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The analysis of the relationship between inequality and economic growth in distinct politi-coeconomic environments has been one of the central preoccupations of the extensive theoretical and empirical work on growth in the last decade. The authors argue that the empirical evidence available to date strongly indicates the relevance of this work for understanding the elusive causal connection between economic development and democracy. The state of the literature suggests considerable sophistication in conceptualizing the direct economic effects of inequality and contains critical insights into politically unconstrained policy-making aimed at the alleviation of their negative economic impact. However, the political feasibility of the recommended policy measures and the politically mediated effects of inequality and redistributive policy on growth and on the strength and stability of democratic regimes are understood less well. The authors discuss the critical factors influencing these effects and sketch several approaches to creating a comprehensive politicoeconomic account of the interaction between inequality, redistributive policy-making, and political regimes.

The authors present a political economy model in which policy is the outcome of an interaction between three actors: government (G), managers and workers (W), and transfer recipients (P). The government's objective is to stay in power, for which it needs the support of either P or W. It can choose slow privatization with little asset stripping and significant taxation, thus protecting the fiscal base out of which it pays pensioners relatively well (as in Poland). Or it can give away assets and tax exemptions to managers and workers, who then bankroll it and deliver the vote, but it thereby loses taxes and pays little to pensioners (as in Russia). The authors apply this model to Russia for the period 1992-96. An empirical analysis of electoral behavior in the 1996 presidential election shows that the likelihood of someone voting for Yeltsin did not depend on that person's socioeconomic group per se. Those who tended to vote for Yeltsin were richer, younger, and better educated and had more favorable expectations for the future. Entrepreneurs, who had more of these characteristics, tended to vote for Yeltsin as a result, while pensioners, who had almost none, tended to vote against Yeltsin. Unlike Poland, Russia failed to create pluralist politics in the early years of the transition, so no effective counterbalance emerged to offset managerial rent-seeking and the state was easily captured by well-organized industrial interests. The political elite were reelected because industrial interests bankrolled their campaign in return for promises that government largesse would continue to flow. Russia shows vividly how political economy affects policymaking, because of how openly and flagrantly government granted favors in return for electoral support. Bur special interests, venal bureaucrats, and the exchange of favors tend to be the rule, not the exemption, elsewhere as well.

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- Figures -- Tables -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction: global markets and transnational social movements -- Markets and market transformations -- Global markets and transnational social movements -- How transnational movements succeed: some hypotheses about market transformation -- Hypotheses about market structure -- Hypotheses about framing and norms -- Hypotheses about movement coherence -- Hypotheses about strategy -- Hypotheses about institutions -- Conclusions -- Appendix A: A brief history of AIDS and the AIDS treatment movement -- Appendix B: Key dates -- 2 Industry structure and movement opportunities -- Defining terms: market concentration and fluid rules -- Analyzing industry structure: big pharma as a hard case -- Advocacy opportunities to contest pricing and patents -- Unpacking market concentration: pharmaceutical pricing and the ARV market -- Understanding fluid rules: drug access and the TRIPS regime -- Conclusions -- 3 Drugs = life: framing access to AIDS drugs -- Framing: why is it important? -- What frames are compelling? -- What were the competing frames on access? -- The argument: access campaigns for life-saving goods are most compelling -- Goods essential for life -- Access to treatment is a human right -- The scale of the epidemic -- Personal responsibility for the disease -- The universality of the problem -- Unequal access is what matters -- Assessing these disparate explanations through surveys -- Survey 1: first access experiment -- Survey 2: pre-test of attitudes toward diseases -- Survey 3: second United States access experiment -- Survey 4: India experiment -- Survey 5: third United States access experiment -- Conclusions -- 4 Movement coherence and mobilization -- Defining movement coherence -- Mechanisms of influence -- Case studies of incoherence.

The United States' dominance in arms exports to Asia, a source of regional influence, is under threat. (Survival / SWP)

AbstractWhy were AIDS activists successful in putting universal access to treatment on the international agenda when so many other global campaigns have either failed or struggled to have much impact? We focus on: (1) permissive material conditions; (2) convergence on a policy prescription; (3) attributes of the activists; and (4) the broad political support for their cause. In our view, the market for antiretroviral (ARV) drugs was politically constructed; activists had to bring the demand and supply sides of the market together through a variety of tactics and strategies. The idea that motivated the activists was that ARVs should ideally be 'merit goods', goods that are available to everyone regardless of income. But, when ARVs first came on the market, poor people in the developing world lacked the resources to buy them. Activists successfully lobbied donor nations to use foreign aid to buy ARVs, and they pressured pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices, while encouraging generic firms to enter the market. However, even where a policy enjoys favorable material conditions – i.e. low costs, large benefits, demonstrated feasibility – this may not be enough. A clear prescription, credible messengers and resonant arguments may be necessary for an issue to receive adequate political support.Policy Implications

Global activists are playing an increasingly important role in world politics, but global activism influences policy outcomes only under certain conditions.
Global activists can only succeed when they couple compelling moral arguments with permissive material conditions.
Global activists need to build broad coalitions in order to be politically successful.
Despite the success of the access to treatment regime, questions remain about its sustainability in light of the great recession that began in 2008, donor fatigue regarding AIDS and the emergence of other policy priorities in the foreign aid community.

Is it possible to generate more efficient outcomes with respect to public procurement in general and defense acquisition in particular? Or are cost overruns inevitable when it comes to major engineering projects, like the development of modern weaponry? In this article, we draw on a unique data set of nearly 50 French armaments contracts in order to examine how one government has reformed its defense acquisition process over the past twenty years. Beginning in the early 1990s, France embarked on a series of policy reforms that enabled the state to contain skyrocketing weapons costs. We emphasize three, inter-related aspects of the defense acquisition environment in France that favored cost containment: first, hard budget constraints; second, the great technical capacity that the French government brought to bear on the weapons acquisition process, coupled with its iterative relationship with a small number of suppliers; and third, the use of contracting techniques that empowered project managers.