 1973 ST-ECA/190 p.VI [15] ibid. p.1 [16] ibid. [17] Joseph, Sarah. Castan, Melissa. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials. (3rd Edition, OUP, 2013) p.4 [18] ibid. p.5 [19] ibid. [20] Alston, Philip. U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy. The American Journal of International Law Vol.84, No.2 (CUP,1990) pp.365-393, p.4 [21] UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Article 1 [22] Simpson, Gerry. The Diffusion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age (Ashgate Publishing, 2000) p.266 [23] Ibid. [24] Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976 [25] Carasco, Emily. Singh, Jang. Towards Holding Transnational Corporations Responsible for Human Rights. European Business Review Vol.22, No.4, (Emerald Publishing Group, 2010). p.4 [26] Cernic, Jernei. 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Collected data and research material presented in the monograph are a result of financing of the Polish science budget in the years 2011−14; the research project was financed by the National Science Centre according to decision no. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. The project that resulted in this monograph was financed from public funds for education for 2011 − 2014, the National Science Center under Contract No. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. ; Value-Based Working Capital Management analyzes the causes and effects of improper cash flow management between entrepreneurial organizations with varying levels of risk. This work looks at the motives and criteria for decision-making by entrepreneurs in their efforts to protect the financial security of their businesses and manage financial liquidity. Michalski argues that businesses exposed to greater risk need a different approach to managing liquidity levels. The scientific aim of this monograph is to present the essence of financial liquidity management under specific conditions faced by enterprises with risk and uncertainty. Enterprises differ from one another in risk sensitivity. This difference affects the area of taking decisions by the managers of those enterprises. The result of interactions between levels of liquidity and sensitivity to risk affects the managers of such enterprises (Altman 1984; Tobin 1958; Back 2001; Tobin 1969). In this monograph the research hypothesis is the claim that enterprises with a higher sensitivity to risk are very different from enterprises with a lower sensitivity to risk, resulting in a different approach to managing their working capital. Enterprise managing teams react to risk, and this reaction is adjusted by an enterprise's sensitivity to risk. Because of its subject area, the book will address the issues of corporate finance. The monograph discusses the behavior of enterprises and the relationships between them and other factors in the market occurring in the management process under the conditions of limited resources. As a result of these interactions with the market and the environment in which individuals who manage enterprises operate, there is an interaction between money and real processes that in the end are the cornerstone of wealth building. This chapter discusses the objectives and nature of enterprises in the context of their risk sensitivity, as well as the relationships between the objectives of enterprises and the characteristic features of their businesses. Enterprises operate in various business environments, but generally speaking, they all have one main aim: wealth creation for their owners. The realization of that aim depends on an idea of business in which the enterprise is an instrument to collect money from clients of the enterprise's services and products. Business environment is crucial not only for future enterprise cash inflows from the market but also for risk and uncertainty (Asch, and Kaye 1997; Copeland, and Weston 1988; Fazzari, and Petersen 1993). According to the author, it is necessary to include an understanding of that risk and uncertainty of future in the rate that reduces the net size of free cash flows for the enterprise owners, beneficiaries, or more generally stakeholders. Enterprise value creation is the main financial aim of the firm in relation to working capital components (Graber 1948; Jensen, and Meckling 1976; Lazaridis, and Trifonidis 2006). Working capital management is a part of a general enterprise strategy to its value maximization (Laffer 1970; Kieschnick, Laplante, and Moussawi 2009; Lyland, and Pyle 1977). This chapter presents a definition of financial liquidity and liquidity-level measurements. This chapter contains four subchapters that address the specific role of short-term financial decisions, a classification of definitions of financial liquidity, sources of information about liquidity level, and liquidity-level measurements (Lazaridis and Tryfonidis 2006; Long, Malitz, and Ravid 1993; Kieschnick, Laplante, and Moussawi 2009). Financial liquidity definition and liquidity-level measurements Here we have an opportunity to present the author's opinion on what assets should be financed with short-term funds and what the level of liquidity is in an enterprise (Michalski 2012a). The discussion also pertains to the issue of the dividing line between long-term and short-term decisions, with greater emphasis on the durability of their effects, rather than the decision-making speed. This section also attempts to answer the question: What are the short-term effects of operations under conditions of uncertainty and risk? The reason for the considerations in this section is the need to characterize the decisions that affect the level of enterprise liquidity. The research hypothesis of this monograph assumes that differences between more risk sensitive and less risk sensitive enterprises are seen in liquidity management. Simply because the enterprises, during financial liquidity management, take into account the differences in their risk sensitivity. This chapter discusses the relationship between firm value and business risk sensitivity. The chapter starts with a presentation of intrinsic liquidity value and firm reactions to market liquidity value. This is the basis for target liquidity level in the enterprise. Liquid assets are the main part of working capital assets, so the next part of the chapter focuses on working capital investment strategies and strategies of financing such investments in working capital in the context of firm value creation. The chapter concludes that, from a firm-value-creation point of view, more risk-sensitive entities should use flexible-conservative strategies, while less risk-sensitive entities have the freedom to use restrictive-aggressive strategies. In the context of a crisis, this is the clear answer and explanation for higher levels of working capital investments observed empirically during and after a crisis. The determinants of intrinsic value of liquidity are attributed to liquidity by enterprise management. Enterprises in which financial liquidity has a high internal value will have a tendency to maintain reasonable liquid resource assets at a higher level. The levels of stocks of funds maintained by enterprises are also the result of the relationship between the liquidity market value and the intrinsic value of liquidity. It demonstrates how to approach the estimation of liquidity and presents the market value of liquidity. Having connected this information with the knowledge of manifestations of the internal liquidity, we can offer an explanation as to why the target (and also probably the optimal) level of liquidity for enterprises with higher-than-average risk sensitivity is at a higher level than the corresponding target (optimal) level for enterprises with a lower level of risk sensitivity. Working capital value-based management models In this part of the monograph we discuss the items contained within the cost of maintaining inventory. Using this approach, a model of managing inventories is presented. Theoretically, the value-maximizing optimal level of inventory is determined to be the modified EOQ model, presented as VBEOQ model. We also present an outline of issues associated with the risk of inventory management and its impact on the value of the enterprise for its owner. We also discuss the principle of the optimal batch production model and how the size of the production batch affects the value of the enterprise for its owner. Here also is demonstrated a modification of the POQ model: VBPOQ. The proposed modification takes into account the rate of the cost of capital financing and the measures involved in inventory when determining the optimal batch production. When managing the commitment of the inventory, it is crucial to take into account the impact of such decisions on the long-term effectiveness of the enterprise. This chapter also discusses the relationships between the management of accounts receivables and the value of a business. A modified (considering the value of a business) model of incremental analysis of receivables is presented, as is a discussion of the importance of capacity utilization by an enterprise for making management decisions pertaining to accounts receivables. Issues related to the management of working capital and enterprise liquidity are and will be an area of research. The analysis in this study focused primarily on working capital and liquidity management; understanding its specifics will facilitate the management of liquidity in any type of organization. Working capital as a specific buffer against risk has its special role during a crisis and can serve as a good forecasting indicator about future economic problems in the economy if a whole business environment notices higher levels of working capital and its components, like cash, inventories, and accounts receivables. The scientific value of the issues discussed in the book is associated with the issue of working capital and liquidity management in enterprises. It is also a result of the exploration and definition of the main financial objective of businesses and the relationship between the objective and the management of working capital and enterprise liquidity. The choice of topic and the contents of research resulted also from empirical observation. Empirical data on enterprises that operate in countries touched by the last crisis document higher-than-average levels of working capital before, during, and after the crisis in these enterprises. These conditions provided the means for a "natural experiment" of sorts. From that point, working capital management theory faced a necessity of even wider development. ; Collected data and research material presented in the monograph are a result of financing of the Polish science budget in the years 2011−14; the research project was financed by the National Science Centre according to decision no. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. The project that resulted in this monograph was financed from public funds for education for 2011 − 2014, the National Science Center under Contract No. DEC-2011/01/B/HS4/04744. ; How to Cite this Book Harvard Grzegorz Michalski . (April 2014). Value-Based Working Capital Management . [Online] Available at: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137391834. (Accessed: 28 May 2014). APA Grzegorz Michalski . (April 2014). Value-Based Working Capital Management . Retrieved from http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137391834 MLA Grzegorz Michalski . Value-Based Working Capital Management . (April 2014) Palgrave Macmillan. 28 May 2014. Vancouver Grzegorz Michalski . Value-Based Working Capital Management [internet]. New York: Palgrave Macmillan; April 2014. [cited 2014 May 28]. Available from: http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/10.1057/9781137391834 OSCOLA Grzegorz Michalski , Value-Based Working Capital Management , Palgrave Macmillan April 2014 ; Author Biography Grzegorz Michalski is Assistant Professor of Corporate Finance at the Wroclaw University of Economics, Poland. His main areas of research are Business Finance and Financial Liquidity Management. He is currently studying the liquidity decisions made by organizations. He is the author or co-author of over 80 papers and 10 books, and sits on the editorial board of international conferences and journals. Reviews 'Due to the recent financial crisis, interest in the topic of working capital has grown significantly to both theory and practice. The research results presented by Grzegorz Michalski contribute to the development of a comprehensive theory of liquidity management and the creation of an integrated working capital and liquidity for different types of business model. The job is processed on a high quality level." -Marek Panfil, Ph.D, Director of Business Valuation Department Warsaw School of Economics 'The book of Grzegorz Michalski is a very good publication that has found the right balance between theory and practical aspects of financial liquidity management. It is extremely timely and valuable, and should be required reading for all corporate finance practitioners, academicians, and students of finance. Value-Based Working Capital Management is comprehensive, highly readable publication, and replete with useful practical examples. It has also enabled corporate leaders to make better-informed decisions in their efforts to protect the financial security of their businesses and manage financial liquidity.' -Petr Polak, Author of Centralization of Treasury Management, and Associate Professor of Finance, University of Brunei Darussalam ; REFERENCES Introduction Adner, R., and D. A. Levinthal (2004). "What Is Not a Real Option: Considering Boundaries for the Application of Real Options to Business Strategy." Academy of Management Review 29(1). Altman, E. (1984). "A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question." Journal of Finance 39. Back, P. (2001). "Testing Liquidity Measures as Bankruptcy Prediction Variables." 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Text finalised on December 15th, 2024. This Nota Internacional is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team. Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, with contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Jordi Bacaria, Pol Bargués, Javier Borràs, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Daniel Castilla, Carmen Claudín, Patrizia Cogo, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Patrícia Garcia-Duran, Víctor García, Seán Golden, Rafael Grasa, Josep M. Lloveras, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Oscar Mateos, Pol Morillas, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Laia Tarragona and Alexandra Vidal. 2025 begins with more questions than answers. The world has already voted and now it is time to see what policies await us. What impact will the winning agendas have? How far will the unpredictability of Trump 2.0 go? And, above all, are we looking at a Trump as a factor of change or a source of commotion and political fireworks?In 2025 there will be talk of ceasefires, but not of peace. The diplomatic offensive will gain ground in Ukraine, while the fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad opens an uncertain political transition. These movements will test an international system incapable of resolving the structural causes of conflicts.The world is struggling with the posturing of new leaderships, the shifting landscapes that are redefining long-running conflicts and a Sino-US rivalry that may develop into a trade and tech war in the near future. Fear, as a dynamic that permeates policies, both in the migration field and in international relations, will gain ground in 2025.2025 will be a year of post-election hangover. The world has now cast its vote, and it has done so in many cases from a place of anger, discontent or fear. Over 1.6 billion people went to the polls in 2024 and in general they did so to punish the parties in power. The list of defeated rulers is a long one: US Democrats, UK Conservatives, "Macronism" in France, the Portuguese left. Even those who weathered the storm have been weakened, as shown by the election debacle of Shigeru Ishiba's ruling party in Japan, or the coalitions necessary in the India of Narendra Modi or the South Africa of Cyril Ramaphosa.The election super-cycle of 2024 has left democracy a little more bruised. The countries experiencing a net decline in democratic performance far outnumber those managing to move forward. According to The Global State of Democracy 2024 report, four out of nine states are worse off than before in terms of democracy and only around one in four have seen an improvement in quality. 2025 is the year of Donald Trump's return to the White House and of a new institutional journey in the European Union (EU) underpinned by unprecedentedly weak parliamentary support. The West's democratic volatility is colliding with the geopolitical hyperactivity of the Global South and the virulence of armed conflict hotspots. Which is why 2025 begins with more questions than answers. With the polls closed and the votes counted, what policies await us ? What impact will the winning agendas have? How far will the unpredictability of Trump 2.0 go? And, above all, are we looking at a Trump as a factor of change or a source of commotion and political fireworks?







Even if the United States today is a retreating power and power has spread to new actors (both public and private) who have been challenging Washington's hegemony for some time now, Donald Trump's return to the presidency means the world must readjust. Global geopolitical equilibriums and the various conflicts raging – particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East – as well as the fight against climate change or the levels of unpredictability of a shifting international order could all hinge on the new White House incumbent. The fall of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad opens an uncertain political transition, which reinforces the idea that 2025 will be a year of need for diplomatic processes that accompany the geopolitical rebalancing that may come in the coming months.We also live in a world still weighed down by the impact of COVID-19. Five years after the coronavirus pandemic, many countries continue to grapple with the debt they took on to combat the economic and social damage of that global health crisis. The pandemic left us a world deeper in debt, one that is more digitalised and individualistic, where the discordant voices among the major global powers have been gaining ground; where climate, economic and geopolitical goals are becoming increasingly divergent. It is a world in which not only policies clash, but discourses too. The old social and cultural fault lines have become more evident: from culture wars to the struggle for control over information and algorithmically inflated bubbles on social media. The elections in the United States, Pakistan, India, Romania, Moldova or Georgia are a clear illustration of the destabilising power of "alternative" narratives.







The US election hangover, then, will not be the type to be cured with rest and a broth. Trump himself will see to ramping up the political posturing as he makes his return to the Oval Office starting January 20th. Yet, above the rhetorical noise, it is hard to distinguish what answers will be put in place, to what extent we are entering a year that will further reinforce the barriers and withdrawal that have turned society inwards and fragmented global hyperconnectivity; or if, on the other hand, we shall see the emergence of a still tentative determination to imagine alternative policies that provide answers to the real causes of discontent and try to reconstruct increasingly fragile consensuses. 1-EGO-POLITICS AND INDIVIDUALISM2025 is the year of posturing and personalism. We shall see the emergence not just of new leaderships, but also of new political actors. The magnate Elon Musk's entry into the campaign and Donald Trump's new administration personify this shift in the exercise of power. The world's richest individual, clutching the loudest megaphone in a digitalised society, is stepping into the White House to act as the president's right-hand man. Musk is a "global power", the holder of a political agenda and private interests that many democratic governments do not know how to negotiate. In this shift in power (both public and private) the cryptocurrency industry accounted for nearly half of all the money big corporations paid into political action committees (PACs) in 2024, according to a report by the progressive NGO Public Citizen. The last political cycle – from 2020 to 2024 – was characterised by "election denialism": a losing candidate or party disputed the outcome of one in five elections. In 2025, this denialism has reached the Oval Office. The myth of the triumphant narcissist has been bolstered by the ballot box. It is the triumph of ego over charisma. Some call it "ego-politics".Ever more voices are challenging the status quo of democracies in crisis. Anti-politics is taking root in the face of mainstream parties that are drifting ever further away from their traditional voters. Trump himself believes he is the leader of a "movement" (Make America Great Again, or MAGA) that transcends the reality of the Republican Party. These new anti-establishment figures have gradually gained ground, allies and prophets. From the illiberal media phenomenon of the Argentinian president Javier Milei – who will face his first big test in the parliamentary elections of October – to Călin Georgescu, the far-right candidate for the presidency of Romania who carved a niche for himself against all odds, without the support of a party behind him and thanks to an anti-establishment campaign targeting young people on TikTok. He is the latest example of a 2024 that has also seen the arrival in the European Parliament of the Spanish social media personality Alvise Pérez and his Se Acabó la Fiesta ("The Party's Over") platform, garnering over 800,000 votes, or the Cypriot youtuber Fidias Panayiotou, among whose achievements to date number having spent a week in a coffin and having managed to hug 100 celebrities, Elon Musk included. All this also has an impact on a Europe of weak leaderships and fractured parliaments, with the Franco-German engine of European integration feebler than ever. Indeed, the hyper-presidentialism of Emmanuel Macron, who also embraced the idea of the En Marche movement to dismantle the Fifth Republic's system of traditional parties, will have to navigate 2025 as a lame duck, with no possibility of calling legislative elections again until June. Germany, meanwhile, will go to the polls in February with an ailing economic model, rampant social discontent and doubts about the guarantees of clarity and political strength that might be delivered by elections that have the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) lying second in the polls. In 2025, we shall also see an escalation of the political drama in the Philippines between the country's two most powerful political clans, brought on by the toxic relationship between the president, Fernando "Bongbong" Marcos, and his vice president, Sara Duterte, and which includes death threats and corruption accusations. The return to politics of the former president, Rodrigo Duterte, nicknamed the "Asian Trump", who in November registered his candidacy for the mayoralty of Davao, and the midterm elections in May will deepen the domestic tension and division in the archipelago. In South Korea, meanwhile, 2024 is ending with signs of resistance. President Yoon Suk Yeol, also considered an outsider who triumphed in what was dubbed the incel election of 2022, faced popular protests and action by the country's main trade unions after declaring martial law in response to political deadlock. The Korean Parliament has voted to initiate an impeachment process to remove Yoon Suk Yeol and, if it goes ahead, the country will hold elections before springThe year also starts with individualism on the rise. We live in a more emotional and less institutional world. If fear and anger have become what drive people when it comes to voting, this growing sense of despair is worryingly high among young people. In the 2024 European elections there was a decline in turnout among the under-25s. Only 36% of voters from this age group cast their ballot, a 6% decrease in turnout from the 2019 elections. Among the young people who failed to vote, 28% said the main reason was a lack of interest in politics (a greater percentage than the 20% among the adult population as a whole); 14% cited distrust in politics, and 10% felt their vote would not change anything. In addition, according to the Global Solidarity Report, Gen Z feel less like global citizens than previous generations, reversing a trend lasting several decades. This is true for both rich and poorer countries. The report also notes the perceived failure of the international institutions to deliver tangible positive impacts (such as reducing carbon emissions or conflict-related deaths). Disenchantment fuses with a profound crisis of solidarity. People from wealthy countries are "significantly less likely to support solidarity statements than those in less wealthy countries", and this indifference is especially evident in relation to supporting whether international bodies should have the right to enforce possible solutions.







2-TRUCE WITHOUT PEACE A year of global geopolitical turmoil ended with the surprise collapse of the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria; but also, with a three-way meeting between Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Emmanuel Macron in Paris, against the backdrop of the reopening of Notre Dame. The rhythms of diplomacy and the quickening pace of war are out of step on international political agendas. And Russia, the common thread running through recent events in Syria and Ukraine, is quick to issue a reminder that any diplomatic moves must also go through Moscow. Given this backdrop, in 2025 we may speak of ceasefires, but not of peace. For starters, the electoral announcements of a Trump intent on putting an end to the war in Ukraine "in 24 hours" prompted an escalation of hostilities on the ground with various actions: the appearance on the scene of North Korean soldiers in support of the Russian troops; authorisation for Ukraine to use US ATACMS missiles for attacks on Russian soil; and the temporary closure of some Western embassies in Kyiv for security reasons. Speculation about possible negotiations has increased the risk of a tactical escalation to reinforce positions before starting to discuss ceasefires and concessions. While the diplomatic offensive may gain traction in 2025, it remains to be seen what the plan is, who will sit at the table and what real readiness the sides will have to strike an agreement. Ukraine is torn between war fatigue and the need for military support and security guarantees that the Trump administration may not deliver. Although, given the prospect of a capricious Trump, nor can we rule out the possible consequences for Vladimir Putin of failing to accept a negotiation put forward by the new US administration. Trump is determined to make his mark from the very start of his presidency, and that might also mean, in a fit of pique, maintaining the military commitment to reinforcing the Ukrainian army. It is also an essential battle for Europe, which must strive to avoid being left out of negotiations on the immediate future of a state destined to be a member of the EU and where the continent's security is currently at stake. The EU will have Poland's Donald Tusk in charge of the 27 member states' rotating presidency as of January, with the former Estonian prime minister, Kaja Kallas, making her debut as the head of European diplomacy. She is currently feeling the vertigo of Trump snatching the reins of a hasty peace while the member states have proved incapable of reaching an agreement on the various scenarios that might emerge in the immediate future. In any case, the Middle East has already illustrated the frailty and limited credit of this strategy of a cessation of hostilities without sufficient capacity or consensus to seek lasting solutions. The ceasefire agreed in the war that Israel is waging against Hezbollah in Lebanon is more of a timeout in the fighting than a first step towards the resolution of the conflict. The bombings and attacks after the ceasefire are an indication of the fragility, if not emptiness, of a plan that neither side believes in. Meanwhile, the war in Gaza, where over 44,000 people have died, has entered its second year of devastation, transformed into the backdrop of this fight to reshape regional influence, but with a Donald Trump intent on pushing a ceasefire agreement and freeing hostages even before he takes office on January 20th.The year begins with a change of goals in the region, but with no peace. While the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, made it clear that his priority now was to focus on Iran, the regional escalation unexpectedly hastened the end of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, with Iran debilitated economically and strategically, and Hezbollah decimated by Israel's attacks, the Syrian president was bereft of the external support that had propped up his decaying dictatorship. The civil war festering since the Arab revolts of 2011 has entered a new stage, which also changes the balance of power in the Middle East. We are entering a period of profound geopolitical rearrangement because for years Syria had been a proxy battleground for the United States' relations with Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia.We are therefore faced with scenarios that have been thrown wide open, where any negotiation proposal put forward will be more a strategic move than a prior step to addressing the root causes of the conflicts. And yet these diplomatic moves – individual and personalist initiatives primarily – will once again put to the test an international system plagued by ineffectiveness when it comes to delivering broad global consensus or serving as a platform to resolve disputes. 3- PROTECTIONISM AND AUSTERITYDonald Trump's return to the US presidency steps up the challenge to the international order. If in his first term he decided to pull the United States out of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Paris climate agreement, now he is preceded by the announcement of a trade war in the making. The existing geo-economic fragmentation – in 2023 nearly 3,000 trade restricting measures were put in place, almost triple the number in 2019, according to the IMF – will now have to contend with an escalation of the spiral of protectionism should the new US administration keep its promise to raise tariffs to 60% on Chinese imports; 25% on goods coming from Canada and Mexico, if they fail to take drastic measures against fentanyl or the arrival of migrants at the US border; and between 10% and 20% on the rest of its partners. In 2025, the World Trade Organization (WTO) marks 30 years since its creation and it will do so with the threat of a trade war on the horizon, a reflection of the state of institutional crisis that is paralysing the arbiter of international trade.As a result, countries are looking to strengthen their positions through various alliances. The world is increasingly plurilateral. India is expanding its free trade agreements with the United Kingdom and in Latin America; in 2025 the EU must finally tackle a lengthy obstacle course to ratify the long negotiated deal with Mercosur. Trumpism, what's more, reinforces this transactional approach: it fuels the possibility of more unpredictable partnerships and the need to adapt. Among those that have begun to reconsider goals and partners is the EU. The European countries will foreseeably make more purchases of liquefied natural gas and defence products from the United States to appease Trump. Despite US pressure and the profile of the new European Commission appearing to presage a harder line from Brussels on China in the economic sphere, nor can we rule out seeing fresh tension among the EU partners over the degree of flexibility of its de-risking strategy. A US withdrawal from the global commitments to fight climate change, for example, would intensify the need for alliances between Brussels and Beijing in this field. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether the emergence of European countries more accommodating of this geopolitical dependence on China may expose a new fault line between member states.







Given this uncertainty, recipes for fiscal discipline are also making a comeback. Brazil ended the year announcing cuts in public spending to the value of nearly $12bn; Argentina's Javier Milei boasts of implementing "the world's toughest austerity policy"; Mexico's minister of finance and public credit, Rogelio Ramírez de la O, has vowed to reduce the fiscal deficit in 2025 by pursuing austerity in the public administration and cutting spending in Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos). In the United Kingdom, the prime minister, Labour's Keir Starmer, has embraced the "harsh light of fiscal reality" in the budget and plans to raise some £40bn by increasing taxes and cutting spending in order to address the fiscal deficit.The EU is also preparing to tackle US protectionism in the awareness of its own weakness, with the Franco-German axis failing and its economic model in question. Paris and Berlin are both in a moment of introspection, and the siren calls of austerity are once again ringing through some European capitals. In France, parliamentary division is impeding an agreement to avert a possible debt crisis, while in Germany it will be the next government – the one that emerges from the early elections of 23 February – that must address the stagnation of the economy and its lack of competitiveness.Even though inflation is set to slip out of the picture somewhat in 2025, the effects of what Trump calls "Maganomics" remain to be seen. In the United States, the introduction of tariffs and the potential decline in the workforce in the wake of "mass deportations", coupled with tax cuts, could increase inflation in the country and limit the Federal Reserve's capacity to continue lowering interest rates. While Republican control of both houses in Congress and their majority in the Supreme Court may facilitate the adoption of these measures, actually carrying out the deportations appears to be much more difficult in view of the legal and logistical challenges it poses.Meanwhile, despite the savings generated by a possible pared-back public administration and the income from tariffs, the independent organisation Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget estimates that Trump's measures could increase the deficit significantly and place the debt on a path towards topping 140% of GDP in 10 years, from 99% at present. This means investors will be more demanding when it comes to buying US debt in the face of the risk of a fiscal crisis. It will also be crucial to see whether the attempts to undermine the independent regulatory agencies or the independence of the central bank are successful.The IMF's global growth forecast for 2025 is 3.2%, much the same as the estimate for 2024, but below the pre-pandemic trend. This figure, however, masks significant differences between regions, where the strength of the United States and certain emerging economies in Asia stands in contrast to the weakness of Europe and China, as well as the rapid pace of the change taking place globally from consumption of goods to consumption of services. In Asia, all eyes will be on the ailing Chinese economy, weighed down by its real estate sector, and how its leaders respond to the new restrictions on trade, investment and technology from the United States. At the close of 2024, the main Asian economies were going against the austerity measures expected in Europe and America. Both China and Japan have announced economic stimulus packages, although the desire to cut the 2025 budget on the part of the opposition in Seoul has triggered political chaos domestically. In the circumstances, we can expect an increase in economic insecurity and an escalation of the fragmentation of the global economy, where we can already see like-minded nations moving closer together. Some key countries in the "reglobalisation" trend, like Vietnam or Mexico, which had acted as intermediaries by attracting Chinese imports and investments and increasing their exports to the United States, will see their model suffer in the face of pressure from the new US administration. The drop in interest rates worldwide, meanwhile, will allow some low-income countries renewed access to the financial markets, although around 15% of them are in debt distress and another 40% run the risk of going the same way.







4-GLOBAL DISMANTLING OF INSTITUTIONS The brazenness of this world without rules is only increasing. The undermining of international commitments and security frameworks and growing impunity have been a constant feature of this yearly exercise on the part of CIDOB. In 2025, the crisis of multilateral cooperation may even reach a peak if personalism takes the lead and does even further damage to the consensual spaces of conflict resolution, i.e. the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the WTO. We live in a world that is already less cooperative and more defensive, but now the debate over the funding of this post-1945 institutional architecture may help to compound the structural weakness of multilateralism. The United States currently owes the United Nations $995m for the core budget and a further $862m for peacekeeping operations. Donald Trump's return could lead to an even greater loss of funding for the organisation and prevent it from functioning properly. It remains to be seen whether, despite the geopolitical rivalry, there are areas where agreement among powers is still possible. We remain in a world marked by inequality, heightened by the scars of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since 2020, the gap between the more and the least developed countries has been growing steadily. In 2023, 51% of the countries with a low human development index (HDI) had not recovered their pre-COVID-19 value, compared to 100% of those with a high HDI. Given these circumstances, it will be crucial to see the outcome of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which will take place in Seville in 2025.







In addition, 2024 ended with a bid from Brazil to seek an agreement in the G20 to levy the world's wealthiest people with an annual tax of 2% on the total net worth of the super-rich, those with capital in excess of $1bn. But for the time being Lula de Silva's proposal has gone no further than the debate stage. And while the United States is by far the country among the most industrialised nations where a much greater proportion of the wealth and national income ends up in the hands of the richest 1%, the arrival of the Donald Trump-Elon Musk entente in power in Washington will make it harder still to approve such a tax.







