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In this edition, the reader will find ten articles distributed in two thematic sections: Cooperation and asymmetric international integration in matters of security, strategy and commerce and Global culture in international relations.Cooperation and asymmetric international integration in matters of security, strategy and commerce We opened the 2018-I edition of the article entitled "How to strengthen EU-China cooperation based on Belt and Road", by the authors Weidong Wang and Simona Picciau; in which the Belt and Road initiative, presented by the Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013, promotes cooperation and the strengthening of person-to-person connections between Asia, Africa, and Europe. China has already signed cooperation agreements with more than forty States and trained thirty others. This initiative impacted the establishment of relations between China and the European Union, based on win-win cooperation and aimed at fostering mutual respect.Sonia Alda Mejías publishes her article "The challenges of Latin America to project as a regional actor in the field of international security", in which she considers the possibility of Latin America to project itself as a regional actor in the field of global security from a qualitative methodology. Also, reference as necessary the processes of subregional or regional integration and the development of national and international multilateral cooperation in the field of security and defense, and the participation of Latin American countries in international peace missions, from a sovereignty perspective very marked.The article "Notions of safety and control in the Northern Border Plan: an expression of teichopolitics", by the authors Gilberto Aranda and Cristian Ovando, considers the teichopolitics as a current expression of segmented globalization, which not only raises the erection of walls. Chile manifested this policy in the 70s, undermining border areas as preventive mechanisms to a foreign invasion and today, through the Northern Border Plan. This securitization mechanism aims to guarantee the continuity of trade flows and the cultural consequences that it entails, from the constructivist approach.Pablo Garcés Velástegui presents his article "Latin American integration as a wicked problem: the case for a plural approach". In this paper, social planning is not any problem, but a "wicked", not docile, a problem of exact sciences that involves a public policy issue; a problem hard to define, unique, inherently paradoxical, important, subject to many interpretations and, thus, without a correct solution. Latin American integration has these characteristics, and the implications are relevant for academics and decision makers. If regional integration continues to be approached as an easy problem, the results will probably continue to disagree with expectations."The United Kingdom and Argentina: geopolitics of technological constraint and strategic-export controls", by Daniel Blinder, shows how the United Kingdom controls the export of military or dual-use technology to the Argentine Republic through its defense institutions and trade, as well as with others of an international nature. A strategic public policy at a local and global level represented in the logical space/power, relative to the possibility of Argentina acquiring sensitive technologies.The co-authors Roldán Andrés-Rosales, Luis Alberto Sánchez-Miter and José Nabor Cruz Marcelo, present the article entitled "Insecurity and its impact on tourism in Guerrero: a spatial approach, 1999-2014". This paper gives the reader the possibility to know how Mexican insecurity has affected the economic growth of the State and the region at the tourist level. This is done through a case study in Guerrero because it obeys one of the most insecure areas, classified worldwide, which is an index of violence that shows the concentration of the danger through the analysis of the figures of the Institute. National Statistics and Geography."Asymmetric regionalism as the axis of the South American resistance to Brazil (2000-2013)", by Rita Giacalone, assumes that regionalism in itself creates asymmetric tensions. Brazilian regionalism has realistic, constructivist and institutionalist features, which emphasize such asymmetries following the region-centric paradigm. The organizations built to support the regional and global projection of Brazil generated resistance in South American governments between 2000 and 2013. This article analyzes the opposition of Chile, Argentina, and Venezuela, through a decentralized multipolarity.Global culture in international relationsWe open this thematic section with the article by Juliano Oliveira Pizarro titled "Governance of sport: an inflection of global governance?" In this, it is considered that the global is a birthplace of diverse actors that exercise specific governments, as represented by football. A sport made a social and cultural mechanism that suffers direct impacts from the globalizing processes. FIFA is a non-profit, non-governmental organization, although it may not seem so, because its activities express hybrid and contradictory conditions, either from the perspective of global governance or as a multinational company.Luis González Tule, in his article "Organization of global space in 'classic' geopolitics: a view from critical geopolitics", starts at the roots of the geopolitics and its development, in between of European imperial rivalries, global wars, border mutations, political changes, significant technological developments and transformation in the dynamics of power (1870 and 1945). The classic indoctrinators coming from the main powers established the geopolitical discourses to their accommodation.Thus, this edition closes with the article "The emergence and increase of Anti-Semitism in the Governments of Hugo Chávez and its relationship with the deepening of the relations between Venezuela and Iran (2005-2013)", by Margarita Figueroa Sepúlveda, which establishes the growth of media and Chavez anti-Semitic incidents in 2004, as well as their direct proportional relationship with the rapprochement and creation of new ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The ideological convergence —based on anti-imperialism— is analyzed through the empirical evidence provided by primary and secondary sources. The author considers that anti-imperialism made Israel be conceived as an enemy of both countries.Thanking the confidence of the institutional authorities again to edit the Journal of International Relations, Strategy and Security, I invite you to know, use and disseminate the content of this edition. ; En esta edición el lector encontrará diez artículos distribuidos en dos secciones temáticas: Cooperación e integración internacional asimétrica en asuntos de seguridad, estrategia y comercio y Cultura global en relaciones internacionales.Cooperación e integración internacional asimétrica en asuntos de seguridad, estrategia y comercio Abrimos la edición 2018-I con el artículo denominado "Cómo fortalecer la cooperación EE. UU. - China basada en el cinturón y la carretera", de los autores Weidong Wang y Simona Picciau, en el cual la iniciativa belt and road, presentada por el presidente chino Xi Jinping en 2013, promueve la cooperación y el reforzamiento de las conexiones persona-a-persona entre Asia, África y Europa. China ya ha firmado acuerdos de cooperación con más de cuarenta Estados y capacitó a otros treinta. Esto impactó el establecimiento de relaciones entre China y la Unión Europea, basadas en la cooperación win-win y direccionadas al favorecimiento del respeto mutuo.Sonia Alda Mejías publica su artículo "Los desafíos de América Latina para proyectarse como actor regional en el ámbito de la seguridad internacional", en el que contempla la posibilidad de América Latina de proyectarse como actor regional en el ámbito de la seguridad internacional desde una metodología cualitativa. Asimismo, referencia como necesarios los procesos de integración subregional o regional y el desarrollo de la cooperación multilateral intra e internacional en el ámbito de la seguridad y la defensa, y la participación de los países latinoamericanos en las misiones internacionales de paz, desde una perspectiva soberanista muy marcada.El artículo "Las nociones de seguridad y control en el plan frontera norte: una expresión de teichopolítica", de los autores Gilberto Aranda y Cristian Ovando, considera la teichopolítica como una expresión actual de la globalización segmentada, la cual no solo plantea la erección de muros. Chile manifestó dicha política en los años 70, minando zonas fronterizas como mecanismos preventivos a una invasión extranjera y hoy, a través del plan Frontera Norte. Este mecanismo securitario pretende garantizar la continuidad de los flujos comerciales y las consecuencias culturales que conlleva, desde el enfoque constructivista.Pablo Garcés Velástegui presenta su artículo "Integración latinoamericana como un problema perverso: el caso para un abordaje plural". En este la planificación social no es un problema cualquiera, sino uno "perverso", nada dócil, un problema de ciencias exactas que conlleva un tema de política pública; un problema difícil de definir, único, inherentemente paradójico, importante, sujeto a muchas interpretaciones y, así, sin una solución correcta. La integración latinoamericana tiene estas características y las implicaciones son relevantes para académicos y tomadores de decisión. Si la integración regional continúa siendo abordada como un problema dócil, los resultados probablemente seguirán discordando con las expectativas."El Reino Unido y Argentina: geopolítica de la limitación tecnológica y controles de exportación estratégicos", de Daniel Blinder, muestra cómo el Reino Unido controla la exportación de tecnología militar o de uso dual a la República Argentina a través de sus instituciones de defensa y comercio, así como con otras de índole internacional. Una política pública estratégica a nivel local y global representada en la lógica espacio/poder, relativa a la posibilidad de que la Argentina adquiera tecnologías sensibles.Los coautores Roldán Andrés-Rosales, Luis Alberto Sánchez-Mitre y José Nabor Cruz Marcelo presentan el artículo titulado "La inseguridad y su impacto en el turismo en Guerrero: un enfoque espacial, 1999-2014", que le brinda al lector la posibilidad de conocer cómo la inseguridad mexicana ha afectado el crecimiento económico del Estado y la región a nivel turístico. Esto lo hacen a través de un estudio de caso en Guerrero, pues obedece a una de las zonas más inseguras, clasificada a nivel mundial, lo que constituye un índice de violencia que muestra la concentración del peligro a través del análisis de las cifras del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía."El regionalismo asimétrico como eje de la resistencia sudamericana a Brasil (2000-2013)", de Rita Giacalone, supone que el regionalismo en sí mismo crea tensiones asimétricas. El regionalismo brasileño posee rasgos realistas, constructivistas e institucionalistas, que enfatizan tales asimetrías siguiendo el paradigma región-céntrico. Las organizaciones construidas para apoyar la proyección regional y global de Brasil generaron resistencia en Gobiernos sudamericanos entre 2000 y 2013. Este artículo analiza la resistencia de Chile, Argentina y Venezuela, mediante una multipolaridad descentralizada.Cultura global en relaciones internacionalesAbrimos esta sección temática con el artículo de Juliano Oliveira Pizarro titulado "Gobernanza del deporte: ¿una inflexión de la gobernanza global?". En este se considera que lo global es un espacio de nacimiento de diversos actores que ejercen gobiernos específicos, como lo representa el fútbol. Un deporte hecho mecanismo social y cultural que sufre impactos directos desde los procesos globalizadores. La FIFA es una organización no gubernamental sin fines lucrativos, aunque no lo parezca, pues sus actividades expresan condiciones híbridas y contradictorias, bien sea desde la óptica de la gobernanza global, o bien como una empresa multinacional.Por su parte, Luis González Tule, en su artículo "Organización del espacio global en la geopolítica "clásica": una mirada desde la geopolítica crítica", inicia en las raíces de la geopolíca y su desarrollo, en medio de rivalidades imperiales europeas, guerras mundiales, mutaciones fronterizas, cambios políticos, grandes desarrollos tecnológicos y transformación en las dinámicas de poder (1870 y 1945). Los doctrinantes clásicos provenientes de las principales potencias establecieron los discursos geopolíticos a su acomodo.Así, pues, la presente edición se cierra con el artículo "La emergencia y aumento del antisemitismo en los Gobiernos de Hugo Chávez y su relación con la profundización de las relaciones entre Venezuela e Irán (2005-2013)", de Margarita Figueroa Sepúlveda, que establece el crecimiento de los incidentes antisemitas mediáticos y chavistas en 2004, así como su relación directamente proporcional con el acercamiento y creación de nuevos lazos con la República Islámica de Irán. Se analiza la convergencia ideológica –sustentada en el antiimperialismo–, a través de la evidencia empírica proporcionada por fuentes primarias y secundarias La autora considera que el antiimperialismo hizo que Israel fuera concebido como enemigo de ambos países.Agradeciendo nuevamente la confianza de las autoridades institucionales para editar la Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad, los invito a conocer, usar y divulgar el contenido de la presente edición. ; Nesta edição o leitor encontrará dez artigos distribuídos em duas seções temáticas: Cooperação é integração internacional assimétrica em assuntos de seguran- ça, estratégia, comércio e Cultura global em relações internacionais.Cooperação e integração internacional assimétrica em assuntos de segurança, estratégia e comércioAbrimos a edição 2018-I com o artigo denominado "Como fortalecer a coopera- ção EE. UU - China baseada no cinturão e a estrada", dos autores Weidong Wang e Simona Picciau, no qual a iniciativa belt and road apresentada pelo presidente chino, Xi Jinping em 2013, promove a cooperação e o fortalecimento das conexões pessoa-a-pessoa entre a Ásia, África e a Europa. China já assinou acordos de cooperação com mais de quarenta Estados e treinou a outros trinta. Isto impactou o estabelecimento das relações entre a China e a União Europeia, baseadas na cooperação win-win e direcionadas ao favorecimento do respeito mútuoSonia Alda Mejías publica no seu artigo "Os desafios da América Latina para projetar-se como ator regional no âmbito da segurança internacional", no qual contempla a possibilidade da América Latina de projetar-se como ator regional no âmbito da segurança internacional desde uma metodologia qualitativa. Assim mesmo, referência como necessários, os processos de integração sub-regional ou regional e o desenvolvimento da cooperação multilateral "intra" e internacional no âmbito da segurança e a defesa, e a participação dos países latino-americanos nas missões internacionais de paz, desde uma perspectiva "soberanista" muito marcada.O artigo "As noções de segurança e controle no plano fronteira norte: uma expressão de "teichopolítica", dos autores Gilberto Aranda e Cristian Ovando, considera a "teichopolítica" como uma expressão atual da globalização segmentada, na qual não fala somente na construção de muros. Chile manifestou tal política nos anos 70, minando zonas de fronteiras como mecanismos preventivos a uma invasão estrangeira, através do plano Fronteira Norte. Este mecanismo de segurança pretende garantir a continuidade dos fluxos comerciais e as consequências culturais que leva, desde o foco construtivista. Pablo Garcés Velástegui apresenta seu artigo "Integração latino-americana como um problema perverso: o caso para uma abordagem plural". Neste a planificação social não é um problema qualquer, si não um problema "perverso", nada suave, um problema de ciências exatas que encaminha a um tema de política pública; um problema difícil de definir, único, inerentemente paradóxico, importante, sujeito a muitas interpretações e assim sem uma solução correta. A integração latino-americana tem estas características e as implicações são relevantes para acadêmicos e tomadores de decisão. Sem a integração regional continua sendo abordada como um problema suave, os resultados provavelmente continuarão discordando com as expectativas."O Reino Unido e Argentina: geopolítica da limitação tecnológica e controles de exportação estratégicas", de Daniel Blinder, mostra como o Reino Unido controla a exportação tecnologia militar ou de uso dual para a República Argentina através de suas instituições de defesa e comércio, assim também como com outras de caráter internacional. Uma política pública estratégica a nível local e global representada na lógica espaço/poder, relativa a possibilidade de que Argentina adquira tecnologias sensíveis.Os co-autores Roldán Andrés-Rosales, Luis Alberto Sánchez-Mitre e José Nabor Cruz Marcelo apresentam o artigo titulado "A insegurança e o seu impacto no turismo em Guerrero: um enfoque espacial, 1999-2014", que lhe oferece ao leitor a possibilidade de conhecer como a insegurança mexicana tem afetado o crescimento econômico do Estado e da região a nível turístico. Isto o faz através de um estudo de caso em Guerrero, pois abrange a uma das zonas mais inseguras, classificada a nível mundial, o que constitui um índice de violência que mostra a concentração do perigo através das análises das cifras do Instituto Nacional de Estatística e Geografia."O regionalismo assimétrico como eixo da resistência sul-americana ao Brasil (2000-2013)", de Rita Giacalone, supõem que o regionalismo em si mesmo cria tensões assimétricas. O regionalismo brasileiro possui rasgos realistas, construtivistas e institucionalistas, que enfatizam tais assimetrias seguindo o paradigma "região-centrico". As organizações construídas para apoiar a projeção regional e global do Brasil geram resistência nos Governos sul-americanos entre 2000 e 2013. Este artigo analisa a resistência do Chile, Argentina e Venezuela, mediante uma multipolaridade descentralizada.Cultura global em relações internacionaisAbrimos esta seção temática com o artigo de Juliano Oliveira Pizarro titulado "Governança do deporte: uma inflexão da governança global?". Neste se considera que o global é um espaço de nascimento de diversos atores que exercem governos específicos, como representa o futebol. Um esporte feito para mecanismo social e cultural que sofre impactos diretos desde os processos globalizadores. A FIFA é uma organização não governamental sem fins lucrativos, ainda que não pareça, pois, as suas atividades expressam condições híbridas e contraditórias, seja ela, desde a ótica da governança global ou bem como uma empresa multinacional.Luis González Tule, por sua parte, no seu artigo "Organização do espaço global na geopolítica "clássica": um olhar desde a geopolítica crítica", inicia nas raízes da geopolítica e seu desenvolvimento, em meio das rivalidades imperiais europeias, guerras mundiais, mutações de fronteiras, mudanças políticos, grandes desenvolvimentos tecnológicos e transformações nas dinâmicas do poder (1870 e 1945). Os doutrinantes clássicos provenientes das principais potencias estabeleceram os discursos geopolíticos de acordo a sua conveniênciaAssim, a presente edição se fecha com o artigo "A emergência e aumento do antissemitismo nos Governos de Hugo Chávez e sua relação com a aprofundamento das relações entre Venezuela e o Iram (2005-2013)", de Margarita Figueroa Sepúlveda, que estabelece o crescimento dos incidentes antissemitas mediáticos e chavistas em 2004, assim como a sua relação diretamente proporcional com a aproximação e criação de novos laços com a República Islâmica do Iram. Se analisa a convergência ideológica –sustentada no anti-imperialismo–, através da evidencia empírica proporcionada por fontes primárias e secundarias. A autora considera que o anti-imperialismo fez que Israel fosse concebido como inimigo de ambos países.Agradecendo novamente a confiança das autoridades institucionais para editar a Revista de Relações Internacionais, Estratégia e Segurança, os convido a conhecer, usar e divulgar o conteúdo da presente edição.

The training of teachers for Secondary Education / High School (ES / EM) of Geography and Social Sciences in Brazil and Spain has its own characteristics in its host countries. In this research, we sought to understand the process of teacher training for this level of education in these countries. The methodological procedures covered the analysis of their legislation, examination of documents, with emphasis on the works of Master's Degree (TFM) and follow-up of teacher training classes in the Master of Training of Professor of Geography and History of the University of Valencia (UV) . In addition to these procedures, instruments / polls were applied to the students of the Master of the UV to understand their motivations for the teaching of Geography and Social Sciences. The results point to a convergence of formative processes, although in Spain Secondary and Secondary Education teachers, who correspond to the High School in Brazil, have to take a Master's degree to practice teaching at that level of education. It is considered that the training at the masters level that has been followed is of a high level and allows the students in training to reach the contents and teaching skills for the teaching of Secondary Education and Baccalaureate in Spain for the proposed disciplines. However, in Brazil, teacher training is developed in undergraduate courses, in the specific degrees, in this research did not analyze any teacher training school for basic education, only the legislation and structuring regulations of undergraduate courses. It is concluded that the training of ES / MS teachers in Geography and Social Sciences in Brazil and Spain are distinct, mainly, in the following aspects: a) In Brazil ES / MS teacher training occurs in Faculties of Teaching, in graduation level; b) In Spain, teacher training for ES / MS occurs, as well as throughout the European Higher Education Area, in Master's courses, at postgraduate masters level; c) Brazilian teachers with a degree in Geography are also qualified to teach classes in Elementary School II; and, d) The teachers who are graduates of the Master do not have the competence to teach in Primary Education, this is reserved for the graduates of the Primary Education Teacher Training Course. ; La formación de profesores para la Educación Secundaria / Enseñanza Media (ES / EM) de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales en Brasil y en España tiene características propias en sus países sede. En esta investigación se buscó entender el proceso de formación del profesorado para este nivel de enseñanza en esos países. Los procedimientos metodológicos pasaron por el análisis de sus legislaciones, examen de documentos, con relieve a los Trabajos de Fin de Máster (TFM) y acompañamiento de clases de formación del profesorado en el Máster de Formación de Profesorado de Geografía e Historia de la Universidad de Valencia (UV). Además de estos procedimientos, se aplicaron instrumentos / encuestas a los alumnos del Máster de la UV para entender sus motivaciones para el magisterio de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales. Los resultados apuntan a una convergencia de procesos formativos, aunque en España los profesores de Educación Secundaria y Bachillerato, que corresponden a la Enseñanza Media en Brasil, tienen que cursar un Máster para ejercer el magisterio en ese nivel de enseñanza. Se considera que la formación a nivel de maestría que se acompañó es de alto nivel y permite a los alumnos en formación alcanzar las competencias de contenidos y didácticas para el magisterio de la Educación Secundaria y Bachillerato en España para las disciplinas propuestas. Sin embargo, en Brasil, las formaciones del profesorado se desarrollan en cursos de graduación, en las licenciaturas específicas, en esa investigación no se analizó ninguna escuela formadora de profesores para la educación básica, sólo la legislación y normativos estructurantes de los cursos de licenciatura. Se concluye que la formación de profesores de ES / EM de Geografía y Ciencias Sociales en Brasil y España son distintas, sobre todo, en los siguientes aspectos: a) En Brasil la formación de profesores de ES / EM ocurre en las Facultades de Magisterio, en nivel de graduación; b) En España la formación de profesores para la ES / EM ocurre, así como en todo el Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior, en cursos de Máster, a nivel de postgrado de maestría; c) Los profesores brasileños con Licenciatura en Geografía también están habilitados para impartir clases en la Enseñanza Fundamental II; y d) Los profesores egresados del Máster no tienen competencia para enseñar en la Educación Primaria, esto está reservado a los egresados del Curso de Formación de Profesores de la Educación Primaria. ; A formação de professores para a Educação Secundária/Ensino Médio (ES/EM) de Geografia e Ciências Sociais no Brasil e na Espanha tem características próprias em seus países sede. Nesta pesquisa se procurou entender o processo de formação do professorado para este nível de ensino nesses países. Os procedimentos metodológicos perpassaram pela análise de suas legislações, exame de documentos, com relevo aos Trabalhos de Fim de Máster (TFM) e acompanhamento de classes de formação do professorado no Máster de Formação de Professorado de Geografia e História da Universidade de Valencia (UV). Além destes procedimentos, aplicou-se instrumentos/enquetes aos discentes do Máster da UV para entender suas motivações para o magistério de Geografia e Ciências Sociais. Os resultados apontam para uma convergência de processos formativos, embora na Espanha os professores de Educação Secundária e Bachillerato, que correspondem ao Ensino Médio no Brasil, tenham que cursar um Máster para exercer o magistério naquele nível de ensino. Considera-se que a formação a nível de mestrado que se acompanhou é de alto nível e permite aos alunos em formação alcançar as competências de conteúdos e didáticas para o magistério da Educação Secundária e Bachillerato em Espanha para as disciplinas propostas. Sem embargo, no Brasil, as formações do professorado são desenvolvidas em cursos de graduação, nas licenciaturas específicas. Nessa pesquisa não se analisou nenhuma escola formadora de professores para a educação básica, apenas a legislação e normativos estruturantes dos cursos de licenciatura. Conclui-se que a formação de professores de ES/EM de Geografia e Ciências Sociais no Brasil e na Espanha são distintas, sobretudo, nos seguintes aspectos: a) No Brasil a formação de professores de ES/EM ocorre nas Faculdades de Magistério, em nível de graduação; b) Na Espanha a formação de professores para a ES/EM ocorre, assim como em todo o Espaço Europeu de Ensino Superior, em cursos de Máster, em nível de pós-graduação mestrado; c) Os professores brasileiros com Licenciatura em Geografia também são habilitados a ministrar aulas no Ensino Fundamental II; e, d) O professores egressos do Máster não tem competência para lecionar na Educação Primária, pois isto está reservado aos egressos do Curso de Formação de Professores da Educação Primária.

