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We study the impact of debt maturity management in an economy where monetary policy is 'passive' and subservient to fiscal policy. We setup a tractable model, to characterize analytically the dynamics of inflation, as well as other macroeconomic variables, showing their dependence on the monetary policy rule and on the maturity of debt. Debt maturity becomes a key variable when the monetary authority reacts to inflation and the appropriate maturity of debt can restore the efficacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation. This requires debt management to focus on issuing long bonds. Moreover, we propose a novel framework of Ramsey optimal coordinated debt and monetary policies, to derive analytically the interest rate rule followed by the monetary authority as a function of debt maturity. The optimal policy model leads to the same prescription, long term debt financing enables to stabilize inflation. Lastly, the relevance of debt maturity in reducing inflation variability is also confirmed in a medium scale DSGE model estimated with US data.

We study the impact of debt maturity management in an economy where monetary policy is 'passive' and subservient to fiscal policy. We setup a tractable model, to characterize analytically the dynamics of inflation, as well as other macroeconomic variables, showing their dependence on the monetary policy rule and on the maturity of debt. Debt maturity becomes a key variable when the monetary authority reacts to inflation and the appropriate maturity of debt can restore the efficacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation. This requires debt management to focus on issuing long bonds. Moreover, we propose a novel framework of Ramsey optimal coordinated debt and monetary policies, to derive analytically the interest rate rule followed by the monetary authority as a function of debt maturity. The optimal policy model leads to the same prescription, long term debt financing enables to stabilize inflation. Lastly, the relevance of debt maturity in reducing inflation variability is also confirmed in a medium scale DSGE model estimated with US data.

The State contract is one of the most important tools for public management. The formation, execution and liquidation of State contracts are also a potential cause of State patrimonial damages. Perhaps for this reason, many State contractors are prosecuted as if they were public spending managers. The question, however, is not as simple. The fiscal liability process has a qualified recipient: the fiscal manager. In this article, through a conceptual exposition and a case study, we identify the criterion for determining in which cases a State contractor acquires the function of controlling public funds and when he/she can be subjected to a fiscal liability. ; El contrato estatal es una de las más importantes herramientas para la gestión fiscal. La celebración, ejecución y liquidación de contratos estatales también es una fuente potencial de daños patrimoniales al Estado. Quizá por eso, muchos contratistas del Estado son llamados a responder fiscalmente como si fueran auténticos ordenadores del gasto público. La cuestión, sin embargo, no es así de sencilla. El proceso de responsabilidad fiscal tiene un destinatario cualificado: el gestor fiscal. En este artículo, mediante una exposición conceptual y un estudio de caso, se identifican los criterios para determinar en qué eventos un contratista del Estado queda investido de la función de administrar fondos públicos y cuándo puede verse sometido a un proceso de responsabilidad fiscal.

We study the impact of debt maturity management in an economy where monetary policy is 'passive' and subservient to fiscal policy. We setup a tractable model, to characterize analytically the dynamics of in ation, as well as other macroeconomic variables, showing their dependence on the monetary policy rule and on the maturity of debt. Debt maturity becomes a key variable when the monetary authority reacts to in ation and the appropriate maturity of debt can restore the efficacy of monetary policy in controlling in ation. This requires debt management to focus on issuing long bonds. Moreover, we propose a novel framework of Ramsey optimal coordinated debt and monetary policies, to derive analytically the interest rate rule followed by the monetary authority as a function of debt maturity. The optimal policy model leads to the same prescription, long term debt financing enables to stabilize in ation. Lastly, the relevance of debt maturity in reducing in ation variability is also confirmed in a medium scale DSGE model estimated with US data.

Title varies: Forms management program. ; Description based on: 1984; title from cover. ; Mode of access: Internet.

The main purpose of this article is to analyze the results of fiscal policy management in Brazil during the period between 1994 and 1999. The central idea of the text is that there was no significant change in the fiscal management during the period, even considering the fiscal adjustment program under the IMF arrangement. The policy's emphasis has been the short run approach, based on the raising of the fiscal revenues as a way to avoid primary deficits deterioration. In contrast, the structural reforms necessary to support the fiscal adjustment have been continuously postponed. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

Can the "illusionary" fiscal results of the public accounts of the Brazilian federal government, impacted by the employment of fiscal maneuvers and creative accounting, be attributed to accountancy applied to the public sector? Based on bibliographical and documental research and employing exploratory techniques and content analysis regarding the accountability of the Brazilian federal government from 2000 to 2014, this study aims to demonstrate the limits of public accountability regarding the manipulation of fiscal results. The results show that the distortions in the primary result are not dependent on existing accountancy tools, as they stem from the discretionary initiative of Brazilian public managers, stimulated by internal and external incentives regarding the practice of these manipulations of results. This is done by using a form of unorthodoxy that is not included in the instrumentality of accounting as a science. It is the responsibility of the managerial agent.