Likewise, in October 2024 Israel passed laws barring the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) from operating in the country and curtailing its activity in Gaza and the occupied territories of the West Bank by stopping contact between Israeli government actors and the agency. The legislation will come into force at the end of January 2025, exacerbating the humanitarian disaster in Gaza. Although most countries that paused their UNRWA funding have resumed contributions, the United States withdrew $230m. The mobilisation of the international community to ensure the survival of UNRWA once the Israeli law takes effect will be crucial to demonstrate the resilience of humanitarian action; alternatively, it may compound the collapse of another United Nations pillar. Similarly, the dismantling of the institutions and rules of democracy has impacted spaces for protest in civil society, whether in the United States itself, in Georgia or in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, political violence scourged Mexico, where as many as 30 candidates are thought to have been murdered in the runup to the presidential elections of 2024, and demonstrations were banned in Mozambique. The year 2024 was a tumultuous one globally, marked by violence in multiple regions: from the ongoing battle against al-Shabaab in East Africa and the escalating regional conflict in the Middle East to over 60,000 deaths in the war in Sudan to date. Global conflict levels have doubled since 2020, with a 22% increase in the last year alone. The space for peace is shrinking. In 2025, the EU will end various training or peacebuilding missions in Mali, the Central Africa Republic or Kosovo, while the number of United Nations peacekeeping missions will also decrease in Africa. Similarly, if it is not renewed, the extended mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will end on August 31st. Some 10,000 blue helmets from 50 nations are deployed in the south of the country and they came under Israeli attack during the incursion against Hezbollah. All these moves reflect both the broad changes underway in the international security system and the crisis of legitimacy UN peacekeeping operations are suffering. Even so, the eighth peacekeeping Ministerial on the future of these operations and the five-year review of the international peacebuilding architecture will take place in May 2025, at a time when the organisation is trying to restore some of its relevance in countries gripped by violence like Haiti or Myanmar.While political violence grows, international justice is faltering. Take the division in the international community caused by the ICC's arrest warrants against the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his former defence minister, Yoav Gallant, even among European countries that recognise the court. France refused to abide by the ruling, on the grounds of the supposed immunity of non-signatories of the Rome Statute, while Italy called it "unfeasible". The response stands in stark contrast to the resolve of the European countries regarding the arrest warrants issued against Vladimir Putin or the leader of the military junta in Myanmar, Min Aung Hliang. The situation will not improve with Trump in the White House. While US opposition to the ICC has traditionally been bipartisan, the hard-line stance towards the court of the first Trump administration went much further than rhetorical censure, resulting in sanctions against the court itself and its officials, which the Biden administration subsequently lifted. Which countries will best navigate this gradual dismantling of the international order? In 2025, we shall continue to see a highly mobilised Global South geopolitically, engaged in the reinforcement of an alternative institutionalisation, which is expanding and securing a voice and place for itself in the world, albeit with no consensus on a new reformed and revisionist order. In this framework, Brazil is preparing to preside another two strategic international forums in 2025: BRICS+ and COP30. As for Africa, the continent has become a laboratory for a multi-aligned world, with the arrival of actors such as India, the Gulf states or Turkey, which now compete with and complement more established powers like Russia and China. In late 2024, Chad and Senegal demanded the end of military cooperation with France, including the closure of military bases, in a bid to assert their sovereignty. South Africa, meanwhile, will host the G20, the first time an African nation will stage this summit on its soil, following the inclusion of the African Union (AU) into the group. It will mark the end of a four-year cycle in which the summit has been held in Global South countries. And in Asia there is the perception of some pacification processes underway: from the easing of tension on the border between China and India, with the withdrawal of troops in the Himalayas, to the return of trilateral summits among South Korea, Japan and China after a five-year hiatus. The region is withdrawing into itself in the face of the uncertainty that 2025 holds. 5- TECHNOLOGY CLASH AND (DE)REGULATORY PRESSURE The tech competition between the United States and China is set to gather further pace in 2025. The final weeks of Joe Biden's presidency have helped to cement the prospect of a clash between Beijing and Washington, which will mark the new political cycle. On December 2nd, 2024, the introduction of a third round of controls on exports to China, with the collaboration of US allies such as Japan and South Korea, further reduced the possibility of obtaining various types of equipment and software for making semiconductors. China, meanwhile, retaliated with a ban on exports of gallium, germanium and antimony, key components in the production of semiconductors, and tighter control over graphite, which is essential for lithium batteries. Apart from this bipolar confrontation, in 2025 we shall see how tech protectionism gains currency worldwide. Global South countries have begun to impose tariffs on the Chinese tech industry, albeit for different reasons. While countries such as Mexico and Turkey use tariffs to try to force new Chinese investment in their territories – particularly in the field of electric vehicles (EVs) – others, like South Africa, are doing it to protect local manufacturers. Canada too announced a 100% duty on imports of Chinese EVs, following the example of the EU and the United States, despite having no EV maker of its own to protect.Given the circumstances, for Xi Jinping 2025 will be a year to reassess the strategy that has enabled China to gain leadership of five of 13 emerging tech areas, according to Bloomberg: drones, solar panels, lithium batteries, graphene refining and high-speed rail. However, a decade on from the start of the Made in China 2025 plan – its road map towards self-sufficiency – development and innovation in the semiconductor sector in China has slowed, owing to its inability to secure more advanced chips, the machinery to produce them or more cutting-edge software. Will the chip war escalate with Trump's return to power? During the campaign, the president-elect accused Taiwan of "stealing the chip business" from the United States. Yet in 2025 the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (SMC) will start large-scale production of integrated circuits at its factory in the United States. The investment in Arizona by Taiwan's biggest chip maker was announced by the first Trump administration, so it is not hard to imagine another round of investment in the future on the part of the new Republican administration to reinforce supply chain security. In addition, Elon Musk's influence in the White House also promises greater symbiosis between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon. Tech competition and the rise in conflicts across the world have restored Big Tech's appetite for public contracts in the defence field, which means that with Trump's return its leaders are hoping to gather the fruits of their investments in the presidential campaign. Just two days after the elections of November 2024, Amazon and two leading AI companies, Anthropic and Palantir, signed a partnership agreement to develop and supply the US intelligence and defence services with new AI applications and models. It seems likely, then, that the consensus reached in April 2024 between Biden and Xi Jinping to "develop AI technology in the military field in a prudent and responsible manner" will be rendered obsolete under the new Trump administration.But hyper-technology extends beyond the military field, as it cuts across ever more sectors of the administration in ever more countries. The entry into force of the Pact on Migration and Asylum in Europe, for example, will be accompanied by new technological surveillance measures, from the deployment of drones and AI systems at the border in states such as Greece to the adaption of the Eurodac system – the EU database that registers asylum seekers – to gather migrants' biometric data. This will only consolidate a model of surveillance and discrimination against this group. It also remains to be seen what impact the new political majorities in the United States and the EU will have on tech governance. Following a flurry of regulation creation and legal action in the courts against the monopolistic power of the major tech firms, in 2025 we shall see a slowdown – if not a reduction – of new measures against Big Tech. The EU's new political priorities, moreover, will put the emphasis in tech on security over competition, and we shall see the emergence of an internal debate on current regulation; over whether it can be implemented effectively or whether it has been too ambitious. It is a shift that contrasts with the regulatory trend, particularly regarding the use of AI, developing in the rest of the world, from South Korea to Latin America. Lastly, the United Nations proclaimed 2025 as the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology (IYQ). Quantum computing is a branch of IT that will enable the development of more powerful computers that can run more complex algorithms, helping to make giant leaps in scientific research, healthcare, climate science, the energy sector or finance. Microsoft and another tech firm, Atom Computing, have announced they will begin marketing their first quantum computer in 2025. And Google has also unveiled Willow, a quantum chip that can perform a task in five minutes that it would take one of today's fastest supercomputers quadrillions of years to complete. This new generation of supercomputers harnesses our knowledge of quantum mechanics – the branch of physics that studies atomic and subatomic particles – to overcome the limitations of traditional IT, allowing a host of simultaneous operations. 6-A "THIRD NUCLEAR AGE"?While algorithmic complexity gathers pace, debates about nuclear safety take us back to the past, from a new rise of atomic energy to the constant recourse to the nuclear threat as a means of intimidation. With an increasingly weak global security architecture, the international arms race is hotting up without guardrails. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), both the number and type of nuclear weapons under development increased over the last year, as nuclear deterrence once again gains traction in the strategies of the nine states that store or have detonated nuclear devices. That is why the risk of an accident or miscalculation will still be very present in 2025, both in Ukraine and in Iran.Indeed, coinciding with 1,000 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and an escalation of fighting on the ground, Vladimir Putin approved changes to Russia's nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. The revised text states that an attack from a non-nuclear state, if backed by a nuclear power, will be treated as a joint assault on Russia. In order to drive home its message, the Kremlin threatened to use Russia's Oreshnik hypersonic missile on Ukraine, capable of carrying six nuclear warheads and travelling ten times faster than the speed of sound. Against this backdrop, the deployment of North Korean soldiers to support Russia on the Ukrainian front in late 2024 also means the involvement of another nuclear power in the conflict and raises fresh questions about what Pyongyang will receive in return. Commenting on the subject, the NATO secretary general, Mark Rutte, said Russia was supporting the development of the weapons and nuclear capabilities of Kim Jong-Un's regime. As a result, the threat of a potential upsetting of the balance in the Korean Peninsula and Trump's return to power have further fuelled the nuclear debate in Seoul and Tokyo, which had already been reignited by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. There could also be changes in the United States' nuclear policy. Project 2025, the ultraconservative blueprint that means to guide the Trump administration, champions the resumption of nuclear testing in the Nevada desert, even though detonating an underground nuclear bomb would violate the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the United States signed in 1996. The nuclear arms industry already surged under the first Trump administration. This time, however, experts believe that if the programme is implemented, it would be the most dramatic build-up of nuclear weapons since the start of the first Reagan administration four decades ago.At the same time, the two European nuclear states – France and the United Kingdom – are also in a process of nuclear modernisation. The British government has been immersed in an expansion of its arsenal of nuclear warheads since 2021 and, as a member of the AUKUS trilateral agreement along with the United States and Australia, in 2025 it will train hundreds of Australian officials in the management of nuclear reactors in order to prepare Canberra for its future acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. France, too, is developing its own design for a "latest generation" sub. In addition, 2025 will be a decisive year for Iran's nuclear programme. The deadline is approaching for the world's powers to start the mechanism to reinstate all the sanctions lifted in the deal that put a brake on Iran's nuclear expansion, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). So far, Tehran has already warned that if the sanctions return, Iran will withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The threat only adds to the risk of an escalation of hostilities in the Middle East and the possibility of Israel considering an attack on nuclear facilities in Iran. Similarly, the nuclear debate has been revived in Europe, following a global trend. Nuclear energy production is expected to break world records in 2025, as more countries invest in reactors to drive the shift towards a global economy looking to move beyond coal and diversify its energy sources. The EU, which is at a critical juncture as it tries to satisfy the demand for energy while boosting economic growth, is also witnessing fresh impetus in the nuclear debate. Around a quarter of the EU's energy is nuclear, and over half is produced in France. In all, there are more than 150 reactors in operation on EU soil. Last April, 11 EU countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden) signed a declaration that urged regulators to "fully unlock" the potential of nuclear energy and "enable financing conditions" to support the lifetime extension of existing nuclear reactors. Italy is mulling whether to cease to be the only G7 member without nuclear energy plants and lift the ban on the deployment of "new nuclear reactor technologies". A possible return of the Christian Democrat CDU to the German chancellery, following the elections in February, could reopen the debate on the decision taken by Angela Merkel in 2023 to close the last nuclear reactor operating in the country.Lastly, Taiwan, despite a strong aversion to nuclear in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in its neighbourhood, is also immersed in a process of reflection on nuclear energy, in a year in which the last operating plant is to close. Indeed, the need to meet the growing demand for semiconductors thanks to the AI boom, mentioned in the previous section, has put a huge strain on the country's energy consumption. The Taiwanese government is not the only one in this situation. Microsoft is helping to restart the Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Pennsylvania, which closed in 2019, while Google (owned by Alphabet) and Amazon are investing in next-generation nuclear technology.7- CLIMATE EMERGENCIES WITH NO COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP2024 will be hottest year on record. It will also be the first in which the average temperature exceeds 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, marking a further escalation of the climate crisis and the failure of attempts to keep the global temperature below that threshold. To June 2024 alone, extreme climate phenomena had already caused economic damage to a value of more than $41bn and impacted millions of people across the planet. And yet the global mitigation struggle is faced with a growing absence of political leadership. This was evident in the debates and outcomes of COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November, where every political effort was devoted to just one battle: finance. Even so, the pledge on the part of the wealthiest countries to provide $300bn a year by 2035 is considered insufficient to cover the needs of the poorest countries and ensure climate justice. The cost of mitigation and adaptation for developing countries is estimated at between $5tn and $6.8tn to 2030. The pessimism, moreover, is borne out by the facts: while in 2009 the developed countries made the pledge to devote $100bn a year to climate finance, they failed to meet that goal until 2022. In Baku, in the wake of Donald Trump's victory and the shadow of a political agenda that has relegated the climate to the back seat in the face of inflation or energy prices, the Global North chose not to fight the mitigation battle. If at COP28 in Dubai it was said for the first time that the world should embark on a transition beyond fossil fuels, at COP29 it was not even mentioned. The year 2025 will be one to measure commitments, both on finance and taking action. The signatories to the Paris Agreement (2015) must present their national action plans to demonstrate they are honouring the agreed mitigation commitments. The scheduled delivery date for this new round of national contributions is February, but it is looking like many countries will be late and that their level ambition will not match up to what the science and the climate emergency require. In addition, the United States – the world's second biggest greenhouse gas emitter after China – could deal a fresh blow to the global fight against climate change if Donald Trump again decides to withdraw his country from the Paris Agreement, in a repeat of his first term. He would find it harder, however, to leave the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the treaty that underpins the agreement and the multilateral talks on the climate. But this is not the only question mark over the United States' "green transition". Trump's pick of Chris Wright, an oil executive from Liberty Energy and a climate crisis denier, to lead the Energy Department may again put fossil fuels before green energy goals.The new European Commission must also decide what role it wants to play on the global climate stage. The new political majorities will make it difficult for the EU to act with one voice on climate matters, as demonstrated recently in the European Parliament with the controversial decision to postpone and dilute the European deforestation law. Thus in 2025 we will see growing tension in the EU to lower environmental regulations and standards.While global progress in the mitigation battle slows and US leadership on climate matters fades, China is expanding its ambition and its influence. In 2025, hopes are pinned on China's energy transition and its new role as voluntary financial contributor to the agreement sealed in Baku. According to the experts, China's coal and CO2 emissions could peak in 2025 – five years ahead of its target. The climate progress China is making will have a clear impact not only on the planet, but also on the Asian giant's economic and energy interests. Part of China's economic transition since the pandemic has been directed at incentivising the development and introduction of renewables, making it the sector that most contributed to the country's economic growth in 2023. But, at the same time, it also has geopolitical implications: the more its consumption of renewable energy grows, the less dependent it is on hydrocarbons imports from third countries, including Russia. According to the vice president, Ding Xuexiang, China has devoted $24.5bn to global climate finance since 2016. With greater pressure from Brussels for China to increase its contributions, we may see the Asian country trying to burnish its image through greater climate activism in 2025. Still, the major players in renewables are the countries of the Global South. According to a study published by the think tank RMI, nations of the South are adopting these technologies at a much quicker pace and on a much greater scale than in the North. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that new solar and wind energy facilities in these countries have grown by 60% in 2024, with Brazil, Morocco and Vietnam at the head of the pack, reporting a greater adoption rate of these energies than part of Europe and the United States. The staging of COP30 in 2025 in Brazil, one of the most ambitious countries in terms of climate commitments, raises even greater hopes and expectations of a new global impetus in the battle against climate change, one that takes account of the needs and demands of the Global South. While the adaptation discourse, a longstanding demand of these countries, is expected to begin to gain traction on the international and local agenda, the change of narrative could hide new challenges. For one, the need to think about a world beyond the 1.5°C temperature increase. And for another, the risk of compounding inequalities between communities and countries with greater adaptation capacity, since poverty is directly linked to a country's resilience to climate risks and its capacity to recover from them. This places developing countries in a situation of considerable risk, and the adaptation gap is getting wider.8- GENDER: THE END OF CONSENSUS In 2025, polarisation around gender consensus will increase. As conservative agendas gain political ground, the international agreements that for decades have enabled gender equality to advance are under challenge again. On the one hand, 2025 will be a year of celebration of two international milestones for women's rights: the 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women (1995), and the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Celebrating the two agreements, adopted at a time marked by optimism and the successes of transnational feminist movements, will be an invitation to reflect on lost consensuses, present challenges and the lack of political will to secure their full adoption and implementation. On the other hand, the Generation Equality forum, launched in 2021 to mark 20 years since Resolution 1325 with the aim of consolidating progress on women's and girls' rights in five years, will have to account for its unfulfilled commitments. According to the Population Matters association, one in three countries has made no progress on gender matters since 2015, and the situation of women has worsened in 18 countries, particularly Afghanistan and Venezuela. The difficulty in achieving new consensuses, leaderships and political will is apparent in the bid to adopt new international plans to protect the rights of women and girls. According to WILPF figures, 30% of the National Action Plans (NAPs) for domestic implementation of the WPS agenda expired more than two years ago, and the national strategies of 32 countries or regional organisations will end between 2024 and 2025, raising a question mark about their updating and renewal in an international context marked by tension and disputes, the rise of the far right and polarisation around gender. Two agreements to promote gender equality will end in 2025 and must be renegotiated: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Equality Strategy and the EU's Gender Action Plan III (GAP III). In the latter case, it is hard to envisage a European Commission as committed to gender equality as it was during Ursula von der Leyen's first term. During that time, the German marked several gender equality milestones, like the Directive on combatting violence against women or EU accession to the Istanbul Convention. The first steps of her second term, however, have offered a glimpse of the difficulties she will encounter to continue down that path. While in her presentation of the political guidelines for the new commission, von der Leyen declared her commitment to gender equality and the LGBTIQ collective, the team of commissioners proposed by the member states has already challenged her desire for parity in the commission she leads. Just 11 of the 27 commissioners are women – including the president herself and the high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, Estonia's Kaja Kallas. In addition, and as the name of the post indicates, the figure of commissioner for crisis management and equality – a competence first introduced in 2019 – will also be responsible for the management and prevention of crises now, diluting the emphasis on gender parity. Similarly, with a European Parliament that has shifted right and with a greater number of EU governments led by far right and antifeminist groups, it will be difficult to make headway on progressive measures. Against this backdrop, Donald Trump's return to the presidency of the United States augurs another severe setback for gender equality, particularly in the field of sexual and reproductive health rights. The arrival in power of Republican candidates is always accompanied by the restoration of the Mexico City policy (also known as the global gag rule), which places severe international restrictions on sexual and reproductive health rights. It is a policy that bars NGOs in the health sector from offering legal and safe abortion services or even actively promoting the reform of laws against voluntary termination of pregnancy in their own countries if they receive US funding – even if they do so with their own funds. Yet this restriction is not limited to the field of development assistance. Among other measures included in Project 2025, there is the elimination of language for gender equality, sexual orientation and gender identity, or the protection of sexual and reproductive health rights in future United Nations resolutions, but also in domestic policy and regulations of the United States.In 2017, countries such as Sweden and Canada – at the time the only ones to have adopted a feminist foreign policy – were quick to fill the void left by the change of US priorities, with the introduction of international projects like SheDecides, which sought to channel international political support to safeguard women's "bodily autonomy" throughout the world. Since 2022, however, with Sweden ditching the feminist flag in foreign policy and other countries such as Canada, France or Germany focusing on their upcoming elections and the domestic political instability they must face in 2025, it is hard to imagine alternative leaderships and funding. Europe is experiencing its own regression. But the reversals in political consensus at the highest level do not stop there. Following the US elections, harassment and misogynist texts have been sweeping social media with messages such as "your body, my choice", which has registered an increase of up to 4,600% on X (formerly known as Twitter). Cyberviolence against women is on the rise. According to a 2023 study, around 98% of deep fakes are pornographic and target women. These scandals have multiplied with AI, opening a debate on the regulation and possible criminalisation of such cases. 9- MIGRANT DEPORTATIONS AND RIGHTSAs 2024 comes to an end, thousands of Syrian refugees are returning home. After 14 years of civil war, the fall of Bashar al-Assad has raised hopes in a country facing the world's largest forced displacement crisis, according to the United Nations, with over 7.2 million internally displaced people – more than two-thirds of the population – and 6.2 million refugees, mainly living in the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Yet despite the uncertainty of the political moment and that fact that fighting is still taking place on the ground, some EU countries (Germany, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, Finland or Belgium) are rushing to suspend the asylum applications of Syrian refugees as others, like Greece and Austria, are taking measures to expel them. The Austrian government has even launched a deportation programme that is reassessing the situation of some 40,000 Syrians who had been granted refugee status in the country over the last five years. All these moves further aggravate the debate among European partners over the concept of "safe third country" so criticised by social organisations. 2025 will be a year of deportations, in terms of discourse and in practice. Immigration has been the cornerstone of Donald Trump's political career, and in his second presidential campaign he vowed to carry out the biggest deportation in history. How will it be done? It remains to be seen if we will see staged deportations or what the real impact might be on the US labour market of a policy that, according to multiple studies, is not a zero sum game in favour of US-born workers. Irregular migrants work in different occupations to those born in the United States; they create demand for goods and services; and they contribute to the country's long-term fiscal health. There are also doubts about the economic sustainability of this type of policy, particularly in view of the prospect of a growth in flows and the dramatic increase in the number of deportations in the United States already since the pandemic (some 300,000 people a year). Yet Trump's victory saw the value of firms engaged in the deportation of migrants and monitoring or supervising the border, as well as the management of detention centres, rocket on the stock market. The deportation business is booming.And deportation is not only an instrument of the Global North. Iran is considering mass deportations of Afghans; the Turkish deportation system has been bolstered by hundreds of millions of euros from the EU; and Tunisia too is conducting illegal "collective expulsions" of immigrants with funds from the EU. Egypt, meanwhile, for months has been carrying out mass arrests and forced returns of Sudanese refugees. On a European level, in 2025 the EU member states must present their national plans to implement the new Pact on Migration and Asylum. The rules are scheduled to enter into force in 2026, but Spain has asked for the use of new tools for border control and the distribution of migrants to be brought forward to next summer. The pact, however, has already been challenged by some member states, which are calling for it to be replaced by a model that allows migrants to be transferred to detention centres located outside the EU in countries that are deemd to be safe. Italy's decision last August to open centres of this type in Albania, though it ended in a resounding legal defeat for Georgia Meloni's government, offered a clear foretaste of the growing tension between policy and the rule of law. In these circumstances, moreover, in 2025 judges may become more acutely aware of the lack of tools to safeguard the rights to asylum and refugee status in a global environment that has been dismantling international protection for years. The war in Gaza – which in its first year caused the forced displacement of 85% of the population – illustrates the calamitous failure of international law, both in the humanitarian field and regarding asylum. Fear, as a dynamic that permeates policy both in the migration field and in international relations, will gain ground in 2025. That is why the staging of deportations has become a symbolic deterrent. The criminalisation of migrants – who feel targeted – and the social burden narrative that certain governments exploit with an agenda of public cuts, are setting the tone in an international system increasingly obsessed with border protection and lacking the interest (or tools) to ensure safe and regular migration. 10- MILITARISATION OF INSECURITYIn this world of fragile institutions, the cracks through which organised crime can seep and expand are growing. Organised crime networks are multimillion dollar, transnational businesses that construct hierarchies and strategic alliances. As the international order fragments, mob geopolitics is evolving with new actors and a change of methodology: rather than compete, organised crime groups are cooperating more and more, sharing global supply chains for the trafficking of drugs and people, environmental crimes, counterfeit medicine or illegal mining – which in some countries, like Peru or Colombia, are as profitable as drug-trafficking, if not more so. Global networks that stretch from China to the United States and from Colombia to Australia, thanks to "narco submarines", account for the diversification of businesses and locations, but they also explain their capacity to penetrate the structures of power and undermine the rule of law, because they exist in a context of increasing corruption of states and their legal and security systems. In Ecuador, for example, a hotspot of drug-trafficking on a global scale, the government has declared war on 22 criminal organisations and speaks of an "internal armed conflict". Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, today is a city in the grip of rival criminal groups locked in turf wars, which have led to the various armed gangs seizing control of neighbourhoods, police stations and even temporarily blocking the airport. The latest escalation of violence has left nearly 4,000 dead and over 700,000 displaced people inside the country, according to the UN Human Rights Office. Meanwhile, the geopolitical crisis of fentanyl, where the epicentre is Mexico as a well-established producer of this synthetic drug since the COVID-19 pandemic, has developed into a bilateral problem of the first order with the United States and Canada and a threat to Central America. In Europe too, port cities like Marseille, Rotterdam or Antwerp are major points of drug entry and seizure. Organised crime is currently the biggest threat facing the Swedish government, with 195 shootings and 72 bombings that have claimed 30 lives this last year alone. Globalisation means this new hyperconnected reality has even reached the islands of the Pacific, which now occupy a prominent place on the international strategic chessboard thanks to a proliferation of trade, diplomatic and security commitments. It has also transformed the region's criminal landscape, with the presence of Asian triads and crime syndicates, the cartels of Central and South America, and criminal gangs from Australia and New Zealand.According to the Global Organised Crime Index, at least 83% of the world's population lives in countries with high levels of crime, when in 2021 it was 79%. If organised crime is one of the winners in this new fragmented order, the rise in violence has also brought the imposition of policies of securitisation. In Latin America, for instance, the clear choice to militarise security – seeking national solutions (containing the violence) to what is a transnational challenge – has favoured "firm hand" responses.







The world is rearming. With the rise in conflicts, like the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, so revenues from sales of arms and military services have grown. According to the SIPRI, 2025 will the biggest year for military spending in a long time. Given these circumstances, the pressure on NATO countries to increase their defence spending will ramp up again with the return of Donald Trump to the White House, but also on account of the unpredictability of the international environment. Over the coming months, NATO must negotiate various internal fractures: for one, the demand to raise defence spending to 3.5% of GDP; for another, the differences among allies over the strategies used against Russia. Countries such as Poland and the Baltic nations are calling for a more aggressive stance against Moscow, while other members, such as Hungary or Turkey, are looking to maintain a more neutral approach. This could hinder the formulation of a unified strategy in the face of threats from Russia and future geopolitical scenarios in Ukraine. In addition, during his campaign Trump questioned the commitment to mutual defence enshrined in Article 5 of the NATO treaty. If the new US administration adopts a more isolationist stance, the European allies might doubt US reliability as a pillar of their security. There is also growing concern in the EU over the security of essential components and undersea cable infrastructures, which are critical to connectivity and the global economy, particularly in the wake of several episodes of suspected sabotage like those seen in the Baltic Sea in the last few months. Lastly, China's growing militarisation of its maritime periphery is also triggering fresh security fears in Asia. Beijing is promoting – ever more zealously – a Sinocentric view of the Indo-Pacific region. This is raising fears that 2025 will see an increase in the aggressiveness of China's strategy to turn East Asia into its exclusive sphere of influence.Against this backdrop, the quickening pace of geopolitics raises multiple questions both for analysts and for international relations actors themselves. The world is struggling with the posturing of new leaderships, shifting landscapes that are redefining long-running conflicts and a Sino-US rivalry that may develop into a trade and tech war in the near future. Given this prospect, the multi-alignment efforts that many countries across the world are trying to make, with security at heart, are becoming increasingly complex as confrontation escalates among the major global powers .







CIDOB calendar 2025: 80 dates to mark in the diary January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, Panama and Somalia, which were elected in 2024, will join the council as non-permanent members, replacing Ecuador, Japan, Malta, Mozambique and Switzerland. Meanwhile Algeria, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Slovenia and South Korea, which were elected in 2023, will start their second year as members.January 1 – Poland takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The government of Donald Tusk will focus council activity on moving forward with the accession processes of the countries aspiring to join the EU, comprehensive support for Ukraine and strengthening transatlantic ties with the United States. The latter priority must accommodate an uncomfortable truth for Brussels: the return of Donald Trump to the White House.January 1 – Bulgaria and Romania become full members of the Schengen area. In November 2024, Austria lifted its veto on the full integration of Bulgaria and Romania into the Schengen area. The two countries, members of the EU since 2007, were admitted to the borderless travel zone in March 2024, but checks on people were only lifted at ports and airports. Now the same will apply to land border checks, and the common visa policy will be in operation at the EU's external borders.January 1 – Finland takes up the yearly rotating chairmanship of the OSCE. The organisation responsible for maintaining security, peace and democracy in a hemisphere comprising 57 countries across Europe, Asia and North America has been through some low times since the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which, despite the condemnation, remains a member. The 32nd OSCE Ministerial Council meeting will take place in Finland between November and December 2025. The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who was barred from the council meeting in 2022, did however attend in 2023 and 2024.January 1 – Handover between the African Union's ATMIS and AUSSOM missions in Somalia. The AU will remain involved in the efforts to bring peace to Somalia and stabilise the country – stricken by the al-Qaeda allegiant organisation al-Shabaab – with a new mission, the third consecutive operation since 2007. However, AUSSOM will come up against escalating tension between the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia, after Addis Ababa struck a deal on naval access to the Gulf of Aden with the secessionist Republic of Somaliland.January 1 – 30th anniversary of the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO enters its third decade of activity in an international context marked by growing opposition to globalisation, the rise of protectionism worldwide, and Donald Trump's electoral promise to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese goods and 10-20% on other imports.January 7 – John Mahama is sworn in as president in Ghana. In the English-speaking West African country, which has one of the most robust democratic systems on the continent, John Mahama, former president of the Republic for the first time in 2012-2017 and candidate of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) party, will return to power. Mahama will take over from the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) president Nana Akufo-Addo, who defeated him in 2016 and 2020. January 15 – Daniel Chapo takes office as president of Mozambique. The fifth straight president from the leftist FRELIMO party since national independence in 1975 was declared the winner of the elections of October 9, 2024. His opponents claimed fraud and called for popular protests. The crackdown left over 30 dead, including children. While rich in natural resources, Mozambique remains mired in underdevelopment and faces jihadist threats and serious climate risks.January 20 – Donald Trump takes office as president of the United States. The Republican starts a second non-consecutive term after roundly defeating the Democrat Kamala Harris in the election of November 5, 2024, with promises to deport undocumented immigrants, cut taxes and levy new trade tariffs. Trump returns to the White House with a more radical nationalist rhetoric than the one that marked his first term between 2017 and 2021.January 20-24 – Annual meeting of the World Economic Forum (Davos forum). The influential group of thinkers each year convenes figures from politics, business, academia and civil society to a select and extremely high-profile international gathering in the Swiss town of Davos. In 2025, it will put three major global challenges up for discussion: geopolitical shocks, stimulating growth to improve living standards and stewarding a just and inclusive energy transition.January 26 – Presidential elections in Belarus. Unlike in 2020, the dictator Alexander Lukashenko will not even have to pretend there is a competition at the ballot boxes because the country's election commission will only allow token candidates to stand, and none from the gagged opposition. The longest-serving president in Europe – in power since 1994 – and staunch ally of Vladimir Putin is sure to win a seventh presidential term.January 31 – End of the mandate of EUCAP Sahel Mali. A regional instrument of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali was launched in 2015 to assist the government in the fight against organised crime. Its continuation remains in doubt after the EUTM training mission, geared towards the fight against jihadism, was not renewed in 2024 and following the anti-French turn taken by the military junta in Bamako. Its twin operation in Niger, EUCAP Sahel Niger, also ended in 2024. On September 19, the EUTM in the Central African Republic will likewise come to a end.February 9 – General elections in Ecuador. The centrist Daniel Noboa won the snap presidential election in 2023, called by his predecessor, the liberal conservative Guillermo Lasso, to avoid impeachment by the country's congress. Noboa will seek re-election, this time for a normal constitutional period of four years, in a climate overshadowed by the brutal wave of criminal violence afflicting Ecuador. His chief rival once again will be Luisa González, a protege of leftist former President Rafael Correa.February 10 and 11 – Artificial Intelligence Action Summit, France. The French government is staging one of many international AI-related events in 2025. Unlike the rest, this action summit will gather heads of state and government and leaders of international organisations, as well as company CEOs, experts, academics, artists and NGOs. Following on from the summits of 2023 in Bletchley, in the United Kingdom, and 2024 in Seoul, the Paris meeting will look at how AI can benefit public policy.February 11-13 – 13th World Governments Summit, Dubai. The WGS is a Dubai-based organisation that each year gathers leaders from government, academia and the private sector to debate technological innovation, global challenges and future trends in pursuit of good governance. The theme of the 2025 edition is "Shaping future governments".February 14-16 – 61st Munich Security Conference. Held every year since 1963, the MSC is recognised as the most important independent forum for the exchange of opinions on international security. In 2025, over 450 policymakers and high-level officials will discuss, among other topics, the EU's role in security and defence, the security implications of climate change and new visions of the global order.February 15 and 16 – 38th African Union Summit, Addis Ababa. The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government will hold an ordinary session in which Mauritania will hand over the one-year chairpersonship, and the successor to the Chadian Moussa Faki as chairperson of the African Union Commission will be elected. The Pan-African organisation has been running the NEPAD development programme since 2001 and in 2015 it adopted its Agenda 2063 to hasten the continent's transformation. Six member states – Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan – are currently suspended following their respective military coups.February 23 – Federal elections in Germany. Six days after Chancellor Olaf Scholz fired his finance minister Christian Lindner, of the liberal party FDP, from the government over budget differences, on November 12, 2024, the Social Democrat came to an agreement with the Christian Democrat opposition to bring forward by seven months elections due in September. The SPD and The Greens, the only remaining partner following the collapse of the "traffic light" coalition, go into the vote languishing in the polls, with the CDU/CSU and the far-right AfD in the lead.March 1 – Yamandú Orsi takes office as president of Uruguay. The candidate from the leftist opposition Broad Front beat the conservative Álvaro Delgado, from the ruling National Party, in the runoff presidential election of November 24, 2024. The successor to the outgoing president, Luis Lacalle, has a five-year term. Broad Front's return, after holding power for the first time between 2005 and 2020, will precede the celebration of the bicentenary of Uruguay's Declaration of Independence on August 25.March 1 - End of the mandate of the new Transitional Government in Syria. This was the date announced on December 10, 2024, two days after the fall of the Baathist regime of Bashar al-Assad in the lightning offensive launched on November 27 against Damascus by a coalition of rebel groups, by the new Prime Minister, Muhammad al-Bashir. The day before, he was appointed to the post by the main rebel wing, the Islamist guerrilla group HTS (Hayat Tahrir al Sham) of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani and the Syrian Salvation Government, which Bashir himself had been leading.March 3-6 – 19th edition of the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona. A fresh yearly edition of the world's leading mobile communication technologies event, where device manufacturers, service providers, wireless carriers, engineers and scientists unveil the latest developments in the sector. The 2025 MWC, the theme of which is "Converge. Connect. Create", will focus on topics including the next phase of 5G, IoT devices and generative AI.First quarter – Sixth European Political Community Summit, Albania. The EPC came about in 2022 at the initiative of Emmanuel Macron. It is a biennial gathering of the leaders of 44 European countries that seeks to provide a platform to discuss strategic matters in a non-structured framework of dialogue among the 27 EU member states and a further 17 states from the continent that are candidates for accession or are associated with the EU.First quarter – Election of the president of Armenia by the National Assembly. The term of Vahagn Khachaturyan will come to a close no later than April 9. This is the date the tenure of the previous holder of the post, Armen Sarkissian, was due to end. Sarkissian resigned in 2022. A parliamentary republic, Armenia remains in Russia's orbit, a situation that is proving increasingly problematic for the authorities in Yerevan given Moscow's lack of action towards the country's military defence in the face of attacks by Azerbaijan. One of these attacks in 2023 forced the surrender of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.First quarter – First European Union-United Kingdom Summit. The Labour government of Keir Starmer champions a new era of bilateral relations between London and Brussels. Following Brexit in 2020, the United Kingdom's economic exchange with the 27 EU members takes place under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which provides a limited area of free trade in goods and services. The British prime minister is pursuing "constructive" ties with the EU that cover complex issues such as immigration, although he rules out a return to the free of movement of workers, the customs union and, in short, the single market.April 13-October 13 – Universal exhibition, Osaka. The Japanese city is organising a world's fair for the third time, after 1970 and 1990. The theme of Expo 2025 is "Designing future society for our lives".May 6 – 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the European Union and the People's Republic of China. Beijing and Brussels will celebrate half a century of diplomatic relations at a time defined by tensions over China's overcapacity, the imposition of tariffs on Chinese Electric Vehicles, and China's role in the war in Ukraine.May 9 – 75th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration. In 1950, the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, made a proposal to place France and Germany's coal and steel production under a single authority. This was the genesis of a web of supranational integration institutions (ECSC, EEC, Euratom) that decades later would result in what today is the European Union.May 12 – General elections in the Philippines. The deterioration of the relationship between the Marcos and Duterte families, who lead the current ruling coalition, could trigger a competition between the two main governing parties in an election where more than 18,000 positions in the Senate, the House of Representatives, and provincial and local governments across the archipelago are up for renewal.May 19-23 – 29th World Gas Conference, Beijing. The growing importance of natural gas as an alternative fuel to petroleum products in the transition to carbon neutrality, its status as a raw material in the production of grey hydrogen and the greater demand for gas as a result of the war in Ukraine gives the triennial WGC gathering particular importance. The International Gas Union (IGU) has been staging the event since 1931. In China, production, imports and consumption of gas are increasing constantly.May 26 – End of Luis Almagro's tenure as OAS secretary general. Uruguay's Luis Almagro was elected head of the OAS in 2015, and in 2020 he secured re-election for a second and final five-year term. The candidates to succeed him are the Paraguayan foreign minister, Rubén Ramírez, and his counterpart from Suriname, Albert Ramdin. The vote will take place at the General Assembly, which in June will hold its 55th regular session in Antigua and Barbuda.May – Presidential elections in Poland. The Civic Platform (PO), a pro-European and liberal conservative party, returned to power in Poland in 2023 led by Donald Tusk. It is hoping to win this direct ballot and bid farewell to an uncomfortable cohabitation with the head of state elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2020, Andrzej Duda, from the right-wing party Law and Justice (PiS). The Polish system of government is a mixed one, where the president wields important powers.May – Pope's visit to Turkey. The Vatican is planning this papal visit, of a marked ecumenical nature, to commemorate 1,700 years since the First Council of Nicaea, whose doctrinal legacy is accepted by all the Christian churches. Pope Francis already made an apostolic visit to Turkey in 2014.June 9-13 – Third UN Ocean Conference, Nice. Three years after the second edition in Lisbon, the UN will stage a new thematic conference in the city on the French Riviera to support Sustainable Development Goal 14: "Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources". June 8, the day before the inauguration of the UNOC, marks World Oceans Day.June 14 – End of the EULEX Kosovo mission mandate. Since 2008, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo has been the largest civilian mission to be launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). EU support for the Kosovar institutions on rule of law matters is one of the three pillars of the international commitment to peace, security and stability in Kosovo, the others being UNMIK, the UN interim administration mission, and KFOR, the NATO force. June 20 – World Refugee Day. According to the UN's specialist agency UNHCR, in 2024 there were 117 million forcibly displaced people in the world, of whom 43.4 million could be considered refugees; 40% of them were under 18. A total of 69% of refugees and other people in need of international protection live in countries bordering their countries of origin, and only 25% are hosted by high-income countries.June 21-29 – London Climate Action Week. LCAW, founded in 2009 by the think tank E3G and the Mayor of London, is an annual major get-together where individuals, communities and organisations swap ideas and propose collaborations to support decarbonisation and climate resilience. Also taking place within it is the Cites Climate Action Summit (CCAS), organised by the Smart Cities Network.June 24-25 – NATO Summit in The Hague. The North Atlantic Council will meet at heads of state and government level with the number of member states increased to 32 and with the Netherlands' Mark Rutte as the organisation's new secretary general. NATO is expected to make significant decisions regarding Ukraine and Russia, with a question mark over what new US president Donald Trump's strategic focus will be.June 25 – 75th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War. The event is being preceded by flaring tension on the Korean Peninsula, which is seeing out 2024 on a state of alert thanks to an escalation of hawkish action on the part of North Korea (fresh missile launches into the sea, the blowing up of road and rail links to the border with South Korea, the sending of troops to support Russia in the war in Ukraine) and, in response, joint manoeuvres by the armed forces of the United States, Japan and South Korea.June 30-July 3 – Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, Seville. The discussions of the high representatives of the nations attending this conference sponsored by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) will focus on the policies and resources required to fulfil the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs globally. FfD4 Seville will assess the progress made in the implementation of the Monterrey Consensus (2002), the Doha Declaration (2008) and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2015).June – 51st G7 summit, Kananaskis. Canada in 2025 will lead the annual gathering of the seven big powers from the Global North, plus the European Union. For the Canadian government, some of the priorities to be addressed are the inclusive economy, climate action and managing emerging technologies. Kananaskis, in the Rocky Mountains of Alberta province, west of Calgary, already played host to the G7 in 2002.July 1 – Denmark takes over the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. The rotating council presidency "trio" standing between January 1, 2025, and June 30, 2026, will be completed by Poland (as the outgoing holder) and Cyprus (as the incoming holder in 2026).July 1 – Bulgaria to adopt the euro. Bulgaria is looking to become the 21st eurozone country on this date, once the five convergence criteria on inflation, deficit, debt, interest rates and monetary stability are met, the latter through participation in the ERM II exchange rate mechanism. The initially planned date of January 1, 2025, had to be put back after the European Central Bank told Sofia inflation was still too high.July 27 – Elections for the House of Councillors in Japan.The elections to renew half of the upper house of Japan's legislative power could reaffirm the current weakness of the leading party, the Liberal Democratic Party, headed by the unpopular Ishiba Shigeru. Following the snap general elections of 2024, Japan faces a historic political anomaly: a minority government, which brings uncertainty to the otherwise stable Japanese politics.August 1 – 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. The signing of this declaration in the Finnish capital by the 35 states participating in the closing meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, the precursor to the OSCE) marked a milestone in establishing a model of co-existence among blocs and neutral countries in the detente years, during the first phase of the cold war. The successor to this instrument was the Paris Charter of 1990.August 6 – Bicentenary of the independence of Bolivia. The Andean country is gearing up for the commemoration in a climate of serious political upheaval, with outbreaks of violence and hints of civil strife, at the heart of the ruling party Movement for Socialism (MAS), where there is an escalating feud between the current president of the republic, Luis Arce, and his predecessor in the post, Evo Morales. With their respective factions behind them, both are seeking to lead the MAS candidacy in the presidential elections of August 17. Arce's current five-year term ends in November.August – General elections in Gabon. In August 2023, General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema ousted the president, Ali Bongo Ondimba, in a bloodless military coup. He immediately proceeded to proclaim himself president for a transitional period with a process to adopt a new constitution that, on paper, should end in August 2025. The transition charter does not expressly bar Oligui Nguema from standing in future presidential elections. The presumption is that the general will run for the presidency, in which case he is likely to win.September 8 – Legislative elections in Norway. The ballot will be a test of the performance of the coalition government comprising the Labour Party of Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre and the centrists, which won power in 2021. During the term now nearing its end, the Nordic country has seen its strategic value soar as a hydrocarbons provider to European allies looking to reduce their dependence on Russia. In late 2024, the polls were worrying for the Labour Party, the most popular choice in every election since 1927, as they were trailing the Conservatives and even the right-wing Progress Party.September 15 – 30th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Signed after the Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action represents the most ambitious commitment to gender equality to date, identifying 12 critical areas for action to end inequality. Its commemoration will coincide with the rise of anti-gender movements and the challenges posed by setbacks and ongoing backlash in gender equality in recent years.September 27 – Federal elections in Australia. This is the date on or before which the ballot to elect new members of the Australian House of Representatives must be held. The ruling Labor Party of Anthony Albanese, the prime minister since 2022 with a majority in parliament, will be up against the conservative Liberal-National coalition, headed by the Liberal's Peter Dutton.September – 80th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly gathering that brings together all the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and how they see the world. The regular session will begin on September 9 and the high-level general debate will start on September 23.September – End of the first phase of the conclusion of United States military operations in Iraq. That is the timeline put forward by the Department of Defense to move to the "second phase" of the "transition plan" that began in September 2024 for the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) the military operation to combat Islamic State in Iraq and Syria since 2014. The United States ended combat operations in Iraq in 2021 but left behind a contingent of soldiers on logistics and training missions.September – Artemis II mission to the Moon. Barring technical difficulties causing further delays, NASA will carry out the second launch – the first crewed mission – of the Artemis space programme around this time. The plan is for the Orion spacecraft, propelled by the SLS rocket, to leave the Earth's orbit, perform a flyby of the Moon and return to Earth in ten days. If all goes well, the following mission, Artemis III, also crewed by four astronauts, will mark the first time humans have set foot on the Moon since the lunar landing by Apollo 17 in 1972.October 6 – World Habitat Day. The UN General Assembly established this day of global observance in 1985. Previously, in 1977, the UN had created its Human Settlements Programme to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities. UN-Habitat held its third international conference (Habitat III) in Quito in 2016 and the next edition (Habitat IV) is scheduled for 2036. Looking ahead to World Habitat Day 2025, the agency is calling for reflection on how to tackle the sustainability crises affecting urban areas.October 17-19 – Annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group, Washington. Preceded by the "spring meetings", the main international organisations providing credit assistance to states will bring together their boards of governors and their advisory bodies, the Development Committee and the International Monetary and Financial Committee, in Washington, the corporate headquarters of both bodies. Bulgaria's Kristalina Georgieva has been in charge of the IMF since 2019 and the Indian-born American Ajay Banga has been the president of the World Bank since 2023.October 20 – Federal elections in Canada. The Liberal Party prime minister, Justin Trudeau, faces elections to the House of Commons with personal popularity ratings in free fall after a period in power stretching back to 2015. The centre-left leaning Liberals have run a minority government since 2019 and, after three straight victories, they are seeing how Pierre Poilievre's Conservatives have a commanding lead over them in the polls. Once hugely popular, a string of controversies and missteps have caused the progressive Trudeau's star to fade.October 26 – Legislative elections in Argentina. The South American country will elect a third of its senators (24) and half of the national deputies (127). A new feature in these elections will be that voters will mark their preferences on a single ballot paper. As a prior step, the "simultaneous and mandatory open primaries" (known by the Spanish acronym PASO), called for August 3, will be crucial. The government of President Javier Milei, however, wants to abolish them. In the 2023 legislative elections, Milei's La Libertad Avanza ("Liberty Advances") coalition debuted with 35 deputies, 23 fewer than the Peronist Unión por la Patria ("Union for the Homeland").October 31 – 25th anniversary of UN Resolution on Women, Peace and Security. United Nations Security Council Resolution adopted resolution (S/RES/1325) on women and peace and security on 31 October 2000 to reaffirm the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction. The resolution stresses the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.October – Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire. The French-speaking country that carries most economic weight in sub-Saharan Africa goes into these elections in a climate of relative calm, compared to the violent upheavals of 1999-2011. The president, Alassane Ouattara, was elected in 2010, re-elected in 2015 and secured a third term in 2020, amid huge opposition protest. In late 2024, it was not known whether Ouattara, in a fresh – and dangerous – self-serving interpretation of the country's constitution, would stand for a fourth time. The controversial former president and opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo had confirmed he would run.October – Legislative elections in the Czech Republic. ANO, the populist right-wing party of Andrej Babiš, was dislodged from the government in 2021 by a five-member liberal conservative coalition headed by the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Petr Fiala. The polls are predicting a resounding victory for Babiš, though falling short of an absolute majority. The businessmen turned politician under the shadow of corruption is tipped to secure a return as prime minister with a nationalist, Eurosceptic rhetoric that is hostile to military assistance for Ukraine.October – Presidential elections in Cameroon. Paul Biya, now in his nineties and the president of the republic since 1982 (he is the fourth longest serving head of state in the world, behind Equatorial Guinea's Obiang, the King of Sweden and the Sultan of Brunei) will run for the post for the eighth straight time. A 2008 amendment to the country's constitution abolished the limit on the number of seven-year terms a president can serve. The conservative and Francophile ruling party the RDPC, has closed ranks behind the elderly and ailing Biya, a de facto dictator at the head of an authoritarian regime that tolerates pluralism but not true electoral competition.October – General elections in Tanzania. Marked by increased political violence against the opposition during the 2024 local elections, these elections will test current President Samia Suluhu Hassan's commitment to democratic reforms or, instead, it will evidence a return of the African country to authoritarianism.October or November – 47th ASEAN Summit, Malaysia. This dynamic bloc of ten Southeast Asian countries, which operates its own free trade area and another, the RCEP, with its regional partners, holds summits twice a year, the autumn summit being the most important on account of the profusion of parallel meetings it hosts. Also taking place at the 2025 edition, then, is the 20th East Asia Summit, the 28th ASEAN+3 Summit and bilateral summits with China (28th edition), Japan (28th), South Korea (26th), India (22nd), the United States (13th) and Australia (5th), as well as one with the UN (15th).November 6 – 50th anniversary of the start of the Green March. The Moroccan occupation of parts of the Sahara through the march of 360,000 volunteers on foot, along with the Sahrawi people's refusal to abandon their right to self-determination, initiated the still-unresolved Western Sahara conflict. In recent years, Spain and France have shifted their stance from supporting a referendum in the territory to expressing interest in Rabat's autonomy plan as a solution.November 10-21 – 30th United Nations Climate Change Conference, Belém. Brazil will host three parallel meetings (COP30, CMP20 and CMA7) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, as scientific alerts and extreme climate events mount up on account of global warming. In tune with the general sensation of emergency and to demonstrate its commitment to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the government of Lula da Silva has chosen as venue for the event the capital of a state, Pará, that takes in the heart of the Amazon rainforest.November 16 – General elections in Chile. In Chile, the sitting president is not eligible to run for an immediate second term, which means that Gabriel Boric, who was elected in 2021 (and whose record in office has led to low approval ratings), will make way for another candidate from Alianza de Gobierno ("Government Alliance") the centre-left coalition in power and successor to Apruebo Dignidad ("Approve Dignity"). A year before the elections, neither the left nor the opposition centre-right or right had clearly defined figures to champion the various sectors.November 27 and 28 – 20th G20 summit, Johannesburg. The South African president, Cyril Ramaphosa, the target of criticism at home on account of a relentless decline in electoral support and rifts within his party, the ANC, has pinned considerable hopes on the outcome of the 20th meeting of the most renowned and influential world leaders forum, which will be held in an African country for the first time. November 30 – General elections in Honduras. The vote will decide the successor to the president, Xiomara Castro, from the left-wing Libre (Liberty and Refoundation) party. Under the country's constitution, Castro is not eligible to seek a second term after the one that began on January 27, 2022. November – Second World Summit on Social Development, Qatar. A second summit, following the one held in Copenhagen in 1995, devoted to just and sustainable social development across the globe. WSSD2, convened by the UN General Assembly, will analyse shortcomings in the application of the Copenhagen Declaration and – say the organisers – should reinvigorate the programme of action for fulfilling the 2030 Agenda. Other directly related instruments are the FfD4, which is to take place in Seville in the summer, and the Summit of the Future, held in New York 2024.November – 32nd APEC summit, Gyeongju. The South Korean coastal city will play host to the heads of state and government of the world's biggest regional economic cooperation and trade group (ahead of the EU/EEA, the RCEP, the TPP and ASEAN), comprising 21 Pacific basin countries including China, the United States, Russia and Japan, as well as 12 of the 25 biggest economies by GDP. The APEC has not managed to form a free trade zone, but its leaders' summits have a deeply political and diplomatic aspect.December 1 – Centenary of the Locarno Treaties. The signing in 1925 of seven international agreements negotiated among Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, Belgium and Czechoslovakia following a conference held in the Swiss city laid the foundations of a new order of peace, security and inviolability of the borders of Europe in the wake of the First World War. What was often referred to as "the spirit of Locarno" allowed Weimar Germany's entry into the League of Nations, but the advent of Nazism dashed those hopes.First week of December – 10th Summit of the Americas, Punta Cana. Since 1994, the Summit of the Americas has provided the format for the institutionalised political gatherings of the heads of the continent's 35 sovereign states, two of which are not included in the OAS. It takes place roughly once every three years. In 2022, President Biden did not invite the leaders of Cuba, Nicaragua or Venezuela to the summit in Los Angeles as he considered their regimes were dictatorships, a decision that sparked controversy among the other Latin American delegations. The Dominican government is focusing on making the 2025 gathering an "inclusive" event and is looking to avoid controversy.December 14 – 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The accords signed at the U.S. military base in Dayton brought an end to the Bosnian War, with tragic episodes such as the Srebrenica genocide. In a peace negotiation that overlooked gender issues, Dayton condemned Bosnian women to be survivors of war and victims of peace by failing to address sexual violence as a weapon of war, leaving wounds that remain unhealed. Pending – Ninth CELAC summit and fourth CELAC-EU summit, Colombia. As holder of the presidency pro tempore, the South American country will be in charge of the annual gathering of the heads of state and government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, where 33 sovereign nations of the continent discuss their integration without the presence of the United States or Canada. The bi-regional CELAC-EU summit will seek a common agenda on cooperation and investment, providing a more multilateral context to the association or free trade agreements between the EU and several of America's countries and subregional blocs.Pending – 17th BRICS summit, Brazil. The intergovernmental association formed in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China is expanding rapidly, and in 2025 it will stage its 17th summit in the first of those founding countries. The leaders of the nine member states will attend, as well as those of associated countries and the candidates to join, gathered as BRICS+. The drivers of the forum frame their activities in the contest with the Western powers to achieve a multipolar world order that includes the Global South.Pending – 25th summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, China. The founding superpower will once again orchestrate the annual gathering of leaders from the SCO, which – alongside the Belt and Road Initiative – is the chief instrument of the People's Republic of China to extend its geopolitical and geo-economic influence in Eurasia on the intergovernmental plane, hand in hand with Russia, its strategic partner. The Heads of State Council of the ten member states will be joined by the leaders of observer and associate countries, under the SCO+ format. Pending – Sixth Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) summit, New Delhi. India for the first time will host a leaders' summit of the Quad, the discussion forum in which the Asian power engages with the United States, Japan and Australia on both diplomatic and security matters of interest, with an eye on China. The Quad dialogue takes place in conjunction with the Malabar joint air and naval military exercise conducted every year in waters of the Indian or Pacific Oceans.Pending – 34th Arab League summit, Baghdad. Iraq will host the annual meeting of Arab League leaders. Apart from the armed and territorial conflicts tearing several of its members apart (Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia), the organisation is proving incapable of having a positive influence on ending the wars Israel has been waging against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon since 2023. In addition, its stance on Iran is far from unanimous.Pending – 17th summit of the Economic Cooperation Organization, Baku. Azerbaijan, one of the countries gaining most strategic advantage from the war in Ukraine, will host the gathering of presidents of this organisation of ten Eurasian governments that includes Turkey, Iran and the whole of Central Asia, but not Russia or China. The oil-exporting Transcaucasian country already staged COP29 in 2024 and in 2025 it will also be the venue for a summit of the Organization of Turkic States.Pending – Bulgaria to join the OECD. In 2022, the OECD began talks for the entry of six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania. In 2024, they were joined by Thailand and Indonesia. Of them all, the country to have made most progress towards joining the club of developed market-based economies committed to democracy appears to be Bulgaria, which is hoping to become the 39th member state at the end of 2025.Pending – Norway to ban the sale of new petrol and diesel cars. The government in Oslo has set out to ensure that as of 2025 all new cars will have zero carbon emissions, i.e. they will be electric or they will run on hydrogen. The ban by Norway – a major hydrocarbons producer – is a decade ahead of the goal mapped out by the EU. As for overall climate neutrality, it aims to achieve it by 2030, 20 years before the EU. Norway generates much more energy than it consumes and is committed to clean energies like green hydrogenAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB or its donorsDOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2024/313/en

Issue 33.5 of the Review for Religious, 1974. ; Review lot Religious is edited by faculty members of the School of Divinity of St. Louis University, the editorial offices being located at 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; St. Louis, Missouri 63103. It is owned by the Missouri Province Educational Institute; St. Louis, Missouri. Published bimonthly and copy-right ~) 1974 by Review ]or Religious. Composed, printed, and manufactured in U.S.A. Second class postage paid at St. Louis, Missouri. Single copies: $1.75. Sub-scription U.S.A. and Canada: $6.00 a year; $11.00 for two years; other countries, $7.00 a year, $13.00 for two years. Orders should indicate whether they are for new or renewal subscriptions and should be accompanied by check or money order payable to Review ]or Religious in U.S.A. currency only. Pay no money to persons claiming to represent Review ]or Religious. Change of address requests should include former address. R. F. Smith, S.J. Everett A. Diederich, S.J. Joseph F. Gallen, S.J. Editor Associate Editor Questions and Answers Editor September 1974 Volume 33 Number 5 Renewals, new subscriptions, and changes of address should be sent to Review for Religious; P.O. Box 6070; Duluth, Minnesota 55802. Correspondence with the editor and the associate editor together with manuscripts, books for review, and materials for "Subject Bibliography for Religious" should be sent to Review for Religious; 612 Humboldt Building; 539 North Grand Boulevard; St. Louis, Missouri 63103. Questions for answering should be sent to Joseph F. Gallen, SJ.; St. Joseph's Church; 321 Willings Alley; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106. Papal Bull Holy Year Proclaiming the Paul VI Given below is the English translation of Paul VI's Bull proclaiming the Holy Year that will begin on Christmas Eve, 1974. The translation is that which appeared in the English edition of Osservatore romano. Paul, servant of the servants of God, to all the faithful: Health and apostolic blessing. As the universal jubilee to be celebrated in Rome approaches, the memorials of the Apostles shine forth more brightly for the faithful as the goal of pilgrimage--the holy places of Rome where the tombs of the Apostles Peter and Paul are worthily preserved and religiously venerated, those "holy fathers" through whom the ~ity became not only the "diSciple of truth" but also the teacher of truth1 and the center of Catholic unity. Down the centuries, these memorials have always impelled the Chris-tian people to be fervent in their faith and to testify to ecclesial communion. This is so because the Church recognizes her identity and the cause of her unity in the foundation laid .by Jesus Christ, namely, the Apostles." From as early as the second century the faithful came to Rome to see and venerate the "trQphies" of the Apostles Peter and Paul in those very places where they are preserved,:' and they. made pilgrimages to the church of Rome to contemplate her "regal dignity."4 In the fourth century the pilgrimage to 1See St. Leo the Great, Sermon 82, 1 : PL 54, 422. ZSee Rev 21 : 14. 3See the testimony of Gaius, an ecclegiastic of the time of Pope Zephrynus, as given in Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica, II,25,7. 4See the inscription of Abercius, bishop of Hierapolis in Phrygia at the end of the second century; the text and translation is given in M. Guarducci, "L'iscrizione di Abercio," Ancient Society, v. 2 (1971), pp. 176-7. 993 994 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 Rome became in the West the principal form of that kind of religious journey. It was similar to, and had the same religious purpose as, the pil-grimage which was made in the East to Jerusalem where the Lord's sepulchre is found? In the early Middle Ages, those who were "linked to the Chair of Peter,'''~ and those who wished to make a profession of their orthodox faith at the tombs of the Apostles,; especially monks, came off pilgrimage to Rome from various parts of Europe and even from the East. The idea of a pilgrimage increased further from the 12th to the 13th century, becoming all the more common by reason of a renewal of spirituality and popular piety which spread throughout Europe at that time. This renewal served to enrich the ancient notion which the Church received from tradition and which was equally 1~o be found in other religions, namely, the concept of a "pilgrimage undertaken for the love ot~ God.''s The jubilee year originated in this way; it was as it were the result of a maturing process in the doctrinal; Biblical and theological fields.:' It emerged plainly for the first time in the year 1220 when our predecessor Honorius III proclaimed a jubilee.year for pilgrimage to the tomb of St. Thomas ~ Becket.1° Later, as is well known, pilgrims came to Rome to the basilicas of St. Peter and St. Paul, in the great popular and penitential movement of the year 1300, a movement confirmed by our predecessor Boniface VIII.11 This was marked by a longing to obtain pardon from God and peace among men. The move-ment was directed to this very lofty motive: "the glory of God and the exaltation of the faith.''1~ The Roman Jubilee of 1300 was the beginning and the pattern for those which have followed (every 25 years from the, 15th century onwards, except when the series was interrupted by extraneous circumstances). This is an indication of the continuity and vitality v~hich have always confirmed the relevance of this venerable institution for every age. It is correct to say that the jubilees celebrated in recent times have pre- ~See St. Maximus of Turin, Homily 72: PL 57, 405b. GThe expression is found in a letter of St. Columban to Pope Boniface IV in 613: Sancti Columbani opera ed. G. S. M. Walder (Dublin, 1957), p. 48. rConcerning this custom see F. M. Mignanti, lstoria della sacrosanta Basilica Vaticana (Rome/Turin, 1867), p. 180. 8See in general B. Kotting, Peregrinatio religiosa: Wall]ahrten in der Antike und das Pilgerwesen in der Alten Kirche (Regensburg, 1950). ~R. Foreville, "L'id6e de jubil6 chez les th6ologiens et les canonistes (XII-XIII s.) avant l'institution du Jubil6 Romain (1300)," Revue d'histoire eccl~siastique, v. 56 (1961), pp. 401-23. 10p. Pressuti, Regesta Honorii 1H (Rome, 1888-95), p. 1840; the text is given in R. Foreville, "Le Jubil6 de saint Thomas b. Becket du XIII au XV sii~cle (1220-1470)," Etudes et documents (Paris, 1958), pp. 163-4. alBull, Antiquorum habet fida relatio, dated February 22, 1300: Extravagantes Comm. V,IX, I. ~zSee the gloss of Cardinal Giovanni Monaco on the same bull. Papal Bull Proclaiming the Holy Year / 995 served this outstanding value whereby the unity and renewal of the Church aCe affirmed in a special way and allmen are encouraged to recognize one another as brothers and to walk in the path of peace. Such a desire was manifested at the beginning of this century when our predecessor Leo XIII proclaimed' the jubilee year in 1900. The human family was~ filled with the same hopes and expectations when, a,quarter of a century later, afflicted by grave ,dangers and contention, 'it awaited the Holy Year of 1925. These were proposed for the special Holy Year of 1933 on the occasion of the 19th centenary of the redemption. The same noble aspirations for justice and peaceful coexistence among men were put forward by Pius" XII for the last jubilee, in the year 1950. I It seems to us that in the'present Holy Year all the principal and im-portant motives of the previous jubilees are present and expressed in sum-mary form in the .themes that we ourself laid down in our discourse of May 9, 1973 when we first announced ,the Holy Year: renewal and reconcilia-tion. a:~ We have offered these themes for the reflection of pastors and faithful, particularly during the anticipated celebration of the jubilee in local churches, and we have.added to them our exhortations and our catechesis. But the aspirations that the two themes enunciate and the lofty ideals that they express ~vill find a more complete realization in Rome, where pilgrims to the tombs of the Apostles Peter and Paul and to the memorials of the other martyrs will come into more ready contact with the ancient sources of the Church's faith.and life, in order to be converted by repentance, strengthened in charity, hnd united more closely with their brethren by the grace of God. Thi~ renewal and reconciliation pertain in the first place to the interior life, above all because the root of all good and, unfortunately of all evil, is found in the depths of the heart. It is in the depths of the heart therefore that conversions of metanoia must take place, that is, a change of direction, of attitude, of option, of one's way of life. But also for the Church as a whole, ten years after the end of the Second Vatican Council we view the Holy Year as the ending of a period of reflection and reform arid the beginning of a new phase of building up in the theological, spiritual, and pastoral spheres, to be developed on the foundations laboriously laid down and consolidated during the past years; in accordance with the principles of new life in Christ and of the communion of all men in Him who reconciled us to the Father by His blood,a~ For the whole w~arld this call to renewal and reconciliation is in harmony a3See Paul VI, "Allocution Announcing the Plans for a 1975 Holy Year," May 9, 1973: AAS, v. 65 (1973), pp. 322-5. 14See 2 Cor 5:18-20; Rm 5:10. 996 / Review for Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 with the most sincere aspirations for freedom, justice, unity, and peace that we see wherever men become aware of their most serious problems and suffer from the mishaps produced by divisions and fratricidal wars. With the message of the Holy Year, therefore, the Church wishes to indicate to all men of good will- the vertical dimension of life that ensures reference of all aspirations and experiences to an absolute and truly universal value, without which it is vain to hope that mankind will once more find a point of unification and a guarantee of true freedom. Even though it is charac-teristic of many sectors of modern society to assume secuIar forms, the Church, without interfering in matters which do not come within her competence, nevertheless wishes to impress on men the need to be con-verted to God who alone is necessary,a5 and to imbue all their actions with fear and love of Him. For faith in God is the most powerful safeguard of the human conscience and is the solid foundation of those relationships of justice and brotherhood the world yearns for. The pilgrimage to Rome by representatives of all the local churches, both pastors and people, will therefore be a sign of a new process of conversion and brotherly reconciliation. As the minister of the word and of the grace of reconciliation, we respond to this sign of the interior dispositions of the pilgrims and of the renewed resolve of the Christian people whom they represent, by imparting the gift of the jubilee indulgence, insofar as we are able, to all the pilgrims who come to Rome and to all those who, though prevented from making the journey, accompany them in spirit. II It is well known from the Church's very ancient custom that the indul-gence attached to many penitential practices was granted in a special way as a gift on the occasion of pilgrimages to the places sanctified by the life, passion, and resurrection of our Savior Jesus Christ and by the confession of the Apostles. Today, too, we associate ourself with that venerable tradition, according to the principles and norms that we have ourself laid down in the apostolic constitution Indulgentiarum doctrina~'; and which we wish to recall briefly at this point. Since Christ is our "justice" and, as has been fittingly said, our "indul-gence," we, as the humble minister of Christ the Redeemer, .willingly extend a share in the gift of the indulgence~in accordance with the Church's tradi-tion- to all the faithful who, through a profound conversion of heart to God, through works of penance, piety, and brotherly solidarity, sincerely and fervently attest their desire to remain united in charity with God and l~See Lk 10:42; Mt 6:33. ~6Apostolic Constitution, lndulgentiarum doctrina: AAS v. 59 (1967), pp. 5-24. Papal Bull Proclaiming the Holy Year / 997 their brethren and to make progress in that charity.~: In fact, this sharing comes from the fullness of the treasury of salvation which is primarily found in Christ the Redeemer Himself, "in whom the satisfactions and merits of His redemption subsist in all their value.''xs In this'fullness in Christ, which we have all received,x" there shines forth "the most ancient dogma of the communion of saints, whereby, in Christ and through Christ, the lives of the individual sons of God are linked with the lives of all the other Christian brethren by a marvelous bond in the supernatural unity of the Mystical Body of Christ, as in one mystical person.''~° For, "by the hidden and benevolent mystery of the divine will, men are linked together in a supernatural relationship, whereby just as the sin of one also harms the others, so also the holiness of one is beneficial to the others.'''-'~ By means of the indulgence, the Church, making use of her power as minis-ter of the redemption of Christ the Lord, communicates to the faithful a sharing in this fullness of Christ in the communion of saints,'-"-' providing them with the ample means of salvation. Thus the Church, aiding and embracing them like a mother, sustains her weak and infirm children, who.find a firm support in the Mystical Body of Christ, which in its entirety works for their conversion through charity, example, and prayer. Thus penitents find in this singular form of ecclesial charity a powerful aid to help them put off the old man and put on the new. Conversion and renewal consist precisely in this.'-':' In fact, the Church's aim in granting indulgences is not only that of helping the faithful expiate the punishment they have deserved but also that of stimulating them to carry out works of piety, penance, and charity, and in particular works that serve to favor the growth of faith and the common good.~' III For this reason, interpreting.as it were the Church's maternal sentiments, we impart the gift of the plenary indulgence to all the faithful who are prop-erly disposed, and who, after confessing their sins and receiving Holy Communion, pray for the intentions of the supreme pontiff and the college of bishops: 1:See Paul V1, Letter to Cardinal de Fiirstenburg Officially Announcing the Beginning o! the 1975 Holy Year, dated May 31, 1973: AAS, v. 65 (1973), pp. 357-60. ~SApostolic Constitution, lhdulgentiarum doctrina, 5: AAS, v. 59 (1967), p. 11. ~gSee Jn 1:16. -~0Apostolic Constitution, lndulgentiarum doctrina, 5: AAS, v. 59 (1967), pp. 10-1; and see St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, III,q.48,a.2 adl; and q.49,a.l. ZlApostolic constitution, lndulgentiarum doctrina, 4: AAS, v. 59 (1967), p. 9. '-'Zlbid., 8: AAS, v. 59 (1967), p. 16. '-':~See Paul VI, Letter to Father 'Constantine Koser on the 750th Anniversary o] the Portiuncula Indulgence, dated July 14, 1966: AAS, v. 58 (1966), pp. 631-4. z4See the Apostolic Constitution, lndulgentiarum doctrina, 8: AAS, v. 59 (1967), p. 17. 