Mestrado de dupla diplomação com a Université Moulay Taher ; This study was intended to evaluate the quality parameters of ten honey samples, from various regions in semi-arid region of Algeria. Different parameters such as the melissopalynological and the physicochemical properties of the honeys (moisture, color, electrical conductivity, 5-hydroxymethylfurfural, pH, acidity, proline, and diastase activity) were determined, as well as the evaluation of sugars, minerals and phenolic compounds. Nutritional composition, antioxidant activity (reducing power and DPPH free radical scavenging activity), anti-inflammatory and cytotoxicity were also evaluated. Finally, antibiotics residues such as sulphonamides and tetracyclines antibiotics residues were screened. The melissopalynological results identified ten types of pollen, with Cytisus striatus pollen being identified as the most abundant, present in all samples with percentages between 26.0 % and 83.8 %. EC1, MF1 and MF2 (Sidi Belabes region) were classified as monofloral of Cytisus striatus honey. Additionally, although samples J1 to J3 were not considered as Jujube monofloral, they showed a high percentage of Ziziphus pollen. The remaining samples (EC2, EF1, EF2, and EF3) were classified as multifloral. Regarding the physicochemical parameters, no significant differences were found in the color of the samples which ranged between amber, light amber and extra light amber. Moisture content was found to be between 13.6% (EF1) and 18.3% (EC1), while pH values ranged between 4.2 and 5.1. Electrical conductivity values varied between 270 and 410 μS.cm-1, while 5- hydroxymethylfurfural content showed values between 0 and 36.5 mg.kg-1 and diastase values between 8.8 DN and 13.3 DN. Concerning the proline content, the samples showed proline levels between 2.2–4.7 mg/kg, indicating a good maturity of the honeys and absence of adulteration. All the honeys meet the standard required by the European legislation with exception of the diastase index. The sugar profile, analyzed by high pressure liquid chromatography with refractive index detection (HPLC-RI), showed that all samples have higher fructose content than glucose, being the total more than 88.70 %, allowing the classification of all the samples as nectar honeys. Within the minerals, potassium was quantitatively the most important mineral (72.93% of total minerals quantified), having an average content 730.59mg/kg, followed by sodium, calcium and magnesium, with 17.05%, 4.43% and 4.22%, respectively, while cadmium and lead had the lowest concentration, 0.003 % and 0.04% respectively. The total phenolic content of the analyzed honey samples ranged between 0.7 mg GAE/g, for samples EF and J and 1.4 mg GAE/g, for samples EC, with an average of 0.9 mg GAE/g. The total flavonoid content varied from 0.03 to 0.09 mg QE/g with the highest levels observed in J honey samples. The values obtained for DPPH ranged from 0.02 to 0.04 mg/mL, without significant differences between the samples. The analysis of the phenolic profile was performed by UPLC/DAD/ESI-MSn, where nineteen phenolic compounds were identified, including six phenolic acids, nine flavonoids, two isoprenoids (abscisic acid isomers), one phenolic diterpenoid (carnosol) and one spermidine (N1, N5, N10-tri-p-coumaroyespermidine). The major quantity of phenolic compounds was found in sample EC1 with 202 mg/100 g, while sample EF3 showed the lowest amount with 59.85 mg/100 g. Concerning the anti-tumoral evaluation, all the studied extracts presented good activity, with MF1 showing the highest cytotoxicity, followed by EF1. Also, all the extracts under study showed anti-inflammatory capacity, with IC50 values between 8 and 400 μg/mL. Regarding the antibiotics residues, its presence was found in three of the samples (MF1 EF1 EF3) showed positive results for sulphonamides residues. ; Este estudo teve por objetivo avaliar os parâmetros de qualidade de dez amostras de mel, de várias regiões da região semiárida da Argélia. Neste âmbito foram determinadas as características melissopalinológicas e os parâmetros físico-químicos dos méis (humidade, cor, condutividade elétrica, 5-hidroximetilfurfural, pH, acidez, prolina e diástase), bem como efetuada a avaliação do perfil de açúcares, minerais e compostos fenólicos. A presença de resíduos de antibióticos como sulfonamidas e tetraciclinas foi também verificada. Paralelamente foi estudada a composição nutricional dos méis e a sua bioatividade através da atividade antioxidante (DPPH e poder redutor), anti-inflamatória e citotoxicidade. Os resultados melissopalinológicos identificaram dez tipos de pólen, sendo o pólen de Cytisus striatus o mais frequente, estando presente em todas as amostras com percentagens entre 26,0% e 83,8%. As amostras EC1, MF1 e MF2 (região de Sidi Belabes) foram classificados como méis monoflorais de Cytisus striatus. Já as amostras J1, J2 e J3, não tenham sido consideradas monoflorais de Jujube, apresentaram uma alta percentagem de pólen de Ziziphus. As restantes amostras (EC2, EF1, EF2 e EF3) foram classificadas como méis multiflorais. Em relação aos parâmetros físico-químicos, não foram encontradas diferenças significativas na cor das amostras que variaram entre âmbar, âmbar claro e âmbar extra claro. Os resultados do teor de humidade encontrados ficaram entre 13,6% (EF1) e 18,3% (EC1), enquanto os valores do pH variaram entre 4,2 e 5,1. Os valores da condutividade elétrica variaram entre 270 e 410 μS.cm-1, enquanto o conteúdo de 5-hidroximetilfurfural apresentou valores entre 0 e 36,5 mg.kg-1 e a diástase variou entre 8,8 DN e 13,3 DN. Quanto ao conteúdo de prolina, as amostras apresentaram níveis de prolina entre 2,2–4,7 mg/kg, indicando boa maturidade dos méis e ausência de adulteração. Todos os méis presentaram valores dentro do requerido pela legislação europeia, com exceção do índice de diástase. O perfil de açúcares, analisado por cromatografia líquida de alta pressão com deteção de índice de refração (HPLC-RI), confirmou um maior teor de frutose do que glucose, sendo o total superior a 88,7%, permitindo a classificação de todas as amostras como méis de néctar. O potássio foi o mineral encontrado em maior quantidade (72,93% dos minerais totais quantificados), tendo um teor médio de 730,59mg/kg, seguido do sódio, cálcio e magnésio com17,05%, 4,43% e 4,22% respetivamente), enquanto o cádmio e o chumbo apresentaram a concentração mais baixa, 0,003% e 0,04%, respetivamente. O conteúdo fenólico total das amostras variou entre 0,7 mg GAE/g, para as amostras EF e J e 1,4 mg GAE/g, para as amostras CE, apresentando uma média de 0,9 mg GAE/g. O teor de flavonóides totais variou entre 0,03 e 0,09 mg QE/g, sendo as amostras J as que apresentaram um valor mais elevado. Os valores obtidos para o DPPH variaram entre 0,02 e 0,04 mg/mL, sem diferenças significativas entre as amostras. A análise do perfil dos compostos fenólicos foi realizada por UPLC/DAD/ESI-MSn, onde foram identificados dezanove compostos fenólicos, incluindo seis ácidos fenólicos, nove flavonóides, dois isoprenóides (isómeros do ácido abscísico), um diterpenóide fenólico (carnosol) e uma espermidina (N1, N5, N10-tri-p-coumaroyespermidina). A amostra EC1 apresentou a maior quantidade de compostos fenólicos com 202 mg/100g, enquanto a amostra EF3 apresentou a menor quantidade com 59,85 mg/100 g. Quanto à avaliação anti-tumoral, todos os extratos estudados apresentaram atividade, sendo o MF1 o que apresentou maior citotoxicidade, seguido do EF1. Além disso, os extratos apresentaram capacidade anti-inflamatória, com valores de IC50 entre 8 e 400 μg/mL. Em relação aos resíduos de antibióticos verificou-se a presença de três das amostras (MF1, EF1, EF3) com resultados positivos para resíduos de sulfonamidas.

Waste generation, in general, increases with technological development, consequently the interest in environmental protection and health risks have grown in recent years. Therefore, it is necessary to develop strategies that has a beneficial impact on waste reuse and management trying to achieve sustainable development in which the resources used and the waste generated are minimised, as well as trying to achieve a circular economy, incorporating waste and co-products to new materials. This approach has already been included in the European Union waste strategies, prioritizing the prevention in waste generation, as well as the recycling and valorisation of wastes as alternative to their landfilling disposal. The main objective of this Doctoral Thesis was born out of the need to develop new efficient applications with commercial interest as construction materials (ceramics, cement and bricks), depending on the percentage of three types of inorganic residues: (1) Ilmenite mud generated in the production of TiO2 pigment, (2) phosphogypsum from the H3PO4 industry, and (3) construction and demolition waste (CDW). A number of instrumental techniques were deployed to characterise both the wastes used and the new materials designed, such as, X-ray diffraction (XRD), X-ray fluorescence (XRF), inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS), inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectrometry (ICP-OES), thermo-gravimetric analysis and differential scanning calorimetry (TGA/DSC) and scanning electron microscopy (SEM). In addition, the technological properties, such as resistance, water absorption, etc., have been compared in relation to traditional commercial materials and evaluated according to the established technical standards. Since, some of the wastes are considered NORM (Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material), the materials obtained were evaluated by alpha and gamma spectrometry, and the environmental implications (leaching and radiological studies) were evaluated. The most prominent findings of the present research can be divided under three main headings: Ilmenite mud Once the physical, chemical, granulometric, micro-structural and radiological properties of this waste were known, the design of new sulphur polymer cements and ceramic bodies adding different percentages were carried out. The results shown that ilmenite mud could be successfully immobilised and valorised as an additive. Theirs technological properties are in agreement with the requirements established in each regulations and, in some cases, the results were even better than those obtained by the reference materials. Finally, it can be concluded that that both materials can be used with negligible environmental impact or health risk. Phosphogypsum This waste has been valorised as an additive in ceramic manufacturing, complying with the international regulations for both technological properties and environmental requirements. Moreover, the addition up to 5 wt.% of phosphogypsum improves the technological properties in relation to the reference material. In addition, this waste has been studied as a calcium source for CO2 mineral sequestration and calcite production with high efficiencies (96 %). The study of the fluxes of metals and radionuclides showed that most of the phosphogypsum pollutants are transferred to calcite (> 95%). Construction and demolition waste (CDW) This waste has been recycled as substitute of natural aggregates to produce bricks. The results shown that low cost bricks with excellent technological properties can be obtained using CDW as an aggregate and lime or cement, as binders. ; La generación de residuos, en general, aumenta según incrementa el grado de desarrollo tecnológico de una sociedad, por lo que el interés por la protección del medio ambiente y los riesgos para la salud han florecido en los últimos años. Por tanto, desarrollar estrategias que mejoren la gestión de los residuos tratando de alcanzar un desarrollo sostenible en el que se minimicen los recursos utilizados y los residuos generados es muy necesario, así como tratar de alcanzar una economía circular, incorporando los residuos y co-productos a nuevos materiales. Este enfoque ya ha sido incluido en las estrategias de la Unión Europea en materia de residuos, priorizando la prevención en la generación de residuos, así como el reciclaje y la valorización de estos como alternativa a su depósito en vertedero. El objetivo principal de la presente Tesis Doctoral nace de la necesidad de desarrollar nuevas aplicaciones eficientes y de interés comercial en materiales de construcción (cerámicas, cementos y ladrillos), en base a diferentes porcentajes de tres tipos de residuos inorgánicos: (1) lodo de ilmenita generado en la producción de pigmento de TiO2, (2) fosfoyeso procedente de la industria del H3PO4, y (3) residuos de construcción y demolición (RCD). Para el estudio, tanto de la caracterización de los residuos como de los nuevos materiales diseñados, se han empleado diferentes técnicas instrumentales; entre otras, la difracción y la fluorescencia de rayos X (DRX/FRX), espectrometrías de masas o de emisión óptica con fuente de emisión por plasma de acoplamiento inductivo (ICP-MS/OES), análisis termo-gravimétrico y calorimétrico de barrido diferencial (TGA/DSC), y la microscopía electrónica de barrido (MEB). Las propiedades tecnológicas, como la resistencia, la absorción de agua, etc., han sido comparadas en relación a materiales comerciales tradicionales y evaluadas de acuerdo a los estándares técnicos establecidos. Como algunos de los residuos son considerados NORM (Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material = materiales radioactivos de origen natural), los materiales obtenidos fueron evaluados mediante espectrometría alfa y gamma, y también se evaluaron las implicaciones ambientales de su utilización (estudios de lixiviación y radiológicos). Los resultados más relevantes obtenidos de la presente Tesis Doctoral se pueden dividir en tres bloques: Lodo de ilmenita Una vez conocidas las propiedades físicas, químicas, granulométricas, micro-estructurales y radiológicas de este residuo se llevó a cabo el diseño de nuevos cementos poliméricos sulfurosos y cuerpos cerámicos, incorporando diferentes porcentajes. Los datos obtenidos demostraron que el lodo de ilmenita puede inmovilizarse y valorizarse con éxito al incluirlo como aditivo. Sus propiedades tecnológicas cumplieron sobradamente con los requisitos marcados en las diferentes regulaciones y, en algunos casos, fueron incluso mejores a las de los materiales de referencia. Finalmente, indicar que ambos materiales pueden ser usados sin generar problemas ambientales o de salud para las personas. Fosfoyeso Este residuo ha sido incluido como aditivo en cerámicas, las cuales has cumplido con las normativas internacionales vigentes en relación a las propiedades tecnológicas y con los requisitos ambientales establecidos. Incluso la adición de hasta 5 % de fosfoyeso mejora las propiedades tecnológicas en comparación al material de referencia. Este residuo también ha sido estudiado como fuente de calcio para el secuestro mineral del CO2 y obtención de calcita, obteniéndose altas eficiencias (96 %). El estudio de los flujos de metales y radionucleidos demostraron que la mayor parte de los contaminantes del fosfoyeso se transfieren a la calcita (> 95 %). RCD Este residuo ha sido reciclado como sustituto del agregado natural para la producción ladrillos. Los resultados muestran que pueden obtenerse ladrillos de bajo costo con excelentes propiedades físicas usando RCD como agregado, y cal o cemento como aglutinantes.

Doutoramento em Economia ; Climate change mitigation and the imperative of a new sustainable energy paradigm are among the greatest challenges facing the world today, and they are high on the priority list of policy makers as well as within the scientific community. In this context significant efforts are being made in the design and implementation of energy and carbon mitigation policies at both European and national level. Evidence of this can be seen in the recent adoption by the EU of an integrated climate and energy policy that setts ambitious binding targets to be achieved by 2020 – known as the 20-20-20 targets of the EU Climate and Energy Package. Undoubtedly, the cost of these policies can be substantially reduced if a comprehensive impact assessment is made of the most efficient and cost-effective policy measures and technological options. Policy impact assessment therefore plays an important role in supporting the energy and climate decision-making process. This is the context of and motivation for the research presented in this thesis. The first part of the thesis, the conceptual framework, describes the development of the Hybrid Bottom-up General Equilibrium Model (HyBGEM) for Portugal, as a decision-support tool to assist national policy makers in conducting energy and climate policy analysis. HyBGEM is a single integrated, multi-sector, hybrid top-down/bottom-up general equilibrium E3 model formulated as a mixed complementarity problem. The second part of the thesis, the empirical analysis, provides an impact assessment of Portugal's 2020 energy-climate policy targets under the EU Climate and Energy Package commitments, based on the HyBGEM model and the baseline projections previously developed. Five policy scenarios have been modelled and simulated to evaluate the economic, environmental and technological impacts on Portugal of complying with its individual 2020 carbon emissions and renewable energy targets. Furthermore, insights are gained into how these targets interact with each other, what are the most efficient and cost-effective policy options, and how alternative pathways affect the extent of policy-induced effects. The numerical analysis reveals that Portugal's 2020 energy-climate targets can be achieved without significant compliance costs. A major challenge for policy makers is to promote an effective decarbonisation of the electricity generation sector through renewable-based technologies. There is evidence that the compliance costs of Portugal's low carbon target in 2020 are significantly higher than the costs of achieving the national RES-E target, given that imposing carbon emissions constraints and subsidising renewable electricity generation via a feed-in tariffs scheme both have a similar impact on economy-wide emissions. This result suggests that the most cost-effective policy option to achieve the national energy-climate targets is to promote renewable power generation technologies, recommending that policy makers should proceed with the mechanisms that support it. The transition to a 'greener' economy is thus central to the ongoing fight against climate change. There is also evidence that emission market segmentation as imposed by the current EU-ETS creates substantial excess costs compared to uniform emissions pricing through a comprehensive cap-and-trade system. The economic argument on counterproductive overlapping regulation is not corroborated by the findings. Furthermore, there is no potential for a double dividend arising from environmental tax reforms. To conclude, the results highlight the critical importance of market distortions and revenue-recycling schemes, together with baseline projections in policy impact assessment. ; A mitigação das alterações climáticas e o imperativo de um novo paradigma energético sustentável estão entre os maiores desafios que o mundo de hoje enfrenta, surgindo no topo da lista de prioridades quer dos decisores políticos quer da comunidade científica. Neste contexto, têm sido envidados esforços significativos na conceção e aplicação de políticas energéticas e de mitigação de carbono, tanto a nível europeu como nacional. A recente adoção de uma política integrada da UE em matéria de clima e energia, com objetivos ambiciosos a serem alcançados até 2020 – os denominados objetivos 20-20-20 do Pacote Clima-Energia da UE, é prova disso. Não há dúvida de que o custo destas políticas pode ser substancialmente reduzido se for feita uma avaliação global das medidas e das opções tecnológicas mais eficientes e com melhor relação custo-eficácia. A avaliação de impacto das políticas desempenha assim um papel importante no apoio à tomada de decisão em matéria energética e climática. São estes o contexto e a motivação para a investigação apresentada nesta tese. A primeira parte da tese, referente à estrutura conceptual, descreve o desenvolvimento do modelo HyBGEM – Hybrid Bottom-up General Equilibrium Model, concebido para Portugal. Trata-se de uma ferramenta de apoio à decisão em matéria de políticas de energia-clima. O HyBGEM é um modelo E3 de equilíbrio geral, com uma estrutura híbrida top-down/bottom-up integrada, multi-setorial e formulado como um problema de complementaridade mista. A segunda parte da tese, referente à análise empírica, apresenta uma avaliação de impacto das políticas de energia-clima para Portugal no quadro dos compromissos assumidos no Pacote Clima-Energia da UE, com base no modelo HyBGEM e em projeções de base previamente construídas. Foram modelados e simulados cinco cenários de política para avaliar os impactos económicos, ambientais e tecnológicos do cumprimento das metas nacionais traçadas para 2020 em matéria de limitação de emissões de carbono e promoção das energias renováveis. Avalia-se também o modo como estes objetivos interagem entre si, quais são as opções de política mais eficientes e custo-eficazes, e em que medida opções alternativas influenciam a magnitude dos impactos. A análise numérica revela que as metas energia-clima 2020 para Portugal podem ser alcançadas sem incorrer em custos de cumprimento significativos. O desafio fundamental que se coloca aos decisores políticos consiste em impulsionar a descarbonização do setor de produção de energia elétrica através de tecnologias de energia renovável. Existe evidência de que os custos de cumprimento da meta de redução de carbono são significativamente mais elevados que os custos de cumprimento da meta de FER-E, sendo que a imposição de restrições às emissões e a subsidiação da produção de eletricidade a partir de fontes de energia renovável (regime de tarifas feed-in) têm um impacto semelhante sobre o total de emissões. Este resultado sugere que a promoção das tecnologias de base renovável no sistema energético nacional é a opção com melhor relação custo-eficácia para a concretização dos objetivos nacionais energia-clima para 2020, instando os decisores políticos a prosseguir com os mecanismos de apoio existentes. A transição para uma economia mais 'verde' afigura-se assim fundamental no combate em curso contra as alterações climáticas. A análise revela também que a segmentação do mercado de emissões imposta pelo atual CELE gera custos adicionais substanciais quando comparada com um sistema de direitos de emissão uniforme. O argumento económico de que a sobreposição de regulamentação é contraproducente não é corroborado pelos resultados. A expectativa de um duplo dividendo decorrente das reformas fiscais em matéria ambiental não foi confirmada. Os resultados destacam ainda a importância crítica das distorções de mercado, dos sistemas de reciclagem de receitas e das projeções de base, para a avaliação de impacto das políticas.