Assuming the role of debt management is to provide hedging against fiscal shocks we consider three questions: i) what indicators can be used to assess the performance of debt management? ii) how well have historical debt management policies performed? and iii) how is that performance affected by variations in debt issuance? We consider these questions using OECD data on the market value of government debt between 1970 and 2000. Motivated by both the optimal taxation literature and broad considerations of debt stability we propose a range of performance indicators for debt management. We evaluate these using Monte Carlo analysis and find that those based on the relative persistence of debt perform best. Calculating these measures for OECD data provides only limited evidence that debt management has helped insulate policy against unexpected fiscal shocks. We also find that the degree of fiscal insurance achieved is not well connected to cross country variations in debt issuance patterns. Given the limited volatility observed in the yield curve the relatively small dispersion of debt management practices across countries makes little difference to the realised degree of fiscal insurance.

The growing recognition of the importance of strengthening the civic society to perform its designated role hasbeen an important factor in shaping the debate on fiscal transparency. The series of financial crises experiencedduring the last decades have raised two issues about public policy making, and the need to reduce high vulnerability.Public policy making, in general, and the national fiscal system, in particular has become a unit of analysis.Transparency enables all stakeholders in a country to see the structure and functions of the government, itspolicy intentions and fiscal projections, and accounts for past periods. The main purpose of opening these windowsis to render those inside accountable and answerable for their decisions and actions. Accountability is the obligationto render an account for the responsibility conferred.Fiscal transparency, reflecting a system of well organized windows on public policy making and policy implementation,is not an end in itself, but is a means contributing to effective and comprehensive accountability that aimsat securing full answerability from governments and their officials. Greater fiscal transparency is seen as a means ofimproving economic governance arrangements in ways, which, by promoting fiscal stability, will in turn improve thefunctioning of the government sector and facilitate improvements in the economic environment for the privatesector.Accountability imposes discipline on national authorities by ensuring that the authorities are answerable to thegeneral public and market participants for their decisions. Accountability thereby lessens the likelihood that nationalauthorities will make imprudent policy decisions. More particularly, transparency and accountability shouldresult in better–informed public debate about the design and objectives of fiscal and monetary policies and therebystrengthen the credibility and public understanding of macroeconomic policies and choices, as well as the quality ofdecisions taken. To facilitate the efficient allocation of ...

Improved fiscal management is a frequent justification for promoting boundary consolidations. However, whether or not this is actually the case is rarely placed under rigorous empirical scrutiny. Hence, this article investigates if fiscal outcomes are improved when municipalities are merged. The basic argument is that the conceptualisation of fiscal management in political science is often too narrow as it focuses on the budget and pays hardly any attention to balances in the final accounts and debts – elements of management which are central to policy making. On this background, the causal relationship between municipal mergers and fiscal outcomes is analysed. Measured on the balance between revenues and expenses, liquid assets and debts, municipal mergers improve the fiscal outcomes of the municipalities in a five‐year perspective, although the pre‐reform effects tend to be negative. For liquidity and debt, however, the improvement only entails re‐establishing the levels prior to the reform. The testing ground is the recent mergers of Danish municipalities, which, it is argued, constitute a quasi‐experiment. This forms the basis of a Difference‐in‐Difference design, allowing the alleviation of endogeneity problems and enabling causal inference. The analysis is based on administrative data from the Danish municipalities in the period 2003–11.

"Public Budgeting in African Nations aims to provide usable budgeting and fiscal policy management information to development practitioners interested in improving the performance of governments in the context of good governance. It shares regional and cross-cultural experiences with international audiences and gives reflective attention to comparative budgeting and fiscal policy management. With a promising economic and fiscal forecast, such information is timely for international development practitioners and for scholars and researchers interested in advancing development management. This book adopts an interdisciplinary/pragmatic approach to analyze and present research findings on public budgeting as a sustainable development tool. The central argument is that development practice will benefit from a bottom-up, decentralized approach to budgeting and fiscal policy management, involving national, sub-national, and civil society institutions. From this perspective, a balanced budget should draw from and reflect values and priorities across the full spectrum of social and political life."--Publisher's description