998 / Review Jor Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 (1) If they undertake a sacred pilgrimage to one of the patriarchal basilicas (the basilica of St. Peter's in the Vatican,,St. Paul's Outside-the- Walls, ttie Lateran Archbasilica of the Most Holy Savior, or St. Mary Major), or to some other church or place of the city of Rome designated by the competent authority, and devoutly take part in a liturgical celebration there, especially the Sacrifice of the Mass, or some exercise of piety (e.g., the way bf the cross, the rosary); (2) If they visit, in a group or individually, one of the four patri-archal basilicas and spend some time there in devout recollection concluding with the Our Father, the profession of faith in. any approved form, and a prayer to the Blessed Virgin Mary; (3) If, being prevented by illness or some other grave reason from going on a pilgrimage to Rome, they unite themselves spiritually with this pilgrim-age and offer their prayers and sufferings to God; (4) If, being prevented while in Rome. by illness or some other grave reason from taking part in a liturgical celebration or exercise of piety or visit made by their group (ecclesial family or social, as mentioned in 1 and 2 above), they unite themselves spiritually with the group and offer their prayers and suffering to God. During the Holy Year, moreover, the other concessions of indulgences remain in force, with the proviso as before that a plenary indulgence can be gained only once a day;~'' however, all indulgences can always be applied tb the dead in modo suffragii."-''~ For the same reasons, namely, in order that the faithful be provided with ¯ every possible aid to salvation, and to help priests, especially confessors, we proclaim that confessors taking part "in the jubilee pilgrimage may use the faculties they have been given in their own dioceses by the legitimate au-thority,~ so that both on the journey and in Rome they may hear the con-fessions of the faithful accompanying them on the pilgrimage, and also the confessions ot~ others who, together with the members of their own group, may approach them. The right of the penitentiaries of the patriarchal basilicas regarding the confessionals reserved to them is maintained,'-'~ and special faculties will be granted by the Sacred Apostolic Penitentiary to the penitentiaries. IV We stated above that the following two principal purposes have been established for the Holy Year: spiritual renewal in Christ and reconciliation with God, and we have said that these aims concern not only the interior '-',~See Enchiridion indulgentiarum, norma 24, para. 1. ~Ibid. norma 4. ~zSee Paul VI's motu proprio, Pastorale munus, I, 14: AAS, v. 56 (1964), p. 8. "-SSee First Synod o] Rome, 1960, art. 63. Papal Bull Proclaiming the Holy Year / 999 life of each individual but the whole Church, and also, .in a certain sense, the whole of human society. For this reason we earnestly exhort all con-cerned to consider these proposals, to undertake initiativ,es and to coordinate programs so that during the Holy Year real progress may be made in the renewal of the Church and also in the pursuit of certain goals very dear to us, in accordance with the farsighted spirit of the Second Vatican Ecu-menical Council. Repentance, the purification of the heart, and conversion to God must consequently bring about an increase in the apostolic activities of the Church. During the Holy Year, therefore, generous efforts must be made to further evangelization, which is certainly the first of all the activities to be promoted. For the pilgrim Church "has been divinely sent to all nations that she might be 'the universal sacrament of salvation' "'-'~' and she "is by her very nature mis.sionary,' . and in the course of her history is renewed to the extent that she shows herself ready to accept and to deepen through faith the gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God, and to proclaim His saving message to men by word and the witness of her life. The coming assembly of the Synod of Bishops does not have a merely extrinsic and fortuitous connection with the Holy Year.-On the contrary, as we have already stated, "a zealous effort must be made to coordinate and closely link both these ecclesial events.'':~ In this regard the Synod will pro-pose directives and suggestions for the reflection of pastors gathered about the supreme pontiff, so that they may carefully consider in the light of faith "the evangelization of the modern world," taking into account, in the light of the charity of Christ, the wishes of the whole Church and the more urgent needs of our time. Therefore devout attention to the word of God together with catechetical instruction given to the faithful of every state and of all ages must lead Christians to purify their way of life and to a higher knowledge of faith; it must dispel doubts and stimulate the negligent to joyfully activate in their lives the gospel message; it must impel everyone towards a conscious and fruitful sharing in the sacraments; it must encourage communities and indi-viduals to give witness to the faith by the uprightness and strength .of their lives, so that the world may see the reason for the hope that is in us.:"-' Now ten years after the SecQnd Vatican Council began, the great and salutary work of renewal in the fields of the pastoral ministry, the practice of penance, and the sacred liturgy, we consider it altogether fitting that this z~Vatican Council II, Ad gentes divinitus (Decree on the Missionary Activity o] the Church), I: AAS, v. 58 (1966), p. 947. :"qbid., 2: AAS, v. 58 (1966), p. 948. :;~"Discourse to the General Secretariat of the Synod of Bishops," Osservatore romano, April 6, 1974, p. 4. :~See 1 Pt 3:15. 1000 / Review jor Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 work should be reviewed and furthered. If what the Church has clearly approved is kept in mind, it will be possible to recognize the valid and legitimate elements to be found in the many and varied experiments that have been carried out everywhere. Similarly, these same elements can, by a more earnest effort, be put into practice in accordance with the norms and principles suggested by pastoral prudence and a sense of true piety. The presence of large numbers of pilgrims, both pastors and people, from Christian communities throughout the world, brought together in Rome by a fraternal desire to gain the true benefits of the grace and love of Christ, will undoubtedly afford excellent opportunities for putting forward, comparing, and evaluating studies and viewpoints of various kinds. This will most cer-tainly bc the case if congresscs and meetings are held at different levels in the ecclesial community and by varied groups of experts, and provided that prayer and a ready willingness to carry out the apostolate are joined together. At this point we wish to draw particular attention to the need to find a just and proper balance between the differing demands of the pastoral min-istry today, a balance similar to that which has been admirably achieved in the sacrcd liturgy. We refer to the balance between tradition and renewal, b~twccn the necegsarily religious nature of the Christian apostolate and its effectivencss as a force in all fields of social living, between free and spon-taneous activity--which some are accustomed to call charismatic--in this a.postolate and fidelity to laws based on the commands of Christ and of the pastors of the Church. For these laws, laid down by the Church and con-tinually brought up to date, make allowance for individual experiments within the Christian community, in such a way that they are a help in build-ing up the body of Christ, which is the Church, and not a hindranceY:' We wish likewise to draw attention to the ever increasing need to pro-mote the kind of apostolate which, without damaging the Church's necessary and traditional institutions, namely dioceses and parishes, takes special account of particular local circumstances and categories of people. Such an apostolate must ensure that the leaven of the gospel permeates those forms of modern social living which often differ from traditional forms of ecclesial life and seem foreign to the communities "in which the faithful gather to-gether and are linked" in prayer, faith, and charity. The forms we are thinking of are principally those of workers, members of the academic world, and young people. It will also be necessary to examine carefully the methods of teaching religion and of preaching the sacred word of God, to insure that they meet the needs of our time. This mt~st be done with the aim of finding effective methods. Special care must be taken to insure that the media of social com-munications promote the human and Christian progress both of individuals and of communities. :~.aSee Rm 15:2; 1 Cor. 14:3; Eph. 4:12. Papal Bull Proclaiming the Holy Year / 1001 These are questions of the greatest seriousness and importance. We must face up to them and with humble prayer seek the grace of the Holy Year in order to solve them. V As is well known, i~ recent years one of the Church's most pressing con-cerns has been to disseminate everywhere a message of charity, of social awareness, and of peace, and to promote, as far as she can, works of justice and solidarity among all men, whether individuals, social groups, or peoples. We earnestly desire, therefore, that the Holy Year, through the works of charity which it suggests to the faithful and which it asks of them, should be an opportune time for strengthening and supporting the moral conscious-ness of all the faithful and of that wider community of all men which the message of the Church can reach if an earnest effort is made. The ancient origins of the jubilee as seen in the laws and institutions of Israel clearly show that this social dimension is part of its very nature. In fact, as we read in the Book of Leviticus,:" the jubilee year, precisely be-cause it was dedicated in a special way to God, involved a new ordering of all things that were recognized as belonging to God: the .land, which was al-lowed to lie fallow and was given back to its former owners; economic goods, insofar as debts were remitted; and, above all, man, whose dignity and free-dom were reaffirmed in a special way by the emancipation of slaves. The year of God, then, was also the year of man, the year of the earth, the year of the poor, and upon this view of the whole of human reality there shone a new light which emanated from the clear recognition of the supreme dominion of God over the whole of creation. In today's world also the problems which most disturb and torment mankind--economic and social questions, the question of ecology and sources of energy, and above all that of the liberation of the oppressed and the uplifting of all men to a new dignity of life-~can have light cast on them by the message of the Holy Year. We wish, however, to invite all the sons and daughters of the Church, and especially the pilgrims coming to Rome, to undertake certain definite tasks which, as successor of Peter and head of that church "which presides over the universal gathering of charity,'':~' we now publicly propose and com-mend to all. We refer to the carrying out of works of faith and charity for the benefit of our needy brethren in Rome and in other chu'rches of the world. These works will not necessarily be grandiose ones, although such are.in no way to be excluded. In many cases what are today called "micro-realizations" will be sufficient, corresponding as they do to the gospel spirit of charity. In this field the Church, in view of the modest resources at her :~"Lv 25: 8ff. :~r'See St. Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Romans, salutation: Funk, v. 1, p. 252. 1002 / Review jot Religious, Volume .33, 1974/5 disposal, will perhaps have to limit herself more and more to giving men nothing more than the widow's mite.:"~ But she knows and teaches that the good which counts most is that which, in humble and very often unknown ways, manages to provide help where there is a small need and to heal small wounds--things which often find no place in large projects of social reform. Nevertheless, the Church feels that it is necessary to give encourage-ment also to these larger programs for promoting justice and the progress of peoples. She renews her call to all those who have the power and the duty to build up in the world a more perfect order of social and human relations, urging them not to give up because of the difficulties of the present times and not to be won over by selfish interests. Once more we make a particularly strong appeal on behalf of developing countries and of people still afflicted by hunger and by war. Let special attention be given to the many needs which oppress man today, to the finding of employment by which men can provide for the needs of life, to housing which so many lack, to schools which need much assistance, to social and medical aid, and to the develop-ment and safeguarding of decent public moral standards. We should like also to express the humble and sincere desire that in this present Holy Year, too, in accordance with the tradition of previous jubilees, the proper authorities of the different nations should consider the possibility of wisely granting an amnesty to prisoners, as a witness of clemency and equity, especially to those who have given sufficient proof of moral and civic rehabilitation, or who may have been caught up in political and social upheavals too immense for them to be held fully responsible. We express in anticipation our gratitude ~ind invoke the Lord's abundant blessings on all those who will strive to insure that this message of charity, of social awareness, and of freedom, which the Church addresses to all men in the lively hope that she may be understood and listened to, is ac-cepted and translated into reality in the political and social order. In express-ing this hope we are conscious of following a wonderful tradition which began with the law of Israel and found its fullest expression in our Lord Jesus Christ who, from the very beginning Of His ministry, presented Him-self as the fulfillment of the ancient promises and figures connected with the jubilee year: "The spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to free those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord.'':~: Vl If there is one spiritual advantage which we especially desire from the :";See Lk 21:2; Mk 12:42. ZrLk 4:18-9. Papal Bull Proclabning the Holy Year / 1003 celebration of the Holy Year, .it is an increase in the number of those who devote their lives to serving the Church, especially priests and religious. For in order that the paths of grace and the means of salvation which the Holy Year indicates and offers to all the faithful may be properly explained and made available, there will always be a need for those sacred ministers and witnesses of Christ's gospel who by completely following the Lord show their fellowmen, namely the men of this and subsequent ages, the way of penance and of holiness. Thus, the voice of God must be listened to diligently. He never ceases to stir up and invite chosen individuals to dedicate themselves generously to the .service of the Church and the whole human race by the exercise of the priestly ministry and by the faithful witness of the religious life. Some will be called by God to offer themselves to Him through obedience and sacred celibacy and as priests of Christ to teach and sanctify and lead the faithful wherever they may be. Others, men and women of various ages and conditions, will be attracted to the religious life, so that by fulfilling their baptismal promises through a higher way of life they may fully live in the spirit and truly benefit the Church and society. We desire strongly that the multitude of these especially dear members of the Church may increase and flourish more and more, so that through their priesthood and t~e~activity of their religious life they may bear the joyful message of Christ to the ends of the earth and all give glory to the heavenly Father. VII Finally, we wish to proclaim and preach that the reconciliation of Chris-tians is one of the principal aims of the Holy Year. For, before all men can be brought together and restored to the grace of God our Father, com-munion must be reestablished between those who by faith have acknowl-edged and accepted Jesus Christ as the Lord of Mercy who sets men i~ree and unites them in the spirit of love and truth. For this reason the jubilee year, which the Catholic Church has accepted as part of her own custom and tradition, can serve as a most opportune period for spiritual renewal and for the promotion of Christian unity. We would, moreover, point out that the Second Vatican Council has taught that every effort and undertaking directed toward the reconciliation of Christians and all true ecumenism must necessarily start from an inner conversion of the heart, since the desire for Christian communion springs and grows from spiritual renewal, self-denial, the full exercise of charity, and fidelity to revealed truth?~ It is here that there is to be found the full and proper realization of the whole ecumenical movement to which the Catholic Church adheres as far as she is able, and through which Churches and communities not yet fully .~sSee Unitatis redintegratio (Decree on Ecumenism), 7: AAS, v. 57 (1965), p. 97. 1004 / Review [or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 in communion with the Apostolic See seek and desire the perfect unity willed by Christ. It is in fact the task and duty of the whole Church to reestablish this unity in full ecclesial communion.:'~' The year of grace, in this sense, provides an opportunity for doing special penance for the divisions which exist among Christians; it offers an occasion for renewal in the sense of a heightened experience of holiness of life in Christ; it allows progi'ess toward that hoped for reconciliation by intensified dialogue and concrete Christian collaboration in the salvation of the world: "that they also may be one in us, so that the world may believe.'''~ We have expressed once more our intentions and our desires concerning the celebration of the Holy Year in this city of Rome. Now we invite our brothers in the episcopate and all the pastors and faithful of the churches throughout .the world, of those churches also which are not in full communion with the Roman Church, and indeed all who believe in God, to participate at least spiritually in this feast of grace and redemption, in which Christ offers Himself as the teacher of life. Together with the pastors and faithful on pilgrimage to the tombs of the Apostles and the early martyrs, we desire to profess faith in God the almighty and merciful Father and in Jesus Christ our Redeemer. For our part we would hope that all who come to Rome to see Peter'1 may through us experience in the Holy Year the truth of the words of St. Leo the Great: "For in the whole church Peter repeats each day, 'You are Christ the Son of the living God,' and every tongue which confesses the Lord is inspired by the teaching of this voice.'"': We would wish also that through our ministry and that of our brother priests a huge multitude of faithful may come to the sources of salvation.":' May the holy door which we shall open on the night of Christmas Eve be a sure sign of this new approach to Christ who alone is the way"" and the door.4'~ It will be a sure sign too of the paternal affection with which, filled with love and desiring peace, we open our heart to all. We implore the Blessed Virgin Mary, the holy Mother of the Redeemer and of the Church, Mother of grace and of mercy, collaborator of reconcili-ation and shining example of the new life, to ask her Son to grant to all our brethren and sons and daughters the grace of this Holy Year, to renew and preserve them. To her hands and to her maternal heart we commend the beginning, the development, and the conclusion of this most important matter. 3Olbid., 5: AAS, v. 57 (1965), p. 96. 4°Jn 17:21. 41See Gal 1 : 18. 4"-Sermon 3: PL 54, 146. ¯ ~:~See Is 12:3. ¯ ~4See Jn 14:6. t~See Jn 10:7,9. Papal Bull Proclaiming the Holy Year / 1005 We wish this our letter to take full and immediate effect in such a manner that. whatsoever has been laid down and decreed in it be religiously ob-served by all concerned and come into force, all things to the contrary not-withstanding. If anyone knowingly or unknowingly shall act other than in accordance with what we have laid down, we order that such action be con-sidered altogether null and void. Given in Rome, at St. Peter's, on the 23rd day of May, the solemnity of the Ascension of the Lord, in the year 1974, the 1 lth of our pontificate. 1, Paul, Bishop of the Catholic Church The American Religious, Evangelizer at Home Peter J. Henriot, S.J. The following is the text of the address that Father Henriot delivered to the 17th Annual Assembly of the Conference of Major Superiors of Men held in Chicago June 16-20, 1974. Father Henriot is a staff associate of the Center of Concern; 3700 13th Street, N.E.; Washington, D. C. 20017. In a recent article in America magazine, Father Hubert Horan, a White Father who spent several years as a missionary in Tanzania, questioned whether the topic of the upcoming Synod, "evangelization," was a "cop-out," a retreat from more potentially controversial questions. Given his own mis-sionary understanding of "evangelization," he felt that it certainly was not an insignificant topic, but one which would be rich and fruitful in increasing our understandings and actions as Church in the world today. But Father Horan did admit that the term is a "slippery one," open to ever wider and wider interpretations. In a sense, we might say that evangelization, like charity, "covers a multitude of sins." Thus in countless discussions preceed-ing, during, and after the Synod this fall, discussions such as we are in-volved in these days here in Chicago, this topic will be explored, broadened and narrowed, and, hopefully, appropriated in our own individual lives and in the lives of our communities. This morning, in addressing the topic, "The American Religious, Evan-gelizers at Home," I will not be offering you any neat and compact new definition of evangelization. I know that you all recognize the difficulty-- the folly---of attempting that, since we are all grappling with what this term means. I do not apologize, therefore, for using the meaning which the official pre-Synod document has adopted for the sake of clarity, namely, "the activity whereby the Church proclaims the gospel so that the faith may be aroused, may unfold, and may grow." The American Religious, Evangelizer at Home / 1007 Evangelization and Action for Justice How the A~erican religious is called upon today, to take part in this task of evangelization is a question critical to our vocation of service in the Church. I would like to narrow our focus of attention during this day to one aspect or dimension of the task of evangelization, an aspect which was defined and delineated at the last Synod in 1971. This aspect ,is found in a sentence which I must adroit I have probably overused by quoting it inces-santly, "in season and out of season." The sentence is from the Synod's statement, Justice in the World: Action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel, or, in other words, of the Church's mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation. The preaching of the gospel--the task of evangelization--includes as a "con-stitutive dimension" the task of "action for justice," the commitment to trans-form a world where increasingly we hear, again in the words of the Synod, "the cry of those who suffer violence and are oppressed by unjust systems and structures." I want to share with you this morning my own understanding of why [l~is "action for justice" is constitutive to the task of evangelization, and why it is worth reflecti~ng on, praying over, and resolvihg about in our focus on the "American Religious, Evangelizer at Home." But let me firs[ make one thing perfectly clear, to borrow a phrase. My emphasis here is not upon "social action," the "social apostolate," or similar segmental aspects of religious life. My emphasis is upon a characteristic, a modality, of religious life which must--if religious life is to be evangelical--be c6nstitutive of its existence and practice~ in our Church and our world today. The Global Scene Our discussion has to be placed in context, and not carried on in a vacuum. "]'he context is our modern world, where, again citing the words of the 1971 Synod, "social structures place obiective obstacles in the way of conversion of hearts, or even of the realization of the ideal of charity." Less than two weeks ago I participated in a conference of over one hundred major religious leaders from Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish groups in the United States, called to discuss and plan the response of churches and synagogues to the current crisis in .global justice. During three days we heard factual analyses of the world situation from diverse figures such as Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, and Neville Kanakaratne, Ambassador to the United States from Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and a leading Third World spokesperson. We heard theological analyses of'Why religious people should respond, from people such as Archbishop Marcos McGrath of Panama, and Rabbi Marc Tannenbaum, of the American Jewish Com- 1008 / Review [or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 mittee--who both spoke of liberation from oppression as being central to the message of God's dealing with His people. And the participants planned and committed themselves to strategies for change: through the political system, in lifestyle, in education, in investment policies, and so forth. Finally, the conference received a ringing "statement of conscience," which spoke of the need for a profound conversion, in values, interests, and loyal-ties, in policies, institutions, and patterns of behavior, if any effective steps were.to be taken toward meeting the crisis of global justice. I would like to read one of the opening paragraphs of that statement to you, because I believe that it puts a context to some of the things we will be discussing~ The conference said: As Americans we have come to realize how many of our national policies, of our institutional structures of production, marketing and defense, and of our current personal patterns of conduct and consumption, are all inextricably linked to the ongoing av, d explosive global catastrophe of famine, hunger and malnutritior~; which continues to claim millions of lives every year in various parts of the world. Things are not getting better. The rich are getting richer, the poor poorer. Many millions will die this year from starvation. Hundreds of millions of children will be so undernourished that, if they survive at all, their physical and mental development will be seriously retarded. This is our world. The conference was able to say those things because it had put before it a description of a world marked by the twin horrors of hunger and repression. With the price of grain tripled in the past few months and the present world food reserves down to 27 days, the lowest since World War Two, the spectre of famine is a daily reality to millions of people in Africa and the Indian sub-continent. World-wide inflation, heightened through the quadrupling of the price of oil in the past year, means that the increasingly scarce resources of our finite world are getting even scarcer. And the world's population, now approaching 4 billion, will double in the next 35 years--except for the intervention of war and/or famine. Such deadly intervention is, of course, a real possibility. In a globe increasingly small, increasingly finite, and increasingly in-terdependent, two-thirds of the people of the world live in conditions of des-titution and degradation, while one-third enjoy the rich blessings created for all humankind. It is a literal re-enactment of the Dives and Lazarus story. Justice Needs at Home But in setting the context here, even so cursory a reference to the global scene should not distract us from the problems of social justice here at home. Those of you who live and work in major urban areas know that our cities, though outwardly quiet in the past few years, continue to see unrest, amidst conditions of unemployment, poor housing, and poor educa-tional systems. Our political system--as we approach the celebration in song and dance of our Bicentennial--seems paralyzed, locally as well as The American Religious, Evangelizer at Home / 1009 nationally, to deal with issues such as prison reform, tax reform, medical care, and so forth. One out of six Americans lives below a poverty line of what is required for basic health and well-being; the unemployment rate rose again last month to around 51/2%, with the rate of non-whites twice as high; inflation con-tinues to eat away the savings of the elderly and those on fixed incomes; while' life expectancy for the'average American is now around 71 years, for the non-white it is ten years less; and the U.S. infant mortality rate is one of the highest of any major industrialized nation in the world. Ten million Americans go to bed hungry every night in our land of diet cola and weight-reducing programs. Structural and Systemic Approaches This picture of social injustice--globally and nationally--is nothing new to you, I am sure. What might be new to you is the emphasis I want to give to the structural, systemic nature of the problems. We are not talking about isolated instances of poverty and injustice, but of the socio-economic-polit-ical structures, institutions~ and processes which create and perpetuate these problems. We need to move, as Gustavo Gutierrez suggests, from an "anec-doctal" approach to social problems to an "analytical" approach. Not stories about cases of injustice, but systemic analysis of why the injustices exist: only this will help us to experien~:e that call to profound conversion I spoke of earlier. This structural approach to injustice is central to the understanding of evangelization we are addressing here. It is central to the q971 Synod's discussion of "the systematic barriers and vicious circles" which hinder true justice. It is central to an appreciation of the strongest statement made by the Synod, when the Bishops described the present-day situation of the world as "marked by the grave sin of injustice." For the structural social injustice in our world and our nation is nothing less than sin, social sin. Social Sin and Evangelization Herein 'lies the reason why "action for justice" and transformation of the structures of injustice is constitutive to the preaching of the Gospel, to the task of evangelization. It is a continuation of the saving work of Jesus, who frees us from the bondage of sin: "For Gods~ loved the world that he gave his only son, so that everyone who believes in him may not be lost, but may have eternal life. For God sent his son into the world not to condemn the world but so that through him the world might be saved" (Jn 3:16-8). We Christians talk about sin only because we can talk of redemption, of grace. St. Paul tells us: "Where sin abounded, grace has abounded all the more" (Rm 5:20). And so as we speak of social sin, we also speak of social grace, God's revealing goodness and love in the social structures, institutions, and processes which we have created down through history. 1010 / Review /or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 It is precisely to fight against social sin, and to cooperate with social grace, that we Christians engage in "action for justice," that is, commit our-seives to the cause of social justice. Such action is not peripheral to the task of evangelization but is integral, constitutive. The 1971 Synod summarized this by saying: The mission of the preaching of the Gospel dictates at the present time that we should dedicate ourselves to the liberation of man even in his present ex-istence in ~this world. For unless the Christian message of love and justice shows its effectiveness through action in the cause of justice in the world, it will only with difficulty gain credibility with the men of our times. Thus the American religious evangelizer is, in a very true and genuine sense, the socially just religious, the socially just community. Note again that I am not speaking of social justice as an "apostolate" or as "work" or "projects." Social justice is a way o[ li[e which is integral to the.religious re-sponse to the call of the gospel. As integral to the gospel, it is something which cuts across all aspects of the evangelical life which we profess. It is living out of values which are counter to the values embodied in oppressive structures; it is a simplicity which says no to the conspicuous consumption which wastes the world's finite resources; it is a sharing which says no to the hoarding of the affluent in a world of so much poverty; it is a reaching out which says no to the dominance of entrenched power over the weak; it is a hope which says yes, there is a possibility of social change for a more just world. Action for social justice, then, is evangelization, a preaching of the good news to the poor, because our fundamental religious option is on the side of the poor, the powerless, the oppressed. We can do no less, reminded as we are by Mary's Magnificat of the fundamental option of God who has "pulled down princes from their thrones and exalted th.e lowly; the hungry he has filled with good things, and the rich sent away empty" (Lk 1:53-4). Concrete Implications Against this background of an understanding of the American religious evangelizer as the just religious, the just community, I would like to discuss some concrete implications which I see coming from this structural approach. I believe that they are only further extensions of what Father Paul Boyle wrote in his letter in the spring of 1972, urging CMSM members to be "witnessing and educating to social justice," and of what your own 1972 CMSM Assembly affirmed in the several resolutions you passed on the topic of social justice. For the sake of our exploration here this morning, I will speak in terms of the traditional aspects of evangelization, word, witness, and work. The word refers to the vision we religious have and relates particularly to the topic of formation; witness refers to our credibility, and relates to our life The American Religious, Evangelizer at Home / 1011 style; and work refers to the corporate thrust of the 9ommunity, and relates here specifically to the question of leadership. 1. Formation It has become increasingly accepted--theologically, philosophically, sociologically--that it is only possible to speak of the reality of a human person today by taking into full account the three dimensions of human existence: the individual, the interpersonal, and the public. These are not three separate and distinct dimensions so much as three moments in our perception of a single reality. The individual dimension is the realm of the private, the intimate. The person is an individual in as much as he/she is unique. The interpersonal dimension, on the other hand, is constituted in those relationships by which one individual deals with another in either, the limited sense of an 1-Thou encounter or in an extended sense of ordinary" societal dealings, The public dimension, however, includes the projections of individual and interpersonal existence into the institutions, structures, and processes of society. The person is organically one with these projec-tions. The identity of a human person is inadequately situated outside this triadic framework, this consideration of all three dimensions simultaneously. For this reason, the formation process of the American religious evangelizer must take account of the public dimension, the area of a person's involve-ment in and interaction with social structures, processes, and institutions. This formation--and I include the preparation of the novice, the training appropriate to brothers or. priests, the on-going "continuing education" programs for everyone in the community--should take account of the peculiar situation of the religious in the United States and the Roman Catholic Church of this last quarter of the twentieth century. Let me briefly suggest three points to be taken note of in this formation. "Spiritual Renewal and Social Justice Action First, there is great need today for an integration ,of the so-called "spiri-tual renewal" movement with the movement for greater social justice. We are experiencing in the Church today th6 movement of the Holy Spirit, renewing us through a heightened attention to prayer and faith, a growing acceptance of shared prayer, directed 'retreats, discernment workshops, spiritual direction, and the increasing activity, of charismatic, Pentecostal groups. Last year's annual CMSM Assembly was especially devoted to "building the faith community?' But I think that we are all aware that a danger lies in the possibility of a "turning inward," a false "spiritualism." Thus there is the potential case of someone becoming involved in these spiritual activities, spi,ritual ministries, as an escape from involvement with the evangelical task of changing unjust social structures. This might be understandabl~, given some of the flurry of "social action" during the 1960's, 1012 / Review [or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 and also the intensity of challenge in the authentic struggle for social reform. But we religious would surely fail in our responsibility to our Church and our world if we did not make every effort to integrate the two great dy-namisms moving around us today, the call for more active°social justice and the drive for more deeply renewed interiority. Social Determinisms Second, we have to attend in formation to the power of the "social determinisms" which affect all of us American religious. These determinisms are part of our culture and infringe upon the full exercise of our freedom. They provide the context, the milieu, within which choices are made. I will mention three of them which my colleagues at the Center of Concern have in recent months been analyzing--the implications of which I believe you ¯ °will all realize. (a) "Cultural addictions"--those patterns, habits, styles of life which we become acculturated, socialized, to from birth. Though frequently lived out inadvertently, these cultural addictions have a powerful influence over our choices, for example, in the matter of life style in this affluent, consumption-oriented nation. (b) "'Mindsets"--those perceptual frameworks, paradigms, which guide our thinking, our viewing of reality. For example, we Americans tend to be highly mechanical, pragmatic, problem-solving, "can-do,'" in perception. (c) "Class bias"--those socio-economic-political expectations and ideologies which influence our patterns of speech, behavior, judgment. Since the majority of religious come from the middle-class and few, I suspect (though I am open to correction on this), from the working class, we have a class orientation which provides us with specific sets of norms, values, and attitudes. These social determinisms operate in us all. Think for a moment of examples in different members of your community, and in yourself. They must be recognized and critically examined if we American religious are. ever to raise questions, for instance, about the global social justice implica-tions of the American way of life, of being Number One, of the spirit of competition, and so forth. Need for Sociological and Theological Analysis Finally, we need to foster in all stages of formation, for young and old alike, a deepening insight into both the sociological analysis of the struc-tures of injustice and the theological analysis of the imperatives of justice. How knowledgeable are the members of our community, for example, about the facts of world population; about the institutions of global trade such as tariffs, multi-national corporations, and monetary arrangements; about the relationship of the current food crisis to the energy crisis through the link of the fertilizer shortage? How aware are we religious about the structures of injustice in our own country--inequitable tax systems, the policy of "red- The American Religious, Evangelizer at Home / 1013 lining" on housing mortgages, zoning policies, cost of medical care for the elderly, the farm worker problem? And how conversant are we about the Church's social consciousness as articulated through the great documents of "~Rerum novarum, Quadragesimo anno, the Christmas messages of Pius XI1, Mater et Magistra, Pacem in terris, Gaudium et spes, Octagesima adveniens, Justice in the World? What do we know of the theology of liberation, and other expressions of social theology? My several questions, of course, may simply be unfair. I am not saying that all religious need to be social scientists or social theologians. But the questions do point to the continual need to update ourselves in the reality of the world we live in--a need which can be met only through organized efforts in formation. And our updating must include not only study but also experience, the real praxis of which Paulo Freire speaks. Only then can we religious hope to be about the task of evangelization. 2. Life Style In one of several disturbing passages in the 1971 Synod's statement Justice in the World, the bishops addressed the issue of the credibility of the Church regarding its message of social justice. Its credibility, the document said, was affected by its own mode of acting, and in the possessions and life style found in the church. Two passages are particularly relevant. In speak-ing of temporal possessions, the Synod argued that the evangelical witness the Church is obliged to give should never become ambiguous because of privilege, power, and wealth--the gospel must be proclaimed to the poor. "If instead the Church appears to be among the rich and the powerful of this world, its credibility is diminished." Again, the Synod suggests an examina-tion of conscience regarding life style, wherein we ask ourselves "whether our life style exemplifies that sparingness in regard to consumption which we preach to others as necessary in order that so many millions of hungry people throughout the world may be fed." Now I know that we religious have all been engaged at great length in discussions about the meaning of our vow of poverty today. I.know that we all cringe when we hear remarks like that of Bishop Sheen--and I usually don't quote Bishop Sheen in my talks--to the effect that "There are millions of people who would be only tOO glad to take a vow of poverty." Yes, would that the poor of the world had such a luxury to embrace religious poverty! Changes in Religious Poverty But I really think that the terms of the discussion and debate over religious poverty have changed in recent years. While still recognizing the ascetical and spiritual value of the vow of poverty--linking it to the kenosis of the Lord Jesus--we are beginning to appreciate its social value, I might 1014 / Review for Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 even says its political value. This appreciation is contained in the 1971 Synod's on "sparing and sharing" as a way to meet the challenge of global justice. It is found in the 1972 resolutions adopted by the annual CMSM Assembly, in which you yourselves pledged a program of action to promote within your communities greater simplicity of life style "to express our solidarity with the poor of the world and our respect for the needs of future generations." It is found in the 1973 Lenten pastoral letter of the Dutch Bishops, who discussed "Prosperity, Responsibility, Frugality," and spoke of the obligation of all Christians who live in an affluent nation to practice a socially-oriented sparingness as a no to even greater and greater con-su~ ption. And it is found recently, to speak of somethi~ng I know personally, in a communication of Father Pedro Arrupe, Superior General of the Society of Jesus, on "Simplicity of Life," in which he urges Jesuits to experi-ence an inner conversion to the poverty of Christ so that we can regain true apostolic credibility--especially with the poor. This would be shown in a simpler and hence freer life style. This communication is part of a con-tinual insistence on the part of Father Arrupe that unless Jesuits come to grips with the problem of their poverty, they have no future. In the socially unjust contemporary world, they deserve no future. This new dimension to an understanding and practice of religious poverty is linked to the realization that poverty and affluence, underdevelopment and oTerdevelopment, are correlatives. In a small, finite, and interdepen-d~ int globe, the extra serving of grain-fed beef on Dives' table means a smaller crumb of bread for Lazarus; the eight-cylinder automobile which guzzles petroleum products in the United States means a higher price for gasoline used to run the little irrigation pump on a small farmer's plot in India. The course of the Green Revolution--production of miracle grains to stave off famine in the developing countries--has in recent months come to a shattering halt because of the global shortage of fertilizer. But heavily-fertilized private lawns, golf courses, and cemeteries in the United States will not turn brown this summer. Freeing Ourselves [rom Affluence How can we American religious witness to an evangelization which really is a preaching of the Good News to the poor? We need to free our-selves from the subtle--and not so subtle--attachments to the affluent ways of our American life style. Today our simplicity of life is menaced, as Father Arrupe says, "not by a single but by a double danger. It is menaced not only by our built-in egoism, but by the consumer society in which we are plunged: a society that provides with such facility almost everything our egoism craves." We really do need freedom. But how free are we? (And I ask myself this question just as hard as I ask you.) Without making an effort to reduce our corporate resources and simplify our life styles, we American religious The American Religious, Evangelizer at Home / 1015 will continue to experience great unfreedom and our ability to be evan-gelizers will be hindered. Again I quote Father Arrupe: If, in a society of economic progress, abundance, and consumerism, we lack the spirit of poverty and the detachment derived from it, we run the risk, more than at any other time in the past, of becoming slaves. Slaves in many different ways: slaves of propaganda, of that high-pressure salesmanship which is the distinguishing mark of a consumer society; slaves of acquisiliveness, the drive to accumulate possessions which begin as luxuries and end up as neces-sities; slaves of snobbery, which limits our apostolic 9.ctivity, whether openly or tacitly, to a privileged social class. Poverty and simplicity of life, on the other hand, by reducing our needs to a minimum, sets us free--free to respond to any and every challenge of the apostolate. Three Points for Consideration Much could be said about promoting a response to that challenge of the apostolate, about promoting a life style which witnesses to the social dimension of evangelization I have been speaking of here. I mention only three brief points. First, because changes toward a simple life style run so counter to prevailing American values of consumption and affluence, there is need for religious communities to institute a positive, community-based and community-supported plan to reduce corporate resources and simplify individual and community life styles. The process does not come through pious wishes but through pragmatic plans. Second, continual community reinforcement and critique is required, to assure that efforts at simpler life styles are undertaken with a maximum of common sense, a minimum of self-righteousness, and a modiciam of good humor. Thirdly, we need a spirit of experiment, of risk, of adventure, in this task. A new citizen's lobby for affecting policy to meet the world hunger crisis, Bread for the World, has recently encouraged Americans to experi-ment with three meatless days a week, in order to curtail our dispropor-tionate consumption of~ meat--the most inefficient source of protein in a protein-short world. If religious communities in the United States were not risky enough to have offered this suggestion earlier, surely we could hope to be risky enough to try out the suggestion now that everyone is talking about it. 3. Leadership In developing the social dimension of the task of evangelization, I have spoken at considerable length of the word aspect of formation, and the witness aspect of life style. I will speak only briefly of the third and last aspect, the work aspect of leadership. Whereas I have had experience with formation programs (my own and others') and have analyzed and experi-mented with simpler life styles, I stand this morning before this august body of religious leaders with considerable hesitancy to speak about leadership. You have the experience--for better or worse!