In accordance with the existing environmental issues and the basic principles of the Circular Economy on waste management, the suitability of five different wastes has been assessed for lightweight aggregate (LWA) production: a granite and marble sludge generated from ornamental rock sawing (COR), a factory sepiolite reject (SEP), household polyethylene-hexene thermoplastics (P), carbon fiber remnants from the production of aviation pieces (FC) and a heavy metal polluted material (MAZ), which was taken from the tailings of an abandoned mine. This Doctoral Thesis is made up of six main lines of research and a secondary one which can be summarized as follows: i) Analysis of the suitability of mixtures rich in granite and marble sludge for the production of LWAs: Although some LWA varieties were sintered from SEP and MAZ as major components, this investigation has been focused mainly on COR as it is a relatively common and widespread residue. Hence, different mixtures were prepared using COR as major component, while FC and P were examined as bloating additives and SEP as a binder, since the plasticity of COR itself was very low to be properly molded into spherical pellets. Once the wastes were milled (FC and P) or disaggregated (COR and SEP) to a very fine particle size, a preliminary study of their physicochemical properties and their thermal behavior was carried out in order to devise the appropriate batches. In accordance with the results obtained, a base mixture was prepared by blending 90 wt% COR and 10 wt% SEP (mixture called COS) to confer plasticity as well as 0, 2.5, 5 and 10 wt% of P or FC to check their suitability as pore-forming elements. The resulting mixtures were kneaded with their optimum water volume, extruded, shaped into pellets by hand, oven-dried and finally fired at 1100, 1125 and 1150 °C for 4, 8 and 16 minutes in a laboratory-scale rotary kiln. The main technological properties of the aggregates related to bloating, density, porosity, loss on ignition, water absorption and mechanical strength were determined. In addition, SEM microscopy was used to study the microstructure of some selected specimens. Of a total of 49 types of aggregate using the granite-marble sludge as major constituent, 42 were lightweight. However, those LWAs coming from COS mixture without any additive or when it was P did not exhibit either bloating or the typical LWA shell-core-macropore structure, but one consisting of micropores and microchannels. The increase in temperature and time of heating involved a greater sintering in these samples, which in turn was translated into higher shrinkage, density and compressive strength values, but less porosity and water absorption. In fact, the addition of plastic did not entail any improvement, but rather the opposite, as the resistance to crushing dropped significantly. From those batches, only the LWA sintered without P at the minimum time (4 min) and minimum temperature of firing (1100 °C) displayed adequate features to assess its water suction capability. The results pointed out that this LWA could be suitable in hydroponics and/or water filtration systems, even better than the commercial LWA called Arlita G3. For its part, the addition of FC did promote bloating and the formation of a highly porous shell-core structure. It was remarkable the presence of unburnt carbon fibers embedded in the mineral matrix, which helped to enhance the mechanical strength. Although all the FC varieties met the regulatory requirements on LWA density, the specimens fired at 1150 °C are noteworthy, as they were particularly lightweight, yielding a particle density of 1.1-1.2 g/cm3, which is far below the maximum standardized limit of 2.0 g/cm3 applicable to LWAs. ii) Analysis of the impact of firing conditions on the mineralogy and texture of the samples: In order to assess the influence of the heating temperature (1100, 1125 or 1150 °C), the dwell time (4, 8 or 16 min) and the additive (FC, P or none) on the mineralogy and the texture, twelve of those aggregates were selected and subjected to a thorough study by means of microscopy and thermal techniques, as well as by X-ray diffraction, analyzing the polycrystalline powder diagrams according to the Rietveld method. Only small proportions of quartz, plagioclase and alkali feldspar withstood the sintering process from the original mineralogy, while glass increased from 36 to 70 % as temperature and dwell time were risen. Some augite (6.5 %) was neo-formed at about 980-1025 °C, far below the sintering temperatures. The addition of P barely affected the mineralogy, while FC promoted the development of glass and a highly porous fiber-microsphere-holding texture in which the phenocrysts observed in other specimens were almost absent. It was remarkable that the glass formation was connected with lower solid-phase density, less water absorption and greater closed porosity in the aggregates. iii) Analysis of the suitability of mixtures rich in sepiolite rejects for LWA production: A less comprehensive study with the sepiolite-rich sample, SEP, and the mining waste, MAZ, as major components was also performed. Regarding the former, some tentative tests showed that when SEP is fired without any gas-pressure-mitigating additive, the pellets burst inside the kiln very quickly. This undesirable effect was prevented by the addition of 2.5 wt% of P. In order to find out if carbon fiber entailed any impact, another mixture was prepared by adding 2.5 wt% P + 2.5 wt% FC into SEP. The resulting pellets were heated at 1225 °C for 4 minutes. White color LWAs of high porosity, low density and significant mechanical strength were obtained. A meaningful volume of glass was evolved in all the aggregates (>50 %), just as less proportions of enstatite, protoenstatite and diopside as neo-formed species. Quartz was the only inherited mineral, appearing in the form of isolated phenocrysts inside an overall porous porphyritic texture. The addition of FC did not mean any remarkable improvement in this case. iv) Manufacturing of lightweight aggregates from a heavy metal polluted mining waste: As MAZ was a sandy material, it was sieved <63 µm to collect the fraction in which the heavy metals adsorbed to phyllosilicates and organic matter are usually concentrated. Just like COR, MAZ plasticity was poor, so it was blended with 10 wt% SEP to gain consistency (MAS mixture). Likewise, two other mixtures were prepared: the first one by adding 2.5 wt% of thermoplastic and the second one containing 2.5 wt% of carbon fiber so as to check the effect of these two additives as bloating agents in MAS. The pellets were fired at 1175 °C for 4 minutes. Dark color LWAs of high porosity, low density and good mechanical strength were obtained. The addition of P and FC enabled the development of a porous core with well distributed pores surrounded by a very thin shell, which contrasted with the thick cortex formed when these components were not used. While the addition of FC did not provide real advantages in the technological properties, P promoted greater bloating and lower density. A high volume of glass was evolved in all the aggregates (= 60 %) and augite was the main neo-formed mineral. v) Study of the immobilization and changes in the fractionation of chemical elements associated with sintering: The impact of LWA sintering on the fractionation and immobilization of thirty-three metallic elements, including a good handful of heavy metals and rare earth elements, has been assessed thoroughly by means of the BCR method. Four fractions were considered: F1 (weakly adsorbed), F2 (Fe–Mn (hydr)oxide-bound), F3 (sulfide- organic matter-bound) and FR (immobile, e.g., aluminosilicate-bound). Seven LWA varieties were selected: one sintered from the mixture COS (90 % granite-marble sludge + 10 % rejected sepiolite), five from COS-2.5FC (COS + 2.5 % of carbon fiber waste) and one from MAS (90 % heavy-metal-rich mine tailing + 10 % sepiolite). Both the unfired mixtures and the SEP sample were also subjected to the BCR protocol in order to evaluate the effect of firing on the mobility of the elements. The major components detected were Fe and Mg, this last one coming mostly from the sepiolite. Besides, MAS presented concentrations of Zn, Pb, Ni and As exceeding the legal limits established in USA (US EPA, 1993; USDA, 2000), as well as the ones ruling in Spain (Real Decreto 1310/90), which are based on the Council Directive 86/278/EEC of the European Union (Council Directive, 1986). The study was mainly focused on the mixture COS-2.5FC and its selected LWAs, which were sintered at different temperatures (1100, 1125 and 1150 °C) and dwell times (4, 8 and 16 min). It has been observed that although most of the elements follow the expected redistribution (a decrease in their concentrations of F1, F2 and F3 in favor of FR), this pattern is not followed in many cases, and in fact, complex trends depending on heating intensity have been observed (e.g., in Fe, Co, Ni, Cu and As). Accordingly, the elements have been grouped into different classes based on the fractionation behavior observed. As a general rule, with some exceptions, LWA sintering has caused the desired effect by increasing the immobilization of the elements to a greater or lesser extent. Only arsenic has exhibited a clear increase of its bioavailability at the expense of a pronounced reduction of FR. An environmental evaluation based on regulatory thresholds and the Risk Assessment Code (RAC) applicable to the BCR test, has indicated that the aggregates manufactured with the granite-marble sludge as main component do not entail any negative environmental concern, while that prepared from the mining-tailing would not be appropriate for agricultural uses in its current state due to its high concentration of As and the high leachability recorded for this metalloid. vi) Application of selected aggregates in the manufacture of lightweight concrete: Since LWAs are usually intended for lightweight concrete production, three of the varieties containing carbon fiber (the most interesting according to their technological characteristics) have been selected for this purpose. Prismatic concrete specimens were prepared in triplicate using these LWAs as coarse fraction. Additional specimens containing a normal-weight aggregate, a commercial lightweight aggregate and no coarse aggregate (mortar) were prepared for comparison. Water/cement ratios of 0.45 and 0.55 were studied. A comprehensive analysis of the properties related to workability, density, porosity, mechanical strength, elastic modulus and thermal transfer was conducted. Interfacial transition zones were examined through SEM-microscopy. Compressive strengths between 35 and 55 MPa and low values of density and thermal conductivity have been obtained with the LWAs developed in this investigation. Furthermore, the concrete samples manufactured from them have displayed the highest ratios relating the mechanical strength over the density and the thermal conductivity, meaning more balanced features than the other specimens, even exceeding the values of the normal-weight concrete. vii) Secondary research line: development of a new methodology to determine more accurately the plasticity of raw materials and their optimum moisture content for extrusion and molding: This Doctoral Thesis has also addressed the development of a new method to measure plasticity. This method has been of great importance in measuring not only the consistency of the samples but also their optimal water content for extrusion and pelletizing. Furthermore, this new approach has enabled us to develop new soil classification systems and a new definition of clay, whose potential application goes beyond even the manufacture of LWAs, covering fields such as ceramics, agriculture or geotechnical engineering. On balance, it has been proven that the wastes embraced in this research are suitable for LWA production, highlighting some varieties (e.g., some of those containing carbon fiber) whose characteristics in terms of strength/density ratio exceed those of commercial LWAs, which is very important in structural lightweight concrete production. Other specimens have shown excellent features for agriculture, while from an environmental standpoint, beyond the profit linked to the recycling process, the use of highly-polluted materials to manufacture LWAs could be promising not only to obtain high-quality materials intended for concrete, agriculture or civil engineering, but particularly to immobilize heavy metals from contaminated sites.

Entrepreneurship education dianggap mempunyai pengaruh terhadap nascent halalpreneurial intention. Penelitian ini menggunakan mahasiswa Muslim di Indonesia yang sedang atau telah menempuh mata kuliah kewirausahaan sebagai obyek penelitian. Selain itu, entrepreneurship education dapat menjadi faktor penting timbulnya commitment to entrepreneurship pada mahasiswa dan menumbuhkan niat berbisnis dikalangan mahasiswa. Hal ini karena entrepreneurship diakui sebagai cara untuk menciptakan lapangan kerja dan mengurangi pengangguran. Menggunakan metode penelitian kuantitatif dan kuesioner yang disebarkan secara online kepada responden mahasiswa Muslim, ditemukan bahwa entrepreneurship education dan commitment to entrepreneurship berkaitan dengan nascent halalpreneurial intention pada mahasiswa Muslim di Surabaya. Kata Kunci: Entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurship education, Commitment to entrepreneurship, Innovativeness, Nascent halalpreneurial intention. ABSTRACT Entrepreneurship education is considered to have an influence on nascent halalpreneurial intention. This study uses Muslim students in Indonesia who are currently taking or have taken entrepreneurship courses as research objects. In addition, entrepreneurship education can be an important factor in generating commitment to entrepreneurship among students and fostering business intentions among students. This is because entrepreneurship is recognized as a way to create jobs and reduce unemployment. Using quantitative research methods and questionnaires distributed online to Muslim student respondents, it was found that entrepreneurship education and commitment to entrepreneurship were related to nascent halalpreneurial intention to Muslim students in Surabaya. Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Entrepreneurship education, Commitment to entrepreneurship, Innovativeness, Nascent halalpreneurial intention. DAFTAR PUSTAKA Adam, A., & Fayolle, A. (2015). 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The study of the history of primary education in Azerbaijan expands the boundaries of pedagogical thinking. The re-introduction of the progressive aspects of the historical and pedagogical heritage of the 20th century into scientific circles plays an important role in the formation of modern educational culture. Historical and pedagogical heritage is a source of renewal of pedagogical knowledge, acquisition of qualitatively new content, as well as its sustainability. It is important to study the history of primary education, as it helps to solve two problems that are closely related to each other. Firstly, what happened when one first examined the historical pedagogical heritage? How did it happen? Why did it happen and what was the result? What was the significance of what happened during that period and further development? Secondly, by referring to the historical pedagogical heritage, it is possible to understand the theory and practice of today's education, the problems of modern pedagogical thinking and worldview. The article examines and compares the role of tradition and innovation in the development of the theory of primary education in Azerbaijan in the 1920s. For this purpose, the article analyzes the educational technologies used in that period, general scientific approaches, curricula and content of textbooks prepared for primary schools, and quality criteria in teacher training. It is argued that this period was politically complex, economically difficult, characterized by a general decline in the common cultural and educational level of the population, but was interesting in terms of the building of a new society and a new state. Reforms in the field of education in Russia were repeated in Azerbaijan. Although experiments in the field of education were aimed at raising the cultural level of society, eliminating illiteracy, establishing new approaches to education, innovations (application of "complex" approach, use of active learning methods, application of project method, etc.), they did not improve the quality of education. The introduction of innovations sometimes led to the denial and oblivion of traditions. The new teaching methods applied in Azerbaijani schools without any expertise, as they were brought from European and American schools, created serious problems in the formation of education because the new technology denied the tradition. The class-lesson system with strict regulations, exhaustive structure and function, and rich traditions were replaced by the laboratory-brigade method. The results of incorrect experiments became a serious obstacle to the development of education. For this reason, in the early 1930s, official government decisions banned experiments that hindered the development of education. ; El estudio de la historia de la educación primaria en Azerbaiyán amplía los límites del pensamiento pedagógico. La reintroducción de los aspectos progresivos del patrimonio histórico y pedagógico del siglo XX en los círculos científicos juega un papel importante en la formación de la cultura educativa moderna. El patrimonio histórico y pedagógico es fuente de renovación del conocimiento pedagógico, adquisición de contenidos cualitativamente nuevos, así como de su sostenibilidad. Es importante estudiar la historia de la educación primaria, ya que ayuda a resolver dos problemas estrechamente relacionados entre sí. En primer lugar, ¿qué sucedió cuando se examinó por primera vez el patrimonio histórico pedagógico? ¿Como paso? ¿Por qué sucedió y cuál fue el resultado? ¿Cuál fue el significado de lo que sucedió durante ese período y el desarrollo posterior? En segundo lugar, al referirse a la herencia histórica pedagógica, es posible comprender la teoría y la práctica de la educación actual, los problemas del pensamiento pedagógico moderno y la cosmovisión. El artículo examina y compara el papel de la tradición y la innovación en el desarrollo de la teoría de la educación primaria en Azerbaiyán en la década de 1920. Para ello, el artículo analiza las tecnologías educativas utilizadas en ese período, los enfoques científicos generales, los planes de estudio y el contenido de los libros de texto elaborados para las escuelas primarias, y los criterios de calidad en la formación docente. Se argumenta que este período fue políticamente complejo, económicamente difícil, caracterizado por un declive general en el nivel cultural y educativo común de la población, pero fue interesante en términos de la construcción de una nueva sociedad y un nuevo estado. Las reformas en el campo de la educación en Rusia se repitieron en Azerbaiyán. Aunque los experimentos en el campo de la educación tenían como objetivo elevar el nivel cultural de la sociedad, eliminar el analfabetismo, establecer nuevos enfoques de la educación, innovaciones (aplicación de un enfoque "complejo", uso de métodos de aprendizaje activos, aplicación del método de proyectos, etc.), no mejoraron la calidad de la educación. La introducción de innovaciones a veces condujo a la negación y al olvido de las tradiciones. Los nuevos métodos de enseñanza aplicados en las escuelas azerbaiyanas sin ningún conocimiento, ya que fueron traídos de escuelas europeas y americanas, crearon serios problemas en la formación de la educación porque la nueva tecnología negaba la tradición. El sistema de lecciones de clase con regulaciones estrictas, estructura y función exhaustivas y ricas tradiciones fue reemplazado por el método de brigada de laboratorio. Los resultados de experimentos incorrectos se convirtieron en un serio obstáculo para el desarrollo de la educación. Por esta razón, a principios de la década de 1930, las decisiones gubernamentales oficiales prohibieron experimentos que obstaculizaran el desarrollo de la educación. ; O estudo da história da educação primária no Azerbaijão expande os limites do pensamento pedagógico. A reintrodução dos aspectos progressivos do patrimônio histórico e pedagógico do século 20 nos círculos científicos desempenha um papel importante na formação da cultura educacional moderna. O patrimônio histórico e pedagógico é uma fonte de renovação do conhecimento pedagógico, de aquisição de conteúdo qualitativamente novo, bem como de sua sustentabilidade. É importante estudar a história da educação primária, pois ela ajuda a resolver dois problemas que estão intimamente relacionados um com o outro. Em primeiro lugar, o que aconteceu quando se examinou pela primeira vez o patrimônio histórico pedagógico? Como isso aconteceu? Por que aconteceu e qual foi o resultado? Qual foi o significado do que aconteceu durante esse período e do desenvolvimento posterior? Em segundo lugar, referindo-se ao patrimônio histórico pedagógico, é possível compreender a teoria e a prática da educação atual, os problemas do pensamento pedagógico moderno e a visão do mundo. O artigo examina e compara o papel da tradição e da inovação no desenvolvimento da teoria da educação primária no Azerbaijão nos anos 20. Para este fim, o artigo analisa as tecnologias educacionais utilizadas naquele período, abordagens científicas gerais, currículos e conteúdo de livros didáticos preparados para escolas primárias, e critérios de qualidade na formação de professores. Argumenta-se que este período foi politicamente complexo, economicamente difícil, caracterizado por um declínio geral no nível cultural e educacional comum da população, mas foi interessante em termos da construção de uma nova sociedade e de um novo estado. Reformas no campo da educação na Rússia foram repetidas no Azerbaijão. Embora as experiências no campo da educação visassem elevar o nível cultural da sociedade, eliminando o analfabetismo, estabelecendo novas abordagens para a educação, inovações (aplicação de abordagem "complexa", uso de métodos de aprendizagem ativa, aplicação de método de projeto, etc.), elas não melhoraram a qualidade da educação. A introdução de inovações às vezes levou à negação e ao esquecimento das tradições. Os novos métodos de ensino aplicados nas escolas azerbaijanesas sem nenhum conhecimento especializado, pois foram trazidos de escolas européias e americanas, criaram sérios problemas na formação da educação porque a nova tecnologia negou a tradição. O sistema de aulas de classe com regulamentos rigorosos, estrutura e função exaustivas e ricas tradições foram substituídos pelo método de brigada de laboratório. Os resultados de experimentos incorretos se tornaram um sério obstáculo ao desenvolvimento da educação. Por esta razão, no início dos anos 30, as decisões oficiais do governo proibiram os experimentos que dificultavam o desenvolvimento da educação.

