Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe Lisbon Treaty has fundamentally revised the external relations of the EU in pursuit of more visibility, coherence and consistency. The EU is, for instance, given a single legal personality, the pillar structure is (formally) abolished, new functions are created to reinforce its external representation and external policies appear to be streamlined. But is there more to it than meets the eye? A critical legal assessment is given of the major Treaty modifications relating to the EU external relations whilst addressing two underlying issues. First it is questioned whether the Member States have really given up their traditional reluctance to share fully the international scene with the EU. It is argued that the Lisbon Treaty in fact means to redress the balance in favour of intergovernmentalism under CFSP. A second crucial and related issue links to the silent dialogue with the CJEU to be discerned in the Lisbon Treaty. It wavers between the codification of important case law, such as Kadi, and attempts at containing or even reversing case law which was more prejudicial to the Member States' interests, such as the Ecowas judgment. In so doing the Lisbon Treaty again raises interesting yet complex legal questions which will most likely necessitate further clarification through case law.

Chapter 1. Intoroduction /Lorenzmaier) -- Part A: Evolution and Current Challenges of the External Action of the Union: From Shared Competences to Shared Values -- Chapter 2. New Challenges for The Union's Treaty Making Powers and Common Values in Implementing Its Agreements (Müller-Graff) -- Chapter 3. From ERTA to Singapore - and Beyond (Vedder) -- Chapter 4. Exclusive and Shared Competences after the Singapore Opinion of the European Court of Justice - 2/15 Revisited (Lorenzmaier) -- Chapter 5. Mixed Agreements after ECJ-Opinion 2/15 on the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (Kumin) -- Chapter 6. The EU-Swiss Sectoral Approach Under Pressure – Not Least Because of Brexit (Tobler) -- Chapter 7. The Ratification Saga of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement: Some Lessons for the Practice of Mixed Agreements (van Elsuwege) -- Part B: EU Cooperation with its Eastern Neighborhood and Eurasia: Shared Values v. Closer/Remote Integration -- Chapter 8. Challenges of EU-Ukraine AA's Effective Implementation into the legal order of Ukraine (Petrov) -- Chapter 9. Impact of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement on the Legal Order of Georgia (Gabrichidze) -- Chapter 10. Principles and Values of Fair Competition in the EU and its Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (Smyrnova) -- Chapter 11. The EU-Kazakhstan Enhanced Partnership: An Overview and Evaluation (Kembayev) -- Chapter 12. - EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement: A New Instrument of Promoting EU's Values and General Principles of EU Law (Khvorostiankina) -- Chapter 13. Pork, Peace and Principles: The Relations between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (Dragneva) -- Chapter 14. The EU and Russia: Old Legal Grounds for New "Selected Engagement" Relations (Kalinichenko) -- Chapter 15. The EU and Belarus. Current and Future Contractual Relations (Karliuk) -- Chapter 16. Conclusion (Lorenzmaier/Petrov).

In the final days of 2020, the European Union and the United Kingdom concluded a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) covering a broad range of policy areas, including cooperation of law enforcement authorities and social security systems. The EU-UK TCA is unique as concerns the circumstances of its negotiation and adoption, as well as its substance. However, contrary to the argument of the EU institutions, the agreement will have broad implications for the understanding of the EU's external competence and Member States' ability to act in areas that are national competence and rely on national budgets. We are critical of the legitimacy of the TCA's conclusion process, consider that the lack of a deep constitutional analysis of the consequences of EU-only conclusion of the TCA, and of the TCA itself, are problematic, and believe that the choices made are likely to create difficulties for the implementation and enforcement of the agreement. ; Peer reviewed

Personality and powers of the EU -- International representation of the EU -- Treaty-making procedures -- Mixed agreements -- The EU in international organizations -- EU sanctions and countermeasures -- Common commercial policy -- Cooperation policies and humanitarian aid -- Enlargement and neighbourhood policy -- External environmental policy -- Common foreign and security policy -- The status of international law in the EU -- International agreements of the member states

In this second edition, new case law and legislative developments are critically discussed and previous material updated to reflect new international agreements. Combining key primary legal materials relating to foreign relations powers of the EU with editorial commentary, this book is an ideal resource for students, scholars, and practitioners

AbstractIn the European Union, private international law has almost exclusively been developed through the adoption of internal acts (particularly EU Regulations) in the pursuit of internal goals (principally, enhancing the efficient functioning of the internal market, and more recently and broadly the construction of an area of freedom, security and justice). This focus has and must come under challenge in light of two developments. The first is the apparent establishment of EU exclusive external competence in the field of private international law, creating the opportunity for external action by the EU. The second is the increased recognition that internal action by the EU has external effects, which should be viewed not merely as incidental but also as potentially instruments of external policy. In conjunction, these developments demand consideration of what role private international law could and should play as part of EU external relations. This article critically examines a range of possible techniques which might be adopted in relation to this new external dimension of EU private international law. These methods are not necessarily unique to private international law or the EU, and thus this article also provides a case study of the range of legal techniques which can be used by international actors to project policies externally.

The duty of loyalty, or loyal cooperation, (Art. 4(3) TEE, ex Art. 10 EC) governs the interactions between the Union and national legal orders and is linked to fundamental principles, such as effectiveness, primacy and respect of the Member States' autonomy. In the field of EU external relations, the duty of loyalty may express different facets of the Union interest. As an expression of the obligation to effectively implement common rules, the duty of loyalty permits to understand how a mixed agreement in its entirety has to be considered as a source of European Union law. Besides, the duty of loyalty implies the need to ensure the effectiveness of EU law obligations in the exercise of the Member States' retained competence. It results from the recent case law of the Court of Justice that Member States have the obligation to eliminate not only established, but also hypothetical incompatibilities between common rules and their prior international commitments (Art. 351(2) TFEU, ex Art. 307(2)EC). Furthermore, the duty of loyalty implies an obligation for the Member States to facilitate the exercise of the Union competence. It is the basis of their obligation to refrain from adopting a unilateral position and, in some cases, to act in the interest of the Union. Finally, the duty of loyalty, through the duty of close cooperation, contributes to the fulfillment of the requirement of unity of the external representation of the European Union and its Member States.

In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as 'association councils' or 'joint committees'. These institutions bring together European Union and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we hypothesise that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in these institutions. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 such joint bodies set up by the European Union since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations except for the agency loss thesis. Our findings suggest that the European Commission is the primary actor in the implementation of many of the European Union's international agreements, allowing it to influence EU external relations beyond what is currently acknowledged in the literature.

Many international agreements of the European Union establish what we call joint bodies (JBs). Examples of such bodies include joint committees, joint sub-committees, and association and cooperation councils. Over the years, the EU has built an impressive global web of JBs, which bring together EU and third-country executive officials and play a key role in governing EU external relations. But not all of them are created equal, with some considerably stronger than others. What explains this variation in 'JB strength'? We formulate a cost–benefit argument, where stronger JBs generate greater costs and are primarily included in agreements promising greater benefits. Benefits, in turn, are greater if implementation helps the EU attain its goals, parties are interdependent, and agreements have a broad scope. Drawing on an original dataset of 547 agreements concluded since 1992, we find support for the argument that the EU strategically establishes joint bodies 'where they matter most'.