--which I lack. 1016 / Review [or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 But voices from below have never been lacking, so I would like to share with you at least two points. These relate to the promotion of the just community which I have called here the American religious evangelizer at home. The first point deals with models of support given by religious superiors for social change for justice, and the second deals with the issues of polarization and reconciliation. Superiors as Models of Support First, in relating to your communities in matters of social justice--in life style, education, spirituality, apostolate, corporate practices, and so forth--you obviously have several avenues of approach open to you. And here I am simply articulating out loud your own experience. You can exhort the group as a whole, calling them to a closer attention to the oppor-tunities and demands of "action for justice." This can be done by letter or conference or personal address to select groups. Or you can single out par-ticular persons and/or communities for a strong world of affirmation and encouragement. These persons or communities may be the "Abrahamic minorities" in your midst (to use the phrase Dom Helder Camara used last year in speaking to the LCWR) who struggle for justice in a tentative, prob-ing way on the fringes of community; or they may simply be those quiet, long-suffering members who hunger and thirst after justice in less noticeable ways. The approach of affirming these religious not only strengthens them in their work but also educates others in your community. Or again, decisions you take which have social justice impact, and ex-planations for these decisions which you share with your community and with the wider public, can be effective works of evangelization. I think of several instances in recent years where superiors have announced the opening of some new apostolate or the closing of some traditional apostolate, and explained their reasons in ways which significantly advanced the cause of social justice. Finally, there is the symbolic action of the superior who publicly speaks out on an issue of social justice, or personally involves him-self in some particular justice struggle. Last year's statement on universal and unconditional amnesty endorsed by many CMSM members, and the pa,rticipation of CMSM members on the picket lines of the Coachella Valley in support of the farmworkers, are two instances which come to mind. A statement this year by the CMSM in support of the Equal Rights Amend-ment would be a powerful contribution to the social justice issue of women's rights in our society. The point I wish to make in citing these various models of leadership action by religious superiors is simply to indicate explicitly the many ways which are open to you. Superiors, Polarization, and Reconciliation My second point touches on something which sometimes follows when The American Religious, Evangelizer at Home / 1017 this leadership in social justice has been exercised, or when the community really does get involved in "action for justice." This is the issue of polariza-tion in religious communities and the task of the religious superior to be a reconciler. The coming celebration of the Holy Year will emphasize the theme of reconciliation; several months ago, Father Paul Boyle wrote to the CMSM membership a letter discussing this topic. In the context of our focus here on the social dimension of evangelization, I have frequently heard it said that issues ofsocial justice sometimes divide religious communities. We American religious are clearly not all Democrats or,Republicans, con-servatives or liberals, capitalists or socialists. While we may agree in the abstract on many social pr.inciples (but then sometimes we do not even do that!), we usually do not find general agreement or consensus on specific, concrete problems and/or their proposed solutions. What is the religious superior to do when faced with division or po-tentially serious polarization. Let me caution against reconciliation. I say that because I am wary of an,effort to reconcile, smooth over, create consen-sus, where serious issues of social justice are at stake. Usually such recon-ciliation results in the more progressive point--which is frequently, but not always, the point of social justice--being 10st in compromise. At least let me suggest that sometimes reconciliation does not mean that two points of view are reconciled to each other, but that one point of view is reconciled to the point of view of the gospel. The superior who "reconciles" members ° of his community to social justice is truly about the work of evangelization. By Way of Conclusion Let me conclude these reflections of the word, witness, and work aspects of the task of evangelization by referring back to a point which Father Walter Farrell made last year in his summary remarks on the closing day of your CMSM Assembly, which had as its theme "The Role of the Major Superior in Fostering the Faith Community." Some of you may recall that Father Farrell commented that when you asa group talked about prayer, even about God's direct action in prayer, you were quite at ease. But the moment that social issues and the social dimensions of Christianity were raised, you became nervous. Now I was not there to notice your nervous-ness, so I will leave the point to your own memory and reflection. What I do hope and pray for this year is that any nervousness we feel will npt keep us from exploring openly and with feeling the topics I have sketched here this morning, the social structural dimension of evangelization, and its impli-cations for formation, life style, and leadership. Rather I would hope our nervousness would only be that of the Apostle Paul, who on one occasion was led to say: "Woe is me if I do not preach the Gospel!" Just as I began my presentation this morning with that Synod statement which I have overused by quoting again and again, I would like to end by quoting a Scripture passage which I have also much overused. But it is a 1011~ / Review ]or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 passage which is worth using again and again, especially in the context of the social task of evangelization we are discerning about today. It is from the fourth chapter of Luke: He came to Nazareth, where he had been brought up, and went into the synagogue on the sabbath day as he usually did. He stood up to read, and they handed him the scroll of the prophet Isaiah. Unrolling the scroll he found the place where it is written: The spirit of the Lord has been given to me, for he h~s annointed me. He has sent me to bring the good news to the poor, to proclaim liberty to captives and to the blind new sight, to set the downtrodden free, to proclaim the Lord's year of favor. He then rolled up the scroll, gave it back to the assistant and sat down. And all eyes in the synagogue were fixed on him. Then he began to speak to them, This text is being fulfilled today even as you listen. "This text is being fulfilled today even.as you listen." Really, that is the challenge of the "American Religious, Evangelizer at Home"--to strive mightly to assure that this text of good news for the poor, liberty for the captives, new sight for the blind, freedom for the oppressed, this text is indeed being fulfilled, yes, even today as we listen. A Christian Is a Poor Man Kevin O'Shea, C.Ss.R. Father Kevin O'Shea teaches theology at the Redemptorist College; Pennant Hills; Sydney, Australia. Poverty is the most difficult dimension of religious life at present. It is the point at which the tension is greatest between spirit and institution. Institu-tional poverty is reasonable, moderate, and tolerable; in fact, it is argued if it should rightly be called poverty. Charismatic poverty is anything but reasonable, is beyond moderation, and is nearly intolerable; it takes its spirit from a new reading of the Scriptures and calls poverty by its real name. In this sense, poverty is in all likelihood the greatest ferment in religious life at present. What a renewal of chastity and of obedience have not achieved, may well be done, in alarming proportion, by this renewal of poverty. Para-doxically, it is not among religious alone that the renewal is coming. It is coming from men of the Spirit who are taking the gospel to mean what it says. The position of the Gospels on poverty is strikingly clear. Christ's fol-lowers must leave all, and give it to the poor; they must leave the worl~l, and become poor. It is all or nothing. It is not measured and calculated action. It is a form of divine madness. It is the foolishness Of love. The New Testament suggests three main motivations for such poverty. Povert-y is a Messianic mystery; it is a kenotic reality; and it is an ecclesial communion. Poverty a Messianic Mystery A long Hebrew tradition pictured the Messiah (the Christ) as anointed by God to go among the poor, to be a man of the poor, to join the ranks of the poor, and to bring help and life to the poor. Jesus lived in the strength of this image; He shared the misery of the poor and did all He could to 1019 1020 / Review for Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 lessen it, and He waited there in it with the poor for God to come, in His own day, and remove it. The poor were the people who had no resources of their own to assure them of a future and a hope. They were the dispossessed, the disappropriated, the displaced people of this world. They were literally the no-hopers, the have-nots, the forgotten people, the little people without a land. And it was to them that the Messiah came, and it was among them that he became one of them. Not because their misery was a good thing, but be-cause it was a good thing to be among them and to share it, remove it, wait in it patiently till God would take away all tears from their eyes. To His disciples who followed Him, the Messiah asked a Messianic life style: the mystery of their incorporation in the ranks of the poor. A Christian, like the Christ, is a poor man. Poverty a Kenotic Reality The New Testament speaks of a disease of the Christian heart called dipsychia. It is a split psychology, a sort of spiritual schizophrenia. The Christian wants to give himself totally to God, yet he feels an attraction to the things that are easy and immediately in front of him. He is torn two ways. He lacks unity and integration as a single person. There is only one cure for this trouble in the New Testament: it is kenosis, the self-emptying of the person to the very roots of his human existence of which Christ gave him the supreme example of His life and death on the cross. It is only in that utter nothingness of kenosis that integrity is possible. There is no other "fulfillment." But this kenosis is not an attitude, a spirit, and a mentality of mortification, as the Greeks might have thought. It is tangible and real: a man leaves all he has, and becomes poor, nothing, empty, dead in the things he has prized. He knows the nakedness of the poor man. It is not poverty of spirit. It is poverty. Poverty and Ecclesial Communion There is a principle in the New Testament that what one gives up to become poor is given over to the poor, so that they are enriched by it. Christ was rich in laying a rightful claim to Sonship of God. Rich though He was in this respect., He became poor for us and did not cling tenaciously to this right for Himself. Thus, through His poverty, we became rich in His very Sonship. In the Jerusalem community, the model and norm of radical following of Christ in the Church, no one kept his own things (ta idia)-- shall we say that no one "did his own thing"---but each one's own things became thereby the things of all (ta koinonia). It is poverty, then, in its genuine realism and in the self-emptying it implies, that constitutes com-munion and community. The Church is a community because it is a Church. of the poor. Its common life is not a sharing of advantages each retains so that one complements the other; it is a giving of one's all to all and for all, so that in the emptiness of all there can be a truly communed life. Christian Is a Poor Man / 1021 Emphases in New Testament Poverty In these three New Testament motiv.es of pove.rty, there is a strong emphasis on a// --- all is given, so that a poor man can be nothing and have nothing. There is no limit to the poverty that. might be embraced. There is no poor man excluded from the reach of the gospel. There is no poor man that the Christian will not help, no poor man that he will not join. Anawim (the poor) is a plural word; and it has no limits of poverty. There is an instinct for the most needy, the most abandoned, the poorest of all. In these motives, too, there is a new kind of consciousness inculcated in the Christian disciple. What he does, effectively, by external action, for the poor, is limited and, in the last count, not very effective; that does not matter: What matters is what happens to him, and to the poor, when he gets among them and joins them. It gives him a compassion, a self-forget-fulness, a tenderness, an ability to care that transfo~:ms him and communi-cates itself to the poor to whom he now belongs. In poverty, he has become an embodiment of love. He has begun to sense the reality of an incarnation. He has begun to learn to live as a "dropout" from the existence he might have clung to. He has gone to the castoffs from society, who will love him even if they know that he was not always one of them and is not so deeply rooted in misery as they ai-e. He has gone away from the comfortable and complacent, who have struck him of[ from their lists. He knows the lone-liness of the missionary among the anawim. In these motives, again, there is an undreamt of realism and a stark simplicity. This poverty is not a philosophical theory; one does not muse that every creature is poor, or that man is a conscious beggar for his given existence from God. Nor is this poverty simply the acceptance of whatever limitations (or "poverty") are in fact in one's life, which for the moment cannot be removed. Nor is it the poverty of someone who equips himself to help others, and then looks around for needy people to help, and has to be content with less than ideal types to begin. In this poverty, one does not work out first the a priori conditions of poverty and then see how to imple-' ment them. There are really poor people before our eyes, and it is their poverty we must share, with them that we must become one in a self-for-getting and serving compassion. The poor are always with us. They are there, and we respond to them in an instinct of love, not in a calculation of reason. The Gospel Poor Man The life style of the gospel poor man is then that of a worker among the battlers for existence, a struggler among the not-yet-assured, a sharer among the insufficiently endowed, humanly as well as spiritually. It is a simple life, frugal, hard-earned, frustrating, substandard, where one is not sure how one is to survive, where one lives with the poor on their terms, and on his own, where one lives well below the ordinary normal comfort one might have as the result of one's talents and energy. The gospel poor man 1022 / Review for Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 gives his time and his self to the poor, and finds 'his place among them. He can say, "We poor." The inspiration for this way of life is Biblical. We could sum it up in slogan words that resonate anew today in the heart of the Church: words like Messiah, anawim, shalom, shaliah, diakonia, evangelion, eucharistia, the mercy of God. Messianism, Anawim, .Covenant, and Peace There is a real resurgence of Messianism in the Church today, Christians are realizing that they are not Christians unless they fall in love with Jesus as Messiah and adopt his Messianic life style. This means that they must fall in love with the poor of their own time, and adopt their life style, for love of Jesus and the gospel of.the poor. A resurrection theology, over two decades, has divested us of an exaggerated spiritualism' in.our spirituality. A poverty theology, stemming from a new Messiah theology, will divest us of a remain-ing complacency in which we would persuade ourselves, if not others, that we share in the sufferings of the Lord without sharing the lot of His little ones. The anawim are His little ones. Because they are the poor, they are the poor of God. God cannot help it--He must fill emptiness with Himself. He cannot make a covenant except with the poor. It is to those who have neither a future nor a hope that He comes to make flow upon them a river of peace, and to bind Himself to be in person their future and their hope. God laughs at those who would offer Him their goods and their love~ and, as it were, enter a two-way relationship with Him: He loves one way, giving His all to those who have nothing and are nothing. After all, He must have His own way of, as it were, joining the poor, too, musn't He? For, to them, He gives His all. This is wh~t the covenant means, and this is the shalom it brings. Shalom does not mean peace, at least, if peace means a comfortable inner feelin.g of security, and no hostilities without. When God loves the anawim, and sends His Christ to them, He does not--immediately, at least--take away their poverty. They are still the poor, these poor of God. His shalom is not an anaesthetic so that they do not feel it. But it is shalom, and it is a trust and a faith and a certainty that He has not chosen the thi.ngs that are, but the things that are not. It is a willingness to smile, even at death. For resurrec-tion is assured, since the eschaton belongs to the anawim. The simplicity of washing the feet of the poor and of serving them in their deepest human needs is itself a total life style, and those who have heard the Messianic call have no option but to live it. It is not easy to wash a poor man's feet. They are dirty, they smell, and he will probably not thank you, but kick you in the face.You probably won't succeed, but you will know that there is a kind of happiness words can never explain in keeping on .doing it. This is the diakonia of the gospel. A Chr~t~n Is a Poor Man / 1023 o Gospel means good news. To proclaim the gospel means to speak, but much more to be good news to men. Some of my American friends have an unkind expression about a difficult and unattractive, character: They say, "He's bad news." They also say of a genuine and real person, "He's good news." Jesus Himself was this kind of good news to the little ones, to the poor. When He began.His Galilean ministry, he read from the ,scroll of Deutero-Isaiah: "He has, sent me to be good news tothe anawim." When we work in his name, in our apostolate, are we, ourselves, good news to men, to poor men? And do we realize that there is no such thing as a direct apostolate to the rich and the well-established, there is only a mission of Jesus and His disciples to the poor? The others get in to the extent that they, too, leave all and become members of the anawim! , Eucharistia and Mercy Eucharistia--the giving of thanks, the celebrating of life, and saying now in Christ, for the past thanks, for the future yes~ Shall we ever know, the truth of that thanks for the past until we can bless the Providence that has made-us poor men? Shall we ever say a total yes to the future until we can face it without any resources as the pure gift of our Covenanted Resource, the God of the poor? It is only then that we shall know Him in the breaking of the bread of pilgrims, at the table of the poor, and discover in surprise that the Eueharist is the liturgy of the little ones. It is true. God has no love that is not mercy. Mercy is His response, in His heart, to misery. To be among the first clients of His mercy, we must be his anawim. A vocation" to His love is a vocation to our brother, the poor man. Recently, a student of mine at Fordham wrote these words as the conclusion of an assignment on the meaning of the apostolate: Are the people of the Word something sp~'cial, or is it only their words? Will their lives speak to us? The eye and ear ~vorld is all sewn up by the talented admen of Madison Avenue. What is left to us? The heart world. The world where flesh,, speaks to flesh, heart to heart. Do not speak religious themes to me. Speak the Word that is in your heart, your experience of life, enriched, made more than human, by the saving power in it that is believable because you believe it. I do want to be told, not by hearing you but by knowing you. Or is that an issue? I ask you if you understand, and your answer is your life. The Recovery of Messianic Man This poverty of Messianic man we are beginning to see again in our time. It is the challenge of our conscience, this cry of the poor. We can no longer vaguely know that half the world is starving for food, and more than half of it for love, and write off .the situation as bad luck, or permitted by providence, and promise to pray for it and count our own blessings. That is not the Christian life; indeed, it is not human life. The new global village is one parish. Every man is my neighbor, and it is a sin to regard a man as a 1024 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 stranger. The Church is beginning to challenge the reasonable moderation and balanced calculation of its stance, before the secular reality of poverty in the world. Some would even speak of the end of a "Constantinian era" and the beginning of a new Mcssianic epoch where the Spirit shall anoint us and send us to the poor. If this is true, it is but a beginning. We have yet a long way to go. When we try to relatc this thinking with the established or recently adopted norms of institutional poverty among religious, the lines do not even meet. Juridic poverty had a place in the history of religious life," but it is not the same as evangelical poverty. Many, of course, in the name of realism, will remind us 'that just as we once spoke of "tending to perfection," an ideal we never reached, so here we must feel obliged only to tend to this perfection of poverty and Messianic life, not to reach it immediately. Yes, but the acid test of the new Christian conscience is that it cannot use this theological formula as an excuse from real and significantly new action. Formulated obligation cannot measure up to a charismatic spirit. Our conscience is telling us that we are suffering from compassion fatigue, that we have enjoyed the protection of our callousness, that we must now .make a new option to be compassionate rather than honorable. Our skin must stretch around the globe, so that if any man hurts, we hurt with him, and do some-thing about it. The Cry of the Poor Pope Paul has taken up this point in his apostolic exhortation to religious (ll tempio massimo, July 2, 1971). "Our contemporaries," he says, "question you with particular insistence about poverty." "You hear rising up, more pressing than ever, the cry of the poor." "Was .it not to respond to their appeal as God's privileged ones that Christ came, even going as far as to identify Himself with them?" It is a "pressing call for a conver-sion of minds and attitudes, especially for you who follow Christ more closely in this earthly condition of self-emptying." It calls for "a conversion of hearts, it is a call to love." What, in practice, will the cry of the poor demand of religious? First, "It must bar you from any compromise with any form of social injustice." Secondly, "It obliges you to awaken consciences to the drama of human misery." Thirdly, "It leads some of you to join the poor in their situation." Fourthly, "It calls many institutes to rededicate some of their works to the poor." Fifthly, "It enjoins on you a use of goods limited to the requirements of your work." Sixthly, "It is necessary that in your daily lives you give external proof of poverty." A Christian is a Poor Man / 1025 Seventhly, "It is not normal to allow yourself everything offered to you." Eighthly, "Earn your own living and help the poor by your work." Ninthly, "You cannot purely and simply conform to your surroundings." Tenthly, "Do not be excessively preoccupied with appearing to be poor." All this is said in conformity with the patterns of obedience and specific apostolate in a given institute. It is a call from the needs of the times and the demands of the gospel. It is a vocation to discover Christ as a poor man. Renewal and Poverly Much energy has gone into the renewal of religious community. Some-times one gets the impression that they are trying to be beautiful resident communities of loving relationships which might then, as an overflow, have something to contribute to the poor. This is heresy. The Church has no mandate to be a resident, domesticated Church. It is essentially missionary, a pilgrim, servant Church of the poor. It is only by living its vocation to poverty among the poor that it can discover the kind of community life Christ intended for it. Likewise, much work has gone into the renewal of authority and obedience in religious life. It will not fully succeed until authority becomes an initiation of new life among the poor, and obedience is a heeding of the cry of the poor. Again, much has been done to make religious life more human, more relational, more interpersonal, more affec-tive. But the tenderness and the gentleness and the caring concern that we so desire, we must learn from our involvement with the poor. It is but an-other work for the meekness of the anawim. Of the poor, it has been said, "Only he who sees the invisible accom-plishes the impossible."~Of the gospel poor man who goes to the poor, we might likewise say, "Only he who loves the unlovable is good news to the little ones." A Penance Service Bonaventure Hinwood, O.F.M. Father Bonaventure Hinwood is a faculty member of The Seminary; 191 Main Street; Waterkloof; Pretoria, South Africa. His penance service given below was originally composed for teaching sisters to be used during Lent 1974. mo 4. 5. B. 6. 7. 1026 Introduction HYMN OPENING PRAYER P(riest): Heavenly Father, who does not wish the death of a sinner but rather that he should turn from his wickedness and live, we beg You to turn the light of Your truth upon our lives and bring us to true repentance in this time of mercy. Make your Holy Spirit active within us this evening to lead us to see our lives as they are in Your sight, and to sensitize our hearts so that we may give a true response of love and sorrow to Your call. This we ask through Jesus Christ, our Mediator with You and the cause of our joy. C(ongregation): Amen. SCRIPTURE READING: John 3:16-21. SERMON HYMN First Sel]-con]rontation SCRIPTURE READING: Matthew 16:24-7. P. My sisters, the most precious thing in the whole world for most of us is ourselves. This is demonstrated by the fact that we will frequently use or abandon almost every other person or thing in order to realiz,e our own image of our self-fulfillment, to achieve our own plans and A Penance Service / 1027 projects, to satisfy our needs and desires. Jesus, however, has come to free us from our self-centeredness. He has come to give us a share in His own capacity to devote and to give oneself wholeheartedly to bringing about God's kingdom, and to love Him and those for whom He died. This can only be done by an unstinting gift of ourselves to Him. Do we really desire to make this gift, and are we really intent upon trying to make this self-offering more complete? A(ssistan0 1: Jesus' great commandment tells us that we should love the Lord our God with our whole heart, our whole soul, our whole mind, and our whole strength, and our fellow men as ourselves. This is a fulltime job. Yet a lot of our valuable time and energy gets wasted irt useless tension, frustration, and self-pity. Why is this? Am I really prepared to let go of my own will, or am I too attached to my own wants, my own plans, my own projects, my own way of doing things, my own rhythm of life? A. 2: Am I truly open to viewpoints other than my own, or is my own way of looking at things always my supreme criterion in life? Do I really try to understand the contrary opinions of others, or am I too busy thinking of ways to defend my own viewpoint even to listen to what others are saying? Am I too confident in my own judg-ment to consult with others or seek their advice? Have I failed to respect other people's greater learning or experience? How often have these attitudes of mine been the cause of misunderstanding with others or tensions in the community? A. 1: Do I try to lighten the burden of those charged with regulating the affairs of the Church, the community, and the school by ready cooperation and obedience, or am I destructively critical and stub-born? Do I accept that they are honestly trying to do theirbest for the common good and for me, or am I suspicious and negative in my attitude towards them? Do I seek first the kingdom of God and the common good, o.r is my own convenience primary? SILENCE FOR REFLECTION PI~AYER FOR FORGIVENESS P. Jesus who instructed us that "If anyone wants to be a follower of mine, let him renounce himself and take up his cross and follow me" (Mt 16:24): . Have mercy on me a sinner. P. Jesus who calls us to "Shoulder my yoke and learn from Me, for I am gentle and humble of heart, and you will find rest for your souls (Mt 11:29-30): 12. Have mercy on me a sinner. 1028 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 11. 12. P. Jesus who warned that "Anyone who exalts himself will be humbled, and anyone who humbles himself will be exalted" (Mt 23: 12): 12. Have mercy on me a sinner. P. Jesus who said by the well of Jacob, "My food is to do the will of the one who sent Me and to complete his work" (Jn 4:34): C. Have mercy on me a sinner. P. Jesus who prayed in Gethsemani, "My Father, if this cup cannot pass by without my drinking it, your will be done" (Mt 26:42) : ¯ . Have mercy on me a sinner. P. Jesus who, although You were the Son of God, "learnt to obey through suffering" (Heb 5:8) : 12. Have mercy on me a sinner. P. Jesus who, having been made perfect, has become for all who obey You the source of eternal salvation (Heb 5:9): C. Have mercy on me a sinner. P. Jesus who has taught us that a man can have no greater love than to lay down his life for his friends (Jn 15:13): 12. Have mercy on me a sinner. Second Self-con]rontation SCRIPTURE READING: John 15:5, 8-12. P. My sisters, the tone of our own lives gives a tone to the environ-ment in which we live, the mental and emotional atmosphere which we create in our own personalities affects the social atmosphere in which those around us have to live. If we, therefore, are negative, cynical, disgruntled, and grumpy people we pollute the atmosphere of those around us with unpleasantness, tension, gloom, and sadness. If, however, we are positive, creative, contented, and cheerful, then we provide for others an atmosphere of brightness and warmth, of enthusiasm, lightness, harmony, and joy. Does our love for others extend as far as building up Christ's joy in ourselves for their sake? -A. 2: It is only in freedom that we can be truly joyful, and Christ has come to set us free from the inordinate and selfish attachment to people, places, activities, and things, which is the cause of much of our sadness. Do I cherish that freedom which a positive and profound living out of my religious vows brings, or are they for me merely nega-tive restraints which produce frustration and discontent? Am I a ful-filled and joyful person because I love in the freedom of my religious vocation, or have I become selfish and finicky? A. 1: In the theme song for the film Brother Son and Sister Moon, Francis complains that he seldom sees and hears the wonders of God's A Penance Service / 1029 13. creatures because he is too "preoccupied with selfish miseries." Am I so busy with my own emotions, particularly negative reactions of suspicion, wounded pride, self-defense, and criticalness that I am un-able to see the beauty, goodness, and virtue of the people and things around me? Am I so busy manipulating and condemning God's creatures, that I do not have time to thank Him and rejoice in them? A. 2: St. Francis said once to a mournful looking brother that the only reason for being sad was because one was in mortal sin, and the only cure for that was to go to confession. Do I really appreciate what an ecstatic thing it is to have been saved by Jesus Christ, to have been made in Him a child of the Father and an heir of God's Kingdom? Am I so busy rejoicing with Mary at the great things God has done for me, that I do not have time to get downhearted and miserable about the other things that may not go the way I want them to? SILENCE FOR REFLECTION PRAYER FOR FORGIVENESS P. Jesus Christ who has told us the good news we read in the passage from St. John so that You may share your joy with us to the full (Jn 17:13): 12. Forgive me my preoccupation with selfish miseries and my lack of joy. P. Jesus, when the wise men heard the prophecy of your birth in Bethlehem and saw the guiding star they rejoiced exceedingly with great joy (Mt 2:10): 12. Forgive me my preoccupation with selfish miseries and my lack of joy. P. Jesus, when You told Zacchaeus that You would stay in his house that day, Zacchaeus welcomed You with joy (Lk 19:6): 12. Forgive me my preoccupation with selfish miseries and my lack of joy. P. At the angel's message about your resurrection, Lord, the women with great joy ran to tell the disciples (Mt 28:8): 12. Forgive me my preoccupation with selfish miseries and my lack of joy. P. Lord who told us that the person who finds the treasure of the kingdom of heaven, in his joy goes and sells all he has to buy it (Mt 13:44): . Forgive me my preoccupation with selfish ~miseries and my lack of joy. Time for Personal Examination and Confession Conclusion 1030 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 15. 16. 17. PENANCES (one penance to be chosen by each penitent) a. Make the Stations of the Cross, meditating on the obedience, meek-ness, and humility of Jesus. b. Spend ten minutes thinking of the good points of a superior, fellow religious, or pupil of whom you are often negatively critical, and praying for her. c. Walk around or sit in the garden for ten minutes listening to the birds and insects, and looking at the trees and flowers, clouds or stars, and thank God for His goodness and rejoice in the wonder of His creation. OUR FATHER (recited by all together) P. May almighty God have mercy on you, forgive you your sins, and bring you to everlasting life. C. Amen: P. May the almighty and merciful Lord grant you pardon, absolution, and forgiveness of your sins. 12. Amen. DISMISSAL P. May the. Lord renew you with His energy and joy. May He ac-company you on your way with His presence and make all your works fruitful. May He strengthen you against all that is evil and give you the courage to serve those nearest to you and all men wherever they may be. And may the blessing of God almighty, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit be with you and remain with you always. 12. Amen. 18. HYMN The Formation of Contemplatives in Action Ladislas Orsy, S.J. Ladislas Orsy, S.J., who has written often on the theology of religious life, is a mem-ber of the Department of Canon Law; The Catholic University of America; Washing-ton, D. C. 20017. Contemplatives in action are the salt of the earth; as a gracious gift from God, they have a tang, and they are able to bring some goodness into every-thing they touch. Quite a good description of religious life! No wonder many communities intent on the ideal of being the salt of the earth raise the question: How do we form contemplatives in action? We take their query, but, to make it more manageable, we break it up into three questions. First, who is a contemplative in action? Second, how does one develop into such a person? Third, what structured program can help the development? That is, our reflections revolve around three topics: the person, the process, and the program. While the focus of our attention is on the person, the resulting description will exhibit a somewhat static picture. It cannot be in any other way. But the movement that gives us con-templatives in action must he somehow caught; therefore, the pilgrim's progress must be delineated, as it were,'in its natural state. Then comes the problem of the environment, how external structures contribute to a process that is so deeply internal and personal. Since everybody knows how far-reaching these three questions are and how difficult it is to find any final answer, we are in the happy position of having to respond to only limited expectations. The reflections of a man may be no more than a drop into the ocean, but, for that man, it is certainly pleasant to contemplate the vast dimensions of the ocean even if he cannot add much to it. 1031 1032 / Review for Religious. l/olume 33, .1974/5 The dimensions of the question of the formation of contemplatives in action are indeed vast, and the real answer will not be given by any writer, but existentially by communities who do something about it. After all, for-mation is a practical issue. PART I: TIlE PERSON The beginning of any search should be an inquiry. We have already broken up the big fundamental issue into three more particular ones, and now we focus on the first: Who is a contemplative in action? Two qualities must be present in the person: the capacity to contemplate and the ability to act. Moreover, the two should be blended together; this is what the issue implies. Hence, to put our search on the right paths, there should be an even more particularized sequence of questions. Let us ask therefore: Who is a contemplative person? Who is a person of action? And finally, to see how the two blend together, let us see who is an integrated person. Who Is a Contemplative Person? The term "contemplative" can be used in different senses. At times, it means a hermit, a recluse, or a religious with strict enclosure: then it focuses on the external situation in which a person is found, such as solitude and separation from the world. At times, the term means a person bent on in-tellectual reflection: then it focuses on the internal disposition of a writer, of an artist, of anyone who is of reflective type. The Christian Contemplative In Christian tradition, the word includes a sacred dimension: a con-templative person is the one who experiences in his innermost being a tran-scendent and sacred power that draws him to Christ. All the words in this general description° connote a mystery. To be contemplative, then, is to experience in the depths of our being the intrusion of a power that moves us to a direction that is beyond our horizons. This experience does not enter-tain the senses; they can remain thirsty and hungry. Nor does it satisfy the intelligence; it can remain frustrated and empty. But the experience brings a meaning to our humanity even if not every part of it can appreciate its values. The content of the experience is hard to describe; it is not concep-tual; it is the perception of an internal movement that does not necessarily bring new knowledge nor leave a specific impression on our being. Rather, we become aware of an energy that is given to us from a source that is more powerful than ourselves. It comes from a world that is beyond our ordinary capacity to see or to reach. It comes from a transcendental source. This power that wells up in our being is apprehended as sacred. It is concerned with our ultimate destination. It comes from God; it carries us to God. The discovery of this energy may remind us of the precious pearl of a great value; the merchant who finds it sells all to buy it (see Matt 13:45-6). The Formation o] Contemplatives in Action / 1033 The analogy is partially right. The gift is more precious than any pearl, and to sell all to have it makes good sense. Yet the same gift is not an object to be stored and exposed for admiration; rather we become aware of a current that takes hold of us, of a movement that reaches us at the depth of our being. Other Descriptions oI a Contemplative This description leads to another formulation of the definition of a con-templative person. He is the one who is ordinarily aware of the presence and power of the Lord in him and who follows the direction of the move-ment imprinted in him. This definition is more personal; it names the source of the power--it is the Lord. All is put into the context of a person-to-person relationship. The energy is transcendental and sacred because it originates in the one who moves all living things. The experience of the power is an obscure aware-ness of the Lord reminiscent somewhat of the experience of the Apostles fishing on the Sea of Tiberias at the breaking of the dawn and noticing a stranger on the shore. Attracted by His unusual presence, surprised by the power of His voice, gradually they became aware that it was the Lord. The intrusion of the Lord in our life is a gift that does not create a state of romantic happiness; rather, it helps us to realize the complexity of our nature. We can be happy at some depths and yet suffer acutely from thirst and hunger. We can be resigned at one level and yet mourn the loss of a loved person at another level. We can be anchored through hope and yet tossed around by the uncertainties of this world that may amount even to persecution. The gift of contemplation and the discovery of it could be described in many other ways. All would be analogical and incomplete. We could speak about a small light that attracts from a great distance but does not alleviate the darkness and the loneliness of the night. We could speak about a rising inner security that holds a person firm while he is subject to present and future shocks from a world that changes around him. The term "contemplative" may not be the best to describe a person so blessed, since traditionally it implies an intellectual vision and does not con-vey the idea of participation in a movement. The distinction between the two--vision and movement--may be flimsy especially at greater depths. Nonetheless, the term has been sanctioned by tradition; hence it would be difficult to break away from it. Besides, there is no adequate term to cover the reality we described. Through this awareness of God's presence and power, a person trans-cends himself, is carried beyond himself. He enters a new universe that is marked by God's immensity and His infinity. The old conceptual horizons with their precise circumscriptions disappear, and new desires get hold of the heart. The actions of such a person will spring from a new source. 1034 / Review for Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 Becoming a Contemplative Person We attempted an answer to the question: Who is a contemplative per.