In the early 1960s Italy was described as a country characterized both by high disaffection and low social participation, not a picture of a healthy democracy particularly if compared with other more economically advanced countries, characterized by a participant civic culture. Since the country was divided between a partisan minority that actively participated in political parties (and related organizations), and those who did not participate at all, the decentralized pluralistic democracy proposed by Tocqueville was still non-existing in Italy. In the last sixty years Italian society has undergone a process of modernization and mass scholarization that significantly changed the socio-political context: the levels of resources in society increased, an intense season of social mobilization led to an expansion and growth of civil society participation and to a gradual separation from subcultural belonging. According to the neo-Tocquevillian thesis of political socialization of associations, the slow, but persistent, upward movement of Italian social participation and civil associations should have then transformed Italian parochial citizens into participant citizens, with higher political efficacy and more likely to participate at higher rates in politics in less partisan ways. Yet, while political disaffection has stayed quite constant (and extremely high) through the years. Moreover, conventional political participation, relatively high in the 1960s compared to other countries, has undergone a slow but profound crisis since the 1980s while electoral participation, that had been surprisingly high since the end of the war (more than 90% turnout), and quite stable for many years, started to decrease. What appears from these macro level trends of the socio-political context is a paradox in light of social capital theories: in Italy the theory that sees the spread of social associations as producing participatory citizens has not worked, and at the macro level the three indicators of interest, social participation, political disaffection and political participation, seem to follow rather independent behavioural paths. We investigated why it is so and whether the same relation can be found at the micro level. Whereas this longitudinal study that investigates causality is very important for understanding the dynamics at work in Italy, it has much wider implications that go beyond the specificity of a single country. Since we find similar results at the macro and micro levels, the underlying mechanism hypothesized by social capital theories is empirically undermined, at least in its universalistic perspective. This volume consists in two main parts. The first part includes Chapter 1 to 3 and relates to a broad and extensive literature review on the world of political and social participation as well as of political disaffection, both in general terms and in more specific terms relating to the Italian case. The second part of the research includes Chapter 4 to 8 and relates to the empirical analyses of the Italian socio-political context. We first describe through secondary data analysis its evolution across time. We then construct a few hypotheses linking education and time in its time-period, political cohort and life-cycle aspects, in order to test with a multi-source pooled dataset whether the thesis of cognitive mobilization of Inglehart and Dalton has been at work in Italy for different types of associations after the post-war process of societal modernization. We finally move to a more analytical level constructing several hypotheses in order to study the existent causal relationship between social participation, political participation and political efficacy. Using a three-wave Italian national election panel (ITANES), through structural equation modelling (SEM) we test for several forms of association, whether at the micro level the theory of political socialization of associations holds. We also test alternative models, such as the theory of self-selection, or the theory of reverse causation. Finally, in order to give more insight to our findings we run a latent class analysis identifying different profiles of participation among the Italian population. Chapter 9 summarizes our findings, thinking upon the general interpretation of results and discussing the implications for future research. Analyses show firstly that the thesis of "cognitive mobilization" (which gives importance to changing levels of education in society, and to changing attitudes through a process of generational replacement) is only partially able to explain the evolutions of the macro trends of participation in Italy. Secondly, they show that it is not possible to claim which of the causal model tested worked better. Indeed, self-selection models worked only slightly better than political socialization models, but neither worked properly because participation in conventional politics and in civil society associations in Italy do not seem to be much connected to each other. We then conclude that, in a context like Italy, looking only at the demand side (individual characteristics or individual experiences within social groups) distorts the analysis because it is necessary to look also at the characteristics of the political offer and of the socio-political context in which citizens decide to participate, as well as at the structure of political parties. If these were found to be depending on the wider political context, the thesis of social capital might have to be rethought as being context-dependent. Since this research empirically studies only one country in a longitudinal way, however, studying the influence of the political offer is not possible if only in a speculative way. Non-empirically, the Italian "paradox" can indeed be solved in the following way. Italian political system has been modernized under fascism that, being a totalitarian regime, used to mobilize people to participate in a top-down way. This has strongly influenced the structure of the post-war Italian political system, since major parties (DC-Christian Democrats and PCI-Communist Party) were actually structured and functioned in the same way as Fascist party did, although with an extremely different ideological content. Relatively high levels of political participation in late 1950s were then not due to bottom-up participation in a pluralistic democracy, but they were rather a consequence of top-down mobilization of quite homogeneous sub-cultures (as states within the state, and against it). This situation slowly changed with increasing levels of economic and educational resources in society, and change in the international context of the Cold War, finally leading toward a crisis of political parties. When the political system collapsed in the 1990s due to bribery scandals, political parties changed their structure, relating much more on communication via mass media rather than on local branches of parties. The result was that people virtually stopped to participate in conventional politics also because they were no more mobilized from above to participate. Social participation increased across time on the one hand because number of social associations increased, because of higher levels of resources in society, while on the other hand, it can be argued that this increase is the consequence of a closed party system that is not able to incorporate citizens demands, and this is particularly true for the most politicized types of social associations, such as trade unions or social movements associations. Finally, political efficacy remains constant and low across time because of idealized views that citizens hold of political participation, along with perceptions of a closed party system that does not have transparent channels of recruitment and that does not treat citizens in equal ways. We conclude with a question to be investigated in future research: does this peculiar evolution of the socio-political context concerns only Italy, that has apparently not yet become a pluralistic Tocquevillian democracy, or is Italy only an extreme case of a more general European phenomenon, where countries have historically been politicized in a different way than the US (top-down vs. bottom-up, as Tocqueville and then Weber already reported long time ago)?

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security.The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once.







1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.







3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.







In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.







A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.







And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "transitioning away from" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.







Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.







CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers. DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Text finalised on December 15th, 2023. This document is the result of collective reflection on the part of the CIDOB research team.Coordinated and edited by Carme Colomina, it includes contributions from Inés Arco, Anna Ayuso, Ana Ballesteros, Pol Bargués, Moussa Bourekba, Víctor Burguete, Anna Busquets, Javier Carbonell, Carmen Claudín, Francesc Fàbregues, Oriol Farrés, Agustí Fernández de Losada, Marta Galceran, Blanca Garcés, Seán Golden, Berta Güell, Julia Lipscomb, Bet Mañé, Ricardo Martínez, Esther Masclans, Óscar Mateos, Sergio Maydeu, Pol Morillas, Diego Muro, Francesco Pasetti, Héctor Sánchez, Reinhard Schweitzer, Antoni Segura, Cristina Serrano, Eduard Soler i Lecha, Alexandra Vidal and Pere Vilanova.  2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets. The elections held in more than 70 countries will serve as a stress test for the democratic system, and the impact of the multiple conflicts stoking global instability will shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights.The erosion of international norms is more acute than ever, and events become more unpredictable. 2024 begins wide open, marked by an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world, with hanging interests and alliances in issues such as geopolitical competition, green and digital transitions, or international security. The economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024: economic growth will be weak, and China's downturn will reverberate in emerging economies, in a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar. 2024 will be a year of ballots and bullets, a stress test both for the democratic system and for the multiple conflicts stoking global instability. We still face a world in disarray, in upheaval and in dispute. This time, however, any analysis hangs on the huge question mark of the intense series of elections that will shape the coming year. With all-out hostilities in Ukraine, Palestine, Sudan or Yemen, we are seeing the most active conflicts of any time since the end of the Second World War. How the various armed conflicts and the outcome of the more than 70 elections marked on the calendar impact one another will set the geopolitical agenda for the coming months.There are elections that can turn the course of a war. The political fallout of the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza or the stalemate on the Ukraine front also depend on the presidential race in the United States. The cracks in transatlantic unity and the increasingly direct accusations of double standards in the West's loyalties are not unrelated to what happens in the United States on November 5th, 2024. A return of Donald Trump to the White House would bring a drastic shift in the power relations and Washington's position in each of these conflicts, from weapons' supplies to the Ukrainian government or the support for Israel, to confrontation with Russia and China.Yet it is not only about the future of US democracy; over 4 billion people will go to the polls in more than 70 countries. The European Union (EU), India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Taiwan, Mexico, Venezuela or Senegal, for instance: major actors that wield demographic or geopolitical clout will mark a year of unprecedented electoral intensity and shape a world in the throes of a global power shift and a clear regression in terms of humanitarianism and fundamental rights. More elections do not mean more democracy, however. We live in an age of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and extremely sophisticated manipulation that threatens the integrity of the ballot box. Hybrid systems are gaining ground, and it remains to be seen whether the cycle of elections in 2024 will signal a moment of deep degradation for democracy or a moment of resistance.The sensation of disorder is not new, nor even its quickening pace. But every year the erosion of current international norms is more marked, and events become more unpredictable. The world is increasingly decentralised, diversified and multidimensional. This "multiplex order", as Amitav Acharya described it in 2017, is cementing, because everything is happening simultaneously. And yet this reshaping of the world is still wide open because several struggles are playing out at once. 1. More conflict, more impunity2023 has been one of the most conflictive years in the world since the end of World War II. In just twelve months, political violence has increased by 27%. It grew in intensity and frequency. The war in Gaza brought 2023 to a close, with over 17,000 dead accounted for so far, warnings from the United Nations of the risk of humanitarian collapse and genocide of the Palestinian population trapped in the Strip, and the standoff between the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the UN secretary general, António Guterres, to try to secure a ceasefire. In this ongoing crisis of the liberal order and amid discussion over the validity of international law, Israel has dealt a severe blow to the credibility of the United Nations. The Security Council has become an instrument of paralysis; a pincer in the service of the interests of old powers that have led Guterres to publicly acknowledge his frustration and sense of impotence. A politically weakened United Nations clings to its humanitarian action on the ground to try to make the difference between life and death. At least 130 UN humanitarian workers have lost their lives in Gaza since October 7th, the highest number of UN fatalities in a conflict in its history. 2023 has been a violent year. It is estimated that 1 in 6 people in the world have been exposed to conflict in the last twelve months. The sense of impunity and disregard for international law has escalated. Not only in Gaza. The entrenchment of the war in Ukraine; the expulsion of the ethnic Armenian population from Nagorno Karabakh; or the succession of coups in six African countries in the last 36 months are a clear illustration of this moment of "deregulation of the use of force", which has been crystallising over years of erosion of international norms. And if in late 2023 we saw the departure of the international troops from the G5 Sahel deployed to Burkina Faso and Niger, as had already occurred the previous year with the expulsion of the French forces from Mali, in 2024 it will be the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that will have to leave the country before February 29th. Human Rights Watch has called the withdrawal a "catastrophic abdication" because it increases the risk of large-scale atrocities and abuses in a scenario of civil war, ethnic cleansing and famine that has forced more than 7 million people to flee their homes, making Sudan the country with the highest number of internally displaced persons in the world.And yet the international struggle to curtail impunity will be equipped with new tools in 2024. As of January 1st, the Ljubljana - The Hague Convention on International Cooperation in the Investigation and Prosecution of the Crime of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and other International Crimes could be signed (and ratified) by the United Nations member states that wish to join. It is the primary treaty for fighting impunity for international crimes and facilitates cooperation among states in the judicial investigation of these crimes, it ensures reparation for victims and streamlines extradition. At the same time, the UN is also drafting a Convention on crimes against humanity with the aim of creating a treaty that is binding in international law, especially in a climate marked by an increase in these crimes in countries like Myanmar, Ukraine, Sudan or Ethiopia. The United Nations General Assembly will assess the progress of the negotiations in autumn 2024. It will all coincide with the 30th anniversary of the Rwanda genocide.In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, for war crimes in Ukraine, to no effect so far. But should Putin decide to attend the next G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024, it would present a challenge to the host country since, unlike last year's host India, Brazil is a party to the Rome Statute of 1998, the international treaty that led to the creation of the ICC. While President Lula da Silva initially said Putin would not be arrested if he attends the summit, he later rowed back, stating that the decision would fall to the Brazilian justice system and not the government. Despite the pessimism these treaties might produce, in recent months we have seen how, following the Azerbaijani military offensive in Nagorno Karabakh, Armenia signed the ICC's Rome Statute in November, acquiring member status as of February 2024. In addition, in late 2023 South Africa, Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Comoros and Djibouti called for an International Criminal Court investigation into war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in Palestine. In November 2023, the French judicial authorities issued an international arrest warrant for the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad – rehabilitated back into the Arab League the same year, more than a decade after being thrown out – and for several of his generals over the use of chemical weapons against their own people in 2013.2. Democracy under scrutinyMore than 4 billion people will go to the polls in 76 countries, which amounts to nearly 51% of the world's population. While most of the people in these countries will vote in full or flawed democracies, one in four voters will take part in ballots in hybrid and/or authoritarian regimes. In countries such as Russia, Tunisia, Algeria, Belarus, Rwanda or Iran the leaderships will use these elections to try to tighten their grip on power and gain legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens, while the other half of the electorate will exercise their right to vote in countries that have undergone democratic erosion or displayed illiberal tendencies in recent years, like the United States or India.The close of 2023 saw the inauguration of the "anarcho-capitalist" Javier Milei as Argentina's president, confirming the deep crisis of traditional parties and the rise of radical agendas, from Nayib Bukele's aggressively punitive approach in El Salvador ―who will seek re-election in 2024―, to Popular Renewal bursting onto the electoral scene in Peru, following the party's refoundation by the current mayor of Lima, Rafael López Aliaga. They are extreme responses to the various political, economic and security crisis situations. In Europe, there were mixed results at the polls, with victory for the Polish opposition, on one hand, and a win for the Islamophobic Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, on the other. The rapid succession of elections in 2024 will be decisive in determining whether the protest, fragmentation and rise of political extremism that have transformed democracies worldwide are reinforced or whether the system weathers the storm.The votes of women and young people will be key in this test of democracy. They were in Poland, punishing the reactionary polices of the Law and Justice Party (PiS). In Brazil or Austria, for example, men's support of far-right forces is 16 percentage points higher than that of women. In Mexico, the ballot in June 2024 will elect a woman as the country's president for the first time in its history. The two candidates are Claudia Sheinbaum, a former mayor of the capital, for the ruling leftist party Morena, and Xóchitl Gálvez, for the opposition coalition Broad Front for Mexico, which brings together the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), among others. In the United States, the mobilisation of young Latinos will be particularly important. More than 4.7 million young Hispanics have obtained the right to vote in the last few years and they will play a significant role in key states like Nevada or Arizona. While this cohort tends to have a progressive stance and leanings, their view of the dominant parties is complex: questions of identity, discrimination or racism colour their relationships with both the Democrats and the Republicans and they reject political identification, reinforcing the idea that polarisation in the United States is more apparent among politicians than among their voters. Despite that, the fear of unfair elections has increased dramatically (from 49% in 2021 to 61% in 2023). Although US voters still perceive economic inequality as the main threat (69%), probably the greatest challenge in this election race is the presence of Donald Trump, not only because his immediate future is in the hands of the courts but also because if he does become the Republican presidential nominee, it will mean that the party has decided to place its future in the hands of the man who tried to overturn the results of the election four years ago and who the Congress committee to investigate the storming of the Capitol on January 6th, 2020, accused of "insurrection". January will see the start of the state primaries and caucuses. But with the final nominees still to be decided, according to the polls the scenario of an electoral contest between two candidates approaching or in their eighties currently favours Trump. Meanwhile, the date of the former president's trial can get dangerously close to the Super Tuesday, scheduled for March 5, the day on which 13 states vote in the Republican primaries.An investigation by The Guardian with the University of Chicago found that 5.5% of Americans, or 14 million people, believe that the use of force is justified to restore Donald Trump to the presidency, while 8.9% of Americans, or 23 million people, believe that force is justified to prevent him from being president. It is not an isolated trend. The risk of political instability and violence related to electoral processes is on the rise, as the Kofi Annan Foundation confirms.The future of the European Union, which is facing the winter with two wars on its doorstep, will also be decided at the ballot box. Apart from the elections to the European Parliament, which will be held from June 6th to 9th, 2024, 12 member states are also going to the polls. The general elections in Belgium, Portugal or Austria will be a good gauge of the strength of the far right, which is shaping up as one of the winners in the elections to the European Parliament. If the vote in 2019 spelled the end of the grand coalition that had guaranteed social democrats and Christian democrats a majority in the chamber since the European Parliament's beginnings, the big question now is knowing just how far right the European Union will swing.The latest voting intention projections show significant results for the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, home of extreme-right parties like Marine Le Pen's National Rally (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD), which would win as many as 87 seats and surpass the other family on the radical right, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), led by the Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, which would go from 66 MEPs at present to 83. Despite the loss of seats for the traditional forces, the European People's Party (EPP) will remain the EU's main political family. So, one of the questions in 2024 is whether the EPP, led by the Bavarian Manfred Weber, would be ready to seek a possible majority with the radical right.The new majorities will be crucial to determining the future of European climate commitments, continued aid to Ukraine and urgent institutional reforms to facilitate the accession of future members. The EU must deliver on the promise of enlargement, but it is increasingly ill-prepared to carry it through.Four candidate countries to join the EU will hold elections in 2024: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, North Macedonia, and Georgia, as well as the question mark hanging over the staging of elections in Ukraine. According to its constitution, Ukraine should hold elections in March 2024. But under martial law, imposed in the wake of Russia's invasion in 2022, with part of the electorate reluctant to vote in such exceptional circumstances and 8 million Ukrainian refugees outside the country, Volodymyr Zelensky already said in November that it was not "the right time" to go to the polls.The United Kingdom too, in the throes of a political and social crisis could hold early general elections, which are scheduled for January 2025. With the Conservatives facing a challenging scenario against the Labour Party headed by Keir Starmer, the current prime minister, Rishi Sunak, has the power to call the election at a time of his choosing at any point before then. Another issue is Libya. Since the United Nations plan to stage elections was postponed indefinitely in 2021, the inability to reach an agreement between the members of the two governments in the east and west of the country has put the possible date for elections back again, to 2024.There will be 16 elections in Africa, although only six of them will take place in countries considered to be democratic. Thirty years after the 1994 elections in South Africa, which marked the beginning of a democratic journey dominated since then by the African National Congress (ANC), the political landscape is beginning to change. The 2024 general elections may confirm the weakening of power and support for the ANC, while the main opposition parties seek alliances to present an alternative. In addition, the complicated economic situation, combined with other factors such as corruption, has led to the growing popularity of extremist parties.Also in India, the opposition presents itself more united than ever against Narendra Modi seeking to renew a third term in the spring. Boosted by nationalism, polarization, and disinformation, Modi will showcase the country's economic and geopolitical achievements. In 2023 India surpassed China as the most populous country in the world.Finally, it also remains to be seen what degree of participation the Venezuelan opposition might have in the presidential elections agreed with Nicolás Maduro for the second half of the year. For now, the internal panorama has become even more strained with the intensification of the territorial conflict with Guyana and the mobilization of the army.3. From information overload to social disconnection Societies are increasingly weary, overwhelmed by the saturation of content and exhausted by the speed of the changes they must assimilate. Political and electoral uncertainty and the multiple conflicts that will shape 2024 will only widen the distance between society, institutions and political parties. The number of people who say they "avoid" the news remains close to all-time highs and is particularly prominent in Greece (57%), Bulgaria (57%), Argentina (46%) or the United Kingdom (41%). The main reasons? The excessive repetition of certain news stories and the emotional impact they can have on the population's mental health. In particular, according to the Reuters Institute, this fatigue is prompted by issues such as the war in Ukraine (39%), national politics (38%) and news related to social justice (31%), with high levels of politicisation and polarisation. The echoes of the COVID-19 pandemic, images of war-related violence and the economic impact of such events on increasingly adverse living standards for the population have magnified this trend towards disconnection, aggravated by a sense of loneliness and polarisation. Yet this drop in news consumption has gone hand in hand with greater use of social networks: younger generations, for example, are increasingly likely to pay more attention to influencers than to journalists. At the same time, there is growing fragmentation on the social networks. The migration of users to Instagram or TikTok has also changed the way current affairs are consumed, with a prioritisation of leisure over news content. It is not just a voluntary rejection of information; this tendency to disconnect has also led to a reduction in the social participation and involvement in online debates that had characterised the Arab Springs, the MeToo movement or Black Lives Matter. Nearly half of open social networks users (47%) no longer participate in or react to the news. But, moreover, the disconnect from the news is also linked to the political disconnection and social shifts that have clearly altered electoral behaviour. Demographic changes related to technology use and an environment of constant volatility have also resulted in a drop in voter loyalty and that has contributed to the crisis of the traditional parties. The identity element of belonging to a party has changed among young people. Identification is built on stances on issues such as climate change, immigration, racism, women's or LGBTQIA+ rights or even the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Some 65% of American adults say they always or often feel exhausted when thinking about politics. According to the Pew Research Center, six out of ten Americans of voting age admit to having little or no confidence in the future of their country's political system. And this discontent extends to the three branches of government, the current political leaders and candidates for public office. When asked to sum up their feelings about politics in a word, 79% are negative or critical. The most frequently repeated words are "divisive", "corrupt", "chaos" or "polarised", and they complain that conflicts between Republicans and Democrats receive too much attention and there is too little attention paid "to the important issues facing the country". The paradox, however, is that this discontent has coincided with historically high levels of voter turnout over the last few years. The question is whether there will be a repeat of this in the presidential elections in November, especially when they reflect another element of generational disaffection: gerontocracy. The average age of global leaders is 62. In young people's view, the traditional political parties have failed to articulate a direct form of communication, increasing the sense of disconnection between society, politicians and institutions. In this context, a repeat of the Biden-Trump confrontation in 2024 would emphasize the extreme polarization between Republicans and Democrats in an electoral cycle considered risky. Abortion rights and security remain strong mobilization points for voters.Sometimes, however, the disconnection can be forced and in this case a news blackout becomes a weapon of repression and censorship or freedom of expression. Iran, India and Pakistan were the three countries with most new internet restrictions in the first half of 2023, and all three are holding elections in 2024. With the rise and consolidation of AI, disinformation will be an additional challenge in this "super election year". The rapid progress of AI, particularly generative AI, may cast an even longer shadow over trust in information and electoral processes. The refinement of deepfakes, quick and easy creation of images, text, audios files or propaganda by AI and a growing dependence on social media to check and research facts form a breeding ground for disinformation at time when there is still no effective control of these technologies. Perhaps that is why the Merriam-Webster dictionary's word of the year for 2023 is "authentic". With the prelude of "post-truth" in 2016, technology's capacity to manipulate facts has no precedent, from the authenticity of an image to the writing of an academic work. Hence more than half of social media users (56%) say they doubt their own capacity to identify the difference between what is real and fake in news on the internet.4. Artificial intelligence: explosion and regulation 2023 was the year that generative AI burst into our lives; the year that ChatGPT was presented to society, which in January, just two months after its launch, already had 100 million users. In August, it hit 180 million. Yet the revolution also brought a new awareness of the risks, acceleration and transformation involved in a technology that aspires to match, or even improve or surpass human intelligence. That is why 2024 will be a crucial year for AI regulation. The foundations have already been laid. It only remains to review the different initiatives under way. The most ambitious is that of the European Union, which is resolved to become the first region in the world to equip itself with a comprehensive law to regulate artificial intelligence and lead the coming leap forward. The EU has opted to categorise the risks (unacceptable, high, limited or minimal) posed by the use of AI systems and will require a "fundamental rights impact assessment" be carried out before a "high-risk" AI system can be put on the market. The agreement reached in December will be ratified in the first quarter of 2024 and give way to a period of two years before its full implementation in 2026.Almost at the eleventh hour too, on December 1st of 2023 the G7 agreed international guidelines for artificial intelligence developers and users, particularly for generative AI, mentioning the need to introduce measures to deal with disinformation. G7 leaders see it as one of the chief risks because of possible manipulation of public opinion on the eve of a year of global election overdrive.But the debate on governance goes hand in hand with a geopolitical race to lead technological innovation and, unlike the EU, in the case of the United States and China that also means development of its military application. Both countries are looking to bolster their leadership. The first international AI safety summit, called by the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, became a meeting point of major global powers – both public and private; techno-authoritarian or open – trying to regulate or influence the debates on regulation under way. A second in-person summit will take place in Seoul and a third one in Paris, both in 2024 . For now, the "Bletchley Declaration" is on the table, a document signed by 28 countries that gathers the pledge to tackle the main risks of artificial intelligence, an agreement to examine tech companies' AI models before they are launched and a deal to assemble a global panel of experts on artificial intelligence inspired by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel of Experts on Climate Change (IPCC) . In addition, at the US Embassy in London, 31 countries signed a parallel (non-binding) agreement to place limits on the military use of AI. China, for its part, continues to move towards its goal of reaching 70% self-sufficiency in critical technologies by 2025, while clearly increasing its presence in the main tech-related international standardisation bodies.To add to this flurry of regulatory activity, a Global Digital Compact will be agreed at the Summit of the Future in September 2024, organised by the United Nations. This agreement will create a framework of multi-actor and multisectoral cooperation among governments, private enterprise and civil society, which should lay down a set of common rules to guide digital development in the future. The application of human rights online, the regulation of AI and digital inclusion will be some of the main topics under discussion.This need to regulate artificial intelligence will also be heightened in the coming months by a growing democratisation of AI tools, which will bring greater integration into different professional sectors. The focus on a responsible AI will be stepped up locally (more cities deploying AI strategies or regulatory frameworks), nationally and transnationally. As AI takes on a more important role in decision-making throughout society safety, trustworthiness, equity and responsibility are crucial. The latest annual McKinsey report on the use of generative AI tools says that a third of companies surveyed had begun to use these types of programs. The tech and communications sector (40%), as well as financial services (38%) and the legal profession (36%), are the frontrunners in their use and application. Yet the same survey also states that precisely the industries relying most heavily on the knowledge of their employees are those that will see a more disruptive impact of these technologies. Whether that impact is positive or negative is still unclear. Unlike other revolutions that had an effect on the labour market, it is white-collar workers who are likely to feel most vulnerable in the face of generative AI. A European Central Bank study, meanwhile, says that AI has not supplanted workers, but it has lowered their wages slightly, especially in jobs considered low and medium-skilled, which are more exposed to automatisation, and particularly among women.In the midst of this regulatory acceleration of the digital revolution, 2024 will also be the year when the European Union deploys, to it full potential, the new legislation on digital services and markets to place limits and obligations on the monopolistic power of the major platforms and their responsibility in the algorithmic spread of disinformation and harmful content. As of January 1st, it will be compulsory for Big Tech to abide by these regulations, with potential fines for breaches of as much as 6% of global turnover, according to the DSA (Digital Services Act) and between 10% and 20% of global turnover, according to the DMA (Digital Markets Act). The flow of international data will also increase in 2024, particularly transfers between the EU and the United States, by virtue of the new Data Privacy Framework approved in July 2023. We will also see fresh scrutiny from NGOs and digital rights groups to ascertain the legality of these transfers and whether they respect individual privacy.5. Economic fallout and debt sustainabilityThe economic consequences of the succession of crises of recent years will be more visible in 2024, especially the impact of the interest rate hikes to counter the biggest spike in inflation in 40 years following the energy crisis of 2022. Meanwhile, tougher financing conditions will limit fiscal policy, following the rapid rise in borrowing to tackle COVID-19 and the impact of the war in Ukraine.In a climate like this, growth will be slow. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) does not expect inflation to return to the target of most central banks until 2025, which augurs high interest rates for a long time yet, especially if there is a strain on oil prices again against a backdrop of geopolitical uncertainty. The IMF's growth forecast for 2024 is 2.9%, much the same as the estimate for 2023 and below pre-pandemic growth rates.Economies, however, will cool unevenly. The United States appears to have dodged recession thanks to the strength of its labour market and of fiscal incentives, which means it is likely to have a softer landing. Industrial relocation policies, like the Inflation Reduction Act, record corporate profits after Covid and the extraordinary loss of purchasing power caused by inflation are some of the ingredients to explain the resurgence of the US labour movement, without precedent since the 1970s. Its success may spread to other sectors and economies with strained labour markets. Thus, a fall in inflation and an increase in salaries in 2024 could provide some economic relief.In the European Union, there will be greater scrutiny of public accounts, especially those of countries with least financial wiggle room like Italy, following a sharp increase in borrowing to tackle the pandemic and the impact of the war in Ukraine, owing to financing conditions and the entry into force of the reform of the EU's fiscal rules. "Fiscal discipline" will also loom large in the negotiation of the EU's new budget framework (MFF), where its greatest wishes (support for Ukraine, backing for industrial policy, the green transition and an increase in appropriations for defence, migration or the Global Gateway) will come face to face with reality (lack of resources or agreement to increase them). The adoption of the European Economic Security Strategy and the outcome of the antidumping investigation into Chinese subsidies on electric vehicles will go a long way to determining whether, on the economic front, the EU opts to align with the United States in its strategic competition with China or tries to be a champion of a reformed globalisation.It will also be necessary to keep a close eye on the development of China, which is facing its lowest economic growth in 35 years, not counting the Covid years, weighed down by its imbalances, particularly as far as an excessive accumulation of debt and dependence on the property sector are concerned. The change in the rules of globalisation prompted by US strategic competition will also hamper its exports and capacity to attract capital in a climate in which the Chinese leadership prioritises economic security over growth. With unfavourable demographics, the country has yet to establish domestic consumption as a motor for growth.Emerging economies will feel the force of China's slump, especially those with greater trade and financial dependence. The success of the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of investment volume has been overshadowed by repayment difficulties in up to 60% of the loans, which along with criticism has led Xi Jinping to announce a new phase of investments with smaller projects. In 2024, China's new role as a lender of last resort and its participation in the debt restructuring processes of countries in distress will have growing importance in how it is perceived and in its geoeconomic influence over the Global South.A large number of emerging countries are in a delicate fiscal situation. In a climate of rapid tightening of financial conditions and a strong dollar, that also exacerbates their external vulnerability. While some countries such as Mexico, Vietnam or Morocco are capitalising on the reconfiguration of trade and value chains (nearshoring), most emerging economies are likely to be adversely affected by a scenario of greater economic fragmentation. According to the WTO, trade in goods between hypothetical geopolitical blocs – based on voting patterns in the United Nations – has grown between 4% and 6% slower than trade within these blocs since the invasion of Ukraine.In this climate of scant monetary and fiscal space, the buffer for cushioning another crisis is extremely thin, which could exacerbate market volatility and nervousness in the face of episodes of uncertainty. The main focus of attention may shift from Ukraine to the Middle East, since shocks from oil are felt more broadly across the economy than those from natural gas. This could directly affect the EU and Spain, which are particularly dependent because they import over 90% of the oil they consume. In addition, strategic oil reserves in the United States have not been so low since 1983 and the few countries with capacity to increase crude production (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Russia) may not be inclined to do so without significant political concessions.6. South(s) and North(s)In our outlook for 2023 we announced the consolidation of the Global South as a space of confrontation and leadership and pointed to the strategic presence of India, Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Brazil. In 2024, this reconfiguration will go a step further. The contradictions and fragmentations of this dichotomous North-South approach will become more apparent than ever. The Global South has established itself as a key actor in the pushback against the West on anti-imperialist grounds or over double standards. The most symbolic image of this moment of geopolitical expansion will come in October 2024, when the BRICS bloc meets in Russia to formalise its expansion. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are welcoming Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iran into the fold. Together they account for 46% of the world's population, 29% of global GDP and include two of the three biggest oil producers in the world. Thus, the BRICS will have an even more powerful voice, although, inevitably, it may also mean more internal contradictions and conflicting agendas. The election of Javier Milei as the president of Argentina, who has confirmed his decision not to join the BRICS, also feeds into the idea of this clash of agendas and interests in the Global South. Saudi Arabia and Iran vie for strategic influence in the Persian Gulf. India and China have their own border disputes in the Himalayas. The Global South will continue to gain clout, but it will also be more heterogeneous. Other than a shared postcolonial rhetoric, its action is extremely diverse.The Global South is multiregional and multidimensional and comprises different political regimes. But it is also a geographical space where global trade flows are consolidating as a result of reglobalisation. The latest WTO annual report confirms that, while advanced economies are still key players in world trade, they are no longer dominant. However, , if in 2023 we spoke of the geopolitical acceleration of the "others", with India as the symbol of this potential leadership of the Global South, in 2024 it will be Latin America that tries to take a central role. Brazil will host the G20, while Peru will be the venue for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit.And as we move beyond dichotomies, a deep internal crack may also appear in the Global North should the return of Donald Trump to the White House materialise. Transatlantic distance dominates a new framework of relations that is more transactional than a conventional alliance. Washington and Brussels' differences will worsen in 2024 when the United States asks the European Union to increase its contributions to the government of Volodymyr Zelensky and internal divisions among the member states prevent it. The second half of 2024 will be particularly tense, when Hungary – the most reluctant EU country when it comes to military aid and Ukraine's possible accession – takes over the EU's rotating presidency. It will also be paradoxical if this rift in the Global North widens because of the Ukraine war. Precisely, in 2023, the Ukrainian conflict was the mortar that cemented transatlantic unity, and confronted the EU and the United States with the limits of their ability to influence in the face of a Global South that questioned the double standards of the West. In 2024, however, the war in Ukraine may increase the distance between Washington and Brussels.Despite this logic of confrontation, the geopolitical short-sightedness of binarism is increasingly misplaced. And yet, it is difficult to overcome. The fact that both the United States and the European Union conceive their relations with Latin America solely as a space for resource exploitation and geopolitical dispute with China, is part of that short-sightedness. For the moment, the repeated failure of the negotiations over an EU-Mercosur agreement are dashing South America's hopes of being able to boost its trade presence in the European single market. Talks will resume in the first half of 2024, after Paraguay takes over the Mercosur presidency from Brazil.7. Backsliding on international commitmentsThe year 2023 left international cooperation in a shambles. Employing increasingly blunt language, António Guterres declared that the world is "woefully off-track" in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which reached the halfway point to their 2030 deadline in 2023. The coming year must prove whether the international community is still capable of and wishes to agree on coordinated responses to common global problems through organs of collective governance. It will not be easy. We face an acceleration of the ecological crisis, record migration and forced displacements and a clear regression of the gender equality agenda.For the first time, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is projecting that global demand for oil, coal and natural gas will reach a high point this decade, based only on current policy settings, according to the World Energy Outlook 2023. In the short term, fossil fuel-producing countries are ignoring the climate warnings and plan to increase the extraction of coal, oil and gas. The choice of an oil state, the United Arab Emirates, as the host of a climate summit and the appointment of a fossil fuels executive as president was a bad omen at the very least.And yet, COP28 in Dubai has been the first to have managed to produce a text that explicitly recognizes the need to "leave behind" fossil fuels: oil, coal and gas, as the main culprits of the climate crisis. Although the final agreement has been celebrated as historic for referring to this need to initiate a transition to guarantee net zero emissions in 2050, the degree of ambition demonstrated is not sufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Likewise, while the creation of a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate the countries most affected by climate change is also a positive step, the initial collection of $700 million falls far short of what is necessary. Every year developing countries face $400 billion in losses linked to climate action.In this context, not only do we run the risk of exacerbating climate impacts; we shall also see a rise – more acutely than ever – of social and political tensions between governments and societies over the exploitation of resources. In Europe there is growing discontent with the EU's climate transition policies and the rise of Eurosceptic and radical right forces in the European Parliament elections of June 2024 will raise this pressure still further. The flurry of regulatory activity on climate and industrial matters is increasing the politicisation of this issue and stoking social unrest in certain member states. Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and certain sectors in Germany, particularly the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), are trying to limit the EU's ambitions on climate action. The arrival of a new government in Sweden, backed by the radical right, has slammed the brakes on the climate commitments led by one of the countries that has most contributed to EU environment policies. A hypothetical return of Donald Trump to the White House would also shake again some of the limited domestic and international progress in this area.According to a poll carried out by Ipsos, while a large part of European households continues to put the environment before economic growth, this proportion is declining. If in 2019, 53% of households preferred to protect the environment, in 2022 the figure had fallen by 5 percentage points, despite the clear impact of climate phenomena. Yet the trend of "not in my back yard" is not limited to Europe. In late 2023, we saw the resistance of Panamanians against a mining contract extension. Some experts speak of a "clash of environmentalisms" to refer to the confrontation that arises between those who wish to protect their country's natural resources and do not want to see a deterioration in their ecosystems and the interests of governments seeking resources to fuel their energy transition. We might see the same in the European Union. In early 2024, the Critical Raw Minerals Act will enter into force. It aims to guarantee the supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other essential materials for the green transition and strategic industries that are vital for electric cars and renewable energies, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as for computers and mobile phones. And with this in mind the EU means to revive the mining industry on the continent. It is a move that may trigger protests by ecologists in the EU in the coming months.UN member states are also expected to reach a global agreement to end plastic pollution in 2024. It will be an international legally binding treaty and is hailed as the most important multilateral environmental pact since the Paris Agreement, setting a plan of action to 2040.However, it is gender policies and migration policies that are most exposed to this radical wave that has transformed government agendas, particularly in the European Union and Latin America. While it is true that gender parity recovered to pre-pandemic levels in 2023, the rate of progress has slowed. At the present pace, it will take 131 years to reach full parity. Although the share of women hired for positions of leadership has increased steadily by approximately 1% a year globally over the last eight years, that trend was reversed in 2023, falling to 2021 levels.The emerging feminist foreign policies, which defined those countries with a clear commitment to promoting gender equality in international relations, have added four important losses in recent months: Sweden, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and Argentina. The changes in government, together with the growing politicization and polarization of issues perceived as "feminist", have demonstrated the easy abandonment of these initiatives, dependent on the progressive orientations of the governments in power. Mexico, another of the countries that has adopted these policies, will face elections in June that will also mark the continuity or abandonment of its commitment to gender equality in foreign action. And, despite not having a feminist foreign policy, Trump's return to the White House could lead to the reinstatement of restrictive abortion policies and funding cuts against international NGOs that promote sexual and reproductive rights.Moreover, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) reports a resurgence of anti-feminist trends in countries like Croatia and Italy and notes sexist and homophobic speech on the part of European leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Andrzej Duda or Giorgia Meloni, who have justified attacks on women's and LGBTQIA+ rights, undermining years of efforts to secure progress in breaking up gender stereotypes. Although the EU Gender Action Plan III is valid until 2025, a change in Brussels would also dilute the commitments of one of the actors most involved in this area.On a more positive note, it will be interesting to follow, in 2024, the progress of the Convention against Crimes against Humanity, which the UN is developing, as feminist and civil society movements around the world will take this opportunity to try to codify the gender apartheid as a crime against humanity – especially due to the Taliban regime's continued discrimination and oppression of Afghan women, and the situation of Iranian women.European migration policies have also suffered a major setback. The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which is set to move forward before the European elections in 2024, is a legitimisation of the EU's anti-immigration policies. The deal allows delays in registering asylum seekers, the introduction of second-rate border asylum procedures and extends detention time at the border. In short, it lowers standards and legalises what hitherto was unequivocally illegal.This looming agreement reflects the levels of polarisation and politicisation that set the tone of the European response to migration. And as we enter the run-up to the election campaign the migration debate will be even further to the fore in the coming months. It is, what's more, part of another, deeper process. The EU's externalisation policies have also fostered the stigmatisation of immigrants and refugees in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa).8. Humanitarian collapseWar and violence drove forced displacement worldwide to a new high estimated at 114 million people by the end of September 2023, according to UNHCR. The main drivers of these forced displacements were the war in Ukraine and conflicts in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar, as well as drought, floods and insecurity blighting Somalia and a prolonged humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan.In the first six months of 2023 alone, 1.6 million new individual asylum applications were made, the highest figure ever recorded. This is not an exceptional situation. The reignition of forgotten conflicts has increased levels of volatility and violence. In October 2023, over 100,500 people, more than 80% of the estimated 120,000 inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh, fled to Armenia after Azerbaijan took control of the enclave. There were also thousands of displaced persons in northern Shan because of an escalation in fighting between the Myanmar armed forces and various armed groups. At the end of October 2023, nearly 2 million people were internally displaced in Myanmar, living in precarious conditions and in need of vital assistance. And the images of over 1 million Palestinians fleeing their homes because of the Israeli military offensive, after Hamas attack from October 7, illustrate the humanitarian crisis afflicting Gaza.This increase in the number of displaced persons and refugees, however, has not been accompanied by a boost in international aid. Close to 1 million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh must cope with declining international commitment. The United Nations reduced its food assistance and humanitarian aid to this group by one third in 2023. A lack of international funding considerably reduced assistance levels in 2023 and the World Food Programme was obliged to cut the size and scope of its food, monetary and nutritional assistance by between 30% and 50%. Some 2.3 billion people, nearly 30% of the global population, currently face a situation of moderate or severe food insecurity. Further rises in food prices in 2024 and the impact of adverse weather conditions on agricultural production may make the situation even worse still. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that a total of 105 to 110 million people will require food assistance at least until early 2024, with an increase in need in the regions of southern Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and a net decrease in eastern Africa.Experts are pointing to the risk of a new rice crisis in 2024, as a result of India's export restrictions to try to cushion the effects of a drop in domestic production. The shock wave from the ban has also driven up the price of rice in Thailand and Vietnam, the second and third biggest exporters after India, which have seen prices rise by 14% and 22%, respectively. Added to that are the effects of the climate phenomenon known as El Niño, associated with heat and drought across the Pacific Ocean, which could harm production in 2024. Experts are currently warning that if India maintains the current restrictions, the world is headed for a repeat of the rice crisis of 2008.El Niño, which is set to continue to mid-2024, is usually associated with increased rainfall in certain areas of southern South America and the southern United States, the Horn of Africa and Central Asia. On the other hand, El Niño can also cause severe drought in Australia, Indonesia and parts of Southeast Asia.The last episode of the phenomenon, in 2016, was the warmest year on record, with global heat records that have yet to be surpassed.Donor governments and humanitarian agencies must prepare for major assistance needs in multiple regions. The year 2023 has left us some indication of it: extreme drought in the Amazon and maritime traffic restrictions in the Panama Canal; forest fires in Bolivia and power cuts in Ecuador owing to low electricity production in over 80% of hydroelectric plants; the worst floods on record in northwest Argentina, which also caused landslides affecting over 6,000 people; and a devastating category 5 hurricane in Mexico that surprised the authorities and scientists, who failed to foresee the intensity of the phenomenon. 9. Securitisation vs. rightsThe conflict between security and fundamental rights has been a constant feature of 2023 and the electoral uncertainty of the coming months will only compound the urge to pursue heavy-handed policies and control. The public debate throughout Latin America, without exception, has been dominated by security, directly impacting other crises such as migration, which has affected the entire continent for a decade and in 2024 is expected to be even more intense. "Bukelism" has a growing number of fans. The new Argentine president, Javier Milei, has said he is an admirer of the hard-line polices of the Salvadoran president, Nayib Bukele. The election campaign in Ecuador was also coloured by the debate on security.The continent is fighting a new crime wave that has spilled into traditionally more stable countries that are now part of lucrative drug-trafficking routes, as is the case of Paraguay and Argentina. People trafficking, particularly the criminal exploitation of the Venezuelan migration crisis, has also grown throughout Latin America. Against this backdrop, the United Nations and Interpol have launched a joint initiative to combat human trafficking. It remains to be seen what impact the Venezuelan elections might have on this migration crisis, which has already led to over 7 million people leaving their homes since 2014.Moreover, increasing impunity has also brought a mounting risk of authoritarian inclinations on the part of governments in Latin America, with the militarisation of public security and an undermining of democracy across the continent. In the European Union too. For some time, the sense of vulnerability has been a political boon for certain forces in the EU. With the outbreak of war in Gaza, some European countries ramped up security for fear of terrorist attacks, going to the extreme of banning demonstrations in support of the Palestinian people, as in France. In this climate, the securitisation of social movements is also emerging as a strategy that will continue to gain prominence in 2024. More and more, democratic governments are stepping up the pressure on protest movements: fines, curbs on free speech or judicial persecution are shrinking the space for civil dissent. On this point, the EU has reached an agreement to legislate against strategic lawsuits that seek to discourage public participation or silence independent media (known as SLAPPs) which is set to be ratified before the end of the current legislative term.Finally, the debate on security and its impact on individual rights will also mark the months leading up to the 2024 Olympic Games in Paris. Civil rights groups have decried the French government's plans to use AI surveillance cameras to pick up real-time activity on the streets of the capital during the games. Technology is a crucial component of the transformation that security and conflict are undergoing. Drones have become a vital weapon for the resistance in Ukraine, and in the arsenal of Hamas in its October 7th attack on Israel. A United States in the midst of budget cuts is, however, poised to inject extra cash into the Pentagon in 2024 for the development of "electronic warfare" programmes.10. The decoupling of interests and valuesThere is a common thread in many of the previous points that connects an increasingly diverse and (dis)organised world through changing interests and alliances. In its 2023 Strategic Foresight Report, the European Commission acknowledges that the "battle of narratives" it used for so long as an argument in the geopolitical confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism is becoming obsolete. It goes further than the realisation that the West has lost the battle for the narrative in the Ukraine war and that its double standards in the face of global conflicts diminishes the EU's clout. Sudan is the clearest example of how the West can commit to wars it considers existential for the survival of its own values, such as the Ukraine one, while it ignores the genocide being carried out, with house-to-house murders, in the refugee camps of Darfur.The world has turned into a "battle of offers", shaping both public opinion and government action. There is a growing diversity of options and alliances. Thus far, hegemonic narratives are either challenged or no longer serve to make sense of the world. In this "unbalanced multipolarity", with medium-sized powers setting regional agendas, the major traditional powers are compelled to seek their own space. Global competition for resources to fuel the green and digital transitions accentuates this variable geometry of agreements and alliances still further. And the results of the series of elections in 2024 may ultimately reinforce this transformation. The United States' isolationist inclinations are real. Vladimir Putin will confirm his resilience at the polls, after dodging the effects of the international sanctions and building an economic apparatus to withstand a long war in Ukraine. In India, Narendra Modi's popularity remains intact and drives the dominance of his party. The election question sets the stage for a 2024 that begins wide open. The crisis of the liberal order, aggravated by the international reaction to the latest conflicts, and the erosion of multilateralism – with an explicit challenge to the United Nations – foster yet further this sensation of a dispersion of global power towards an assortment of dynamic medium-sized powers capable of helping to shape the international environment in the coming decades.A pivotal year begins to evaluate the resistance capacity of democratic systems long subdued to a profound erosion. We will be attentive to the outcome of the ballots and to the increasing unabashed actions of bullets, pressing the limits of impunity.CIDOB calendar 2024: 75 dates to mark on the agenda January 1 – Changeover in the United Nations Security Council. Algeria, Guyana, the Republic of South Korea, Sierra Leone and Slovenia start their terms as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council, replacing Albania, Brazil, Gabon, Ghana and the United Arab Emirates, whose terms end. January 1 – Dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh. The self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh will cease to exist at the start of the year, after more than three decades of control over the territory. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive to reintegrate this predominantly ethnic Armenian-populated enclave. The assault led the self-declared republic to announce its dissolution. January 1 – BRICS expansion. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will join Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as full members of BRICS. Argentina's new president, Javier Milei, has finally ruled out his country's incorporation. January 1 – Belgian presidency of the Council of the European Union. Belgium takes over the rotating presidency of the Council from Spain, marking the end of this institutional cycle. The Belgian semester will hold until June 30. January 7 – Parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. The vote will take place against a backdrop of deep political division in the country. This division led to mass demonstrations by the opposition at the end of 2023, calling for an interim government to oversee the elections. The current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina Wazed, is looking to for another term after 15 years in power, while her main rival and leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Khaleda Zia, is currently under house arrest on charges of corruption. January 13 – General elections in Taiwan. For the first time since Taiwan became a democracy, three candidates are competing for the presidency after the opposition failed to form a common front: the current vice president Lai Ching-te, from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party; Hou You-yi from the Kuomintang, and Ko Wen-je, a former mayor of Taipei and leader of the Taiwan People's Party. The outcome of these elections will mark the course of Taiwan's policy towards China, with an eye on the United States, at a time of growing tension between Taipei and Beijing. January 14 – Inauguration of Bernardo Arévalo as president of Guatemala. To widespread surprise, the Seed Movement candidate won the 2023 elections. Since the vote was held, political and social tension in the country has been rising due to efforts by the Guatemalan public prosecutor's office to overturn the election results and prevent Arévalo from taking office. January 15-19 – World Economic Forum. An annual event that gathers major political leaders, senior executives from the world's leading companies, heads of international organisations and NGOs, and prominent cultural and social figures. This year's meeting will mainly focus on examining the opportunities provided by the development of emerging technologies and their impact on decision-making and international cooperation. January 15-20 – 19th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. Uganda will be the venue for the next summit of the 120 countries that make up this grouping of states. The theme for this edition is "Deepening cooperation for shared global affluence" and it is scheduled to tackle multiple global challenges of today with a view to fostering cooperation among the member states. January 21-23 – Third South Summit of G-77 + China. Uganda will host this forum looking to promote South-South cooperation, under the theme "Leaving no one behind". The 134 member states from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean will focus on the areas of trade, investment, sustainable development, climate change and poverty eradication. February 4 – Presidential elections in El Salvador. Nayib Bukele, who heads the New Ideas party and currently holds the presidency of El Salvador, is shaping up as the clear favourite for re-election. The country has been in a state of emergency since March 2022, in response to the security challenges affecting the nation. February 8 – Presidential elections in Pakistan. Since Imran Khan's removal as prime minister in April 2022, Pakistan has been mired in political instability, deep economic crisis and rising violence on the part of armed groups. The elections will be supervised by a caretaker government after the expiry of the Pakistani parliament's five-year term in August 2023. February 14 – Presidential and legislative elections in Indonesia. Three candidates are competing to succeed the current president, Joko Widodo, who after two terms cannot stand for re-election. The next leader will face the challenges of boosting growth in an economy reliant on domestic consumption, driving the development of the tech industry and navigating pressure from China and the United States to protect their national interests. February 16-18 – 60th Munich Security Conference. Held every year, it is the leading independent forum on international security policy and gathers high-level figures from over 70 countries. Strengthening the rules-based international order, the impact of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, resisting revisionist tendencies or the security implications of climate change will be some of the main issues on this year's agenda. February 17-18 – African Union Summit. Ethiopia, which holds the presidency of the African Union, will be organising the summit. This year, it will address some of the numerous issues in Africa, including instability in the Sahel, growing global food insecurity, natural disasters on the continent or democratic backsliding. In addition, the tensions between Morocco and Algeria will be centre stage as both countries are vying for the presidency. February 25 – Presidential elections in Senegal. Following multiple waves of protests, the current president, Macky Sall, announced he would not be standing for a third term. It is the first time in the country's democratic history that a sitting president will not be standing in the elections. The need to ensure jobs for the country's young population will be one of the key issues in the election campaign. February 26-29 – Mobile World Congress. Barcelona hosts the world's biggest mobile phone event, gathering the leading international tech and communications companies. This edition will be devoted to 5G technology, connectivity, the promotion of human-centred artificial intelligence or the digital transformation, among other themes. March 1 – Parliamentary elections in Iran. With an eye on the succession of the ageing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iranians will elect their representatives to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, the latter body in charge of electing the new supreme leader in the coming years. The elections will be marked by the escalation of tension in the Middle East and the deep economic and social crisis that has increased popular disaffection with the regime. March 8 – International Women's Day. Now a key date on the political and social calendar of many countries. Mass demonstrations have gained momentum in recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States and Europe. The common goal is the struggle for women's rights and gender equality throughout the world. March 10 – Parliamentary elections in Portugal. The country faces a snap election after the institutional crisis triggered by the resignation of the socialist prime minister, António Costa. The former leader was the target of a judicial investigation over alleged corruption that directly involved several members of his government team. March 15-17 – Presidential elections in Russia. While Vladimir Putin is expected to secure re-election, maintaining his grip on power until 2030, Russia will go to the polls against a backdrop of multiple domestic security challenges. The Russian withdrawal from the Ukrainian region of Kharkiv, the impact of the war in Ukraine, the failed Wagner uprising of June 2023 and the antisemitic disturbances in the North Caucus in October could force Putin to use the election calendar to embark on major a shakeup of the political and military leaderships. March 18 – 10th anniversary of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, which had invaded the region some weeks earlier, was formalised via a referendum on Crimea's political status that went ahead without international recognition. The event took place following the fall of the then Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian, in the wake of a series of protests with a clear pro-European bent. March 21-22 – Nuclear Energy Summit. The International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government will gather over 30 heads of state and government from across the world, as well as energy industry and civil society representatives. The summit seeks to promote nuclear energy in the face of the challenges posed by reducing the use of fossil fuels, enhance energy security and boost sustainable economic development. March 31 – Presidential elections in Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian constitution, presidential elections must be held on the last Sunday in March of the fifth year of the presidential term of office. However, it is uncertain whether they will go ahead given they are illegal under martial law, in effect since the start of Russia's invasion of the country in 2022. A lack of funds and the Ukrainian people's opposition to holding elections in wartime are important factors. March 31 – Local elections in Turkey. The Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition, is hoping to maintain control of the key municipalities it won in 2019. They include the capital, Ankara, Istanbul and other major cities. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's re-election and the retention of the parliamentary majority in the elections of 2023 have prompted his Justice and Development Party (AK Party) to try to make up ground at municipal level. April 7 – 30th anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The deaths of the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in a plane crash provided the trigger for a campaign of organised and systematic extermination of members of the Tutsi population at the hands of Hutu extremists that would last 100 days. On July 15th, 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front established a transitional government of national unity in Kigali that would put an end to the genocide. Between 500,000 and 1 million people are estimated to have been murdered. April-May – General elections in India. Despite growing illiberal tendencies, the "world's biggest democracy" goes to the polls in April and May. The current prime minister, Narendra Modi, is aiming for a third term against an opposition that is more united than ever under the Indian National Development Inclusive Alliance (INDIA). May 2 – Local elections in the United Kingdom. Elections will take place for local councils and mayors in England, including London and the combined authority of Greater Manchester. The elections will be seen as an indicator of the level of support both for the Labour Party and for the Conservatives ahead of general elections scheduled for January 2025. May 5 – General elections in Panama. Panamanian society will elect new representatives for the presidency, National Assembly, mayoralty and other local representatives. The elections will take place against a backdrop of marked polarisation and rising social tension, exacerbated by issues relating to domestic security, political disputes and the management of natural resources. May 19 – Presidential and legislative elections in the Dominican Republic. The current president, Luis Abinader, leader of the Modern Revolutionary Party, is seeking re-election in a vote in which most opposition parties will unite under the Opposition Alliance Rescue RD. Territorial, migration and economic tensions with neighbouring Haiti will be central issues during the election campaign.June – Presidential elections in Mauritania. The current president, Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, will seek re-election after four years of business as usual following the departure in 2019 of the former president, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who today faces multiple corruption charges. The winner of the elections will have to deal with rising social tension, as well as geopolitical tensions across the region. June 2 – General and federal elections in Mexico. Claudia Sheinbaum, the official shortlisted presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), is the clear favourite against the main opposition candidate from the Broad Front for Mexico, formed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), National Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). Voters will not only elect the president and the government, but also senators and federal deputies, as well as thousands of state and/or municipal officials in 30 of the 32 federal entities. June 6-9 – Elections to the European Parliament. Voting will take place simultaneously in the 27 countries that form the European Union. Some of the major questions are how far populist and far-right parties will advance, how much clout the traditional social democrat and conservative families will wield and the possible alliances that might form for the subsequent selection of key European posts. June 9 – Federal elections in Belgium. Coinciding with the Belgian presidency of the European Union, the country will hold federal, European and regional elections on the same day. One of the most significant issues will be how well the far-right party Vlaams Belang fares. It is aiming for a considerable increase in its support to test the resistance of the cordon sanitaire that has excluded it from power until now. June 13-15 – 50th G-7 summit in Italy. Savelletri, a small town in the Italian region of Puglia, will be the venue for a new meeting of the G7. The summit will tackle the main geopolitical challenges on the global stage and their impact on the international economy, along with other crucial issues on Italy's agenda, such as immigration and relations with Africa. June 20 – World Refugee Day. The number of forcibly displaced people hit all-time highs in 2023. There are refugees and internally displaced persons due to the impact of the war in Ukraine and the numerous conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, as well as the impacts of climate change. During that week in June, the UNHCR will release its annual report on the global trends in forced displacement. First half of 2024 – Deployment of an international mission to Haiti. Kenya will lead the deployment of a security contingent with the participation of other countries. The goal is to tackle the gang violence in Haiti that is causing a major security and governance crisis. In October 2023, following a request from the secretary general and Haitian prime minister, the United Nations Security Council authorised a multinational security support mission for a period of one year. First half of 2024 – Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Summit. India will host a new meeting of this strategic forum for the Indo-Pacific region formed by Australia, India, Japan and the United States to address common issues regarding trade, critical technologies, human rights and climate change. July – 24th Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Kazakhstan holds the yearly rotating chairmanship of the main regional forum in Central Asia for security, economic and political affairs, made up of China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The priorities of the Kazakh chairmanship focus on matters of security and regional unity, as well as economic development and regional trade. Belarus is expected to join the organisation this year. July 1 – Hungary takes over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union. Hungary will take over the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of the year, amid tension with the European Commission and Parliament over its failures to comply with EU law. July 8-18 – High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development. World leaders and representatives will meet in New York to follow up and review the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as present Voluntary National Reviews on the SDGs. The theme will be "Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: the effective delivery of sustainable, resilient and innovative solutions". July 9-11 – NATO Summit. Washington will be the venue for the NATO summit, where the presentation of a security strategy for the southern flank is expected, in response to the mandate arising out of the Vilnius summit in 2023. In addition, 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the founding of NATO. July 26-August 11 – Summer Olympic Games in Paris. France will host the Games of the XXXIII Olympiad, the world's main sporting event, which is held every four years. It affords the hosts a good opportunity to kick-start an economy that has stagnated in recent years. August – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda. The incumbent president of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, who has been in the post since 2000, is running for re-election after three successive ballots in which he has polled over 90% of the votes. September – Parliamentary elections in Austria. The burning question is whether the conservatives (ÖVP) and the greens (Die Grünen) will be able to repeat their current government coalition or whether the results of the populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the social democrats of the SPÖ will offer alternative majorities. September 22-23 – UN Summit of the Future. Based on the "Our Common Agenda" report presented by UN Secretary General António Guterres in 2021, on multilateralism and international cooperation, this high-level event aims to accelerate the fulfilment of existing international commitments and tackle emerging challenges and opportunities. The culmination of this effort will be the creation of a Pact for the Future negotiated and endorsed by the participating countries. September 24 – General Debate of the 79th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. A yearly event that brings together the world's leaders to assess the current state of their national policies and their world views. September 26-27 – 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa case. Mexico will mark the 10th anniversary of the Ayotzinapa (or Iguala) case, one of the biggest human rights scandals in the country's recent history. Still unsolved, the case involved the forced disappearance of 43 students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College, Guerrero state. October – 16th BRICS Summit. Kazan in Russia will be the venue for the summit of the new BRICS, now expanded to 11 countries, adding impetus to Moscow's efforts to demonstrate that the country is not isolated despite the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. October 1 – 75th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It is 75 years since Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China. The event marked the end of the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang that had broken out immediately after the surrender of Japan and the dissolution of the Second United Front between the two political forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War. October 6 – Municipal elections in Brazil. The elections will be a good gauge of the level of support for the Workers' Party and the parties that back President Lula, as well as of the advance, or otherwise, of Bolsonaro-linked candidates. In the cities where a second round of voting is required, it will take place on October 27. October 9 – General and regional elections in Mozambique. President Filipe Nyusi will end his second and final presidential term. According to the country's constitution, he cannot stand again. His party, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which has been in power for decades, must find another candidate. The next government will face various challenges, including political tension, an increase in jihadi terrorism and marked social exclusion. October 24 – International Day of Climate Action. The goal is to mobilise and raise awareness of the effects of climate change among society and governments across the world. It is a good moment to analyse the different agendas to fight climate change and the progress being made in the most polluting countries. October 27 – General elections in Uruguay. The Broad Front (FA), a centre-left party with strong ties to the trade unions and other social organisations, will compete for victory against the centre-right Multicolour Coalition, which is currently in power and has faced several corruption cases in recent months. November – APEC Summit. Peru will host a new meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which gathers 21 countries. The theme this year is "People. Business. Prosperity". November – COP29 Climate Change Conference. Azerbaijan will host the world's largest international summit dedicated to climate change in 2024. For the second consecutive year, it will be held in a country whose economy is dependent on fossil fuel production. November – 29th Ibero-American Summit. Ecuador will host the Ibero-American Summit of heads of state and government under the theme "Innovation, inclusion and sustainability". In parallel, the main cities of Latin America, Spain and Portugal will hold a "Meeting of Ibero-American Cities", the conclusions of which will be presented during the summit. November 4-8 – 12th World Urban Forum. Cairo will host the premier gathering on urban issues and human settlements organised by UN-Habitat. November 5 – Presidential elections in the United States. The incumbent president, Joe Biden, is seeking re-election and, with the former president, Donald Trump, still to be confirmed as the Republican presidential nominee, the campaign promises to be highly polarised. The election calendar will influence Washington's foreign policy decisions. November 5 – General elections in Georgia. The ruling coalition Georgian Dream is looking for yet another term. The war in Ukraine has split the country again between those who seek deeper integration with the West and hope to join the European Union in the future and those who advocate normalising relations with Russia. November 11 – 20th anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat. The historic Palestinian leader and president of the Palestinian National Authority died 20 years ago in Paris. He played a crucial role in the Middle East peace process, which, along with Israeli leaders Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994. November 18-19 – G-20 summit in Brazil. Under the theme "Building a just world and sustainable planet", the main topics for discussion and debate at this meeting will include energy transition and development, reform of the global governance institutions, and the fight against inequality, hunger and poverty. December – Presidential elections in Algeria. President Abdelmadjid Tebboune is expected to run for re-election. The country faces several security challenges due to the instability in the Sahel and the rising tension with Morocco over the Western Sahara. It also plays a crucial role as a supplier of gas to Europe amid the energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine. December – General elections in South Sudan. The terms of the peace agreement of 2018, which put an end to an internal armed conflict lasting five years, established the forming of a government of national unity led by the current president, Salva Kiir, and his rival, the vice president, Riek Machar. Kiir has proposed holding free presidential elections in late 2024. December 7 – Presidential elections in Ghana. The elections are expected to be a two-horse race between Mahamudu Bawumia, the current vice president of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP), and the former president, John Dramani Mahama, the candidate of the main opposition party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The country is facing its worst economic crisis of recent decades and major security challenges because of the geopolitical situation in the Sahel. Second half of 2024 – Presidential elections in Venezuela. The Chavistas and the opposition gathered under the umbrella of the Unitary Platform reached an agreement in Barbados on staging presidential elections that provides for the invitation of regional and international observers. The decision came as the United States announced the lifting of sanctions on Venezuelan gas and oil in October 2023. Pending – 53rd Pacific Islands Forum. Tonga is to host a new meeting of the main discussion forum spanning the region of Oceania, which brings together the interests of 18 states and territories on matters of climate change, the sustainable use of maritime resources, security and regional cooperation. It is a geographical space of growing interest to China and the United States, which have begun a diplomatic race to draw some of these countries and territories into their spheres of influence. Pending – 44th ASEAN Summit. Laos will host a new meeting of Southeast Asia's main regional forum, which brings together 10 countries. The theme this time is "Enhancing connectivity and resilience". Pending – AI Safety Summit. France will host the second meeting of this international summit whose goal is to foster work and initiatives to tackle the risks posed by artificial intelligence. The first event, held in London in 2023, resulted in the Bletchley Declaration, which advocated greater international cooperation to address the challenges and risks associated with artificial intelligence. Pending – 33rd Arab League Summit. Bahrein will host a fresh meeting of the main political organisation gathering the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, food and energy security issues, and the regional impacts of the war in Ukraine will be some of the main topics of discussion and debate. Pending – Presidential and parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. The social tension in the country, mired in a deep economic crisis that has led to an International Monetary Fund rescue, has increased in recent months and is expected to intensify throughout the electoral process. Pending – General elections in Chad. Chad's transitional president, Mahamat Idriss Déby, who came to power in April 2021 via a military junta following the death of his father, Idriss Déby, promised the staging of free elections in late 2024. The country is facing a serious food and security crisis. Pending – 3rd Summit for Democracy. South Korea will be the host of this US-promoted summit, which since 2021 has gathered heads of government and leaders from civil society and the private sector. Its goal is to address the challenges and opportunities facing democracies in the 21st century on matters relating to democratic governance, safeguarding human rights and fighting corruption. Pending – General and regional elections in South Africa. The African National Congress (ANC), in power since the first free and general elections in 1994, is looking to stay there, although the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, could pull off a surprise. The country faces countless challenges, particularly in matters of security thanks to soaring crime rates, a major energy crisis and high unemployment. Pending – Presidential elections in Tunisia. They will be the first elections since the power grab by the Tunisian president, Kaïs Saied, in 2021 and the return to authoritarianism of the only country that appeared to have consolidated democracy following the Arab Spring of 2010-2011. Saied has already announced he will not allow the presence of international election observers.DOI: https://doi.org/10.24241/NotesInt.2023/299/enAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution

Tese de doutoramento em Engenharia Informática, apresentada ao Departamento de Engenharia Informática da Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia da Universidade de Coimbra ; Atualmente a sociedade contemporânea tem ao seu dispor um sem numero de serviços que suportam toda a economia globalizada em que vivemos bem como o nosso modo de vida. Serviços como distribuição de energia, água, gás, redes de transportes, telecomunicações, a Internet, entre outros, são atualmente parte integrante da vida dos cidadãos e das empresas. Estes serviços estão de tal forma presentes nas nossas vidas que a sua relevância e o grau de dependência aos serviços, apenas é sentido aquando da sua indisponibilidade. Este tipo de serviço dos quais depende o nosso modo de vida, são fornecidos por infraestruturas críticas, assim referidas pois a sua falha ou quebra da qualidade do serviço prestado pode ter um grande impacto na sociedade ou economia de um País. Para além dos fenómenos da natureza e dos riscos inerentes à sua própria exploração, os riscos que estas infraestruturas correm têm vindo a aumentar ao atrair cada vez mais o interesse de grupos de hackers e terroristas, principalmente pela forte visibilidade e consequências que mesmo um pequeno ataque pode acarretar. De entre os problemas inerentes ao funcionamento das infraestruturas críticas destaca-se o fato da existência de dependências ou interdependências entre infraestruturas. Veja-se o exemplo do serviço de telecomunicações que está por natureza dependente do fornecimento de energia elétrica ou dos serviços bancários que estão dependentes de ambos. Mas não está atualmente o fornecimento de energia dependente dos serviços de telecomunicações e dos seus sistemas de informação? Destes exemplos torna-se visível que, para além da (inter)dependência que possa existir, é necessário analisar também os efeitos em cascata que podem surgir após a falha de uma infraestrutura. Com o objetivo de promover a segurança em infraestruturas críticas, vários governos, em conjunto com a comunidade científica, promovem esforços de investigação nesta área. Em particular, nas áreas da distribuição de energia e das telecomunicações. Ao nível da União Europeia, existe grande determinação para promover projetos nesta área, em particular, projetos que promovem a troca de informação entre infraestruturas, na forma de alertas de risco, prevenindo os Operadores das infraestruturas relativamente a um aumento de risco de perda ou quebra de qualidade do serviço fornecido. Esta troca permite que as infraestruturas possam aplicar atempadamente os seus planos de contingência ou recuperação, minimizando eventuais quebras de serviço e consequentemente reduzindo o indesejado efeito de falha em cascata. A motivação para o trabalho apresentado nesta tese, surgiu da identificação dos principais aspectos em aberto relativos à troca e gestão de alertas de risco entre infraestruturas críticas. Muitas das abordagens existentes relativas à segurança em infraestruturas críticas focam-se na obtenção de níveis de risco através do uso de modelos mais ou menos complexos das infraestruturas. Apesar de estes modelos permitirem uma base sólida para a monitorização do risco, não apresentam mecanismos para a sua troca, gestão e avaliação de qualidade. Este trabalho aborda o problema relacionado com a confiança, reputação e gestão de alertas de risco no seio das infraestruturas críticas. Nesse sentido é proposta a introdução de mecanismos que permitam gerir e aferir em cada instante, o grau de confiança atribuído a cada um dos alertas de risco recebidos ou calculados internamente, permitindo melhorar a sua precisão e consequentemente melhorar também a resiliência da infraestrutura critica quando confrontada com alertas de riscos imprecisos ou inconsistentes. Na tese é abordado o problema da segurança em infraestruturas críticas interdependentes e identificados os principais problemas inerentes à troca de informação de risco, em particular, a forma de efetuar a partilha de informação de uma forma segura, a gestão dessa mesma partilha e a avaliação da fiabilidade da informação envolvida na partilha. Propõe-se nesta tese, a aplicação de mecanismos de gestão baseados no paradigma de gestão por politicas para a gestão da partilha de alertas de risco entre infraestruturas críticas. Com o objetivo de melhorar a gestão da partilha e posterior interpretação dos alertas de risco, é proposta a introdução da análise de confiança e reputação na avaliação da fiabilidade da informação envolvida na partilha e na avaliação do comportamento das entidades envolvidas. As propostas apresentadas nesta tese são discutidas e aplicadas no âmbito do projeto Europeu MICIE (Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures), em particular, no que se refere à solução proposta para a gestão da partilha de alertas de risco, que em conjunto com os indicadores de confiança e reputação propostos, permitem melhorar a proteção de cada infraestrutura relativamente ao uso de informação menos confiável ou inconsistente. Apresenta-se também a adaptação dos conceitos propostos ao CI Security Model, um modelo de análise de risco em tempo real, no qual as falhas identificadas são atenuadas com a introdução da análise de confiança e reputação proposta nesta tese. Os resultados da avaliação das propostas apresentadas são discutidos com base em cenários de simulação bem como através de dados reais de uma infraestrutura crítica. Os resultados obtidos indicam que as propostas apresentadas satisfazem os objectivos definidos, nomeadamente, ao contribuir para o aumento da confiança que uma infraestrutura crítica tem relativamente à informação recebida em tempo real acerca dos serviços dos quais depende, ao permitir uma melhor gestão dessa mesma informação e também ao contribuir para o aumento da fiabilidade dos resultados provenientes dos modelos de risco em uso na infraestrutura. ; Currently, our society has at its disposal an uncountable number of services able to support the global economy and also our current way of life. Services such as power distribution, water, gas, transport networks, telecommunications, the Internet, among others, are now an integral part of the citizens' lives and businesses. These services play such a big role in our lives that their importance is only appreciated when they are unavailable. These types of services, that our lives so heavily depend on, are provided by Critical Infrastructures. They are referred to as ``Critical" due to the fact that in case of failure or breakdown in providing quality of service, the impact on society and the economy of a country can be enormous. Beyond the phenomena of nature and risks inherent to the infrastructure operation, the risks faced by these infrastructures have continuously increasing, by attracting interest from groups of hackers and terrorist groups. Primarily due to the strong visibility and consequences that may result even from a small successful attack. Among the problems inherent to the operation of Critical Infrastructures, it is possible to emphasise the existence of dependencies and interdependencies among infrastructures. For example, a telecommunications service is inherently dependent on the electricity supply or, for instance, banking services are dependent on both telecommunications and energy supply services. However, is it not the service that provides power supply actually dependent on telecommunications services and also on information systems? Based on these examples it becomes apparent that in addition to the (inter)dependence that may exist, it is also necessary to examine the cascading effects that may arise after the failure of a Critical Infrastructure. Critical Infrastructures security has been the subject of discussion by numerous governments with the support of the academia by promoting research efforts in these areas, in particular in areas such as power distribution and telecommunications. Furthermore, within the European Union, there is determination to promote projects in these areas, in particular the promotion of projects that foster the exchange of information, in the form of warnings, among infrastructures. These warnings allow the Critical Infrastructure to be informed and aware of the increasing risk of loss or reduction in quality of the service received. This exchange allows the infrastructure to timely implement their contingency and recovery plans to minimise any service breaks and consequently minimise the unwanted effect of a cascading failure. The motivation for the work presented in this thesis arose from the identification of the main open issues relating to the exchange and management of risk warnings among Critical Infrastructures. Many of the existing approaches to security in Critical Infrastructures are focused on obtaining risk levels through the use of models based on the infrastructure. Although these models allow a solid foundation for risk monitoring, they do not have mechanisms for exchange, management and assessment of its quality. This work addresses the problem related to trust, reputation and risk alerts management within Critical Infrastructures. Accordingly, it is proposed to introduce mechanisms to manage and measure at each instant, the degree of confidence assigned to each of the alerts received or computed internally. Allowing improvement of their accuracy and consequently improving the resilience of Critical Infrastructures when faced with inaccurate or inconsistent risk alerts. This thesis addresses the problem of interdependent Critical Infrastructure security and identifies the main problems related to risk information sharing. In particular, how to allow information sharing in a secure manner, the management of that sharing and how to assess the reliability of such information. This thesis proposes the application of Policy Based Management mechanisms for the management of the risk alert information shared among Critical Infrastructures. In order to improve the information sharing management and the further interpretation of the risk alerts, it is proposed to evaluate Trust and Reputation in order to assess the shared information and also to consider the behaviour of the entities involved. The proposals presented in this thesis are discussed and applied in the context of the European Project MICIE ({Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures). In particular with regard to the proposed solution for the management of shared risk alerts, which uses the Policy Based Management paradigm. By incorporating the proposed Trust and Reputation indicators it allows to improve the Critical Infrastructure protection considering the use of untrustworthy or inconsistent information. It is also proposed the adaptation of the presented concepts to the CI Security Model, a model for real time risk analysis evaluation, in which the identified shortcomings are addressed with the integration of the Trust and Reputation approach proposed in this thesis. The results of the proposals evaluation are discussed based on simulation scenarios as well as through real data of a Critical Infrastructure. The achieved results indicate that the proposed mechanisms meet the objectives such as, by contributing to the increase in confidence that a Critical Infrastructure has on the information received about the services on which it depends. To allow improvement in management of such information as well as contribution to increased reliability of results obtained from the risk models applied to the infrastructure. ; FCT - (SFRH BD/35772/2007)

Mención Internacional en el título de doctor ; El uso de biomasa como recurso energético puede reducir la dependencia actual que hay de los combustibles fósiles hacia un desarrollo más concienciado con el medio ambiente. Este hecho también puede ser empleado para tratar diferentes tipos de residuos que son generados en grandes cantidades como residuos sólidos urbanos, lodos de depuradora o residuos agrícolas, obteniendo productos útiles y reduciendo su eliminación en vertederos. Una de las rutas empleadas para este fin es la transformación termoquímica y, en particular, la gasificación. La gasificación consiste en transformar la biomasa en una mezcla de diferentes productos: gases condensables y no condensables, residuo carbonoso y cenizas a través de la oxidacion parcial de la biomasa a elevadas temperaturas. El principal producto de este proceso es la fraccion de gases no condensables que pueden ser empleados en diferentes aplicaciones: combustible para calderas y motores de gas, o como producto para la generación de hidrógeno, metano o biocombustibles a través del proceso Fischer-Tropsch. En cuanto a los reactores utilizados para llevar a cabo el proceso de gasificación, existen múltiples tecnologías: lechos fijos, lechos móviles, lechos fluidizados, etc. La alta capacidad de mezclado y de transferencia de calor y masa hacen que los lechos fluidizados sean un buena opción para la gasificación de biomasa. Sin embargo, existen tres problemas operacionales importantes que deben de ser tenidos en cuenta. El primer problema es el fenómeno de aglomeración del lecho, el cual está motivado por el alto contenido de metales alcalinos presentes en la biomasa junto con las temperaturas de reacción alcanzadas en el reactor. Estos elementos reaccionan con los compuestos de silicio de los materiales de la fase densa del lecho para formar silicatos con bajo punto de fusión que actúan como un pegamento entre las partículas o las recubren, generando aglomerados y la posible defluidización del reactor. El segundo problema es la generación de alquitranes, una fracción viscosa y pegajosa que condensa en superficies frías, pudiendo atascar y bloquear tuberías y equipos. El tercer aspecto a tener en cuenta es la generación de ceniza, lo que constituye un residuo que tiene que ser tratado o reusado adecuadamente en diferentes aplicaciones antes de su vertido final. La presente tesis doctoral estudia los tres problemas mencionados acerca de la gasificación de biomasa en un reactor de lecho fluido burbujeante. Como biomasa se ha empleado Cynara cardunculus L., un cultivo energético procedente de regiones mediterráneas y con un alto contenido en metales alcalinos, para investigar su uso potencial para la gasificación en lecho fluidizado. Este cultivo presenta alguna ventajas frente a otras plantas como la baja cantidad de agua para su cultivo o el uso de tierras no aptas para el cultivo de productos alimentarios. Otro de los aspectos importantes a tener en cuenta en la gasificación en lecho fluidizado, es la selección del material de la fase densa del lecho. En esta tesis se propone la sepiolita, un mineral arcilloso que se usa comúnmente como absorbente, como material para la fase densa del lecho, comprobando su funcionamiento en la aglomeración, la composición del gas y de los alquitranes, y la resitencia mecánica. La investigación se ha desarrollado empleando tres instalaciones experimentales: un gasificador a escala laboratorio, un gasificador en planta piloto y un lecho fluidizado frío. Se han utilizado diferentes técnicas para analizar los datos y para caracterizar los productos del proceso de gasificación. El proceso de aglomeración se ha estudiado a través del análisis de las fluctuaciones de presión obtenidas en el interior del lecho fluidizado a escala laboratorio. Para la detección del fenómeno de la aglomeración, y en consecuencia, de la defluidización del lecho se utilizan los métodos de la energía contenida en las regiones frecuenciales, la comparación de atractores, y la desviación estándar. En función de la relacin entre la densidad de las partículas de biomasa y del material de la fase densa del lecho, se encuentran dos comportamientos cláramente diferenciados: jetsam y flotsam. En el primero de ellos la biomasa se hunde en el lecho mientras que en el segundo la biomasa tiende a flotar sobre su superficie debido a la mayor densidad de la arena en este segundo caso. El análisis de la energía contenida en las regiones frecuenciales muestran que, para un comportamiento jetsam de las partículas de biomasa, se producen burbujas endógenas debido a la devolatilización de la biomasa dentro del la fase densa del lecho. Sin embargo, para partículas con un comportamiento flotsam, se forma un aglomerado con forma plana en toda la superficie del lecho que puede ser detectado por las altas frecuencias en el espectro de potencia. Los tiempos de defluidización son similares para cada método de análisis, obteniéndose tiempos mucho mayores en los ensayos realizados con sepiolita. El comportamiento de la sepiolita como material de la fase densa del lecho en términos de la composición del gas y de la reducción alquitranes se ha investigado en el lecho fluidizado a escala laboratorio, comparando los resultados con ensayos similares realizados con arena. La calidad del gas resultante de la gasificación es algo menor en el caso de la sepiolita que en el de la arena. No obstante, la generación de alquitranes disminuye significativamente con sepiolita, siendo también diferente la composición de estos para los dos materiales. El área superficieal de la sepiolita así como su morfología se han analizados por medio de las técnicas BET de área superficial y microscopía electrónica de barrido (SEM-EDS) antes y después de los ensayos. El comportamiento de las partículas de biomasa y las propiedades de la sepiolita provocan, la adsorción de los alquitranes y de las cenizas fundidas en la superficie de la sepiolita, generando un mejor comportamiento frente a los alquitranes y a la aglomeración. Admás, se ha realizado un ensayo de desgaste de larga duración en la sepiolita (100 horas), obteniendo una menor tasa de desgaste que para otros materiales usados comúnmente como la alúmina o la dolomita. Esta biomasa, Cynara cardunculus L., también ha sido ensayada en la planta piloto de gasificación con magnesita y olivino como materiales de fase densa del lecho en términos de la composición del gas y de la generación de alquitranes. El gas obtenido muestra un contenido en hidrógeno relativamente alto para ambos materiales. Se observa un efecto positivo de la temperatura en los parámetros de la gasificación y de su eficiencia. Las diferencias observadas en relación a los alquitranes son poco significativas entre la magnesita y el olivino, aunque se obtienen composiciones diferentes de alquitranes en cada caso. La fracción de benceno, tolueno, etilbenceno y xilenos (BTEX) es mayor en el caso del olivino mientras que la fracción de hidrocarburos aromático policíclicos es similar en ambos casos. Se observa un comportamiento catalítico del magnesio procedente de la magnesita y el olivino en el craqueo de los alquitranes. A 700 °C, la magnesita muestra mejores resultados mientras que el olivino lo hace a 800 °C. Finalmente, las cenizas volantes de los ensayos de gasificación en la planta piloto han sido analizadas en términos de su composición elemental y de metales, contenido en azufre y cloro, y comportamiento frente a la lixiviación. La mayoría de los finos quedan retenidos en el primer ciclón. El material de la fase densa del lecho, así como los materiales del propio reactor, también afectan a la composición de los finos. Su reutilización en la industria cementera o como fertilizante se antoja complicada como consecuencia del alto contenido en carbón, alcalinos, cloro y metales pesados, siendo su uso como combustible alternativo/secundario una buena opción por su alto contenido energético. ; The use of biomass as an energy resource can reduce the existing dependence on fossil fuels consumption, shifting towards a more aware environmental development. It can be also an opportunity to deal with huge amounts of solid residues such as municipal solid waste, sewage sludge or agricultural residues, obtaining valuable products from them and reducing their landfill disposal. One of the routes employed for this purpose is the thermochemical conversion and, in particular, gasification. In gasification process, the biomass is transformed into a mixture of products: non condensible gases, condensible gases, solid char and ashes by means of partial oxidation at high temperature. The non condensible fraction of gas is the main product that can be use in different applications: fuel in boilers and gas engines, or raw gas to produce hydrogen, methane or biofuels through the Fischer-Tropsch process. There are multiple gasification technologies to transform biomass by the thermochemical route: fixed beds, moving beds, fluidised beds, etc. The good mixing and high mass and heat transfer rates make fluidised beds a good option for biomass gasification. However, there are three main operational problems that need to be considered. The first problem is the bed agglomeration which is motivated by the high alkali content in biomass and the reaction temperatures reached in the reactor. These elements react with the silicon compounds from the bed material to form low melting point silicates that act as a "glue" between particles or coat them, leading to the agglomerates and to the possible defluidisation of the reactor. The second problem is the tar generation, a viscous and sticky fraction that condense on cold surfaces and may clog and block the pipes and downstream devices. The third aspect is the ash generation, which constitutes a residue that need to be treated or reused in different applications before its final disposal. This PhD thesis studies the above three mentioned related problems of biomass gasification in a bubbling fluidised bed (BFB) reactor. Cynara cardunculus L., an energy crop typical from Mediterranean regions and with a high alkali content, is used as biomass feedstock in order to test its potential for gasification in a fluidised bed. This energy crop has some advantages from other plants such as the low water irrigation or the use of lands not suitable for food purposes. Another main aspect to take into account in fluidised bed gasification, is the bed material selection. In this PhD thesis, sepiolite, a clay mineral that is commonly used as adsorbent, is proposed as bed material, checking its suitability for agglomeration, gas and tar composition, and mechanical resistance. This investigation has been performed in three experimental facilities: a lab- and a pilot-scale gasifiers, and a cold fluidised bed. Different techniques have been used to analyse the data and to characterize the products from the gasification process. The agglomeration process has been studied by means of the analysis of the pressure fluctuation signals acquired inside a lab-scale fluidised bed. Depending on the relation between the biomass particles density and the bed material density, two clearly different behaviours are observed: jetsam and flotsam. The biomass sinks inside the bed in the first case while, in the second one, the biomass floats on the bed surface due to the higher density of the bed material. The wide band energy, the attractor comparison tool, and the standard deviation methods are used in order to detect agglomeration and, as a consequence, the defluidisation of the bed. The wide band energy analysis shows that, for jetsam fuel particles, the endogenous bubbles produced by the fuel devolatilization inside the bed change the energy distribution, while for flotsam fuel particles, the capclinker agglomerate formed is detected by high frequencies in the power spectrum. Similar defluidisation times are obtained for all tested methods, being the defluidisation time of sepiolite experiments considerably higher than in the silica sand tests. The performance of sepiolite as bed material towards gas composition and tar mitigation has been investigated in a lab-scale fluidised bed gasifier, comparing the results with the same experiments operated with silica sand. The gas produced with sepiolite as bed material has a slightly lower quality than the gas generated with silica sand. However, the tar generation is rather reduced in the sepiolite bed and the tar composition is also different among the bed materials. Sepiolite properties such as surface area and morphology have been analysed by means of specific surface area (BET) and scanning electron microscopy (SEM-EDS) before and after the experiments. The fuel behaviour and the properties of sepiolite induce the adsorption of tars and molten ashes on the sepiolite surface, leading to a much better performance in terms of tars and agglomeration. In addition, a long attrition test of 100 hours has been conducted on the sepiolite, obtaining a smaller attrition rate than other common bed materials such as alumina or dolomite. A pilot-scale gasifier has been employed to test Cynara cardunculus L. with magnesite and olivine as bed materials in terms of gas composition and tar generation. A relatively high hydrogen content in the product gas is obtained in both cases. A positive effect of the gasification temperature is observed in the gasification parameters and efficiency. Small differences in total tar are observed between magnesite and olivine, although tar composition is very different. The benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylenes fraction (BTEX) is higher for olivine while similar polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon fraction is obtained in both bed materials. Magnesium from magnesite and olivine shows a catalytic behaviour towards tar cracking. Better gasification performance is observed with magnesite at 700 °C and with olivine at 800 °C. Finally, the fly ashes from the pilot-scale gasification experiments have been analysed in terms of elemental and metal composition, sulphur and chlorine contents, and leaching behaviour. Most of the elutriated fines are retained, by far, in the first cyclone. The bed material and the reactor materials also influence the final ash composition of the fines. The reuse of these fines is quite difficult in the cement industry or as fertilizer as a consequence of the high carbon, alkali, chlorine and heavy metals contents, being the use as alternative/secondary fuel a good option due to the high energy content in the fines. ; The author deeply appreciates the funding support by the Spanish Government (Project ENE2014-54942-R) and by European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-INFRASTRUCTURES) under BRISK Transactional Access grant (Project 284498). ; Programa Oficial de Doctorado en Ingeniería Mecánica y de Organización Industrial ; Presidente: Alberto Gómez Bárez.- Secretario: José María Sánchez Hervás.- Vocal: Filomena Pinto