- son? To understand him further, let us raise the question: How does some-one become a contemplative person? Clearly, there is no other way of becoming a contemplative person than by discovering internally the Lord's power. The gift is independent of us, but the process of discovery is somewhat within our capacity. This search for the elusive gift that is present enough to attract us and absent enough to require a long journey has been frequently described in Christian tradition as a descent into greater depths or as an ascent to greater heights or as a steady progress into ever more intimate dwellings of God in our being. All these allegories are meaningful; all converge into saying that there is a process that ought to be a progress toward a closer relation-ship with the Lord. Usually we speak of the pilgrim's progress, of man's journey to God; correct speech would require us to speak of God's progress in overwhelming man with His grace and power. The initiative is really His at every stage. Yet we can resist His approaches or subtly divert our attention from them. Hence, pragmatically, it serves a purpose to speak of our own journey to God. Perhaps to reconcile the exigencies of the primacy of grace and of our own need to be alert to God, we can use a modern alle-gory and speak about a process of liberation that man must go through to be transformed into an image of God. The principal agent in this process is the Lord, but we are real, active agents as well, if not to the extent of giving freedom to ourselves, at least to the point of removing obstacles before the helping hand of God. Need for Progression in Depth We take up the traditional allegory in a different way: to become a con-templative person means to enter into life with increasing intensity. There is a need for progress in depth. Man indeed is a complex being endowed with an awareness of life at different levels: on the level of what his senses can perceive and communicate, on the level of what his mind can penetrate and understand, and on the level that has no limitations because it opens up into the infinite universe discovered through faith. We all live and move on all these levels; in the awareness of our being, they intermingle, they form a unity. Nonetheless, a person's development can be arrested on the level of a world communicated to him through his senses, without much understanding, without the light of faith. A person can find satisfaction on the level of hu-man intelligence, a worthy and dignified life it would be, yet without the hope that springs from faith. Finally, a person can reach the depths that faith brings and let all his life be invaded by the light and strength that origi-nates in the Lord who revealed Himself through the contingencies of human history. The Formation o] Contemplatives in Action / 1035 Libration from the Communications of the Senses The life of a person can revolve around the content of those communi-cations that he receives from his senses, and the expansion of his personality into the fascinating world of creative intelligence or into the limitless world of faith can be impeded. Such a person is underdeveloped. Without know-ing it, he is a captive of those steady impacts that he receives from the out-side world; his being relishes them, or at least is attached to them, at times to the point that any desire to go deeper is weakened to the point of ex-tinction. Our particular culture favors such an attitude. Much of the press, radio, television, cinema thrives on the passive receptivity of the public; the media rarely stimulate creative activity; still less do they send their readers, lis-teners, o~ viewers into an advefiture of faith. When someone is immersed in that world, the impression clouds his mind and cancels out the natural dynamism of a desire for better things. If this is so, there is a need for an internal war of liberation. To begin with, the person must become conscious of his mutilated state; he must admit that his growth has been arrested, and that he is deprived of a fully human and Christian life. Obviously enough, we are speaking more of a principal trend than of an absolute univocal state. There will always be some intelligent activity in every person, some movements of faith in every Christian, but the question is which of these many trends prevails. '°~AI great deal of our traditional asceticism was meant to liberate the pers.o~ from the captivity that communications from the senses can induce. Thus far it was good; it went wrong when it assumed that mortification alone can achieve liberation. It is also necessary to show the person broader vistas of intelligence and' faith that attract. No one will ever exchange some-thing for nothing, but show him a better value that pulls his being and-he will be ready to sacrifice many things. Many novitiates failed in the past because they taught asceticism without opening up new horizons. As soon as the novitiate was over, the imposed practices collapsed, and there was no realization of new frontiers that opened up into a new world. Liberation from the overbearing communications that come through our senses is necessary, but it can be achieved only by the steady pull of higher values consistently present in our consciousness. Liberation from the Limitations of Intelligence A person's life can focus mainly on the fascinating world of his creative intelligence. This is progress in depth; it means more humanity, it means greater likeness to God's image. Yet it has limitations: it does not know the immense world opened up by faith, or, when that world is presented, it can impede the person from entering into the dizzy unknown that he cannot measure or explain. The world of human intelligence can offer much human satisfaction. We feel at home there, the problems are of our own size, and 1036 / Review Sot Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 the objects of our desires are attainable. It is all a comfortable and also a comforting world, but, because there is a longing in man for the infinite, a reassuringly human world can become a prison; man can enclose himself in a universe proportionate to his mind. A process of liberation may be necessary precisely to enter a new universe opened up by faith, perhaps by the experience of the presence and power of the Lord in our innermost being. Much of the traditional literature that spoke about the mortification of judgment intended to speak about the freeing of the mind for the impact of faith, about opening up our being for God's own horizons. It was right as far as it did not suggest an empty exercise but rather showed .the greatness of God and the harm6ny of His plan which makes worthwhile an exchange that leads to the loss of our thoughts and desires. The New World o] Faith To live on the level of faith is to live in a new universe with God in its center, known as He revealed Himself through Jesus Christ. In Him, all things and events receive a meaning--our own life included. The limitations of our humanity imposed by the senses and by our intelligence are broken up; there is an infinite openness in every direction. The transition into the world of faith is a radical ch.ange. Once again, it brings out the complexity of our natui'e. While the deepest and the best in us relishes the expansion of our horizons into infinity, while'~we experience a new security in our Maker, our mind misses the clarit.y, of human equations, and our senses long for the security of a more familiar world. Paradoxically the universe of God that brings peace to our restless he~-t unsettles our intelligence and our senses. For those who live by faith, the awareness of a deep security is compatible with the experience of insecurity in their human-ity. To comprehend this seemingly contradictory situation is the clue to the acceptance of it. Many recoil from entering the universe of faith because they cannot handle this complex situation in themselves, and they do not realize that the resulting tension is the ordinary lot of a pilgrim who is entering into an unknown land. No writer has ever better described this paradoxical state than St. John of the Cross: To enjoy all enjoy nothing; To possess all, possess nothing; To be all; be nothing; To know all, know nothing. To reach what you do not enjoy go where there is no enjoyment; The Formation oj Contemplatives in Action / 1037 To learn what you do not know, tread the path of ignorance; To obtain what you do not possess, walk without possessions; To be what you are not, leave behind all that you are. (The Ascent o] Mount Carmel, Book 1, Chapter 13) Our translation is not literal. Its intent is more to bring out the stark simplicity of the Spanish text than to render exactly each word. Once we understand the complexity of our nature, those sharp contrasts painted by the saint become meaningful. At one level our being can embrace all and be satisfied, while on another level it is thoroughly frustrated and empty. In the depths of our heart we can know of the presence of a mystery and accept its demands, while our mind and senses cry out for some nourishment more proportionate to their desires. The Paradoxes of a Li[e in Faith No one should be surprised if a person entering the universe of faith and experiencing its dimensions and demands on his being becomes upset and appears disoriented. He has a fine balancing job to do, and it cannot be learned in one day. Moreover, he may discover new depths every day, and like all humans he may become dizzy and scared. He must reconcile securi-ty with insecurity, satisfaction with hunger, a most intense personal relation-ship with a human loneliness. He experiences courage and fear, the ex-pansion of his own personality and the loss of friends who do not under-stand. But as the balancing work progresses, he begins to be himself in a fuller sense of the word than he has known before. Almost certainly, he be-comes both a witness who attracts and a sign that is contradicted. He finds his journey both lonely and exhilarating. Strangely enough, as he progresses into the unknown land of faith, his humanity opens up and his intelligence becomes more creative than ever and his senses partake somehow in celebrating new discoveries. Such a person is anything but dull; he is the salt of the earth--with a tang. Summing It Up To sum it all up: a human perso.n can live on different levels. His life may revolve around the impacts that his senses communicate, or his life be an expression of the creativity of human intelligence, or his life may be the sharing of God's life and of His universe in faith. To speak about levels, of course, is to use a metaphor to express somehow the complexity of our nature, about which there can be no doubt. These levels blend into each other, and a thoughtful person graced by God should progress from the more external to the more .internal, from human desires to divine in-vitations. There is a dynamism in our being that attempts to bring it con-tinuously to greater depths. 1038 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 The right question about the formation of contemplatives can be formu-lated now; it is: How can a person be helped to progress into the universe of faith; how can his attention be directed to the unknown land that God's revelation opens up, and how can he be attracted into desiring an adven-ture? In particular, the question should be put: How can a person be helped during the specific crisis of transition from the world of human measures into the unmeasurable universe of God? To this question, we shall return when we speak of the process and pro-gram of formation. Before doing so, we must reflect on action that springs from contemplation. Who Is a Person of Action? A contemplative person is the one who experiences the Lord's presence and power in his innermost being, a close interpersonal relationship. Is it a closed relationship as well? Or, is it open so as to" inspire action? At any rate, who is a person of action? Two Misconceptions To clear our mind for a fruitful inquiry, let us exorcise it from two mis-conceptions. One conceives human action as something added to a person from the outside in much the same way as an external object can be pegged onto a tree. Such an aberration, of course, does not make any sense. Human action proceeds from the depths of a person, as the fruit is produced from the inner potentials of a tree. As there is an organic, sequential unity between the tree and the fruit, so there is a dynamic and harmonious unity between the inner riches of a man and his actions. They cannot be considered separately, even if mentally we draw a distinction between cause and effect. Another mistake is to think that actions to be significant ought to be s.pectacular. °They must initiate a new movement, or they must make a dra-matic impact on thousands. Not so! Significant action can evolve around humbler objects, as the actions of a Christian mother who takes care of her family, or the actions of a monk who with sudden inspiration or enduring patience creates a new melody to praise the Lord. By action, we mean all kinds of creative activity that somehow enriches this universe. Action Is an Enrichment o[ the Universe Now that these understandings are out of the way, we can return to our question: Who is a person of action? He is the one who brings fruit that can be seen by his fellow men and enriches them. The quality of the action depends on the potentials of the person who produces it; and the state of his mind, of his heart will be projected into his actions. An action is first born when our intelligence discovers a possibility for enriching this universe. It ought to be a real possibility in the sense that The Formation o] Contemplatives in Action / 1039 the action once taken will blend into a broader plan that is already un-folding outside us. Therefore, no one can be sensibly active unless he can direct his attention to all relevant facts around him, unless he can grasp an intelligent pattern behind them; moreover, he must have strength and energy to transform a possibility into reality. Action is indeed an act of creation. Through it, man somehow tran-scends himself, produces something new, similar to his internal x;ision and desire. When active, man becomes more like God, his creator; after all, he was made to the image of God. Not only is there nothing wrong with action; there would be something missing in a man who is not active--the image of God our creator would not be complete. It follows also that due to the complexity of our nature our actions may originate at different levels; the quality of action will reflect the quality of its source. Levels o] Action An action may originate in what is communicated through the senses without the benefit of intelligent reflection and judgment and without the enlightening influence of faith. It can be a mere emotional response, or it can be a way of doing what the others are doing; in such a case, a man operates in a poor way. What is best in his humanity does not participate in the action. The external act is. marked by its shallow origin; it does not create "a new harmony in the world, it merely add's to the universal noise. At best, the.person beats the drum with the others. An action may proceed from intelligent insight and reasonable judg-ment. Such action is certainly worthy of man, although it may not reflect the wisdom of God that is scandal to the Jews and sheer stupidity to the pagans. Some fields of human activity requir~ this type of action, such as going back and forth in space. After all, the laws of space are proportionate to our intelligence, and consequently, a proper field for reasonable opera-tions. But such action is not enough to build the reign of Christ. The deepest source of action in a Christian is in his contemplation, in his awareness of the Lord's presence and power. When action comes from such depths, it must pass through the screening of critical intelligence; it must also reflect the humanity of our senses: nonetheless, it is born from grace. It comes from God, it builds the kingdom. The Liberation o[ Action As in the case of contemplation, there is a problem of transition into the universe of faith to which Christian actions ultimately must ~be adjusted. Since it does not provoke an immediate reaction on the level of the senses, since it does not prompt ~n immediate intelligent response, our action itself can appear as a journey into the vast immensity of the unknown; all the problems of the paradox we described for contemplation are manifest in 1040 / Review ]or Religious, Volume 33, 1974/5 this field too. Also, the process of liberation must take place in a similar way. Our action must proceed from an increasingly deeper source. A Christian person of action, then, is the one who received God's grace in his whole being and in whom grace brought fruit for the enrichment of the world around him. There is integrity in such a person because his beliefs are followed by good deeds, and those deeds do not spring from an emotional reaction, not even from mere human reasoning, but from a depth which is scrutinized by the Spirit of God. Such a person has a unity in his being; he is whole, he is made of one piece; in his acts of creative action, he mani-fests the image of the Creator. All the elements are together now to answer the question: Who is an integrated person? Who Is an Integrated Person? An integrated Christian person is the one who has developed his poten-tials fully, and thus he became whole. He lives his life with all the intensity his resources allow. He experiences God's presence and power in his inner-most being, and he builds the kingdom of God through external action. In a small scale, he revives something of the mystery of the Incarnation. He is in this world, and he is attentive to all that happens around him. He brings his intelligence to bear on all facts and events. Through his in-sights, he penetrates deeper than the apparent truth. He is liberated enough to see new possibilities, and, once he has decided on a course of action, he is

Transcript of an oral history interview with Angus Macaulay, conducted by Sarah Yahm on 5 May 2015, as part of the Norwich Voices oral history project of the Sullivan Museum and History Center. Angus Macaulay graduated from Norwich University in 1966. His interview focuses on his military service in Korea and Vietnam after graduation as well as his later career at McGraw-Hill, INC. Magazine, and Magazine Services, Inc. ; Angus Macaulay, NU 1966, Oral History Interview May 5, 2015 Interviewed by Sarah Yahm AM It happened in our division when I was there. SY Really? AM I want you to ask me about - most of the guys who went to Vietnam they were gone for a year I was gone for almost two years And I think a question you might want to - that may come up would be what I - the perception of change I felt had happened in the US when I came home SY You know I was going to ask you about that And keep in mind this is casual and so if there's something you want me to ask just tell me We'll just - and you know just be like "Something I've been thinking about." AM Now what do you do? Would you transcribe this eventually? SY I have an assistant who transcribes it. AM Don't you have software that transcribes it? SY It doesn't work because there's so much that's in context and so the software misses AM Ah! SY - that and they botch words and they don't do grammar AM Will I ever see a copy of it? SY Yeah so the way it works is that so we do this recording I get back to Norwich the backlog could be a couple of months AM Oh don't worry about it SY - because transcribing takes a long time Clark gets to work on transcribing it Then what you get in the mail is a copy of the transcript and a CD of the interview You review the transcript make sure things are accurate Did you know Bill Bonk? AM Oh yeah SY Yeah well he AM Bill's a good friend of mine. SY Bill still needs - if you talk to him tell him to send me back my transcript Anyway so you know I sent - I interviewed Bill I sent him his transcript We talked for hours; it was an amazing interview And but you know there are some things like I you know I try to figure out all the place names correctly but there are some you know Vietnam-era military acronyms that I might mess up etc. AM Oh okay don't worry no don't worry about it SY - so he goes through and but he - so then he has to read through it and he has to you know make sure everything is correct and then he sends it Or also there are some things he told me that might be classified that he might want out of the record So you have the opportunity at that point to AM No I don't think I have any (laughs) SY He had a couple of secret missions I think he'll be fine with keeping them in But he might want to go through and think about that right? So then - or for instance somebody on tape said something mean about her mother-in-law and she's going to want to cut that out when I send her her transcript back right? Because this is going to be available on the website right? So the idea is you get it you look through it you make sure that there's nothing - or I interviewed an Iranian woman who describes how she left Iran illegally She's going to need to edit that out so that when she tries to go back to Iran for a visit she's not going to have issues leaving. AM Now how many people from our era have you interviewed? SY Let's see I have a bunch on the list to interview (repeats herself louder) I have a bunch on the list to interview AM From class of '66? SY Yeah there's - there - because of that recent Vietnam issue that came out of the Norwich Record? AM Right. SY A couple of people came out of the woodwork. AM Right. SY But I think Bill Bonk might be one of the - yeah and other people who were in Vietnam AM Bill was in my class Bill's a pretty good friend of mine yeah. SY He's great He's great A great storyteller. AM Yeah. SY So then I have a bunch of other people who've been in Vietnam but were either behind you or ahead of you right by a couple of years So yeah So that's the way it works AM Okay SY - is we have a conversation you get it back you get to look at it and then you sign off on it And then you know eventually they'll be a searchable archive So the idea is that if a student is interested in you know in Vietnam they'll go they'll type in "Vietnam" and then all of the transcripts will come up And if they're interested in a particular thing about Vietnam they can search for those particular words or things. AM Okay. SY And they'll have this - this sample set right of Norwich graduates and they'll be able to sort of you know ascertain certain things about US foreign policy in the 20th century I mean the idea is that this will be a research tool. AM Oh okay. SY Yeah So that's - that's essentially that's the way it works. AM Go. SY All right So here we are I'm interviewing Angus Macaulay It is May 5th - AM Are we on? SY Yeah I'm on And I'll just cut out that first part where we were chatting It's May 5th - correct? Yeah and we're at his house in Maine and we're going to begin interviewing I need to check levels AM Okay SY So if you could just I don't know tell me what you ate for breakfast today AM Well this is about - how is that level? Does that level work for you? SY Yeah it's pretty good If we can get just a little closer - AM A little closer Does that level work for you? SY Yeah that's good AM All right SY Let me actually check one thing I need to make sure - I need to know which - yep okay that is number one Okay AM Okay. SY So we're just going to start out a little bit with your early life So where were you born? AM Was born in New York Actually I was born in White Plains New York but I was raised in Chappaqua New York which is just about 35 miles north of New York City and born in 1942 SY And when you were a kid did you have any idea of what you wanted to be when you grew up? AM Well as we were talking earlier I had a you know a couple of things in my life One was I had done a lot of artwork as a kid and I had several members of my family that had served in the military So those were sort of the two options that I was looking at both military and art And I applied to Norwich I also applied to a couple of art schools several art schools in fact And my father who had been an artist early in his life really thought that it would be better for me to get a four-year education And I - so I applied to Norwich I got in and that's where I went That was really the only- that was the only I think there were a couple of other schools I applied and got into but it was the only one that I was really interested in SY And had you gone up and visited beforehand? AM Yeah I think I did Yeah as a matter of fact I think I did SY Do you remember what your impression of it was? AM No I really can't remember at this time I mean I - obviously I - the impressions are all with - when you - I can't remember the highway Route 7 is that the one that comes up from the south? Or Route 9 or whatever it is? Route 9 So I always remember coming back to school The - you sort of see the lights of the school and it did look a little - a little cool particularly in the wintertime So that was my impression But it was always a very pretty campus so SY And something I actually always ask in these interviews with people who have ended up going to war is did you play war as a kid? AM Did I play war as a kid? I think anybody who was raised - born during the war and raised during - in the 50s of course we played war I mean we take a look at what was - take a look at what was playing on the movie houses Every time they ever show the movie Sands of Iwo Jima the Marine Corps goes up so yeah we all did SY Yeah AM So SY OK so - so then you get to Norwich and some people find rook week easy some people find rook week to be quite a shock How did you deal with that first moment of- AM I think I probably adapted easier than most simply because I had gone away to prep school and I had lived away from home And when I put them all - string out years away from home I probably had six six and a half seven years as a boarding student away from my - both my parents were professionals My mother was a writer my dad was an art director/consultant So I was comfortable with living away from home I'd also had an uncle and a cousin that'd gone to West Point so they kind of clued me in to what to expect in other words don't attract too much attention to yourself and get real small for your first year and stay out of trouble So I don't think I was overly shocked by what I found I think there were a lot of people in my class that were and obviously it didn't work out for them and they left The turnover in my class was exceptionally high I believe we had - we started with something like 440 and we wound up graduating about 240 So there was a culture unfortunately up there of breaking you And I think that if you're in that kind of a situation you allow yourself to bend and not break SY Do you remember any moments where you were like what the hell did I get into? AM No SY Yeah AM No SY And do you remember - AM Be sure to speak up because - SY Oh I'm sorry! AM Yeah SY Yeah so you don't remember moments of doubt? AM No SY And do you remember were there moments of - were you frightened? AM No SY Were there parts of being a rook that you enjoyed? AM That I enjoyed? I think I enjoyed the idea of being in a group and I think it's still - this is - I think it's fairly true today I noticed that at Norwich there still is a great deal of bonding within each class And I was in K Company and I - it's funny because every once in a while I'll run into somebody who was in K Company when we were freshman And I was in other companies at Norwich in subsequent years and they would always bring back that we were in K Company together So there was a great bonding as a freshman So if you want to say did I enjoy that? Yeah I enjoyed that I enjoyed the idea of bonding I come out of a prep school - a coeducational prep school I came out of a very liberal prep school I had three girls four girls in my class who went to Bennington I mean you want to talk about you know complete opposites We had kids who went to Reed out in Oregon For me to go to Norwich they all thought I was nuts But - and actually I think I felt closer to the guys I was at Norwich with than I did with the kids I was in prep school with although my politics are probably more tuned you know skew more liberal than 90% of my class In fact they probably still do today SY Yeah I'm guessing just from having talked to members of your class and having talked to you Yeah So and that's actually something that I was thinking about in the drive up You're a year you're a year younger than my parents I know they were in college when you were in college and had very different experiences For them they were you know getting actively involved in the protest culture that was going on around them So at Norwich you were sort of insulated from the 60s that was emerging around you Were you sort of aware of the - did you feel alienated from the larger context of youth culture in the US? Was that something you thought about when you were there? AM I think that - I think quite frankly I'm not sure I agree with you First of all the culture of the 60s the counterculture of the 60s which you're talking about is something that happened - SY It's a little later AM That happened a little later That happened in 1968 '69 I think we were very much aware of what was going on in the civil rights movement And I - one of the things that - perhaps one of my most vivid memories is when I was 15 years old I went by myself on a bus ride from New York to Tucson Arizona which took me through Georgia Alabama Mississippi and Louisiana And I was by myself and I saw all of the segregation that was going on in the South And my parents were both very very liberal and they warned me about being very careful about what I said That said it also - my selection at Norwich had a great deal to do with why I did not apply to either VMI or The Citadel both of which I probably would have gotten into but I had some real issues with - the whole issue with segregation And it's interesting because at Norwich we were really insulated - we were insulated from that inasmuch as there were no African-Americans in our class And I remember there was a kid - there were a couple of kids - one Brooks who is now on the Board - I think he's on the Board of Trustees He was a year be- couple of years behind me And then there was a guy by the name of Harvey But there were only two or three African-Americans in our class at Norwich when I was there so it was predominantly a very white school It was also a very blue collar school SY Can you talk about that? AM Hmm? SY Can you talk about that? AM Sure I mean I you know I - yeah it was very blue collar One of my classmates Jake Sartz used to say "It's a blue collar military school." A lot of these kids you know I was - I had a sort of biz- I was bizarre A I was a prep school kid - there weren't a lot of prep school kids there Both of my parents were college educated My grandparents were college educ- my grandfather had a PhD in romance languages So I was with guys that - you know we had one classmate of mine who remains one of my favorite people and his father was a garbage collector and he put his child through Norwich and put another kid through college I think that's the great - that's who we are as a society or who we should be as a society Unfortunately I don't think that's where we're going now I think we've gotten to the point now where college education is so prohibitively expensive that it's going to be impossible for a lot of kids who deserve an education aren't going to get them Now all of this said my roommate my senior year - his father was a doctor His sister was at Marymount down in New York and she went on to Georgetown and got her doctorate in microbiology So - and Barry had also been through prep school So there were - there were some of us that had you know whose parents were well educated Roger Bloomfield - his father had gone through the merchant - what was that state? - New York State Maritime Academy and his mother had gone to Skidmore so it's not - and he was from Wellesley so it's not just saying I was alone Predominantly most of these kids were first generation college edu- these were the first kids in the you know to go to college and it was terrific SY Yeah So you were Senior Buck which means to some degree - could you talk about that? AM Yeah I was a Senior - I was a private for my freshman year for my first half of my sophomore year I was promoted to Corporal for my second semester and I was a Senior Buck my junior - a Junior Buck and a Senior Buck I was also involved with - in those days we did a lot of you know we had all these big weekends like Junior Week and Regimental Ball Weekend and all that stuff I did all the decorating for all those things I mean you go back and look at my stuff underneath my thing I was involved in the Outing Club I was involved in Hilly Chilly- do you know what Hilly Chilly is? Mountain and cold weather training I was on the Rescue Team and that was certainly - all of the guys on the Rescue Team - I think I was the only private on the Rescue Team I'm not s- it just wasn't all that important All that rank was - it would have been nice but it wasn't critical I mean we were all going to be Second Lieutenants when we graduated so quite frankly I you know and as I said to you at lunch I thought I saw a lot - as much bad leadership as I saw good leadership I saw some guys up there that - Roger Bloomfield was one Terry Van Meter was another - Terry Van Meter loved the military I mean this guy you know morning noon and night he loved the military but he never foisted it on anyone else He did his job and whatnot On the flip side there were some guys up there that were just - who were colonels and majors and they were - to them it was - it was really political and they were jerks And by the way these are the guys that don't come back to reunions and these the guys that don't give any money to the school I'm sure SY Yeah so you said earlier that you were sort of able to separate the bullshit from what you felt was meaningful So I guess what did you find meaningful and what did you kind of think was bullshit? How did you - AM I thought the Honor Code was the most meaningful thing I got out of the school In fact I wrote to Rich Schneider after reading the book - there's a wonderful book called The Nightingale's Song and it is about John McCain James Webb John Poindexter and Bud McFarlane They were all naval academy graduates they all lived under the honor code You know the story of McCain in Vietnam you know the st- I don't know if you know much about Jim Webb but Jim Webb was a Navy Cross recipient These guys were honorable men Poindexter and McFarlane and Oliver North all got involved with you know with this thing with Iran-Contra and cover-ups and whatnot and it's all about the honor And that's what the book is about and I wrote to Rich Schneider and I said that should be required reading that if you don't have personal honor you don't have nothing SY So do you remember moments when the Honor Code was applied? (phone rings) When you ah let's pause for a moment - AM Don't worry about it SY I don't know I've interviewed other people who had ethical struggles They just - AM I did SY Could you talk about those? AM Yeah I'll tell you a funny story We had a professor that every year would - I was - I can't even remember the course - and - but he would always publish - he always asked three questions on his final exam or five questions whatever it was out of 10 questions or 20 questions And there was always the same 20 questions and he always selected five of them And somebody had figured it out and so what I did was I figured out what 20 questions were and knew what the 20 answers to 20 questions were And I passed the course and all of a sudden I said "Was that an ethical issue?" And so I went to John [Molano?] who was I mean this sounds stupid believe me it sounds - I mean I think how stupid it is I went to Molano who was the Head of the Honor Committee I said "Joe you know I may the heck I may have committed an honor code violation." And I explained it to Joe and Joe said "Get lost That's Mickey Mouse." There were yeah there were honor code violations you know that I saw up there I don't - I don't remember there wasn't any -a lot of stealing I mean it just - it worked Is that what you're asking? SY Yeah moments like that - or how you internalized it It sounds like you resonated with it right away? How was it taught I guess is my question? AM How did you what? SY How was it taught? AM Well (laughs) honestly it's real simple A cadet does not lie steal cheat or condone people who do I mean (laughs) it's not much more to it than that Now you might have a booklet that explains all the legal ramifications but that's the - it's almost like an article in the Constitution it's real simple language - SY And you bought into it right away? It resonated with you? AM I think you buy into it because quite frankly if you don't have it you got to live with yourself And there are things we all - I wrote in that book that I gave you that you did for my 25th reunion about PTSD Did you remember to - did you read what I wrote about it? That there may be instances of PTSD that were caused by people who did things that they weren't particularly proud of Now I'm not sure I haven't modified that a bit to be more empathetic and understanding of what PTSD is I think everybody suffered from it at some degree But I think there were people that if you did watch that documentary on My Lai I was struck - there were two people who were involved one person who feels no responsibility for it and another one who feels a great deal of responsibility for it And I think PTSD has - there is - there were cases of situa- I don't know how people could live with themselves if they committed the kinds of offenses that were committed in Vietnam SY So I mean a big - right I mean when you're looking at something like My Lai or when you're looking at something like Abu Ghraib right? It requires being able to not follow orders right sometimes? AM I had an instance when I first got to Vietnam where I had a platoon and I was assigned to work with an infantry company And we had taken a prisoner - actually we had two of them and both of them were badly wounded they may have been patched up - well one of them excuse me one of them was badly wounded the other one was just tied up He was tied with his hands behind his back And they brought them out to where we were They flew them out by helicopter and we were going to go search for the weapons because the guy was going to take us to where his weapons were And he - one of them was so badly wounded he was on a stretcher and they were actually putting what do you call it some fluids into him or they actually had a bottle up there and the whole trail But the other guy he took these guy- he took the infantry men over to this spider trap - these are tunnels - and he said "It's down - my weapons are down there." And one of the guys went down there and it was booby trapped with spik- with Punji sticks Do you know what they are Punji sticks? They're sharpened bamboo sticks And they pulled him out The guy was messed up badly and everybody was trying to help this guy get him out of the hole and the prisoner broke loose and ran away And fortunately somebody - it took them about a half an hour but they did find him And they brought him back and one of the Vietnamese interpreters started to really beat him up badly to try and get information from him And at one point they dragged him over to one of our armored personnel carriers and said "OK let's roll over - let's roll over him with it." And at that point I said "OK pal that's about as far as I'm going to go." I mean I - you know I was brand new and that's no excuse and this guy was obviously a captain and I was a lieutenant but at that point I saw this thing was going to go across the edge that I wasn't ready to go I think there were a lot of people that were forced into those kinds of situations throughout Vietnam And I'm not going to kid you if you think that any one of us were easy on POWs you're dreaming It was just a very very difficult time particularly when you lost people That gives no excuse to what happened at My Lai because that was his excuse was "I lost a lot of people." Well goddammit I lost a lot of people but I didn't kill people to even the score and what - how are you evening the score? That one I don't get And how do you do it by evening the score with men women and children - or with women and children? I mean that is even further afield so Does that answer your question? SY Yeah what do you think enabled you to stand up to that captain in that moment? (repeats herself louder) What do you think enabled you to stand up to that captain in that moment? AM I don't think it was a big deal I mean I just said "It ain't gonna happen sir." And that didn't happen I mean it just wasn't going to happen I was not going to put one of my vehicles or one of my kids in a position where he had to make you know where he had to be part of that SY In terms of what I've been reading about Vietnam and PTSD I think part of what happened to a lot of enlisted men was that they didn't have officers who were taking care of them right? So the fact that you were thinking about what that would do to the men in your platoon protected them and so there was still a moral universe that they were functioning within Does that make sense? AM Well I think it makes sense I - there's a film out called Platoon I don't know if you've ever seen it but if you haven't seen it I really suggest you do And in the film the platoon sergeant Sergeant Barnes literally was pushing a platoon leader a young lieutenant around you know so you're not going to do this you're not going to do that Quite frankly I had the good fortune of having served for a year in K- almost a year in Korea I'd been a company commander in Korea and I had more sergeants rep- I had you know piles of sergeants reporting to me and other officers So at that point nobody was going to talk - no non-commissioned officer was going to talk to me and no enlisted officer - no enlisted man- was going to talk to me By the same token I had a wonderful medic who worked for me who used to remind me that we all put our pants on the same way every morning one leg at a time And quite frankly it was a tough enough situation that I didn't - you didn't have to spend a lot of time saluting and whatever I must say that in - I was really quite honored of the fact that I was always shown the greatest respect The main guys were very good to me Maybe the best reward I got was I got a wonderful gold watch mailed to me by my unit after I left I don't know how the guys got those gold watches from their unit We got you know other stuff But you know when I got that that's always been a prize possession SY What do you think made you a good leader? (repeats herself louder) What do you think made you a good leader? AM I don't know that I was a good leader I just (laughs) - I was a - you know I - that's tough to say what is a good leader and what's a bad leader? I think it - it's a matter of - well there's a thing that they try and - they used to try and talk about it The most important thing to start with is the mission I mean you got a job to do And then the second most important thing is to take care of your people And then the third thing to worry about is to take care of yourself Unfortunately I used to put it this way Vietnam was full of a lot of guys who were interested in their career There were not a lot of professionals We were talking about Fran Brennan who was the Class of 1964 Fran was a consummate professional I went down and spent a day with Fran He was a company commander He had A Company- first of the 6th Infantry You could just see the way he carried himself from the way he acted around his people that this was a guy they absolutely loved and respected So you know what do I think makes a great leader? Guys like Fran Brennan they're great leaders and what you try to do is you know you try and think how would Fran Brennan have operated? I had a comp- troop commander a company commander in Korea named [Daryl Blaylock?] and he was the same kind of guy He'd been an all-American at Alabama played football career army officer - and it was just the way he treated people If you treat people with respect you know and make them p- not make them part of the decision process because it isn't a democracy You always have to remember at best it's an enlightened despotism That you just treat people with respect make them part of the process let them know what's going on try not to be too terribly - show any you know too terrible - fear because quite frankly when things start happening quickly as it did a number of times after a while you try not to show it if you can But by the way anybody who tells you you weren't scared is either a fool or crazy or doesn't know what they're talking about SY Yeah Let's go back a little bit Did you commission right after you graduated? AM Right SY You did? AM Yeah SY Yeah And you went to Korea? AM Well first I went down to Fort Knox and I spent - went down to the Armor Officers Basic course at Fort Knox And I had volunteered for Vietnam at Norwich SY Really? And did you know what was going on over there? AM Oh yeah But I - this is part of who I am I mean to be honest is that I kind of sensed what was going - I sensed the importance of what was going on I'm not sure I sens- understood exactly what was going on The Battle of Ia Drang Valley happened the month my senior year November my senior year 1965 and I volunteered not only for Vietnam but I volunteered for the First Calvary Division I'm not sure well first of all I said how the hell can you be in the army and not be where it's happening? What I didn't realize and I came to realize very quickly is that it was the defining moment of my generation I have classmates of mine who and God Bl- I love them dearly and they went to Germany and/or you know they went to Fort Polk Louisiana or Fort Benning and spent two years and got out and did nothing I mean they did their service and they're honorable veterans and they probably would have been superb guys in Vietnam but they weren't there And there was a big difference between being there and not being there So I went to Fort Knox and then when I got to Fort Knox they told me that I had to spend a year at Fort Knox before going to Vietnam but I was going They said "You're going." And I said "Well what am I going to do?" And they said "Well you're going to be an OCS TAC officer You're going to run like Officer Candidates like at Norwich." And I went I hated that stuff I hate all that nonsense of shining your shoes and running around and taking people and bossing and all that stuff And I said "I would really would rather be with troops I want to be with real troops." And so I went to see my company commander and I said "Is there a way I can find some troop duty?" And the guy said "Well not unless you're willing to go to Korea." And I said "Fine I'll go to Korea for a year." And he says "You're crazy." And I went "Yeah but I'm single and I got you know." You see when you're that single I mean you have no other responsibilities and so I got on the phone on - it was funny because there was another guy I grew up with from Pleasantville New York - actually Jimmy [Skiff?] - and Jim said "Gee that's a great idea." He wan- he was going to Vietnam too We had the same timetable And so Jim sat down and wrote a letter to somebody in the Pentagon and I sat down and somebody gave me a phone number and I called the guy - called this guy He said "You crazy?" I said "Yeah." He said "Fine I'll cut your orders this afternoon." You know and Jim had to wait four weeks to get an answer (laughs) So I went to Korea and I got to Korea And they were going to send me to a tank outfit and I went "No I'd rather go to a cav outfit." And they said "Well we got a tank outfit open we need somebody in it - cav outfit." I said "I really rather go to a cav unit." And so I went to attend cav and you know I spent almost nine months there SY What were you doing in Korea and what was your impression of Korea? AM Well you have to realize I still think Korea is even today the most dangerous place in the world We were working - the cav squadron which is a battalion was operating with the 7th Division I started out basically in staff headquarters but they immediately moved me over to B Troop And I was the First Platoon Leader of B Troop and also the Executive Officer because the guy only had - it was the Captain and myself