Novel species of fungi described in this study include those from various countries as follows: Antartica, Cladosporium austrolitorale from coastal sea sand. Australia, Austroboletus yourkae on soil, Crepidotus innuopurpureus on dead wood, Curvularia stenotaphri from roots and leaves of Stenotaphrum secundatum and Thecaphora stajsicii from capsules of Oxalis radicosa. Belgium, Paraxerochrysium coryli (incl. Paraxerochrysium gen. nov.) from Corylus avellana. Brazil, Calvatia nordestina on soil, Didymella tabebuiicola from leaf spots on Tabebuia aurea, Fusarium subflagellisporum from hypertrophied floral and vegetative branches of Mangifera indica and Microdochium maculosum from living leaves of Digitaria insularis. Canada, Cuphophyllus bondii fromagrassland. Croatia, Mollisia inferiseptata from a rotten Laurus nobilis trunk. Cyprus, Amanita exilis oncalcareoussoil. Czech Republic, Cytospora hippophaicola from wood of symptomatic Vaccinium corymbosum. Denmark, Lasiosphaeria deviata on pieces of wood and herbaceousdebris. Dominican Republic, Calocybella goethei among grass on a lawn. France (Corsica) , Inocybe corsica onwetground. France (French Guiana) , Trechispora patawaensis on decayed branch of unknown angiosperm tree and Trechispora subregularis on decayed log of unknown angiosperm tree. [.] ; P.R. Johnston thanks J. Sullivan (Lincoln University) for the habitat image of Kowai Bush, Duckchul Park (Manaaki Whenua – Landcare Research) for the DNA sequencing, and the New Zealand Department of Conservation for permission to collect the specimens; this research was supported through the Manaaki Whenua – Landcare Research Biota Portfolio with funding from the Science and Innovation Group of the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. V. Hubka was supported by the Czech Ministry of Health (grant number NU21-05-00681), and is grateful for the support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science – grant-in-aid for JSPS research fellow (grant no. 20F20772). K. Glässnerová was supported by the Charles University Grant Agency (grant No. GAUK 140520). J. Trovão and colleagues were financed by FEDERFundo Europeu de Desenvolvimento Regional funds through the COMPETE 2020 – Operational Programme for Competitiveness and Internationalisation (POCI), and by Portuguese funds through FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia in the framework of the project POCI-01-0145-FEDER-PTDC/ EPH-PAT/3345/2014. This work was carried out at the R&D Unit Centre for Functional Ecology – Science for People and the Planet (CFE), with reference UIDB/04004/2020, financed by FCT/MCTES through national funds (PIDDAC). J. Trovão was also supported by POCH – Programa Operacional Capital Humano (co-funding by the European Social Fund and national funding by MCTES), through a 'FCT – Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia' PhD research grant (SFRH/BD/132523/2017). D. Haelewaters acknowledges support from the Research Foundation – Flanders (Junior Postdoctoral Fellowship 1206620N). M. Loizides and colleagues are grateful to Y. Cherniavsky for contributing collections AB A12-058-1 and AB A12- 058-2, and Á. Kovács and B. Kiss for their help with molecular studies of these specimens. C. Zmuda is thanked for assisting with the collection of ladybird specimens infected with Hesperomyces parexochomi. A.V. Kachalkin and colleagues were supported by the Russian Science Foundation (grant No. 19-74-10002). The study of A.M. Glushakova was carried out as part of the Scientific Project of the State Order of the Government of Russian Federation to Lomonosov Moscow State University No. 121040800174-6. S. Nanu acknowledges the Kerala State Council for Science, Technology and Environment (KSCSTE) for granting a research fellowship and is grateful to the Chief Conservator of Forests and Wildlife for giving permission to collect fungal samples. A. Bañares and colleagues thank L. Monje and A. Pueblas of the Department of Drawing and Scientific Photography at the University of Alcalá for their help in the digital preparation of the photographs, and J. Rejos, curator of the AH herbarium for his assistance with the specimens examined in the present study. The research of V. Antonín received institutional support for long-term conceptual development of research institutions provided by the Ministry of Culture (Moravian Museum, ref. MK000094862). The studies of E.F. Malysheva, V.F. Malysheva, O.V. Morozova, and S.V. Volobuev were carried out within the framework of a research project of the Komarov Botanical Institute RAS, St Petersburg, Russia (АААА-А18-118022090078-2) using equipment of its Core Facility Centre 'Cell and Molecular Technologies in Plant Science'.The study of A.V. Alexandrova was carried out as part of the Scientific Project of the State Order of the Government of Russian Federation to Lomonosov Moscow State University No. 121032300081-7. The Kits van Waveren Foundation (Rijksherbariumfonds Dr E. Kits van Waveren, Leiden, Netherlands) contributed substantially to the costs of sequencing and travelling expenses for M.E. Noordeloos. The work of B. Dima was partly supported by the ÚNKP- 20-4 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology from the source of the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund. The work of L. Nagy was supported by the 'Momentum' program of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (contract No. LP2019- 13/2019 to L.G.N.). G.A. Kochkina and colleagues acknowledge N. Demidov for the background photograph, and N. Suzina for the SEM photomicrograph. The research of C.M. Visagie and W.J. Nel was supported by the National Research Foundation grant no 118924 and SFH170610239162. C. Gil-Durán acknowledges Agencia Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo, Ministerio de Ciencia, Tecnología, Conocimiento e Innovación, Gobierno de Chile, for grant ANID – Fondecyt de Postdoctorado 2021 – N° 3210135. R. Chávez and G. Levicán thank DICYT-USACH and acknowledges the grants INACH RG_03-14 and INACH RT_31-16 from the Chilean Antarctic Institute, respectively. S. Tiwari and A. Baghela would like to acknowledge R. Avchar and K. Balasubramanian from the Agharkar Research Institute, Pune, Maharashtra for helping with the termite collection. S. Tiwari is also thankful to the University Grants Commission, Delhi (India) for a junior research fellowship (827/(CSIR-UGC NET DEC.2017)). R. Lebeuf and I. Saar thank D. and H. Spencer for collecting and photographing the holotype of C. bondii, and R. Smith for photographing the habitat. A. Voitk is thanked for helping with the colour plate and review of the manuscript, and the Foray Newfoundland and Labrador for providing the paratype material. I. Saar was supported by the Estonian Research Council (grant PRG1170) and the European Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence EcolChange). M.P.S. Câmara acknowledges the 'Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico – CNPq' for the research productivity fellowship, and financial support (Universal number 408724/2018-8). W.A.S. Vieira acknowledges the 'Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento Pessoal de Ensino Superior – CAPES' and the 'Programa Nacional de Pós-Doutorado/CAPES – PNPD/CAPES' for the postdoctoral fellowship. A.G.G. Amaral acknowledges CNPq, and A.F. Lima and I.G. Duarte acknowledge CAPES for the doctorate fellowships. F. Esteve-Raventós and colleagues were financially supported by FEDER/ Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades – Agencia Estatal de Investigación (Spain)/ Project CGL2017-86540-P. The authors would like to thank L. Hugot and N. Suberbielle (Conservatoire Botanique National de Corse, Office de l'Environnement de la Corse, Corti) for their help. The research of E. Larsson is supported by The Swedish Taxonomy Initiative, SLU Artdatabanken, Uppsala. Financial support was provided to R.J. Ferreira by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq), and to I.G. Baseia, P.S.M. Lúcio and M.P. Martín by the National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) under CNPq-Universal 2016 (409960/2016-0) and CNPq-visiting researcher (407474/2013-7). J. Cabero and colleagues wish to acknowledge A. Rodríguez for his help to describe Genea zamorana, as well as H. Hernández for sharing information about the vegetation of the type locality. S. McMullan-Fisher and colleagues acknowledge K. Syme (assistance with illustrations), J. Kellermann (translations), M. Barrett (collection, images and sequences), T. Lohmeyer (collection and images) and N. Karunajeewa (for prompt accessioning). This research was supported through funding from Australian Biological Resources Study grant (TTC217-06) to the Royal Botanic Gardens Victoria. The research of M. Spetik and co-authors was supported by project No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0 /16_017/0002334. N. Wangsawat and colleagues were partially supported by NRCT and the Royal Golden Jubilee Ph.D. programme, grant number PHD/0218/2559. They are thankful to M. Kamsook for the photograph of the Phu Khiao Wildlife Sanctuary and P. Thamvithayakorn for phylogenetic illustrations. The study by N.T. Tran and colleagues was funded by Hort Innovation (Grant TU19000). They also thank the turf growers who supported their surveys and specimen collection. N. Matočec, I. Kušan, A. Pošta, Z. Tkalčec and A. Mešić thank the Croatian Science Foundation for their financial support under the project grant HRZZ-IP-2018-01-1736 (ForFungiDNA). A. Pošta thanks the Croatian Science Foundation for their support under the grant HRZZ-2018-09-7081. A. Morte is grateful to Fundación Séneca – Agencia de Ciencia y Tecnología de la Región de Murcia (20866/ PI/18) for financial support. The research of G. Akhmetova, G.M. Kovács, B. Dima and D.G. Knapp was supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office, Hungary (NKFIH KH-130401 and K-139026), the ELTE Thematic Excellence Program 2020 supported by the National Research, Development and Innovation Office (TKP2020-IKA-05) and the Stipendium Hungaricum Programme. The support of the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Bolyai+ New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology to D.G. Knapp is highly appreciated. F.E. Guard and colleagues are grateful to the traditional owners, the Jirrbal and Warungu people, as well as L. and P. Hales, Reserve Managers, of the Yourka Bush Heritage Reserve. Their generosity, guidance, and the opportunity to explore the Bush Heritage Reserve on the Einasleigh Uplands in far north Queensland is greatly appreciated. The National Science Foundation (USA) provided funds (DBI#1828479) to the New York Botanical Garden for a scanning electron microscope used for imaging the spores. V. Papp was supported by the ÚNKP-21-5 New National Excellence Program of the Ministry for Innovation and Technology from the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund of Hungary. A.N. Miller thanks the WM Keck Center at the University of Illinois Urbana – Champaign for sequencing Lasiosphaeria deviata. J. Pawłowska acknowledges support form National Science Centre, Poland (grant Opus 13 no 2017/25/B/NZ8/00473). The research of T.S. Bulgakov was carried out as part of the State Research Task of the Subtropical Scientific Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Theme No. 0492-2021- 0007). K. Bensch (Westerdijk Fungal Biodiversity Institute, Utrecht) is thanked for correcting the spelling of various Latin epithets. ; Peer reviewed

Neural circuits in the cerebral cortex consist of excitatory pyramidal cells and inhibitory interneurons. These two main classes of cortical neurons follow largely different genetic programs, yet they assemble into highly specialized circuits during development following a very precise choreography. Previous studies have shown that signals produced by pyramidal cells influence the migration of cortical interneurons, but the molecular nature of these factors has remained elusive. Here, we identified Neuregulin 3 (Nrg3) as a chemoattractive factor expressed by developing pyramidal cells that guides the allocation of cortical interneurons in the developing cortical plate. Gain- and loss-of-function approaches reveal that Nrg3 modulates the migration of interneurons into the cortical plate in a process that is dependent on the tyrosine kinase receptor ErbB4. Perturbation of Nrg3 signaling in conditional mutants leads to abnormal lamination of cortical interneurons. Nrg3 is therefore a critical mediator in the assembly of cortical inhibitory circuits. ; uterus, and 1 m g/ m L pCAG - Gfp or Nrg3 (kindly provided by C. Lai, Indiana Uni- versity, Bloomington, and subcloned into pCAGGS) plasmids were injected into the lateral ventricle of the telencephalon through the uterine wall. Square electric pulses of 45 V and 50 ms were passed through the uterus five times, spaced 950 ms, using a square pulse electroporator. The uterine horns were placed back in the abdominal cavity, which was then suture closed, and the female was allowed to recover. Explant Cultures For COS cell confrontation assays, COS7 cells were transfected with plasmids encoding Rfp alone, Rfp and Cxcl12 , Rfp and Nrg3 , Rfp and CRD-Nrg1 ,or Rfp and Ig-Nrg1 , and cell aggregates were prepared by diluting transfected cells with Matrigel in a 1:1 proportion. After jellification, COS cell aggregates were cut with a scalpel in small rectangular prisms of approximately 400 3 400 3 800 m m and confronted to MGE explants obtained from GFP-expressing trans- genic mice in 3D Matrigel pads. The cDNA used for expression of Cxcl12 was obtained from Invitrogen (clone number: 3483088; accession number: BC006640). Nrg3 was kindly provided by Cary Lai (Indiana University, Bloo- mington). The sequences used for expression of type I NRG1 ( Ig-Nrg1 ) and type III NRG1 ( CRD-Nrg1 ) correspond to the accession numbers AY648976 and AY648975, respectively. For Cxcl12 chemokine-blocking experiments, SU6656 (Sigma; 330161-87-0) was added to the medium at a final concentra- tion of 15 m M. Previous worked has shown that Src functions downstream of Cxcr4 activation ( Cabioglu et al., 2005 ). In Vitro Focal Electroporation Coronal slice cultures were obtained as described previously ( Anderson et al., 1997 ). A pCAGG-based dsRed plasmid was pressure injected focally into the MGE of coronal slice cultures by a Pneumatic PicoPump through a glass micropipette. Slices were then electroporated within a setup of two hor- izontally oriented platinum electrodes powered by a Electro-Square-Porator, as described before ( Flames et al., 2004 ). Time-Lapse Videomicroscopy Slices were transferred to the stage of an upright Leica DMLFSA or inverted Leica DMIRE2 microscope coupled to a confocal spectral scanning head (Leica; TCS SL) and viewed through 10–60 3 water immersion or 20 3 oil objec- tives. Slices were continuously superfused with warmed (32 C) artificial cere- brospinal fluid at a rate of 1 mL/min or maintained in supplemented Neurobasal medium. To block Cxcl12 function, SU6656 (Sigma; 330161-87-0) was added to the medium at a final concentration of 15 m M. Stripe Assay Purified CXCL12 protein was obtained from PeproTech (250-20A) and used at 1 ng/ m L. GST and EGF-Nrg3-GST were purified using standard protocols and used at 10 m g/mL. Alternating lanes, 50 m m wide, were laid down on a poly- lysine-coated plastic dish. Alexa 555-labeled anti-rabbit IgGs were added to the GST, EGF-Nrg3-GST, and CXCL12 protein solution for lane identification. The lanes were further coated with laminin. MGE explants were dissected out of GFP + brain slices, plated on top of the protein stripes, and incubated in methylcellulose-containing Neurobasal medium for 48 hr. FACS We dissected the sensorimotor cortex of E17.5 embryos and P4 pups following in utero electroporation at E14.5. Cortical tissue was dissociated as described previously ( Catapano et al., 2001 ). GFP + cells were purified using fluorescent activated cell sorting (FACSARIA III; BD Biosciences), and the re- sulting pellet was kept at 80 C. TaqMan Gene Expression Assays We isolated GFP + pyramidal cells by FACS at E17.5 and P4 after in utero elec- troporation at E14.5. mRNA was then extracted using the RNeasy Micro Kit (QIAGEN) according to the manufacturer's instructions. RNA quality was as- sessed using a bioanalyzer (Agilent Technologies) and then retro-transcribed into single-stranded cDNA. The RNA was sent to Unidad Geno ́ mica (Funda- cio ́ n Parque Cientı ́fico de Madrid) for quality control and retro-transcription. Relative gene expression levels from three independent samples were analyzed using custom designed TaqMan low-density array (TLDA) plates (Micro Fluidic Cards; Applied Biosystems). Each plate contained duplicates for all the genes shown in Table S1 . Data were collected and analyzed using the threshold cycle (Ct) relative quantification method. The housekeeping gene 18 RNA was included in the array for assessing RNA quality and sample normalization. Western Blot Cortical lysates were prepared from P30 control and Nestin-Cre;Nrg3 F/F and Nex-Cre;Nrg3 F/F mutants as described before ( Fazzari et al., 2010; Vullhorst et al., 2009 ) and blotted using mouse anti- b -Actin (1:4,000; Sigma) and rabbit anti-Nrg3 (1:500; Abcam). Signals were detected with a luminescent image analyzer (LAS-1000PLUS; Fujifilm) and quantified with Quantity One 1D Anal- ysis Software (Bio-Rad Laboratories). Image Analysis and Quantification Images were acquired using fluorescence microscopes (DM5000B, CTR5000, and DMIRB from Leica, or Apotome.2 from Zeiss) coupled to digital cameras (DC500 or DFC350FX, Leica; OrcaR2, Hamamatsu), or in an inverted Leica TCS SP8 confocal microscope. All images were analyzed with ImageJ (Fiji). For the quantification of migration in MGE explants, the distance migrated by the30furthestcellswasmeasured.Forthequantificationofshort-rangechemo- attraction, the colocalizing area between MGE and COS cells was measured. For the analysis of the interneuron angle of migration, we draw a grid of virtual radial lines (lines perpendicular to the ventricular zone and the pial surface) and oriented each cell in relation to the most adjacent ''radial line.'' Cells that deviated less than 25 from radial lines were considered as radially oriented; those that deviate more than 25 were designated as tangentially oriented. We systematically exclude from this analysis those cells located in the more lateral or medial regions of the cortex, so that the curvature of the slice in those regions would not interfere with our analysis ( Martini et al., 2009 ). For the quan- tification of cell migration in MGE explants, we measured the distance migrated by the30furthest cellsand normalized theaverage migrateddistance tothedis- tancebetweenMGEandCOSexplants.Forthequantificationofthecolocalizing area between migrating interneurons and COS cells in the short-distance confrontation assays, we quantified the colocalizing area using ImageJ (Fiji). Stripes were quantified by counting thenumber of neuronscontained in a virtual grid containing five black and five red lines. The same area was used for all explants. Sections from control and mutant mice were imaged during the same imaging session. Data acquisition was performed using the same laser power, photomultiplier gain, pinhole, and detection filter settings (1,024 3 1,024 resolution; 12 bits). Quantifications were done using ImageJ (Fiji). Layers were drawn following nuclear staining. For in situ hybridization, the area quanti- fied was divided in ten equal bins, and the percentage of cells in each bin was calculated. The bins were then matched to the appropriate layers. Statistical Analyses Statistical analysis was carried out in SPSS (SPSS, Inc.). The p values below 0.05 were considered statistically significant. Data are presented as mean and SEM throughout the manuscript ( Table S3 We thank I. Andrew, S. Bae, M.A. Casillas, M. Ferna ́ndez, and T. Gil for excel-lent technical assistance and laboratory support; A. Caler for excellent support with FACS experiments; G. Expo ́sito for support with imaging; L. Lim for help with quantitative methods; V. Borrell, R. Hevner, C. Lai, V. Pachnis, C. Redies,B. Rico, J.L.R. Rubenstein, and M. Tessier-Lavigne for plasmids and anti-bodies; and A. Barco, M.A. Nieto, and K. Nave for mouse strains. We are grateful to members of the Flames, O.M., and Rico laboratories for stimulating dis- cussions and ideas. This work was supported by grants from European Research Council (ERC-2011-AdG 293683) and the Spanish Government (CSD2007-00023 and SAF2011-28845) to O.M. O.M. is a Wellcome Trust Investigator. ; Sí