And there were - because Vietnam you got to realize there was such a shortage of officers that it was just him and me And one day he walked in I guess this was around - I put it in my notes but it was in the spring of 1967 he came in and he said - I think I'd been in there three months three and a half months - and he said "Well I got good news and good news." I said "What's that?" He said "The good news is I'm going home early and I'm leaving in two weeks." I said "Great What's the other good news?" He says "You're the new troop commander." So what - Second Lieutenant is normally slotted for platoon and the idea that I'm running now a company and I was doing it by myself with a bunch of sergeants And these guys were terrific I mean these guys really took me under their wing and they taught me a lot of good stuff And so I did that for a year and then finally I started getting in platoon leaders - all of whom by the way had come out of OCS and all of them you know I was at that point I was older than most of these guys I was 24 25 - 24 And these guys were 18 - well no not 18 they were about 19 and 20 years old One or - one of them - two of them had two years of college but they had quit college They were very much like William Calley He was a product of you know he'd spent a year in college and gotten thrown out and. And you know OCS at one time was really one of the really premier ways of commissioning guys During Vietnam I saw a bunch of guys come out of OCS - some of them I thought were terrific and some of them I thought were just bozos because they just - and it wasn't their fault It was - they were just so young So anyway I ran the company for - until September We were basically doing everything from working - doing some work up on the DMZ Basically we were just an occupation force doing a lot of stuff out in the field a lot of training out in the field which was really great for me because by the time I got to Vietnam I was familiar with working with vehicles I was familiar with working with people I was working with - familiar with working with maps with radios and all this stuff Whereas if I had stayed at Fort Knox I would have never gotten that kind of experience Fast forward when I show up in Vietnam I said "Oh I'm up on my way to the 1st Calvary." They said "Well they've changed your orders You're going now to F Troop 17th Cav part of the 196th Light Infantry." Now two things went through my mind First of all I had been at Fort Devens when the 196th was there and they were a complete bozo outfit They were really - couldn't find their way out of a paper bag And the worst of them was this F Troop So I had a real problem and I got up there and of course they'd been in Vietnam for over a year By that time it had all of this all of the badness knocked out of them They were very very good; they were very seasoned When I got to the unit the troop commander opened my 2-0-1 file they looked at my 2-0-1 file and they said "You have more command time than I do." He said "Do you mind commanding a platoon again?" And I said "Why? I'm - I was just promoted to First Lieutenant not to Captain of the whatever-you-want-me-to-do." So I was a platoon leader for four months and then became Executive Officer just when the Tet Offensive broke out SY When you think about Vietnam do you have sense memories of Vietnam? Smells sounds? AM I don't think there's a day - there's a day that doesn't go by that I don't think about it SY How do you think about it? How does it come to you? AM That's hard to say I mean it just you know different things You know just yeah I mean your mind always sort of lies - I mean for years I couldn't go to sleep at night before without drifting back to it Now it's a lot easier I've remained very close to the people In fact this morning I wrote to - oh probably we're going to have a reunion down in Florida in October and one of the guys who actually had been a driver for me - he and I are coordinating Another guy who had been a driver for me - radio operator you know we're just trying to put it all together so you know I for some reason I will always think about it I mean it just - it comes back so I mean you have to realize that the intensity of those situations particularly the ones when there was some where people were either getting hurt or you were hurting people or you want to call it combat or whatever It's all slow motion I don't know when you talked to other people whether they've said the same thing that you - it - I can - the first big firefight I got into I felt like after you know it seemed like hours Of course I looked at my watch and we'd only been going at it for a half an hour and I felt like I'd been there for four hours or five hours So you're - this - it becomes very intense and the memories and the images become very very vivid in your mind SY Yeah Did you react to battle or combat the way you thought you would beforehand? AM Well as I say in my - in some of the stuff I've left you I mean I - yeah I guess I did No I - that's a hard question to answer I mean I don't know how the hell I thought I was going to react SY How did you react? AM Well I - we - one of the guys because we were a mobile outfit you ask me how could someone have taken pictures? Well because we had mobility and so guys could carry cameras One guy actually had a tape recorder during the middle of a firefight and I remember listening to that tape And it was a major firefight I mean it lasted all day And I think the thing that shocked me the most about that tape was the fact that I sounded reasonably cool on the radio I mean I kept hearing myself and saying "My God you know I was terrified" and I was! And I was listening to the tape and yet the person talking on the radio was not displaying - does that make any sense to you? SY It makes a lot of sense to me that you managed to sort of perform your role AM Well yeah you know - I - yes but don't overstate (laughs) my heroism because believe me it was just - I think it's also part of that if you want to call it the Norwich training or West Point training or VMI or any one of those when you come out of that there's a lot of that stuff that you - it becomes second nature to you to react to and you do it out of understanding that there are procedures that you're going to have to follow And it's very funny because I remember that we used to have this thing called Mars Stations and Mars Stations were these telephone setups where you could call the United States And I'd been overseas at that point probably 15 months and I hadn't spoken to my parents and - it's not like today with a cell phone - and so somebody set up a phone call and when you get on the radio - when you get on the phone you're actually talking on a radio that you know the guy briefing you said "Look it's just like radio procedure" you know you talk and then you say "Over." You know you use all the formality of radio procedure Well hell I get on the phone I was so excited I forgot radio procedure On the other hand my mother who had never talked on a radio in her life had been briefed similar and she was doing everything correctly So yeah I don't know SY Do you still have your letters? Does anybody have the letters you wrote? AM Yeah I have them upstairs and actually I didn't send them to you when they did that issue Yeah I have them SY Would - are you - is there any part - you want to donate them or are they too private? AM There's some things in there It's funny you should say that because when I - when that whole thing came up and they were looking for letters and I was going to send them in and I had found them and it was when I was a company commander And it was a letter I found And by the way ask me about the second letter because I want to talk about the second letter that I got Well no maybe a third one I went and read that letter and it was sort of not chatty it was sort of telling them what was going on This had to have been in the spring of '6-summer of '68 And I remember reading in a line or a paragraph about the fact that one of my people had been charged with rape which was unusual for our unit And what really shocked me today is I can't remember exactly what happened SY I suspect there was so much going on that was so awful all the time that that one just disappeared AM Well you know it's very funny - well before I get to the second letter I'll mention another one We had a - we were operating out of a - at one point in the summer of 1968 they took my company they put us out on a base camp out in the middle of nowhere in the Quế Sơn Valley a place called LZ Colt And by the way there are photographs in that CD that I'm going to give you has pictures of LZ Colt SY I'm wondering if we should look through some of this stuff because it might trigger your memories - AM No I know those photographs pretty well We were out there and we used to send guys home three days before - you came out of the field three days before your turn to rotate You know you went - or two days whatever the deal was And we sent the guy back - we sent this kid back to LZ Baldy which was our forward operating area And he was going to get on a truck and he was going to ride in a truck from LZ Baldy about 40 miles - 40 kilometers south to Chu Lai - and he was going to go through the medical thing and clear all his stuff and then fly home That is the last day That's your date you know that's it you're home and it's a cakewalk at that point He's riding in this truck and coming in the opposite direction is a tank And the guy who's riding on the tank wanted to know how f- asks the tank driver "How fast will this thing really go?" And there's an accident and this kid is killed who's on his way home - the last day! That was whatever that date is and you can look it up was the day that Martin Luther King was shot Is that '68? I think it was '68 SY It was '68 AM Yeah it was either Ja- it was either King or Kennedy I can't remember which It was Kennedy I think It was Kennedy SY Right - AM Bobby Kennedy SY - because they were in rapid succession AM And because I had been a big Kennedy pa- fan somebody radioed me and said "Bobby Kennedy has been shot." It was Bob Kennedy And on the heels of that I heard this other news and I just - I remember my reaction was I could really give a shit about Bobby Kennedy at this point The idea that this poor kid had gone through all of this and then died was ridiculous I mean it was just terrible The other one the other letter and I have the letter It was from a parent of a kid we lost and it was right after I became troop commander And the parents were writing me a letter consoling me for the loss of their own son because quote as I recall the words "they knew the kid had been well-led blah blah blah blah." And the problem is is now if we had been talking about my platoon I could remember every kid in my platoon At that point I had a company I had three platoons I remember the kid's name but I couldn't picture his face And here these parents were writing this incredible letter to me and I couldn't remember the kid's face SY Oh! AM So that's you know these are the you know I don't know And there were so many of these you know you lose one the first - last day in Vietnam We had a kid who was killed - I became troop commander when the troop commander just - I became troop commander twice but the second time which for the longest period I took over when the troop commander's vehicle hit a mine and it was made up of white phosphorous Do you know what white phosphorous is? It burned the whole thing burned the entire crew up And he got blown free and he got out and quite frankly it's too bad he got out He should have been killed because quite frankly he had put these people in a position where they should not have been You don't cross a bridge in a vehicle You know that there's going to be a mine at the end of that bridge You go find another way It's the only - but anyway I went back and looked at the vehicle The vehicle was up on its end and everything had fallen down inside And I went back and I purposely went in to look at one of the bodies because the kid had just joined the unit and nobody knew who he was And I always felt that I - I felt an obligation to see this kid if only to remember him because nobody else would And in fact he was so new to the unit that they would not allow me to positively identify him I think you had to be in the unit for seven days or six days or something like that before anybody could give you a positive ID So he was obviously shipped home and done by dental records or something like that So it was you know that was you know there was always that first day there was that last day there was the letter I mean you get these sort of bizarre things that happen to you so there SY Did you have to write letters home - AM Oh yeah SY - when a kid in your unit died? Do you remember that process? AM Yeah and that was strange because I as I said I became troop commander twice The second time- and again it's in that recollections that I wrote- my troop commander went on R&R and he went on R&R the day the Tet Offensive broke out And that in itself would have been OK except we didn't know how serious it was so he went home And he was gone - usually those R&Rs were about a week and he was gone for close to two weeks maybe even a little longer And of course part of the Tet Offensive was they were out planting mines and booby traps all over the place In the first vehicle we lost we had 13 guys on board and all of them were killed Now four of them were part of my troop and nine of them were from the infantry So somebody else had to write those other nine letters but I had to write those four letters But the last guy killed in the whole that two-week period happened to be a guy who was probably my best friend He was a buck sergeant who had been in my platoon And his name was Ron Adams just a terrific guy This was his - he had been in Vietnam with another unit had been sent to us He had had prior service He had been in - I think he had been in the Air Force or Navy I guess - married had a child And I actually got to I mean we were close enough that I knew about his wife and his children and all so And so I sat down and I wrote - I went beyond the quote "standard letter" because I thought that that's what they would want to hear from me because obviously I assumed that they knew that we were pretty good friends Then the letter got bounced back - you can't write that You have to use the form Now in 1997 I posted something about Ron on the virtual wall And I guess I left my email because the next thing I know I got an email from his niece and the next thing I know I got an email from Ron's sister And then Ron's sister called me and asked - she was coming up to Boston - we were living in Boston at the time - and so she would she asked if she could come out and see me I said "Absolutely." So we spent the whole day together talking about her brother And what was sad about it - it was she said you know when he was wounded or when he was killed he was first listed as MIA And she said "The impression we always had is that he had been missing and you all had left him." And I said "Well no nothing but - his vehicle blew up is what happened" and he and another fellow - a kid by the name of Lester Smart Mack Smart Maxwell Smart from Get Smart - remember that movie? Well that's why his nickname was Mack And I said "No no he was killed and you know we put him together and sent him back." And she said "We were always under the impression that you had left him." And I said "Well again that was not true." So. SY I wish you'd been able to send that letter AM Huh? SY I wish you'd been able to send that first letter AM Well you know listen I - you know I write better today than I did then (laughs) I prob- no I you know listen I must say that one thing that supposedly Lyndon Johnson did - are you aware that he signed every letter? SY I wasn't. AM Yeah SY That's interesting AM The way it worked from what I understood is that when someone was lost it would go - the company commander would write a letter and then the battalion commander brigade division And I think it went down to MACP [mortuary affairs collection point] and Westmoreland would sign the letter and then a letter went home But then the whole package went to the White House and he signed it Now I don't know if that's true or not but that was what I was under the impression is the way it operated But the President's letter started and yours was on the bottom But yeah I wrote - that was difficult On the other side I got a letter from one of my - I'll just say one of my company commanders - I won't identify which one But I got - because we were a separate battalion - company we had no battalion I got - somebody walked in my office one day we were back in the rear he said "Lieutenant we have a letter for the chaplain." I said "Well I suppose I'm the chaplain too." And I opened it up and it was from some woman who was obviously an extra-marital girlfriend of the Captain and she was wondering why he hadn't written (laughs) I knew he was married so I - I just - I put that one in the circular file I didn't want to touch that one so my experience of being a chaplain was very short-lived SY Very brief so the guy who you said was your best friend he was a sergeant? AM Yeah SY So was that - I somehow thought because he was technically enlisted because he was an NCO - (repeats herself louder) because he was an NCO - AM Right SY - and you were a commissioned officer would that be considered fraternizing? How did those boundaries work? AM Well I you know I don't think - that - you got to re- I mean think about that question Think about it - no it doesn't - no all that stuff go- that is f- that maybe works in the rear some place But it doesn't work in the real world when somebody is shooting at you or you're out on an operation Now I had a - there was a - I have had - I had one young guy - night we were working an operation and we were working at night and we were loggered up - "loggered up" is like we were hunkered into a position and we had a - we were being infiltrated And I was very cautious about opening fire at night primarily because tracer rounds will give you away And I was telling the guys that "Look these people were coming in so close that we can use hand grenades And the reality is is that hand grenades will leave no telltale where they came from So I want you to toss a grenade out there and scare them away." Quite frankly I didn't want to get into a firefight at that point because it all - it's too confusing but there was an American - we were on one side of a river and there was an American unit on the other side of the river And what I was terrified and actually did happen was we - two American units wound up shooting at each other And that kind of stuff happened But anyway during the course of this sort of very quiet radio talk going back and forth between myself and the sergeant the guy kept saying that he was going to open up fire and I said finally I said "Goddammit I'm the lieutenant and today I get to be the troop commander Now tomorrow if I'm dead and you are the troop commander you can make that decision." And you know but I didn't have to do that kind of stuff a lot That you know that didn't - SY There was no standing on ceremony AM No It really wasn't I will tell you I think probably one of the more amusing - we were out in the valley and there were 30 ve- we had 30-plus vehicles - and it was raining it was lousy and it had been a very uneventful trip And you have to understand everybody is plugged in Everybody has a radio set on everybody's got a microphone the whole thing So you got 30+ vehicles four men - at least four guys per vehicle so you got 120 radios operating Now my - our call - my call sign was Fox - well my call sign had been Fox 6 but my nickname became Fox So they whenever they were talking they would talk Lieutenant Fox and what have you regardless of what our real call sign was So we're crossing this very very shallow river and it was very muddy and one of the vehicles - and we were tired I mean we'd been out for da- several days and we wanted to get back into base camp I was wet I was tired everybody else was wet everybody else was tired everybody else was fed up to here And I remember all of a sudden I got a radio call I would track behind the first platoon - First A vehicle zone and on my vehicle and then there would be 16 vehicles behind me Is that right? And then essentially well essentially I said 24 there'd be two in the head if I was taking 26 out I guess And one of the vehicles behind me threw his track In other words the whole thing came on - off the tracks Does that make sense to you? OK "threw a track." And I got off on a God- because the guy had taken too sharp a turn And I got on a Goddammit! I went on a blue streak of four letter words and I stood up on my vehicle I was looking back at this guy and I'm going on and on and I hear this voice say "Fuck you Fox!" And I looked around and every eyeball in the unit was looking at me And all of a sudden I realized they were absolutely right They were just as tired they were just as wet they were just as pissed off and all I could do was laugh So I mean does that explain to you the relationship? I mean I'm going to need - I wrote an email this morning - the four guys I'm going to - the three guys I'm trying to get together - we're going to be down and - all of them were sergeants One of them lost both legs and his arm you know and we - we don't call each other lieutenant we don't call each other sergeant It's Angus it's Chris it's Jim it's Tom Tom is an interesting guy Tom is a Catholic priest and if Tom says "All those words that you used on the radio I finally learned what they meant when I got to the seminary" because they swore just as bad as you did So I don't know SY I think that story actually answers the question I asked about you as a leader right? That's a moment of you being a good leader It's a moment of you having a sense of humor about yourself It's a moment of you being able to take criticism and feedback right and respond accordingly? AM I don't know you know I think that - you - I - that's a tough one I mean I can't make any judgments about myself as a leader That's you know if you want to know who I was as a leader then call Chris [Wunzer?] up And call Jimmy [Sherslee?] up Talk to those guys That's one of the things that I think that's interesting is that these were kids who - Chris had gone to North Texas State played football Lee [Guava?] had gone to the University of Wisconsin one of the smaller University of Wisconsin Jim Sherslee actually went in the Army because the judge said "Either you go in the Army or you're going two years in the slammer." SY That was how my dad's best friend ended up going to Vietnam Yeah. AM Tom [Trippenere?] I think was always destined for the priesthood But these kids it's incredible because they all were either drafted - most of them were drafted you know they all took on the responsibilities of being young leaders And believe me being a squad leader or a section leader - or scout section leader - with two vehicles you're responsible for eight guys You know every couple of days you're going to be the first guy on the truck and if you want to look at some pictures at what happens to a truck when they hit a mine it takes a lot of guts a lot of courage So again yeah I mean I think that standing on about the ceremony of rank - but they always treated me with you know proper deference always called me "Sir" or "LT"- does that sort of. SY Yeah Was there any such thing as a standard day in Vietnam - AM No SY - or was it different every day? AM No and what there is is by the way there's no Saturdays off either no Sundays off I mean you're working seven days a week You're working 24 hours SY And are you just in sort of a heightened state of anxiety all the time? AM Yeah I'll tell you what I've tried to describe this over the years as saying - have you ever been in an automobile accident? SY Yes AM You know that funny feeling just before you hit? SY It's that feeling where you're like "Oh I might be about to die How do I feel about that?" AM Well it might not even be that It might be just so much as you know that you're going to crunch the fender and is that - SY Inevitability? AM Yeah Now that's what Vietnam was like You just ride around with that little feeling in your gut all the time SY That's a good description yeah AM Yes so I mean and by the way when you heighten your anxiety to that level that's why everything is so vivid People say "Well how the hell could you remember that?" Very simple You're walking around - if you lived your life that way every day 24/7 first of all you'd probably go mad but - and that's why you get people high I imagine you wind up with you know a certain amount of battle fatigue or what have you whatever they call it so SY Yeah Did you have nightmares when you were there? Or did you have nightmares when you came home? AM No SY No? AM No I remember going on R&R and I went up to R&R to camp - I went up to Camp Zama in Japan - was it Camp Zama? I guess it was Camp Zama in Japan and - because I knew a girl up in Tokyo that I had met on R&R - I had met between tours She was an American She was going to the American School - university in Tokyo And I thought there might be something there but there really wasn't And I you know it's - I was pretty much involved with a gal in the States but this girl was very very nice and I just thought I wanted to go back and spend some time with her But I remember getting to Camp Zama and that first night - all the enlisted guys were going to Japan They all took them over to barracks and whatnot And the officers of which there weren't very many of us took us to an officer's BOQ Bachelor Officer Quarters I got a private room and a shower and all that stuff And I remember having to - first of all I couldn't go to sleep because it was so quiet And then I remember actually pulling all my stuff and sleeping on the floor because I was so used to sleeping on the floor of an APC And on the next night I gave in and went to sleep like a regular person SY Like a regular guy So what are the incidents that you've written up? Are they particular incidents? AM Well the only one I really I mean I had written a long article about a helicopter pilot who I thought had done some extraordinary things on Thanksgiving Day in 1967 which was probably the biggest firefight I was ever in SY Do you want to tell that story? AM Hmm? SY Do you want to tell that story? AM Well it's all there I mean I - it - when I say yeah I mean when I say tell a story I was a platoon leader who - we were - we weren't supposed to be there and I didn't even know this other operation was going on And all of a sudden I got a radio call to move about four -three or four kilometers south that our second platoon was - had been amb- partly ambushed and I didn't even know they were part of a major task force And I got down there and they had been ambushed There were two I think it was two companies of Americans plus our - one of our platoons and four tanks And we had run into - and the size of the unit I'm never been - never quite sure but from what I understand it was a couple of companies of North Vietnamese And they took out the platoon leader's tank which took the task force commander and knocked him off the vehicle The vehicle ran over his arm this Major - I've gotten to know the guy very very well His name is [Gill Dorlan?] So all of a sudden I basically you better move down there and help out And so I blithefully charged in there not having a bloody idea what's going on And when we pull in there all these vehicles were sort of limp and getting shot at and there's this big wooden line on a hill and it was just very very messy And so the article I wrote about or what I had written in that article was a helicopter pilot that came in to drop off some infantry support and wound up and not through his own fault but wound up literally landing in a crossfire between us and the North Vietnamese And rather than just taking off dropping the troops he let his helicopter down and acted as a screen so the troops could come back to our line and he was just getting pasted and finally he took off and he was just you know kicking out smoke and all that stuff and went back And I - I've always thought that was probably one of the most heroic things I've ever seen because it was done on purpose I mean clearly he was trying to keep these kids from getting shot up And then the whole operation lasted I guess three or four days And so the next part of the operation was for us to assault the hill and that again is written in all the reflections that I've written about But what I - a couple of things as I was re-reading that again this morning the things I remember most were one the - when we got the orders to move and you asked me about - SY Ethics? AM No natural leadership and also - there also comes a point in time when you wind up being led because everybody's on a radio and so they heard we were moving out and going up that hill and everybody just started moving I didn't have to tell anybody to move They just started moving I always wondered to myself whether - did I really have the courage to give the order to move? And the next thing I know we're trying to - we're going up this hill That's the first thing I remember most about So I was as led as much up that hill as anybody else The second thing I remember most was it was a struggle getting up that hill because these guys were very - these North Vietnamese were dug in in bunkers and whatnot We had to take them out And then when we got to the top we took a round - an RPG round - on the side of our vehicle that hit our vehicle and did not go off It was a dud It would have killed everybody in our vehicle had it gone off And that's real pucker time when something like that happens where you all of a sudden realize you were that close SY And can you think about that afterwards or do you have to not think about it because it'll make you crazy? AM I don't think I thought about it I mean yeah you think about it I mean I th- I'll tell you what you think about it after - there is a photograph - we'll look at the photographs later but there is a photograph where you can actually see the scar on the side of the vehicle SY So you think about it later the next day AM You think about it later I mean one of the things that I - it's not in that piece is how dry my mouth was I mean it was just - for some reason I don't know why we didn't have more water with us because normally we carried - each vehicle carried five gallons of water But for some reason we didn't have a lot of water I remember that was something and I remember my mouth just tasted like it was cotton on the inside The other thing that happened was - once we cleared - got to the top of the hill and cleared that and we sort of in another - and brought some infantry in with us and they got beaten up very badly We started taking fire from behind us and all of a sudden there was that you know that moment go through your mind that "My God we're surrounded" because they were behind us they were ahead of us and all that stuff And that was pretty scary but also we had so much firepower they weren't going to take us out I mean it was just - it was sort of like a Mexican standoff a lot of shooting And again things out of my notes - I remember a couple of times thinking if everybody would just stop shooting for a few minutes so I could collect my thoughts we'd be probably far better off and I could make more rational decisions (laughs) Yeah I mean and then you know and then of course the thing went on for a couple of days And another recollection I put in there is that we were calling in - there was another village that we're getting a lot of fire from and we called - we were calling in some artillery on it And we were far enough away that I thought you could stand up and observe it until I felt a hunk of shrapnel go by my face and I could feel literally the wind when it went sailing by my head which meant if my head had been two inches three inches left or right I would have been killed And that really scared the hell out of me and I remember going back and getting inside my track and hiding That was - it was a hell of a way to spend Thanksgiving I must say And actually also in my recollections at one point a helicopter - we had been screaming for - we had been screaming for re-supply of ammunition because we'd been shooting all morning and our firing discipline was awful In other words we weren't controlling how much we were shooting and I wasn't paying much attention to it I figured "Hell Uncle Sam's running this thing and my God it's a bottomless pit Look at the Defense Department budget." And so when we started running low on ammunition I called for re-supply And this helicopter came in and it's all dusty and the crap is all flying all over the place our guys are kicking this stuff off and running over- and it was somebody's Thanksgiving dinner It wasn't ours and I don't even know who ate it because I didn't eat any of it But we didn't get any ammunition Now there is a story - a friend of mine told me it was back at brigade headquarters - I got on the radio and I said "Look I need ammunition." And he said "But when you asked for that re-supply and that screwed up" he said "you got on the radio" and he said "you used a string of four-letter words about the incompetence of people." And at that point General [Geddes?] who was Division Commander walked into brigade headquarters and there I - and this was on a loudspeaker- I was. And Geddes is supposed to have said "Somebody better get that young lieutenant some ammunition because I think he's pissed off enough to come back and shoot you guys" or words to that effect Now I don't know whether that yarn is true I'd like to believe it is SY It's a good story AM It's a good story SY I like that story So I've read about when I read - I think this might have even been on some of letters I read from Norwich alumni - I don't remember about superstitions good luck charms especially when people were "short." Right? That's the phrase when you're about to go home? Things you did to try and guarantee your safety Did you have any of those? AM No SY No? AM I will tell you that - you got to realize I'm there - I was overseas at this point for almost - over 20 months at this point That was longer than anybody and I - albeit eight of it had been in Korea And I was terrified And I was terrified that I was going to get hurt And you know it's a very - I've always felt very guilty about that because I'm now responsible for these 195 kids and I'm worried about my own personal safety and that started to bo- that did bother me We were down - we were down at a place called - we were down at LZ Ross and it was on this road that took - went into the Quế Sơn Valley And I have to say that road had more destroyed vehicles and junk on it - you could shake a stick - had probably more road - there was more damage on that road than any place in Vietnam There probably were more but it was damn near And we had been down there and we were coming back and it was the day before my ro- my turning over the troop to the new guy and he was a Captain And we rode past A Company of the 2nd or the 1st I remember that - and this old Captain was running it this great old guy he was like in his 30s and I you know I mean he was an old guy and he was in his 30s (laughs) and he had this terrible limp from one of his wounds And we went through the gate and I went "It's over man!" I got out and you know as long as I don't get hit in a car accident or shot down in a helicopter I'm cool I'm golden I'm home And we get in and we dismounted and all of a sudden a radio call comes in saying that there was a unit had started taking fire and that we were the new reaction force And I remember climbing up on my vehicle and this Captain who was going to replace me Jim Owens started to follow me And I looked at him I said "Jim would you please stay here because if I fuck up now I don't want anybody to see it." And we started to head out the gate and all of a sudden they called us back and I didn't have to go But I have to tell you that - all of a sudden it got scary Now I'm going to - I told you this and I'm going to tell you what I did next which was really stupid Get down to Chu Lai and I bump into two guys I knew One of them was a Captain - Air Force Captain - and the other one was an Army Captain And the three of us went out and got rip roaring drunk and the Air Force Captain said "I got to go make a flight in a -" what do you call it a f- he was a forward air controller in an O-2 these little tiny bird dog airplanes He says "You want to go for a ride?" I got in the airplane we went off we flew out and I said "You know we're getting awfully close to Laos." And we were and he was supposed to be making a weather flight All I know is that was the stupidest thing I could have possibly done We landed - this was maybe two days after I had turned over the troops - and my Executive Officer is standing there and he's got two bags on there I said "What are you doing?" He says "I just got you a two-day drop That's your plane you're going home." And I got on my airplane and I went home SY Do you remember the moment you turned over your command? Do you remember saying goodbye to people? AM Well actually that flag right up there is the troop guidon and I stole it And I stole it because dammit I felt I'd earned it and I figured they could find another one My Uncle Sam has this sort of bottomless pit called the defense budget and I figured hell if they can build this F-35 they can find another flag Yeah I turned the company over to this guy named Jim Owens who was a National Guard officer and he was a good guy wound up losing his leg And I remember turning the troop over to him and it was a very formal ceremony You know a brigade commander was there and the flags were passed and all that stuff And these guys starting passing out the front gate I mean literally mounted up on it right back to the field And I cried like a baby SY And what were you thinking while you were crying? AM That how much I loved those guys and how much I wished I could stay But that's a very lethal place SY Simultaneously you wished you could stay and wanted to run like hell at the same time AM Yeah You know it's very funny because I had a difficult time when I came home - SY Yeah let's talk about that AM - because I realized I was pretty - when you say I was a good leader I don't know if I was a good leader but I was good at my job And I knew what I was doing And probably the biggest thing that was wrong with that whole war was the fact that it took them a year to find a - somebody who really understood his job and all of a sudden they bring in this guy nice guy but they had to teach him that job all over again SY Right And so everybody was rotating out as soon as they got seasoned AM Yeah I mean once you understood - I mean we would have gotten out of Vietnam if somebody had said "OK we're going to send a half a million Americans to Vietnam and the only people that are - the only people that get to come home are the wounded and the dead And we're just going to keep sending replacements so anyway so those of you guys who were there you'd better win this damn thing" because that's basically the way the North Vietnamese were operating I mean these guys you know that's the thing we all seem to forget is that they were good soldiers They were hard tough soldiers and these guys A were fighting for all the values that we purportedly were fighting for and the reality is that they didn't get to go home They fought until they were either dead wounded or you know They certainly didn't go home on R&R and they didn't have you know Coca Cola they didn't have television they didn't have all that nonsense We brought too much creature comforts to it all I remember going down to Chu Lai on a stand down - we used to pull units out took them down and basically cleaned guys up because after you've been out on the field for a while they pick up all sorts of garbage And you want to get them a little life of sanity you see SY We're talking like lice fungus like all - AM Well we would take them down to the Chu Lai beach and we used to rotate a platoon down at a time And you know we'd get down there and we'd get them some steak and we'd you know beer and take them to the beach and all that stuff And there were - I guess they went to the village and played around with the girls I suppose SY I was going to say they picked up some other things too AM Yeah that's true too But I remember riding along the bunker line at Chu Lai and riding by a bunker - and I was - and when I was down in Chu Lai I actually put on my little lieutenant bar and all that stuff pretended to be an officer And I remember riding by the bunker line at night and all of a sudden I saw what looked like I thought a television screen And I stopped the guy backed up - we backed up my Jeep and drove over to the bunker And these guys were in there watching television and they were watching and laughing And I'm saying to myself "This is insanity You got kids out there -" and that by the way is the other issue And I don't know any of the other guys you talked to about - you talked to Bill Bonk - Bill was on a very [012352] (inaudible) aviation outfit and you really couldn't make a lot of mistakes in his business because not only were you getting shot at but you also had to fly an airplane We didn't have the drug problem and that's something you haven't asked about The drug problem - I imagine it went on I know that I caught one guy with - a buck sergeant early on with a guy in my platoon actually - I caught him with a - SY A joint? AM - like a baggie full of five joints He was changing a track and he was looking for a cigarette And he says "Lieutenant would you reach in my pocket and get a cigarette?" Well I reached in and grabbed a pack but I felt something else I pulled it out I looked at it and I just dropped it in the mud and stepped on it and handed him his cigarettes But I don't recall drugs being a big problem - SY So there was no heroin in your unit? AM No no But - the marijuana - but we did have situations where people would bring it up that "So-and-so is smoking dope." And this is how I handled it We had a mortar section and a mortar section is - do you know what a mortar is? SY Uh-huh AM OK We had a mortar section and we had three mortars And I guess we had maybe 10 guys and it was in our big base camp And we couldn't - we didn't carry those mortars out to the field They were too heavy and they were a pain in the neck and carried off too much ammunition shot it off too fast and a lot - too many problems associated with mortars So we just left them in and we left the crews there and we left a lot of illumination And their job was that if base camp got hit they would you know the parachute flares the illumination also So I stole an idea from a movie and it was a wonderful probably the best leadership movie I've ever seen called Twelve O'clock High where the commander of the aviation unit has - takes all the bad guys in the unit and puts them in one bomber He calls it the - what the hell did he call it? I can't remember what he called it - it'll come to me But he put all the bad eggs in one basket So I made - so I took anybody I caught smoking dope I put them down in the mortar pits All you had to do was drop rounds and pop illumination And I would tell guys you're going to you know you're going down to purgatory and you're going down there and if you go home with heroin habits that's your problem but I'm not going to have you in the field Now was it a big problem? No and only because most of the guys didn't want to go to the field with a doper SY Right What about race in your unit? That's the other thing - AM Race? SY - we haven't talked about yeah AM That's an interesting question and I'll answer it two ways One is when guys - it was called the Leper Colony I would call them the Leper Colony that's what it was I had a platoon leader who was from Tennessee and he was a real Southerner and named Larry [Beetle?] - nice guy And Larry came to me at one point and he said "You know when you get a replacement in if you say well I need a rifleman." Who needs a rifleman? "Second Platoon needs a rifleman." So I just sent him Well Larry came to me one day and he said "Well you know I know you don't think about this but I'm the only white guy in the unit in my platoon." And all of a sudden I went whoah! And I started looking around and sure enough most of the Second Platoon - I think there were maybe one or two guys - the platoon sergeant was white - actually it was platoon leader was a Cherokee Indian and all of a sudden I saw that there was a potential problem So I just quietly started moving people around The other racial issue that came up was recently I was out in - two years ago or a year and a half ago? - two years ago I was down in Washington at a reunion and I was with one of our guys named Bill [Fong?] Bill was Chinese And I said to Bill because of my family association with the 442nd we got talking about Japanese-Americans in the Second World War with the 4-4-2 and I said "How as an Asian did you feel with all the dehumanizing that we do very well in the United States when we want to get angry at an enemy -" By the way it's common practice by everybody so it's not just an American trait OK? And he said you know - I said "How did you deal with that? I mean you're out in the field with some guy who's calling - using all those pejorative terms? How do you deal with that?" And Bill said "Lieutenant you got to remember you know they're all stupid people in the world." SY It still must have been hard AM Yeah so you don't. He said "Ninety percent of the time I was dealt with as an American and not as the fact that I was Chinese-American." And he said "Ten percent of the time they're stupid." SY Do you think there is a way to fight a war without that type of deh- (repeats herself louder) Do you think there is a way to fight a war without that type of dehumanization of the enemy? AM No I wish there were It's interesting because we've allowed it - it's become more apparent in this current situation with the Islamic war than it certainly was with Vietnam I mean I you know you got to realize like in Korea they had all the different - that all worked in Korea too Slope dank you know - SY Gook? AM Gook - the whole thing It's funny is that whenever they - and Charlie and of course whenever we got screwed badly and someone would say Charles' name it was a sign of respect - we would call him Charles - Charles has been up to his hole But this whole thing with the situation in Islamic thing I hear people talk and I go I cannot believe they talk the way they do And somebody wrote to me recently - an ultra-conservative person - who said "Well we all do it." No we all don't do it I'm afraid that's no that you just don't do that You don't - and he gave me all the lists of words that people use And I said no we don't use those words - you may use them but don't try and paint me with your brush SY Yeah Have you ever been tempted to go back to Vietnam - AM No SY - to visit? No? Interesting AM Not really It - I mean it's -have you seen pictures of the place? It's absolutely gorgeous SY I have yeah AM But no no I mean I've seen it I will say that I do go back to Korea and that - I've been back to Korea three times not up to where I was But I've been to Seoul three times and I mean the difference between Seoul - when I saw Seoul in 1968 I think the highest building in Seoul was eight stories Now it's - have you ever been to Seoul? SY No but I have a close - a couple of close friends who are living there AM I mean it's a very cosmopolitan city SY It is yeah I have to run to the bathroom So let's take a little break and then - and I'm also aware that you're probably getting tired - (audio break) AM Coming home? SY I was going to ask you about coming home Let me turn this back on AM Has this been basically what you wanted? SY This is great This is exactly what I want So let's talk about coming home and let's also talk about how the anti-war movement has been building up while you were in Vietnam So is this something that you hear - AM Are we on? SY Yeah we're on Is this something that you sort of had been hearing about in Vietnam? Or is it something you have time to think about? Is it something you - AM No We have time to think about that nonsense I think this anti-war movement - I think your generation is as fascinated with the anti-war movement as my generation was fascinated with - my mother - counterculture movement of the 1920s In other words if you weren't there doing the Charleston you really don't know how to do the Charleston My impression of the anti-war movement and don't make - don't mistake what I'm saying It was terribly important and it made a great - it made an enormous impact on this country I think it had some negative impact one of which was that the first thing Nixon did was get rid of the draft And he created a quote "all volunteer army" which in my mind means that we now have a very right-wing professional military which is too closely tied to the defense industry OK? When you look at 70% of the general officers who retired going to work for a defense contractor that seriously worries me especially when you get into this whole notion of honor and ethics And some general standing up and saying "I'm pitching you to buy an F-35 fighter but oh by the way I wouldn't consult you if I didn't think it was something we needed that was the best in the world because after all I did go to West Point where duty-honor-country means everything." That's bullshit If you're paying a guy $200000 a year to sell airplanes he's working for the $200000 - not for some ethics OK? That said you have to remember that the anti-war movement whether it was the University of Wisconsin or Princeton or Harvard or Kent State - they were a small fraction of the generation Most of these people people like my wife were trying to make a living they're trying to get through school they're trying to get on with their lives Now I have a number of friends of mine who were in the anti-war movement One of my closest friends who I lost contact with and I've never been able to re-connect went to Harvard married a girl whose father was a general in the Army they became - he became very heavily involved in the anti-war movement and it cost him his marriage because when he got his notice he went to Canada and she stayed My partner at a Magazine Services in New York was in Chicago throwing rocks and he was on a rock band And we have a picture that we used to send out to clients which had a picture of me in Vietnam and it has a picture of him in his rock band and it said "Magazine Services We can do it the easy way or the hard way." So the reality is I use- I have - I think a lot of these people in the anti-war movement including Jane Fonda they paid an enormous price with their families and with their friends I sat at dinner one time with a client and there were two people running down - not running the war down but they were sort of discussing the war and finally the more senior president of this ad agency piped up and said "How you know how can you talk this way in front of Angus?" And what I found out later is his son had deserted and gone to Canada and this guy was a veteran So here was a situation where a family had been just torn apart So the anti-war movement - and my feeling about Jane Fonda - everybody always gets upset about Jane is she wrote in her book and I have no reason not to believe her that the moment she sat down at that anti-aircraft gun she knew she'd made a mistake that she was being used Do I think that it changed her views on the war? No - Tom Hayden her husband - very heavily involved in the anti-war movement At Inc Magazine one of my closest friends was Bo [Browingham?] who was one of the leaders of the anti-war movement at Princeton And when Bo and I went to China together everybody said "Boy wait till those two guys get talking." It turns out we - Bo and I have been very very good friends I think Bo's argument and my argument -that people sat on the sidelines and did nothing They took no position and they allowed by the way Richard Nixon to carry that war on for another four and a half years all of which we conveniently forget SY Yeah So what was it like to come back home? What was it like to re-introduce you to- AM It's funny I'm glad you asked that There are two - I'll give you some three things that happened One was I was lucky and that - well I'll tell you the whole trip I got into- I got separated I was still in uniform obviously traveling on boarders And I came down - went down to see my sister in Phoenix from Fort McChord Air Force base up in Washington And I remember an airline stewardess being very solicitous in taking care of me and all that stuff and she was saying something to the effect of you know I said "Geez you don't have to do that you don't have to -" giving me free drinks and all this stuff She said "Believe me they're going to treat you like trash." And I remember on the trip being a layover in Chicago and there was this - I had this feeling by being in uniform that I was - that I had - that I was - there was something wrong with me that I was almost like the plague Now the nice thing was is that when I got home my parents were there with my brothers and my s- all the - the whole family all the signs and all that stuff - "Welcome Home" blah blah blah So I had a very nice welcome home from my family Now my mother and father - my mother is I think I told you was a writer and my father was an art director/business consultant - and my parents were very - my mother was so n- she was so fearful of the military that she wouldn't even come to my graduation at Norwich She didn't come SY Fearful in what way? AM Hmm? SY Fearful in what way? AM She had a brother - she had lost someone in the First World War her brother had fought with the 442nd in Italy in the Second World War I mean she'd seen what the war had done And so when I was graduating and I kind of pretty well knew where I was going and she just said "I can't handle it." She did not want to come to graduation I mean you're looking at my class they were all in uniform everybody was going into the Army She knew what the deal was So we got home and my parents used to have these wonderful dinners My parents had a very formal dining room It's a big house in Chappaqua And so we all sat around the table and I was still in uniform and my mother had built this - she was a fabulous cook and she said "Well tell me what do they all think of Premier Kỳ?" It was at that point - and because my parents were very active pro-political people - and my father didn't like the question because there had been a demonstration in Central Park a couple of months a couple of weeks before he said where literally people were carrying the flag of the country that was trying to kill your son You know literally he was upset about the question and all The way I framed it back to my mother was saying "Look What people don't really quite understand about that is that the average South Vietnamese person doesn't even know who he is." If a local dai uy who's a local Captain - is a thief they like to say "If you're working for the people they might be sympathetic to the government." But it's you know all politics is local whether it's here or there And to realize is what you don't understand is you live in an electronic age where you can worry about what your Congressman in Washington is doing They're worrying about what their local alderman is doing in their town And most Americans didn't quite understand that What I came to find out came to realize as I started to get around the country what was going on was less of the anti-war movement- but the anti-war movement was also morphing into the Black Panther movement SY I got to change batteries but keep talking We still got a little bit of juice AM Do you have some juice in there? SY I got another battery AM Oh you got another battery? Well let's just change your battery SY All right here we go Give me 30 seconds and we're recording again AM OK The other thing that was going on in this country as much as the anti-war movement was beginning to resonate in - throughout the country the civil rights movement had morphed into something more violent and that was the Black Panther movement And one of the - and I remember telling my mom and dad that - because my mother and father I mean we - I got to tell you the other one with my mother too About 20 or 30 days into being home and by this time my sisters and - my brothers and what all they're all gone home back to their own homes but they were - they asked me what changes have you seen? And I said - because I was going into the city every day - I was interviewing for jobs and I said "I smell racial violence." And I said this country is very very close to exploding into - I said there is so much racial tension in this country I could just feel it It was completely different the way it was from what I recall when I left almost two years ago And it was more certainly than what I was feeling in Vietnam Interestingly in Vietnam nobody really - in those situations you shouldn't really be worrying about skin pigment at that point You're worrying about whether you can trust the person on either side of you But that was the first thing that was so - that really struck me was how much tension there was in this country racially Because you asked this racial question about Vietnam - I'm saying it was - it was just as tense here but I don't think people because when you're something around something day in and day out you may not necessarily see it SY Yeah you can't smell it any more AM Yeah The other thing that happened that day coming home is my parents had this you know this large home And I guess to keep my mother busy she went through everything I owned And you got to realize I'd been away at school most of my life and so she'd taken all my school team pictures and stuff like that had them all framed And she had this room done in red white and blue and all this And pennants and all this stuff and I - I went upstairs when my mom and dad said "Well I want you to go and see your room." So we went upstairs to my room my mother was still downstairs My father got into the room with me and I looked around this room and you got to realize what I - the responsibility I'd just had and I looked at her I said who does she think I am? This is not - I'm not Leave It To Beaver And that's what a mother sees her child A mother never really sees her child as an adult I don't think And my father turned to me and said "Your mother put a lot of work in this Live with it for 30 days and then make sure you get yourself out of here." And it was good advice and he was right The other thing that struck me I went to work in the training program at McGraw-Hill And I was work- I was assigned to work on a weekly magazine and I - my job was to basically go call on all the cat-and-dog little classified accounts And it was all terribly disorganized and so I remember them handing me this box full of 3x5 cards and I was supposed to file them by category and then in each category alphabetically And I'm sitting there at my desk saying to myself - now this is what I did become an officer again I said are you kidding me man? I had clerks that did this stuff for me in the Army Yeah you're going from writing letters to people's parents to doing this kind of crap? Well this went on for a while and I - the resentment in me really started to build because there was a lot of other chicken shit jobs that they had me doing And one day I went down if you know New York - do you know New York at all? SY Oh yes I grew up in - AM New York City Charlie Brown's you know Charlie Brown's at Grand Central Station? It was a great saloon in Grand - SY Oh I've walked passed it but yeah AM Anyway I went down to Charlie Brown's one Friday - I went Thursday afternoon for lunch And I went down there with this other guy in the McGraw-Hill training program who was a former Marine officer And I was terribly upset Now he had never been overseas He had just done his time and gotten out And we started drinking and I had more - too much to drink And he finally said "Well you know if you're really pissed off go tell your boss." And that was the worst advice I could have gotten because I did it And I went in and I told my boss that this was a chicken shit assignment and I said I'm out of here And I was seriously at that point - and I had been thinking about actually going back into the service at that point I was so - I thought that what was going on in the real world was so unimportant And what happened was I came in to work the next day terrible hangover and sitting in my boss's office was the Vice President of Marketing for the company and "Come on and sit down." I sat down and he said "I understand we had a little bit of an incident yesterday." And I said yeah and he said "We really don't want to lose you." And I said well and he said "But you've also pissed some people off." And he said "Now this means I got to hide you I've got an assignment in Dallas and I've got an assignment in Chicago Which one do you want?" And I said "I've never been to Dallas." So I went to Dallas I met my wife and the rest is history SY Really? AM Yeah SY And how did you meet her? AM Blind date SY In Dallas? Is she from Dallas? AM South Dakota I met her on September 6th and we were married on December 20th SY That's fast When it works it works AM I was - I think it's fast We've been married almost 45 years SY Yeah? AM Yeah SY Yeah Had you considered staying in the Army? AM Yeah I mean I did and part of the reason I went to Norwich was primarily because I probably thought very seriously about it SY But were you fed up by the end of your tour? AM I think what - I'd thought about this I think probably in some respects doing two tours was a good idea because the first tour got me really ready for the second tour far bett- I was better prepared for my Vietnam tour than 90% of the lieutenants I met because most of these guys you know were doing something other than what they would be doing in Vietnam And I at least got a chance to get some hands-on experience On the back side of that - on the flip side of it was I also stayed too long I was there too long because when I came home I was mentally exhausted SY How did that manifest itself? AM I guess I just didn't want the responsibility any more I didn't want to worry about other people And it's interesting you should say that because when I was - you asked me at lunch about "Oh you resigned from McGraw-Hill and.?" Yeah and what it was why I resigned from McGraw-Hill was I mean there were a lot of reasons I talked about market share and whatnot but when I was managing a sales staff - and I was managing a sales staff of 17 people - behind Business Week I think we were the second or third largest magazine in the company It was a big magazine It was a big deal And if you covered an ad agency and I covered the client - it was what they called split credit on billings and all this stuff and I used to get these absolute chicken shit memos from sales reps worrying about whether they got 10% of the credit or 15% of the credit on a million dollar deal In other words they were so caught up in all of the little minutiae that when I resigned and when I was asked why are you quitting? Well I think Inc is a better opportunity and it's a growing opportunity but I'm also tired of all the bullshit I'm tired of being responsible for whether Johnny so-and-so gets a $500 commission check or whether he gets a $700 commission check on a guy who's making $85000 a year - and this by the way was 30 years ago Why don't you worry about going from $85000 to $105000 rather than worrying about $750? And that was the difference at Inc At Inc. it was you know you made your own - you pack your own parachute and you made your own bonus and interestingly enough financially I made out like a bandit I mean I made more money doing this working for somebody other than McGraw-Hill Yeah I would have gotten a gold watch and they used to give out a neat tie when you worked - had been there for 25 years But hell you can go to Brooks Brothers you can get one of those for 50 bucks SY Right yeah And you don't seem like you were a company man for either the military or McGraw-Hill You didn't want to be a company man AM Well yeah but you also have to respect company Now - I - you know I look at a guy like - Fran Brennan was a - Fran Brennan was the quintessential company guy I don't think there's anybody in the military that I could find that I would respect more than Fran Brennan because Fran Brennan was the kind of guy that led from the front A guy I spoke about a few minutes ago Gill Dorlan you know they handed him the Distinguished Service Cross which right behind the Medal of Honor is the second highest award they give out you know He also I mean he was the youngest Major in his class from West Point He quit too you know he tossed it out but he was a consummate professional You understand what I'm saying? The difference between being a professional and being a career guy SY I do AM You do SY I do understand that AM I know you do I know you do SY Yeah but yeah I think it's an important distinction AM The other thing and interestingly enough one of the things that McGraw-Hill had that it lost - and it lost about the time I was leaving was McGraw-Hill had a very serious mentoring system Albeit these guys started out as ad sales guys there were some very very bright guys At one point McGraw-Hill was made up primarily of Ivy Leaguers I mean you have the - well the McGraw family they were all Princeton people but there were a lot of Dartmouth guys a lot of Yale guys whatnot And it's funny because the guy I worked for in Dallas he was a petroleum engineer and you know I always sat with him He taught me how to really listen and learn about a client's business The guy I worked for in Cleveland the guy who ran the Cleveland office taught me about how to think strategically The guy I worked with in Chicago - I wasn't particularly crazy about him as a human being but he was one of the best public speakers I've ever been around so he really showed me a lot about standup presenting skills And the guy I worked for in New York taught me a lot about the minutiae of working inside of a large corporation And McGraw-Hill was very very good on all these mentoring steps and quite frankly I always felt a responsibility that when I had my own sales staff and I hired people that I treated them and taught them all that I could possibly teach them as sort of payback to what had been invested in me And I think that's gone today I don't think people in your generation - no one cares about anybody but [015526] (inaudible) I worry about me and they don't worry about whether you're making a contribution to somebody's career. SY I think that's true I think that culture is dead AM Well one of the other things that's gone too by the way - when I went through the McGraw-Hill training program and when you read my thing it sounds like I was only in it for 6 months Actually you're a probationary employee I think for 18 months Now that was their formal training program And we used to come back every quarter all the trainees They would recruit 15 trainees a year They would interview maybe 300 people And I was an experiment where they hired five Vietnam veterans and then they hired five guys out of industry and five guys out of grad school And they put you into this class SY Ooo! What was that like? AM Oh it was terrific and I will say the Vietnam guys did better than everybody else We were all much older we weren't older mentally - physically we were older mentally We were far more mature But we all did very very well in our careers SY And was it nice to have four other men who sort of knew what you'd just gone through? AM Well yeah they were all different experience One guy had been an F-105 pilot another guy had been a medic another guy had run Swift boats like John Kerry and another guy had been a navigator on a I think it was on a B-52 So we were all sort of varied experiences of the war None of them really common The guys we hired out of industry one of them is still one of my closest friends Andy [Gandon?] He was a bench chemist and worked for BF Goodrich and they hired him on Modern Plastics magazine And Andy said something very interesting He was up here last year He said "The reason why" he says "I think you did better than most of us is that we learned how to do our jobs and then we just kept doing that same job for 30 years You kept changing the job You kept changing the parameters of the job." SY Yeah you got bored AM Yeah that's right I get bored very easily And so if you don't change - if you can't change the game change the rules SY Yeah So something I asked Bill Bonk and he had some good answers about it that I want to make sure to ask you is so you know Norwich was founded on this idea of the citizen - (repeats herself louder) Norwich was founded on this idea of the citizen-soldier AM Yeah SY Is that something that you relate to? Is that something that - AM Oh absolutely I - and I think it's something this country has lost No that's not fair We haven't lost it We've lost it in the regular Army and the Marines and the Navy and the Air Force And interestingly enough the Air Force the Navy and the Marine Corps were always voluntary services The Army was always subject to draft And by the way so was the Marine Corps During the Vietnam War the Marines actually drafted A lot of people don't know that but they did And they also did in the Second World War I think when we took away the draft we took a piece out of that citizen-soldier equation One of my favorite photographs from World War II are two guys in the Navy And they're both on bunks And one's an officer the other one's an enlisted man The officer is reading a comic book and the enlisted man is reading Tolstoy I don't sense that you have a lot of guys reading Tolstoy who are enlisted any more I think you need - I think that if we had a draft - had we had a draft we would have been very reluctant to invade Iraq. SY So you're saying if a draft works correctly it's a corrective - AM Absolutely SY - to sort of hawkish or cowboy foreign policy AM Absolutely Absolutely SY That's interesting AM Well I mean the reality is is that if all of a sudden - I'm talking about a fair draft I'm not talking about six deferments But if all of a sudden Senator so-and-so's son was at risk or more importantly the son of his largest donor was at risk - my brother said something very interesting to - of a guy who owned our company and he actually had Inc Magazine He also had owned Sail Magazine where my brother worked My brother is a Marine fighter pilot And neither Don nor I are hawks We're both politically are pretty much on the same wavelength And one night they were all hunkered up and they were drinking and the guy who owned the magazine was talking about how he managed to get out of the draft and everybody was laughing at his stories And my brother just said "I'm just curious" and the guy looked at him and said "What are you curious about?" He said "Well somebody had to take your place Do you think he survived?" If we had a true citizen-soldiery that we keep talking about it would have been - it would be based on a fair and equitable draft Now on the other side of it one of the things that people like Ford and Sullivan who had a tremendous influence on it and for whom I have a great respect - he and there's a guy by the name of Vuono and General Meyer- these guys were Chiefs of Staff of the Army When they were put into this situation of creating an all-volunteer army they built a model which depended upon the National Guard Now what you haven't asked is and you wouldn't know to I got called back twice SY Did you really? AM Oh yeah to work with the National Guard And I have to tell you that was a joke and an experience I mean to the point where it was almost insulting how bad they were But I was also in a meeting where - with a battalion of the Louisiana National Guard with the battalion commander - this is 1971 the war is still going on - and I'm quote an "advisory" with several other former officers from Vietnam And this battalion commander announces to the battalion "I know why you're all National Guard You're here to avoid the war in Vietnam." And I think he used the word "illegal" war in Vietnam or "immoral" war And everybody - the guys who'd been in Vietnam we all looked at each other saying what the hell is going on? Now we've gone from that - then I was with the New York National Guard and these guys were a bunch of stockbrokers And you know one guy asked me "Say Lieutenant can I have your Jeep? I need to go in town to call." I'm going wait a second you know We didn't get a chance in Vietnam to say hey listen hold on to the war I got to go make a phone call I got to call my broker I will say the National Guard has done a superb job You know they picked up the slack But yeah I think Norwich has an important role playing that I think unfortunately it may be losing it There's so many of these kids now who are going to Norwich with the idea they're going to make a career of the military I don't think in my class there were that many I think there were oh I think there were probably 12 or 15 guys in my class who wound up staying in the military that spent their whole career in the military. SY Yeah I think that is I think that is different I think there is a new more career (crosstalk inaudible) [020343] - AM We had a lot of colonels in my class both lieutenant colonels and a couple of full colonels I mean let's see Johnny [Otis?] Bill [Bell?] there was one or two others that were full colonels in my class SY So I'm flagging a little bit One last question I think is important because most people don't know about long-term health repercussions of Vietnam Could you talk about that? About the long-term health effects - even though you weren't wounded - the long-term health effects of having survived? AM Well I think that - well I think that yeah I have - I have maybe 40% of my hearing I have arthritis which is directly attributed to Vietnam And I've had two hip replacements I think the other thing that we - we lose sight of the fact you know there's always - in every unit there's always a wise ass no they're dozens of wise asses believe me and they're very smart kids And that's what I always loved about American GIs is they are always very very funny and they're smart They have a language of their own They just - there's a - Hemingway wrote a wonderful book during the Second World War about the language and how the language of the GIs and their humor is just incredible But it's also very black very dark And I remember we had lost a kid and we were waiting to evacuate his remains and this wise ass said something to the effect "Well that cost us another quarter of a million dollars." And I went you know and of course at that point I was you know kind of upset and I said "What do you mean?" And he said "Well look at it this way Lieutenant He's married he had a child and he started going through all the benefits." And he said "By the time we're through"- now this is 1968 "that's going to cost the United States government another quarter of a million dollars." Now fast forward to your 2015 and we look at - now I go to the VA hospitals on a pre- at least a couple of times a year and you walk in and you take a look at these broken up bodies and you realize that every time you send a kid out there and he comes back with a leg missing or an arm missing it's going to cost the United States taxpayers And I hate to put it in those kind of cold-blooded terms but I don't think we even think about those kinds of things By the way I will say that despite all the bad press about the VA I think the VA has done a pretty good job at least here in Maine I also know - I talked to my cardiologist who went to Harvard Medical School and I asked him what he thought of the VA and he said that when he was going to Harvard he used to go over to the VA And he said "You walk down the VA and you would see world-class doctors from Harvard Medical School Boston College Medical School." We're going to be on Friday with some friends of ours whose daughter was a cancer - is now a cancer research specialist All of her training came through the VA So I understand the sort of wonderful political footballs that get tossed out there about the VA and how bad it is or how incompetent it is or what a waste it is But you want to think about our system by comparison to the Russian system Imagine what happened in the Soviet Union when it collapsed in 1990 about the time the millions -I don't mean the hundreds of thousands but the millions of Soviet soldiers that went through the Second World War with what they had to do what do you think they got out of the deal? Or think about the VA system that must be going on in a place like Vietnam? It's not - yeah we have problems but by comparison - SY I think it also depends on who you are when you access the system I interviewed a Norwich alumni who - alum who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and had some head injuries and PTSD And he had a lot of trouble accessing resources because I think the VA is better with broken bones and concrete things than they are with psychological types of injuries He had a hard time getting resources AM Be careful be careful Let me tell you - it's funny you should - let's - that's a good question to ask but before you make that - come to that conclusion think about this Who do you think the hearing people in the world are? SY The best what? AM Hearing SY I don't know AM VA Why? How come? They got more of it Who do you think got the best burn research in the world? SY Right I mean it's a huge organization yeah AM OK in other words I would say the VA is probably doing a better job with PTSD and I don't know than the Defense Department is doing with IEDs The reality is is that and I will - before you leave I'll show you some photographs of what it looks like when an armored personnel carrier hits a 2000-pound bomb SY Actually let's look at those photographs now Maybe we can look at them while we're on tape? AM Here I can put up - put this on you want to leave this one? SY Yeah Let's leave it on because - AM Yeah we'll do this I got it right here SY Yeah Great AM But what I'm saying what I'm saying is that for - what's his name? - our friend Donald Rumsfeld to start talking about well you go to war with the army that you got - now let me see if I can find it That'll make it easier for you to. You know Donald Rumsfeld wants to say we go to war with the army that you got yeah well we had - this is what an armored personnel carrier looks like after it's been hit SY Hmm AM That's a hole in the ground SY Wow where is this? AM This is in the Quế Sơn Valley SY And do you remember the particular hit? AM Thirteen people were on that vehicle SY That's the story you were telling me about the 13 people - AM Thirteen people SY - including the close friend of yours AM Uh no he was killed later on he was killed about oh four or five days later Now there were 13 boys on that But that's my point is that the IED mine problem was there in 1968 and all of a sudden we had to go out and create new vehicles I don't know what they call them now but you know there's a whole new family of vehicles we had to create when we were crea- after going through this kind of nonsense did we think that IEDs and mines were going to go away? SY Yeah I don't know. AM No it's a very effective weapon That happens to be a mine that we dug up That's a small anti-personnel mine Those are Punji sticks SY Yeah we talked about those And what beach is that - do you know? AM Yeah this was taken out west of LZ Baldy and this actually was taken during a what - this became a firefight actually And you can see we just landed infantry And the sand out there was just like it was like flour SY It looks like snow AM It does look like snow And this is the helicopters coming in SY Do you remember that guy? AM Huh? SY Do you remember that guy? AM Yeah that's Sergeant [Pattengill?] That's Sergeant Patty He became a sergeant major terrific guy And that guy became a Catholic priest SY That's the guy who became a priest? AM Yep And that guy became a - went back to college and became a computer programmer He's got a masters degree in information systems and is a software developer has his own software firm And then this is the last day I was in - that's the whole unit lined up SY To say goodbye to you? AM Yep And then we were - this guy became an attorney This fellow right here is a South Vietnamese He actually had been a Vietcong He pulled us out of a minefield and I am awarding him the Bronze Star SY Really? Right here you're awarding him the Bronze Star That's what you're doing right in this picture? AM Yeah And I don't remember that guy And then that's me SY Yeah Same mustache! AM Huh? SY It looked like you with the mustache in the picture AM Yeah SY He has that same mustache AM This is a - SY Let's talk about that painting AM Well the painting - you know the story behind it? It's now in the Vietnam Veterans Museum in Chicago And I had always wanted to do a painting on Vietnam And what I appreciate most about the painting was a couple of things one is I actually went to Chicago and actually saw it hanging in the museum And I have to tell you maybe the biggest trip in the world for any painter is to actually go to a real museum and this is a - this is not a bunch of guys a bunch of old hippies - this is a real museum I mean it's spectacular It was a great facility then it's now even more spectacular So it was a big deal to see it The second thing is that there were two things I wanted to paint I wanted to paint one like this so these guys sort of hanging out You can see there C-ration cans and he's sleeping these two guys are reading a newspaper there's some beer cans one guy is on watch - because 90% 95% of Vietnam was all about boredom And I don't think enough people talk about that It's very very very boring because you're - and then of course the other 5% is stark terror Anyway when I sent this Chicago paint- painting to Chicago I went out to see it I was up on the third floor and one of the curators came up to me She said "Is this your painting?" I said yeah And she said "I want you to know we bring groups in here And the children love this painting This one always gets -" And I said "Really?" I said "How is that? Why is that?" And she said "Because all the other ones are violent and this one isn't." The other painting I wanted to do and I started it and I never finished it is you can see all these rice paddies in these dikes People were - these were all built by hand OK they were all - you've seen pictures of rice paddy docks? And it always - and you can see what happens when you run your tread over the dikes is it - actually it smashes those And I wanted to do a painting of the track going through the rice paddies and the malt spilling out and losing their water and all that stuff And I was going to call the thing "Collateral Damage" because we don't really think about how much damage we created just in the - to their - to the local agrarian environment SY Yeah So why didn't you finish it? Did you get stuck? AM Yeah I mean a lot of times you don't finish paintings I mean sometimes I work - I mean this one if I had to do it again I'd do it again And I - SY Was there - you - so what about this image felt so important to you? Because you usually paint from photographs and this isn't from a photograph AM No This is from memory SY So you remember this moment? Or is it a combination? AM Not particularly I created a moment I created a moment and of course I know the vehicle well enough that I can paint the vehicle in my sleep SY Yeah Are there other moments in Vietnam - images - that you want to put on the canvas? AM Yeah there is one I don't think I've got a photo- I used to have a photograph of it And I - whenever I thought about Vietnam it was - I can't find it - that we were up on a top of a hill and I remember staring down - in fact we were on top of that hill right there And I was staring down when I took the photograph a machine gun And I remember just - I remember the image of staring down that machine gun and it just has always stayed with me SY And what was on the other side? What did you see? AM Hmm? SY What did you see? You're staring through a machine gun? AM Well I was just staring behind a machine gun And I remember taking a photograph of it I'm just looking at an open field but that image just somehow always resonated with me SY Is it the contrast of sort of the beautiful open field and looking down a machine gun? AM Perhaps I mean I - you know it's tough to read what goes through your mind I mean you know it's funny I talked about coming - going to Vietnam - coming to V-coming home Going to Vietnam was interesting too because most of the guys they all like Bill Bonk and people like that they all would go to McChord Air Force base and they would get on a transport and they'd fly you know there would be a bus that would pick them up at I guess they were going to Tân Sơn Nhất? And you know they were all you know so they just. Not me I had to go to Japan see I was coming out of Japan So I went and picked up my orders and I was on Air Vietnam not on military flight I was just on a bigger civilian flight The government paid for it And I remember I get on this airplane and it was all these businessmen and they were all in their blue you know blue bla- you know blue pin-striped grey flannel suits or whatever they wore They all looked like a bunch of commuters going some place and here I am in uniform and I'm going to war SY Right you felt like you were - AM And we're all going to the same place SY You felt like you were in Metro North but instead you were - AM Yeah I mean I felt like I was on a commuter line and then I remember we landed We didn't land at Tân Sơn we landed at Saigon Airport which was whatever the big airport was We didn't land at a military airport We landed at a civilian airport which is like you know landing at Westchester County Airport So I get out and it was funny because all these guys you know scurry to get out and I said "I'm going to be here for a year So I'm just going to take my time." And I remember clearing the hatch and walking across the runway and thinking "Well I haven't been shot yet So far so good." And then there was a reception desk for it just said "incoming military personnel" and so I walked over and I handed the guy my orders And he said "Well we'll take you over to Long Bình" and - which is the replacement center And I said fine So they put me on this bus with a couple of other guys and I noticed that there was wire on all the windows and I realized that's so that they don't throw hand grenades into the bus - these people are serious And of course then I got over to Long Bình and I remember going into the officers' club and sitting next to a guy who had gone to Harvard It turned out he'd gone to Harvard He was going home And I said "Really?" He said "Yeah." And he said "Where you going?" I said "Oh I'm going up north." And he said "Well how do you feel?" And I said "Well I think I can handle most of it but God I hate snakes I really hate snakes." The guy said "Don't worry about it." He says "I've been here a year I haven't seen a snake I've been in the bush most of the year." He said "I have not seen a stinking snake." I'm going to tell you I saw every snake this guy never saw I must have seen dozens of snakes - God I hate them I really hate snakes (laughs) OK really it's almost like - what was that thing? Indiana Jones and all he hated is snakes live sa- (laughs) SY Here are your snakes yeah yeah AM But - and so it was that - my welcome to Vietnam was kind of you know it was really like landing in a commuter flight and it was you know going into war SY How surreal AM So it was kind of interesting SY It was a very surreal moment Whew! AM Anything else? SY I'm losing steam AM All right SY I got a drive ahead of me AM OK SY Do you have any last thoughts? This was wonderful AM No I you know I think - don't mistake what you might perceive as my liberal - being fairly liberal as a criticism of the job I think people did I think the kids who certainly in the military it's very very tough job And I - the experience has been important to me because I know I have a - who knows but I have an idea of how difficult their job is I don't have any idea how difficult the job is today but I sense how difficult the job is and I have nothing more but the utmost respect for them It's a very very tough challenging life By the way one of the best honors that I've gotten is there was a book - I think I've told - maybe I didn't tell you There's a book written about our unit and my name came up a couple of times And about three years ago four years ago the unit had morphed up to a full squadron full battalion and they were going to Iraq And so they called me and asked me if I would come out and speak to their young officers about the pressure of leading as a junior officer And I have to tell you that was a tremendous honor to be asked to - I flew to Alaska and I visited with these guys And then they asked me to stay that Saturday night to speak to the entire group at their regimental mess And I started talking about how important that unit was to me personally and quite frankly how much I wish I was going with them I remember when the first Iraq war broke out and when those kids crossed that burn that - breaking into Kuwait and I'm not a drinker I mean I did when I was younger but I don't drink normally I have a glass of wine at night I guess so I guess I am a drinker now But then I really just did not drink at all And I remember my wife was not home and they were describing them going through that burn and I went over and opened a bottle of wine and drank the whole bottle of wine because I had this sense of understanding - or at least I think I understood what they were going to be going through And I just - it just - I wanted to be numb I didn't want to imagine what these poor kids were going to go through And it's how I feel today I'm so terrified about this whole thing with Iran getting - spinning out of control And not because it makes any sense but for political expedience It's nuts It really is I don't know Any other questions? SY I don't think so I don't think so When you say - when you talk about wanting to go to war with them - I guess I do have another question - is it because you feel like you want to be supporting them through what they're going to struggle through? Is it because you miss the camaraderie? Is it because you miss that sense of purpose? Is it because you feel a sense of duty? What is it exactly? AM Oh I think it's a combination of all of that You know these were the best friends I ever had I mean I - it's funny my father said to me when I gra- when I went to Norwich he said that these would be the best friends you'll ever have And in part he's cor-he was right But it's interesting it took me four years to form a bond that it took me only a year to form with a lot of these kids in Vietnam I'll also say something else about Norwich which I think is important to be said And I don't think having not gone to Norwich you can't understand this and I'm not even sure the civilian students at Norwich can understand it My older brother went to Georgetown and when I moved back to New England he lived in Marblehead And so I would get him out to a hockey game or a Norwich hockey game or what have you And then at one point I took him up to Norwich - and he's a very bright I mean very very smart guy And I remember him you know looking around at Norwich and finally sort of saying he said "You know I've always sort of envied the relationship you had with both the school and with your classmates." He said "So much so that I finally went back to Georgetown for my class reunion and realized how much I hated the place." You - I don't think kids understand how close the relationships are Does that come through still? SY Yes that does come through still Without a doubt that comes through still. AM Yeah and I think you see this by the way at the service academies and that's the only place - you may see it at a small Catholic school like you know where the Jesuits are running it you know like a place like - is it Holy Cross? SY It is Holy Cross AM Is it Holy Cross Jesuit? SY Holy Cross Jesuit yeah AM But if you go to a Jesuit school perhaps you might see it But certainly at Annapolis and Norwich VMI - they have this same - I mean I can remember my brother's best friend in the Marine Corps was a VMI guy When he heard I went to Norwich "How come he's not going to VMI?" "Well you know" my brother said "they're all the same quite frankly." (laughs) So OK? Anything else? SY I think we've covered you know most of the known universe in this interview We talked about a lot AM Are we off now? SY Let me turn - END OF AUDIO FILE